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Abstract 
This study is concerned with the nature of computer misuse and the legal and extra-
legal responses to it. It explores what is meant by the term ‘computer misuse’ and 
charts its emergence as a problem as well as its expansion in parallel with the continued 
progression in computing power, networking, reach and accessibility. In doing so, it 
surveys the attempts of the domestic criminal law to deal with some early 
manifestations of computer misuse and the consequent legislative passage of the 
Computer Misuse Act 1990.  Having outlined the new criminal offences introduced by 
the 1990 Act, the study examines the extent to which the 1990 Act has been effective in 
controlling computer misuse, taking  both prosecution rates and issues of judicial 
interpretation into account. It further examines the amendments made to the 1990 Act 
by the Police and Justice Act 2006 and their potential ramifications when they come 
into force. Having considered the position at domestic criminal law, the study turns to 
assess whether the solution to the effective regulation of computer misuse requires 
more than just the domestic criminal law. It explores the characteristics and purpose of 
the criminal law in the context of computer misuse and examines whether the domestic 
criminal law has limitations.  
The study then introduces theories of risk from realist, cultural and symbolic, ‘risk 
society’ and governmentality perspectives before considering the idea of a governance 
network as a means of responding to risk. It examines computer misuse and the role of 
the domestic criminal law in the light of these theories. Having established the 
theoretical governance framework, the study then explores the role of the law in 
general within this framework, examining potential new nodes of governance from the 
European Union, Council of Europe, Commonwealth, United Nations and Group of 
Eight. It considers whether there might be advantages in moving beyond the domestic 
criminal law in the response to computer misuse. The study then broadens the 
discussion of potential means of governance beyond the law to encompass extra-legal 
initiatives. It establishes a typology of these extra-legal initiatives and examines the 
contribution made by each to the governance of computer misuse.  
Finally, this study concludes with an examination of the complex governance network 
built up throughout the work and considers whether the regulation of computer misuse 
is only viable in a global networked society by a networked response combining nodes 
of both legal and extra-legal governance. 
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Introduction 
 
I do not fear computers. I fear the lack of them. 
Isaac Asimov (1920 – 1992) 
 
In 1990, Tim Berners-Lee, working with Robert Cailliau at CERN, proposed a 
‘hypertext’ system which provided one of the building blocks of the Internet as we 
understand it today; Microsoft released Windows 3.0 and the first commercial Internet 
dialup access provider, ‘The World’, came online. By comparison, as of July 2008, it is 
estimated that in excess of 1.4 billion people are online throughout the world.1 Over the 
last twenty years, computers have become an increasingly unremarkable part of 
contemporary Western society. Computer technology is no longer just concerned with 
specialist scientific, engineering or military applications. It pervades many aspects of 
everyday life and underpins both state and commercial enterprises as well as the routine 
activities of many individuals.  
Although computers have been used for unauthorised or illegitimate purposes since the 
earliest days of their existence, the proliferation of networked technology which 
transcends traditional state boundaries is generating, in turn, a greatly expanding realm 
of potential computer misuse and its victims. It follows that, as everyday life and 
computer technology converge, the misuse of that technology has the capacity greatly 
to disrupt many facets of global society. As such, computer misuse is both a prevalent 
and contemporary issue and it is the purpose of this study to explore the range of 
possible legal and extra-legal responses by which computer misuse might be regulated. 
This chapter seeks to set the overall framework for the study. It will describe the 
central thesis which will be examined and provide an overview of the structure of the 
main body of the work in the context of the research questions to be answered. It will 
explain the methodology used before concluding with a discussion of the concept and 
definition of computer misuse which will be used throughout the study. 
                                                        
1 <http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats.html> accessed 25 September 2008. 
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1.1 Central thesis and contribution to knowledge 
The central thesis which is explored by this study is that:  
There are a number of incompatibilities between the nature of computer misuse and 
the nature of the criminal law. This means that computer misuse cannot be regulated 
effectively by the criminal law alone. Such regulation requires a reflexive and cohesive 
approach which is only viable in a global networked society by a networked response 
combining nodes of both legal and extra-legal governance. 
The study breaks down into three discrete but inter-related parts. The first part deals 
explores whether computer misuse has presented problems for the law. This requires an 
examination of the nature and purpose of both computer misuse and the domestic 
criminal law. The second part considers the application of a multi-tiered governance 
approach as a response to the types of risk posed by computer misuse. In doing so, it 
expands upon the discussion in the first part to encompass the use of the law in general 
and extra-legal governance mechanisms. The final part concludes with an examination 
of the central thesis. 
Although a body of literature exists that examines the legal regulation of technology 
(which will be referred to throughout this study), much of that literature is based upon 
only a relatively limited appreciation of the technology and its capacity for 
manipulation to facilitate criminal behaviour. This research is firmly based upon a 
knowledge of the capabilities of the technology to ensure that it has an accurate and 
current technological foundation. This research also differs from existing studies in its 
ambition to situate this technical knowledge within a discursive enquiry into the ability 
of risk and governance theory to formulate a framework within which computer misuse 
might be regulated. Moreover, the existing literature on computer misuse tends only to 
focus on aspects of the problem, such as the technological, social or legal facets. This 
research provides a treatment of the range of interrelated issues in one study including a 
discussion of extra-legal governance. The fieldwork element of the research adds a 
further layer of originality in surveying a range of qualitative views on the major issues 
arising in relation to the governance of computer misuse. In essence, the originality of 
this research stems from its approach to the scrutiny of the complex interplay between 
technology, law, society, risk, governance and human nature. 
1.2 Principal research questions and chapter structure 
Within the confines of the stated thesis, this study seeks to answer six principal 
research questions in the forthcoming chapters. 
What is computer misuse and did it present a problem for the domestic law? If so, how 
did the law respond? Chapter 2 considers both the evolution of computer technology 
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and computer use and misuse up until the enactment of the Computer Misuse Act 
1990. It explores whether there were any shortcomings in the application of domestic 
law to computer misuse before charting the legislative history, genesis and purpose of 
the 1990 Act in more detail. 
Was the Computer Misuse Act 1990 an effective response to computer misuse and has 
it stood the test of time? Chapter 3 continues the coverage of the two parallel 
evolutionary strands begun in Chapter 2 from 1990 to the present. It discusses the 
continued progression in computing power, reach and accessibility and the consequent 
expansion of manifestations of computer misuse. Following on from Chapter 2, it will 
examine whether or not the 1990 Act has been effective in controlling the problems 
inherent in computer misuse considering both prosecution rates and judicial 
interpretation. It will also discuss any proposed updates and amendments to the 1990 
Act, with particular focus on the Police and Justice Act 2006 and its possible 
ramifications. 
Does the effective regulation of computer misuse require more than just a response in 
domestic criminal law? Having considered the evolution of computing, computer 
misuse and the Computer Misuse Act 1990 in Chapters 2 and 3, Chapter 4 reflects upon 
the question of whether the solution to the effective regulation of computer misuse 
requires more than just the domestic criminal law. It considers the characteristics and 
purpose of the criminal law from a range of theoretical perspectives and its application 
to the problem of computer misuse in particular. This facilitates an examination of 
whether the domestic criminal law has limitations and, if so, whether those limitations 
arise from the nature of computer misuse or the nature of the criminal law itself. 
How do theories of risk and governance apply to computer misuse and the domestic 
criminal law? Chapter 5 introduces the theoretical framework upon which the second 
part of the study is based. It explores theories relating to risk from realist, cultural and 
symbolic, ‘risk society’ and governmentality perspectives before considering the idea of 
a governance network as a means of responding to risk. It concludes with an 
examination of computer misuse and the role of the domestic criminal law in the light 
of these theories. 
What is the role of the law in the governance of computer misuse? Chapter 6 builds 
upon the discussion from Chapter 5 by evaluating the role of the law in general within 
the governance framework. It broadens the analysis beyond the domestic criminal law 
to introduce new nodes of governance at the European Union, Council of Europe, 
Commonwealth, United Nations and G8 levels in order to explore whether there may 
be advantages in moving beyond the domestic criminal law in the response to computer 
misuse. 
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Can extra-legal approaches provide an effective response to computer misuse? Chapter 
7 widens the discussion of the role of the law in relation to computer misuse covered in 
Chapter 6 to include potential extra-legal responses. It will establish a typology of 
extra-legal governance initiatives and will examine the contribution made by each of 
these to the regulation of computer misuse.  
Chapter 8 summarises the findings of the preceding chapters by way of conclusion and 
provides a final critical examination of the central thesis. It also offers some 
commentary as to possible limitations of this study and avenues for future research. 
1.3 Methodology 
The main narrative of this study draws upon a range of different sources and is founded 
on documentary research supported by findings from fieldwork.  
1.3.1 Documentary research 
The documentary research was concerned with the selection of available literature on 
the main themes examined within this study; that is, computer misuse, the criminal law, 
risk, governance and regulation.2 The bibliographic framework explored comprised 
books, journal articles, ‘grey’ literature (such as conference proceedings and 
newspapers),3 official publications4 and statistics. Since this study does not embark on a 
comparative analysis, the primary and secondary legal sources used are essentially those 
pertaining to England and Wales. The findings of the literature survey have been 
embedded throughout the main body of the study rather than being summarised in a 
separate literature review chapter. This integrated approach facilitates a reflective 
discussion on the literature in context. 
1.3.2 Fieldwork approach 
The fieldwork was designed to provide an insight into the views of experts on the 
efficacy of various forms of regulation and their practices and attitudes towards the 
issue of computer misuse. As such, it was decided that the research should take the 
form of qualitative interviews (rather than any form of quantitative approach) for two 
principal reasons. First, the knowledge, views, understandings, interpretations and 
experiences of the participants were considered to be meaningful properties of the 
social responses to computer misuse which this research was designed to explore. This 
                                                        
2 Hart, C, Doing a Literature Search (Sage, London, 2004). 
3 Auger, C, Information Sources in Grey Literature (4th edn, Bowker-Saur, London, 
1998). 
4 Butcher, D, Official Publications in Britain (Bingley, London, 1991). 
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required an interview methodology which was reflexive, open, flexible and which gave 
primacy to the participant.5 Second, it was considered that interaction with the 
participants by way of conversation was a valid means to gather data on these 
ontological properties.6 This was a pragmatic decision in that there was no feasible 
alternative to talking and listening to the participants to ascertain the research data 
sought. Qualitative interviewing is based in conversation7 and emphasises researchers 
asking questions, listening and reflecting and respondents answering.8 Qualitative 
interviews have been referred to as ‘guided conversations’,9 ‘conversations with a 
purpose’10 or ‘talking questionnaires’.11 They are characterised by a relatively informal 
style, a thematic approach and the assumption that the data will be generated via the 
interaction.12  
1.3.3 Form of interview 
Having decided that qualitative interviewing was an appropriate and valid research 
method, it was next necessary to consider the form that these interviews should take. 
Denzin defines three types of interview: the schedule standardised interview, the non-
schedule standardised interview and the non-standardised interview.13 The primary 
purpose of the interviews was to elicit the views of a cross-section of knowledgeable 
individuals who are directly involved in some way with one or more facets of computer 
misuse. Since much of the potential value in the qualitative research data derives from 
the expert viewpoints of the participants, the fieldwork could be considered to be a 
form of ‘elite’ study; that is, one in which the participants are more powerful members 
                                                        
5 Sarantakos, S, Social Research (3rd edn Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2005) 270. 
6 Mason, J, Qualitative Researching (Sage, London, 1996) 39-40. 
7 Kvale, S, InterViews: An Introduction to Qualitative Research Interviewing (Sage, 
London, 1996). 
8 Rubin, H and Rubin, I, Qualitative Interviewing: The Art of Hearing Data (2nd edn 
Sage, London, 2005). 
9 Lofland, J and Lofland, L, Analyzing Social Settings (Wadsworth, Belmont, 1994). 
10 Burgess, R, In the Field: An Introduction to Field Research (Allen and Unwin, 
London, 1984) 102. 
11 Sarantakos, S, Social Research (3rd edn Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2005) 268. 
12 Mason, J, Qualitative Researching (Sage, London, 1996) 38. 
13 Denzin, N, The Research Act: A Theoretical Introduction to Sociological Methods 
(2nd edn McGraw-Hill, Columbus, 1978), Chapter 6. 
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of society such as senior police officers, industry figures or policy makers.14  It is 
recognised that the semi-structured interview is a suitable methodology in such an elite 
study.15  
Semi-structured interviews are appropriate where depth of study is of foremost concern 
and in situations exploring the ways in which complex phenomena have developed over 
time.16 This was suitable for this study since it is primarily concerned with responses to 
complex technological evolution and its potential for misuse. Such interviews recognise 
the special nature of each interviewee’s contribution and consist of a list of information 
required from each participant but allowing variation in the phrasing and order of 
questions.17  
1.3.4 Interview guide 
An interview guide is provided in Appendix A. 
The broad structure of the interview was designed to cover three main topic areas. 
After eliciting some basic biographic information, the interview moved to consider 
computer misuse in general, followed by legal and extra-legal responses. These broad 
headings were chosen to support the evaluation of the central thesis in terms of the 
nature of computer misuse and its associated risks and the role of the law and extra-
legal mechanisms in response to those risks. They were also chosen to reflect the 
thematic approach inherent in semi-structured interviewing, based on a reflexive 
examination of the documentary research performed which identified potential areas 
for informed comment.18 This process of thematising and designing represent the first 
two stages of Kvale’s systematised approach to qualitative interviewing, the others being 
interviewing, transcribing, analysing, verifying and reporting.19 
                                                        
14 Moyser, G and Wagstaffe, M (eds), Research Methods for Elite Studies (Allen and 
Unwin, London, 1987). 
15 Odendahl, T and Shaw, A, ‘Interviewing Elites’ in Gubrium, J and Holstein, J (eds), 
Handbook of Interview Research: Context and Method (Sage, London, 2001) 299, 310. 
16 Crow, I and Semmens, N, Researching Criminology (Open University Press, 
Maidenhead, 2008) 119. 
17 Ibid, 118. 
18 Fielding, N and Thomas, H, ‘Qualitative interviewing’ in Gilbert, N (ed), Researching 
Social Life (2nd edn, Sage, London, 2001) 132. 
19 Kvale, S, InterViews: An Introduction to Qualitative Research Interviewing (Sage, 
London, 1996) 88. 
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Each of these broad headings contained a number of possible smaller research 
questions.20 Although the major questions were asked consistently between 
interviewees, the order may have been changed and new questions asked in order to 
probe for more information where necessary and relevant. The characteristics of the 
individuals determined to some extent the questions that were asked. This flexibility 
ensured that questions were relevant to both the research and the participants. The 
readiness to change, to correct and to adjust as required by the research enabled an 
open discussion with the participants. This openness allowed more opportunity for 
dialogue and exchange in order to facilitate attention on significant themes, although it 
did mean that some previously designed questions were rendered irrelevant in particular 
interviews. These deviations from schedule are a recognised facet of qualitative 
interviewing.21 
The questions were constructed to avoid bias or leading the participant22 and were 
deliberately worded to be as open as possible, allowing the participants to volunteer 
responses without prompting.23 The objective of the interview questions was not 
primarily to test knowledge of the area. Instead, the interview guide was devised in such 
a way as to gain insight into practices and attitudes. The non-standardised nature of the 
interviews allowed the participants the freedom to express their views without external 
limitations. 
It is recognised that the interviewer may have many effects on the responses offered by 
the participants24 and that these effects cannot be eliminated. However, steps can be 
taken to control them. Within this study, the interviewer and the participants were 
experienced professionals and it is unlikely that any interviewer effects would adversely 
challenge the validity of the data captured; that is, the relationship of accuracy between 
the responses and the reality that the responses were intended to capture.25 In terms of 
                                                        
20 Mason, J, Qualitative Researching (Sage, London, 1996) 48-50. 
21 Warren, C, ‘Qualitative Interviewing’ in Gubrium, J and Holstein, J (eds), Handbook 
of Interview Research: Context and Method (Sage, London, 2001) 83, 87. 
22 Crow, I and Semmens, N, Researching Criminology (Open University Press, 
Maidenhead, 2008) 136-138. 
23 Noakes, L and Wincup, E, Criminological Research (Sage, London, 2004) 77. 
24 Hyman, H, Interviewing in Social Research (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 
1954); Sudman, S and Bradburn, N, Response Effects in Surveys (Aldine, Chicago, 1974). 
25 Gomm, R, Social Research Methodology: A Critical Introduction (Palgrave 
Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2004) 152-4. 
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reliability, each interview was conducted by the same interviewer, ensuring consistency 
of approach as far as possible.26 
The interview schedule was piloted on a small sample of three participants in order to 
test its suitability and to use the findings of the pilot study to inform minor 
modifications of the schedule.27 These modifications were largely concerned with 
revision to the wording of some questions in order to achieve clarity and to avoid 
confusion on the part of the participant.28 
1.3.5 Sampling strategy 
There are two types of sampling method. Probability (or random) sampling gives every 
unit in the population an equal chance of being selected, such that there is no bias in 
the selection process. These samples are suitable for studies aiming to estimate 
particular characteristics of the population or testing empirical hypotheses.29 Purposive 
(or non-probability or non-random) sampling involves an element of choice in the 
selection of units. It is suited to exploration and development of theory within which 
probability statements are not required.30 It cannot be assumed that a non-random 
sample is representative of the population, but does not mean that such a sample is not 
worth considering. Indeed, where the aim of the study is to consider a wider 
understanding of social processes and actions, the best sampling strategy is often 
purposive.31 Since the objective of this study was to gather broad views from a sample of 
knowledgeable individuals in order to explore and develop the central thesis, rather 
than to produce meaningful statistical data, a non-random sampling approach was 
adopted. 
Many research studies focus on very specific groups of the population for whom 
sampling frames are not readily available and often only have sufficient resources to 
studying a small number of participants. Given the time and resource constraints 
                                                        
26 Ibid. 
27 Crow, I and Semmens, N, Researching Criminology (Open University Press, 
Maidenhead, 2008) 151. 
28 Oppenheim, A, Questionnaire Design, Interviewing and Attitude Management 
(Continuum, London, 1992). 
29 Arber, S, ‘Designing Samples’ in Gilbert, N, Researching Social Life (2nd edn Sage, 
London, 2001) 61. 
30 Crow, I and Semmens, N, Researching Criminology (Open University Press, 
Maidenhead, 2008) 49. 
31 Arber, S, ‘Designing Samples’ in Gilbert, N, Researching Social Life (2nd edn Sage, 
London, 2001) 61. 
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inherent in doctoral research, it was decided to select a relatively limited sample of 
participants. In any case, when considering the high levels of specialist expertise needed 
to provide meaningful insight into the issues raised in the field of computer misuse, the 
population of potential participants was relatively narrow. Such focused purposive 
studies remain valid provided that the constraints on interpretation which arise are 
noted clearly and honestly.32 While there are obvious dangers of seeking to extrapolate 
findings from such a small-scale study, it was not the aim of this research to draw 
purportedly generalisable conclusions from the interviews. The contribution of the 
participants was to supplement and enhance the findings of the documentary research. 
The participants were experts who provided valuable information and were not merely 
a source of data. Moreover, the complexity of the potential range of responses to 
computer misuse required an understanding of the depth and complexity of 
participants’ accounts and experiences rather than a more superficial quantitative 
analysis of limited accounts from a larger sample. 
Having established the parameters of a small-scale focused study, it was then necessary 
to identify the categories from which the participants would be indentified. In 
qualitative research, theoretical representativeness requires a decision as to which 
categories of respondent would best suit the overall experimental hypothesis.33 In order 
to explore the particular issues associated with computer misuse, it was decided to 
sample from the field of high-level information technology users and policy makers. 
The categories into which this field was theoretically sampled were representatives from 
state and organisational policing bodies (at both local and national level); 
representatives of the IT industry, such as software engineers and security professionals; 
representatives of IT users within industry (that is, commercial enterprises which use IT 
but are not part of the IT industry itself) and policy makers, influencers and 
representatives of professional bodies such as the British Computer Society (BCS), the 
European Information Society Group (EURIM) and the Information Technologists’ 
Company (ITC), whose membership also intersects with the previous categories.  
These categories correspond with various types of elite identified in the conceptual 
literature. These include economic, military and political elites;34 social, specialised and 
governing elites35 and strategic elites within business, politics, diplomacy and defence.36 
                                                        
32 Ibid, 62-3. 
33 Gomm, R, Social Research Methodology: A Critical Introduction (Palgrave 
Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2004) 235. 
34 Mills, C, The Power Elite (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1956). 
35 Nadel, S, ‘The Concept of Social Elites’ (1956) 8 International Social Science Bulletin 
413. 
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It is recognised that locating and negotiating access to such participants can be 
problematic, requiring ingenuity, social skills, careful negotiation and circumstance.37 In 
this study, the researcher had access to certain potential participants by virtue of being 
a senior member of both the BCS and the ITC and having spent fifteen years within the 
IT industry. As such, network (or snowball) sampling was employed. This involved 
contacting a member of the population to be studied and enquiring whether they knew 
(or would be prepared to facilitate an introduction to) others with the characteristics 
required in a particular category.38 This proved to be effective since elite groups are 
often characterised by intricate interpersonal networks which include influential actors 
or gatekeepers to those actors. In addition, where a key participant is prominent within 
their own circle, their referral can help to establish the researcher’s credibility.39 
However, as anticipated, access was ‘negotiated and re-negotiated throughout the 
research process’.40 
The number of interviews performed in each category is shown in Table 1.1. Each 
participant is referred to throughout this study by the corresponding label. 
                                                                                                                                                             
36 Keller, S, Beyond the Ruling Class (Random House, New York, 1963) 20. 
37 Odendahl, T and Shaw, A, ‘Interviewing Elites’ in Gubrium, J and Holstein, J (eds), 
Handbook of Interview Research: Context and Method (Sage, London, 2001) 299, 305. 
38 Arber, S, ‘Designing Samples’ in Gilbert, N, Researching Social Life (2nd edn Sage, 
London, 2001) 63; Crow, I and Semmens, N, Researching Criminology (Open University 
Press, Maidenhead, 2008) 49. 
39 Odendahl, T and Shaw, A, ‘Interviewing Elites’ in Gubrium, J and Holstein, J (eds), 
Handbook of Interview Research: Context and Method (Sage, London, 2001) 299, 307. 
40 Burgess, R, ‘Sponsors, Gatekeepers, Members and Friends: Access in Educational 
Settings’ in Shaffir, W and Stebbins, R, Experiencing Fieldwork: An Inside View of 
Qualitative Research (Sage, London, 1991) 43. 
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Table 1.1 – Categorisation of research participants 
Category Label Number of 
interviews 
Policing (local) Police Officer 1, 2 2 
Policing (national) Police Officer 3, 4 2 
IT industry Technician 1 – 8 8 
IT users in industry User 1 – 8 8 
Policy makers and professional bodies Policy Maker 1 – 4  4 
Total  24 
 
This distribution was selected to give primacy to those who operate within the industry 
or use its products or services whilst encompassing complementary perspectives from 
those responsible for making and influencing policy and those responsible for its 
enforcement. 
1.3.6 Analysis 
The most widely used framework in qualitative analysis is the grounded theory 
approach in which key features and relationships emerge from the research situation 
and are recorded accordingly.41 Within grounded theory, coding is the key to theory 
construction and takes three forms: open, axial and selective.42 In open coding, 
concepts and categories are identified and labelled. Axial coding involves the 
connection of these concepts and categories to extrapolate theories (or higher-order 
concepts).43 Finally, in selective coding, one category is selected for an in-depth 
examination. These stages have also been referred to as descriptive coding, topic coding 
and analytical coding.44 
The interviews in this study were recorded using a digital voice recorder and transcribed 
into Microsoft Word. These transcripts were then further analysed using QSR NVivo 7 
                                                        
41 Crow, I and Semmens, N, Researching Criminology (Open University Press, 
Maidenhead, 2008) 181. 
42 Strauss, A and Corbin, J, Basics of Qualitative Research: Techniques and Procedures 
for Developing Grounded Theory (3rd edn, Sage, London, 2008) 122-3. 
43 Sarantakos, S, Social Research (3rd edn Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2005) 350. 
44 Richards, L, Handling Qualitative Data: A Practical Guide (Sage, London, 2005) 88. 
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qualitative data analysis software in order to extrapolate various themes and threads of 
discussion. The decision to use computer-aided analysis was made on the basis of the 
volume of transcript data (approximately 700 pages in total) and the relative ease by 
which it was possible to import documents directly from Word and to code the 
documents on screen. Moreover, the text coded to a particular node can be highlighted 
via differently coloured coding stripes in the margins of documents, so that it is easy to 
discern which codes have been used where. In addition, it was possible to write memos 
about particular aspects of documents and link these to relevant pieces of text in 
different documents. 
A set of sample codes is given in Appendix A. 
Given the small sample size, no quantitative analysis was undertaken. The findings from 
the interviews are spread pervasively throughout the study where appropriate rather 
than forming the subject of a separate standalone chapter. Quotes have been used 
throughout the main narrative where they have been representative of the kinds of 
responses gathered or have provided an interesting counterpoint. The insight gleaned 
from the interviews adds greater value when embedded in the main narrative than if it 
were presented as a single set of potentially disjointed comments. 
1.3.7 Research ethics 
The research proposal received ethical scrutiny and approval via the Research Ethics 
Review process required by the Faculty of Education, Social Sciences and Law within 
the University of Leeds. This incorporates the University’s guidance on ethical 
considerations in research and practical procedures.45 This process is compliant with the 
Research Ethics Framework policy guidelines established by the Economic and Social 
Research Council which are ‘intended to sustain and encourage good ethical practice in 
UK social science research’.46 In addition, the research proposal complies with the 
ethical guidelines of both the British Society of Criminology47 and the Socio-Legal 
Studies Association.48  
The research participants were all over the age of 18 years and engaged in a professional 
occupation. Therefore, the study did not involve vulnerable participants or individuals 
who might find it difficult to decline a request for informed consent. The nature of the 
                                                        
45 <http://www.leeds.ac.uk/essl/research/ethics/index.html> accessed 25 September 2008. 
46 <http://www.esrc.ac.uk/ESRCInfoCentre/Images/ESRC_Re_Ethics_Frame_tcm6-
11291.pdf> accessed 25 September 2008. 
47 <http://www.britsoccrim.org/ethical.htm> accessed 25 September 2008. 
48 <http://www.kent.ac.uk/nslsa/content/view/140/> accessed 25 September 2008. 
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interviews did not require participants to take part without knowledge and consent at 
the time and no financial or other inducements were offered to participants. No 
significant risks to personal safety, dignity or reputation of the researcher, participant 
or University of Leeds were indentified. There were also no identified risks of mental 
distress, theft, or loss or damage to property. The research involved no actual or 
potential conflict of interest in terms of financial interest, personal relationships, 
organisational affiliation or any other potential for partiality. Given the relatively non-
contentious nature of the research interviews, the main areas requiring further ethical 
consideration concerned informed consent and confidentiality and data protection. 
1.3.8 Informed consent 
It is well established that socio-legal research should be based on the freely-given and 
informed consent of those studied in all but exceptional circumstances, such as covert 
participant observation.49 This is generally taken to mean that those who are being 
researched should have the right to know that they are being researched and that they 
should actively have given their consent.50 
In order to ensure that the participants were fully informed in meaningful terms as to 
the purpose of the research, who was undertaking and financing it, how and why it was 
being undertaken and how any research findings were to be disseminated, a personalised 
letter of invitation on University of Leeds headed paper was sent to each participant. A 
copy of this letter can be found in Appendix A.  
Before each interview commenced, the participants were also asked to sign a consent 
declaration, a copy of which can also be found in Appendix A. All participants were 
reminded that their involvement in the interview was voluntary and that they could 
withdraw at any point during the interview or refuse to answer any individual question. 
Participants were also offered an opportunity to view a transcript of their interview and 
will be sent an outline of the findings of the research at the end of the project should 
they so desire. 
1.3.9 Confidentiality and data protection 
The interview process involved the collection of personal information that could 
identify the participants in the research, including names, addresses, telephone numbers 
and email addresses. There were also certain linking indicators within responses that 
                                                        
49 Shaw, I, ‘Ethics in qualitative research and evaluation’ (2003) 33 British Journal of 
Social Work 107. 
50 Bulmer, N, ‘The ethics of social research’ in Gilbert, N, Researching Social Life (2nd 
edn Sage, London, 2001) 45, 49. 
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related to an individual’s job or position. All data collected were anonymised during 
analysis such that the research participants could not be identified.51 The storage and 
use of data was compliant with the Data Protection Act 1998 and the University of 
Leeds Code of Practice on Data Protection.52 In particular, electronic data were 
password-protected on computer and any printed material was kept in a locked filing 
cabinet when not being used during the research. It will be securely destroyed upon 
completion of the research project. 
1.4 Terminology 
‘Computer misuse’ has been defined as ‘unethical or unauthorised behaviour in relation 
to the use of computers, programs, or data’.53 Defined in this way, a wide variety of 
computer misuse issues can be considered to determine the most appropriate means of 
response to them. 
Computer misuse is a different concept to ‘computer crime’ or ‘cybercrime’. It is 
important to differentiate between these terms. Computer crime is usually defined by 
reference both to the use of a computer as the principal tool to perpetrate criminal 
offences and by threats to the computer or system itself.54 In essence, a computer crime 
is one in which a computer has either been the object, subject or instrument of a crime. 
For example, by this definition, ‘phishing’55 is a computer crime, since it would fall 
within the boundaries of section 1 of the Fraud Act 2006 which criminalises fraud by 
false representation. This is satisfied by the dishonest false representation that the 
phishing website is legitimate, with the intention of making a gain or causing the victim 
to suffer loss. The use of the computer here could be considered peripheral to the 
offence itself. Fraud by false representation can be committed without a computer by, 
for example, dishonestly using a stolen credit card or selling fake designer goods. 
Similarly, physical threats to the computer or system itself such as the theft of hardware 
or software are manifestations of familiar property offences. They are not ‘special’ 
simply because a computer is the target of the attack. As Ingraham comments: 
                                                        
51 Boruch, R and Cecil, J, Assuring the Confidentiality of Social Research Data 
(University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, 1979).  
52 <http://campus.leeds.ac.uk/dpa/code.htm> accessed 25 September 2008. 
53 Wasik, M, Crime and the Computer (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1991) 3.  
54 Mandell, S, Computers, Data Processing and the Law (West Publishing, St Paul, 1984) 
155. 
55 The use of counterfeit websites designed to trick users who have been lured there by 
fake e-mail messages into divulging financial data such as credit card numbers, account 
usernames and passwords. 
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Striking a watchman with a disk pack should remain the battery that it is, and 
not be elevated to the status of a computer crime. There are enough red 
herrings in our courts already.56 
Whether computer crimes should have particular status is immaterial for the purposes 
of this discussion. It is sufficient to say that they are crimes falling within the 
parameters of the criminal law and, as such, there is some legal basis for their 
definition.  
By contrast to computer crime, cybercrime is not a legal term of art. As such, it carries 
with it a certain degree of contextual mutability, including ‘cyberspace crime’57 and ‘the 
transformation of criminal or harmful behaviour by networked technology’.58 
Cybercrime can therefore encompass the use of computers to assist ‘traditional’ 
offending, either within particular systems or across global networks (such as the 
phishing example discussed in conjunction with the Fraud Act 2006). It can also include 
crimes that are wholly mediated by technology – so-called ‘third generation’ 
cybercrimes.59 Such cybercrimes, such as spam e-mail for example, are solely the 
product of the Internet and could not exist without it.  However, many of the so-called 
cybercrimes that have caused concern over the past decade are not necessarily crimes in 
the criminal law.60 In essence, the suffix of ‘crime’ is attached to behaviours which do 
not readily fall within the boundaries of the criminal law. There is, therefore, not 
always a legal basis for certain so-called cybercrimes. As Wall comments, these include 
the more controversial harms which ‘fall outside the jurisdiction and experience of the 
                                                        
56 Ingraham, D, ‘On Charging Computer Crime’ (1980) 2 Computer and Law Journal 
429, 438. 
57 ‘Cyberspace’ being a term coined by Gibson; Gibson, W, ‘Burning chrome’ Omni 
Magazine (July 1982) reproduced in Gibson, W, Burning Chrome (Arbor, New York, 
1986). It was popularised in Gibson, W, Neuromancer (Harper Collins, London, 1984). 
58 Wall, DS, Cybercrime: The Transformation of Crime in the Digital Age (Polity Press, 
Cambridge, 2007) 10. 
59 Ibid, 47. 
60 Ibid, 10. 
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criminal justice process’61 such as cyber-rape62 and the virtual vandalism of virtual 
worlds.63 
In order to avoid the ‘considerable linguistic agency’64 associated with the term 
cybercrime, particularly the use of the word ‘crime’ in relation to something which 
might not lie entirely within the boundaries of the criminal law, this research focuses on 
computer misuse rather than computer crime or cybercrime. Indeed, the legalistic use 
of the word ‘crime’ implies an action accompanied by the requisite state of mind which 
properly attracts the attention of the criminal law. It therefore follows that, since 
certain forms of behaviour involving the misuse of a computer fall outside the 
boundaries of the criminal law, then computer crime is but a subset of computer 
misuse. Computer misuse considers these particular behaviours to determine whether or 
not they fall within the  criminal law and, if not, whether they should be dealt with via 
legal means or otherwise. Therefore, some instances of computer misuse, such as spam, 
might also be a cybercrime (since spam is a product of the Internet) and a computer 
crime.65 However, a denial-of service attack is an instance of computer misuse which 
could be classified as a cybercrime but which posed some difficulties for the criminal 
law.66 Given that this study considers computer misuse, a precise definition of computer 
crime or cybercrime is not required. As Nimmer helpfully summarises: 
Although aspects of computer use in society create vulnerabilities or 
opportunities for abuse these are not always qualitatively different from 
vulnerabilities that exist independently of computers. In many cases, however, 
the degree of risk and the nature of conduct are sufficiently different to raise 
questions about basic social decisions concerning levels of criminality for 
computer-related actions and the ability to discover and prosecute them under 
current law. Whether these are discussed under the heading of computer crime 
or merely as general criminal law problems is not important.67 
                                                        
61 Ibid, 48. 
62 MacKinnon, R, ‘Virtual rape’ (1997) 2(4) Journal of Computer Mediated 
Communication <http://jcmc.indiana.edu/vol2/issue4/mackinnon.html> accessed 25 
September 2008. 
63 Williams, M, Virtually Criminal (Routledge, London, 2006). 
64 Wall, DS, Cybercrime: The Transformation of Crime in the Digital Age (Polity Press, 
Cambridge, 2007) 10. 
65 Privacy and Electronic Communications (EC Directive) Regulations 2003, r 22, 23. 
66 See section 3.3.3.2. 
67 Nimmer, R, The Law of Computer Technology (Wiley, New York, 1985) 9. 
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The burgeoning ubiquity of computer technology and the spread of networked 
technology has generated an expanded realm of computer misuse. Various forms of 
computer misuse are increasingly prevalent within the media.68 This media exposure, in 
conjunction with society’s mixed experience with new technologies, has stemmed a 
range of notions of risk. Such risks include the spread of computer viruses,69 the threat 
of hackers, the accessibility of on-line child pornography70 and the virtual shadow of 
cyberterrorism.71 These risks form part of the increasing culture of risk evident within 
contemporary Western society. 
It can be argued that technology itself has no bearing on behaviour and that it is simply 
the intention of the user (or misuser) of that technology which makes it good or bad. 
However, it can also be argued that the very existence of the technology itself makes its 
misuse inevitable and therefore that technology is far from being a neutral force in 
society. Those who fear the risks associated with new technology may be concerned at 
the release of increasingly powerful tools into the hands of individuals, businesses and 
the state. They may be uncomfortable in a world in which services are accessed, goods 
purchased and transactions in general are increasingly mediated via the use of 
technology. Those who are wholly ignorant of technological risk cannot fear its 
consequences, yet they become potential victims since they are equally ignorant of the 
need to guard against that risk. It may also be true that those who understand the 
technology are fearful, as they understand more about the potential weaknesses in a 
system and the consequent risks associated with its abuse. The National Identity 
Register72 is a case in point. Much public hostility towards the introduction of identity 
cards is driven from a civil liberties perspective73 with less consideration given to the 
                                                        
68 For example, de Bruxelles, S, ‘Hackers force mass website closures’ The Times (6 
December 2007); Harvey, M and Henderson, M, ‘Hackers claim there’s a black hole in 
the atom smashers’ computer network’ The Times (13 September 2008); Denby, K, 
‘Dissident websites crippled by Burma on anniversary of revolt’ The Times (22 
September 2008). 
69 For example, Frith, H, ‘Stowaway computer virus sent into orbit’ The Times (28 
August 2008). 
70 For example, Hines, N, ‘Philip Thompson admits he is child porn “librarian”’ The 
Times (18 August 2008). 
71 For example, Richards, J, ‘Thousands of cyber attacks each day on key utilities’ The 
Times (23 August 2008). 
72 Established by the Identity Cards Act 2006, s 1. 
73 For instance the NO2ID campaign at <http://www.no2id.net> accessed 25 September 
2008. 
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technical feasibility of implementation, although recent high profile losses of personal 
data74 have highlighted some of the potential technological and human flaws in large 
state-controlled systems. In the report commissioned by HM Treasury concerning the 
loss of child benefit data in November 2007, contributory factors included: 
…the prioritisation by HMRC staff of other considerations above information 
security risk concerns [and] inadequate awareness, communication and training 
in information security.75 
Even where there was awareness of information security risks, staff ‘failed to manage 
those risks in an appropriate manner’.76 
In light of the increasing realisation of the criminogenic potential of computer 
technology and the risks associated with it, then it seems desirable that these risks are 
met with an effective response. The response has hitherto been based on legislation, of 
which the primary piece controlling criminal computer misuse is the Computer Misuse 
Act 1990. Indeed, there is often an instinctive reaction to criminalise any perceived 
social problem without exploration of viable alternatives. For example, the UK was 
swift to criminalise the ownership of dangerous dogs77 in response to a spate of vicious 
attacks on young children and to extend the use of banning orders in response to 
football violence overseas.78 This demonstrates a tendency for the UK to rely upon the 
criminal law as a panacea for social ills. However, this study considers whether the 
approach of using the criminal law alone is the most appropriate response to computer 
misuse or whether alternative mechanisms might be preferable or complementary. 
The next chapter will begin this consideration by examining the origins of computer 
misuse and its regulation by the domestic criminal law. 
 
                                                        
74 Webster, P, O’Neill, S and Blakely, R, ‘25 million exposed to risk of ID fraud’ The 
Times (21 November 2007); Webster, P, ‘Millions more ID records go missing’ The 
Times (18 December 2007); Evans, E, ‘Personal data of 600,000 on lost laptop’ The 
Times (19 January 2008); O’Neill, S and Ford, R. ‘Thousands of criminal files lost in 
data fiasco’ The Times (22 August 2008). 
75 Poynter, K, ‘Review of Information Security at HM Revenue and Customs: Final 
Report’ (HMSO, London, 2008) 7. 
76 Ibid, 23. 
77 Dangerous Dogs Act 1991. 
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Part 1    
Constructing the problem of computer misuse 
  
2 
The emergence of the problem of computer misuse 
 
Everything that can be invented has already been invented. 
Charles H Duell, director of the US Patent Office (1899) 
 
This chapter will examine the emergence of the problem of computer misuse, covering 
the period up to 1990 when the primary piece of legislation controlling criminal 
computer misuse – the Computer Misuse Act 1990 – was enacted. It will consider two 
parallel strands. First, the evolution of computer technology itself, and, second, the 
evolution of the scope of their legitimate use and consequently their misuse. Having 
looked at the emergence of computer misuse up until 1990, the chapter will turn to 
consider the attempted means of legal regulation of computer misuse at the time and 
examine whether or not computer misuse proved to be challenging for the criminal law. 
It will conclude with a discussion of the legislative history, genesis and intent of the 
1990 Act and a detailed examination of the offences that it created.  
2.1 A brief history of computing 
This section will provide a brief history of computing, focusing on the key advances in 
computing power and accessibility and the emergence and growth of computer 
networks. 
2.1.1 Key advances in computing 
In the sense that a computer is viewed as a ‘calculating machine’, computers have 
existed in various forms since the abacus was used by the Babylonians around 500 BC. 
Other mechanical calculators included Schickard’s ‘calculating clock’ of 1623, 
Oughtred’s slide-rule from 1625 and the difference engine, first theorised by Mueller in 
1786 and built by Babbage in 1832.1 In 1834, Babbage conceived, and began to design, his 
‘analytical engine’ which combined many of the elements familiar in modern computer 
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technology. The engine would run programs which were stored in read-only memory, 
specifically in the form of punch cards.  
An early indication of the impact that computing technology could have on society was 
demonstrated by the US census of 1890. The 1880 census took seven years to complete 
by hand. However, the increasing population suggested that, by the 1890 census, the 
data processing would take longer to complete than the ten years before the next 
scheduled census. A competition was held to try to find a more efficient data-
processing method. This was won by a Census Department employee, Herman 
Hollerith, who used Babbage’s idea of using punch cards for the data storage. The 1890 
census data was processed in six weeks.2 The Second World War proved to be an 
influential driving force behind technological development. In April 1943, the Bletchley 
Park team completed the ‘Heath Robinson’. This was a specialised machine for cipher-
breaking as opposed to a general-purpose calculator or computer. This machine was the 
forerunner of the earliest programmable electronic computer, Colossus, built in 
December 1943. Colossus was used to crack the German cipher used by the enemy 
‘Enigma’ machines and was able to translate 5,000 characters per second input on 
punched tape.3 
The ENIAC4 was developed between 1943 and 1946 at the US Ballistic Research 
Laboratory by J Presper Eckert and John W Mauchly. It was one of the first totally 
electronic, valve driven, digital computers. It weighed 30 tonnes, contained 18,000 
electronic valves and consumed around 25kW of electrical power (roughly equivalent to 
that consumed by fifteen electric convector heaters). It is widely recognised as the first 
universal electronic computer. The ENIAC was further developed into the UNIVAC5 
through the 1950s. By 1954 twenty UNIVACs had been installed at a cost of one million 
dollars each. They were used for private and commercial functions such as logistical and 
budgeting problems, payroll and  accounting, as well as for military purposes. The 
UNIVAC was closely followed IBM 701 and IBM 650. In essence, the 1950s ‘inaugurated 
the era of commercial stored-program computing’.6 The machines at this time were vast 
                                                        
2 Austrian, GD, Herman Hollerith: The Forgotten Giant of Information Processing 
(Columbia University Press, New York, 1982). 
3 Copeland, BJ, Colossus: The Secrets of Bletchley Park's Code-breaking Computers 
(Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2006). 
4 Electronic Numerical Integrator and Computer. 
5 Universal Automatic Computer. 
6 Ceruzzi, P, A History of Modern Computing (2nd edn The MIT Press, Cambridge, 
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in size and existed as discrete installations in isolation. They were the province of the 
specialist and limited in their processing capability. 
The reach of computer technology expanded greatly throughout the 1960s. The 
minicomputer opened further areas of application. While still a standalone system, the 
minicomputer introduced larger groups of people to direct interaction with computer 
technology. These were originally engineers and scientists and subsequently ‘data 
processing’ workers. Therefore, although computer technology was in existence long 
before the 1970s, it was not truly ‘personal’. Users were homogeneous and the computer 
worked on its tasks in series. However, the DEC PDP-10 offered a ‘time-sharing’ system. 
This created an illusion that each user had access to the full resources that the system 
had to offer. Moreover it provided a random-access disk system allowing users access to 
their personal files and the ability to spool these files onto tape which was portable 
enough to be carried around in a briefcase.7 
Advances in semiconductor technology could be also seen in the spread of electronic 
calculators. In 1970, a calculator cost around $400; in 1971, $250; in 1976, $50. The 
increased accessibility of computing technology sparked an interest for programming 
for many. However, these machines were sold as commodities; as such the 
manufacturers could not afford to educate the purchasers on their full range of 
capabilities, leading those who wanted to know more to congregate together, giving rise 
to user groups and clubs with a range of publications.8 
The new microprocessors and memory chips which came out of the semiconductor 
laboratories converged with the increasing desire for personal computing in 1974. The 
microprocessor-based MITS Altair 8800 sparked an immense period of activity in 
personal computing, even though it had significant shortcomings in terms of complexity 
and unreliability.9 In 1980, Sinclair Research set out to build a simple to use personal 
computer, running BASIC and capable of breaking the psychological price barrier of 
£100. It succeeded with the ZX80, the computer which started the home computer 
revolution in the UK. Before production ceased in August 1981, the ZX80 sold over 
100,000 units. It was also one of the first aimed at the home user, as opposed to the 
hobbyist or professional.10 It marked the arrival of personal computing. 
                                                        
7 Bell, C, Mudge, J and McNamara, E, Computer Engineering: A DEC View of 
Hardware Systems Design (Digital, Bedford, 1979). 
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9 Levy, S, Hackers (Anchor Doubleday, New York, 1984) 191. 
10 Dale, R, The Sinclair Story (Duckworth, London, 1985). 
  
23 
A range of new personal computers – and accompanying software applications – was 
introduced throughout the 1980s. The IBM PC was announced in August 1981 along 
with a suite of accounting and games software.11 The Apple Macintosh was released in 
January 1984. It had a new 3.5 inch disk drive, a mouse, and a graphical user interface 
which Microsoft tried later to copy with Windows. This interface was driven by a 
desire to make computing technology more accessible to a wider range of individuals 
without requiring them to understand the workings of DOS, by hiding much of the 
underlying technology beneath a readily acceptable metaphor.12 The development of 
interfaces designed to circumvent lack of technical knowledge could, in turn, propagate 
a greater lack of in-depth knowledge by shielding the non-specialist user from 
increasingly complex underlying technology. 
2.1.2 The growth of networked computing 
The ARPANET13 was the first transcontinental, high-speed computer network. It grew 
out of a 1969 experiment in digital communications by the US Department of Defense 
to link together universities, defence contractors and research laboratories. It provides 
an example of technological catalysis at work: a technological collaboration and 
productivity tool which consequently increased both the pace and intensity of 
technological advance.14 
Ethernet technology was invented in 1973, yet it was not until the proliferation of 
personal computers in the 1980s that it found its mass-market role. The nature of 
personal computers meant that employees, particularly those who had acquired skills, 
software or both on a home machine, were free to install whatever software they liked 
on their computers, leading to a loss of corporate control. As User 1 commented: 
In the early days, disks were flying everywhere. We had no idea who was 
running what, whether it had a licence – it usually didn’t – or whether it was 
infected with something horrible. 
One of the driving forces behind local-area networking was to give some control back 
to the corporations; storing files and applications on a central server rather than on 
                                                        
11 Pugh, E, Building IBM: Shaping an Industry and Its Technology (MIT Press, Boston, 
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13 Advanced Research Projects Agency Network. 
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individual PCs. This removed much of the ‘personal’ from personal computing, at least 
in the workplace, although the users maintained more autonomy and independence that 
their predecessors with dumb mainframe terminals.15 This was echoed by users: 
I didn’t like the idea of the LAN at first. Although it was easier to share things 
around – even things we probably shouldn’t have been – the idea of a 
technologically-challenged boss looking at my code wasn’t appealing at all.16 
LANs were great for management, but they stifled our creativity at first.17 
Academic networks also formed. BITNET18 was a co-operative US university network 
founded in 1981 between the City University of New York and Yale University. At its 
peak around 1990, BITNET extended to almost 500 organisations with 3,000 network 
nodes, all within educational institutions.19 
2.1.3 Knowledge gap 
It can be seen that the principal advancements which occurred during this period were 
in capacity, user-friendliness and networking. Capacity increased both in terms of 
storage capability and in processing speed. User-friendliness advanced from textual 
commands requiring syntactic rigour to the graphical user interfaces offered by the 
Apple Macintosh and Microsoft Windows. Networking increased both socially in the 
user communities arising in the 1970s and technologically in the rise of local-area 
networking in the 1980s. As a result of these advances, new applications were possible 
and computer technology became more readily accessible; at first in the workplace and 
then in the home. Technology had moved from the realm of the specialist and the 
scientist to increasingly-widespread public availability and consequently into the public 
consciousness. The level of understanding needed of how systems operated at the 
lowest level, which was a necessary and expert skill in the earlier days of computing, 
became a lesser requirement. The user opening a file on the Apple Macintosh by 
clicking a picture certainly did not need to know, or care,  where the underlying data 
was distributed on its hard disk.  
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However, the collective diminution in general computing skill levels gave rise to a 
knowledge gap between the expert and non-expert user. As Technician 2 commented: 
We were quite scornful of anyone who had to use pictures to do their jobs. 
‘Real’ computer engineers wrote in text which the general public had no right 
to understand. They thought they knew how it all worked, but it was just 
smoke and mirrors to sell more kit. 
The exploitation of this knowledge gap could be a potential driver and facilitator of 
susceptibility to computer misuse and computer crime: unless the criminal law was able 
to deter and punish such activity or the technology itself was able to include safeguards 
as well as introduce vulnerabilities. 
Having established the technological and social landscapes, it is next necessary to chart 
some of the early manifestations of computer misuse before discussing the response of 
the criminal law. 
2.2 Manifestations of computer misuse 
According to Levy, the emergence of the hacker culture began in 1961 when MIT 
acquired the first PDP-1. The Signals and Power Committee of MIT’s Tech Model 
Railroad Club invented programming tools, slang, and a new subculture, elements of 
which remain recognisable.20 This group also seems to have been the first to adopt the 
term ‘hacker’. The social impact of the ARPANET also came to bear. It brought 
together hackers all over the US in a critical mass. Instead of remaining in isolated small 
groups with their own developing ephemeral local cultures, the hackers formed 
themselves as a networked ‘tribe’ of experts and enthusiasts.21 The facilities for 
electronic mailing lists that had been used to foster co-operation among continent-wide 
special-interest groups were increasingly also used for more social and recreational 
purposes. DARPA deliberately turned a blind eye to all the technically ‘unauthorised’ 
activity; it understood that the extra overhead was ‘a small price to pay for attracting an 
entire generation of bright young people into the computing field’.22 In the early days of 
computing technology, the terms ‘hacker’ and ‘hacking’ had a distinct meaning from 
that of today:  
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The term can signify the free-wheeling intellectual exploration of the highest 
and deepest potential of computer systems. Hacking can describe the 
determination to make access to computers as free and as open as possible. 
Hacking can involve the heartfelt conviction that beauty can be found in 
computers, that the fine aesthetic in a perfect program can liberate the mind 
and spirit.23  
Hacking has also been described as a ‘recreational and educational sport’ in which the 
intellectual challenge of gaining access is paramount: 
In the vast majority of cases, the process of ‘getting in’ is much more satisfying 
than what is discovered in the protected computer files.24 
In the late 1970s and early 1980s the most direct precursors to modern computer 
misusers appeared; the so-called ‘phone phreaks’. The phreaks used a ‘black box’ which 
mimicked the signal used by the phone systems and gave the phreak unlimited long-
distance access.25 It was generally agreed that phreaking as an intellectual game and a 
form of exploration was semi-respectable, but that the wide scale ‘theft’ of services was 
not. However, as Hafner comments: 
When the personal computer was invented and mated with the modem, 
phreaking took on a whole new dimension and the modern age of the hacker 
was born.26 
The emerging networks of the 1980s were places in which information was plentiful, 
and security was almost non-existent. Hackers were able to exploit this disparity 
between information richness and security weakness. For example, Hans Hubner, a 
German hacker known as ‘Pengo’,27 used simple guest user accounts to steal sensitive 
government data and sell it to the Eastern Bloc.28 The first computer virus to appear 
outside the place in which it was written was Elk Cloner written for the Apple DOS in 
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1982. This spread by floppy disk and simply displayed a poem about itself every fiftieth 
time that the contents of the disk were run. The first PC virus was arguably (c)Brain 
which appeared in 198629 and was designed to deter pirated copies of software 
legitimately written and distributed by the creators of the virus itself.30 Before computer 
networks became widespread, most viruses spread on removable media, particularly 
floppy disks. In the early days of personal computers, many users regularly exchanged 
information and programs on disk. Some viruses, such as Elk Cloner, spread by infecting 
programs stored on these disks, while others, such as (c)Brain installed themselves into 
the disk boot sector, ensuring that they would be run when the user booted the 
computer from the disk.31 
By the end of the 1980s certain types of computer misuse, particularly hacking and virus 
writing were occurring increasingly frequently. Most users interviewed recalled 
experiencing several virus attacks: 
We had SEX, so to speak, Data Crime and Fu Manchu. Great names, but 
intensely irritating. Data Crime formatted part of our hard disks, as I recall.32 
Cascade was a good one. Characters used to fall off the screen. I think there 
was a nastier version which formatted disks too, but we were lucky.33 
The spread of the hacker culture via the burgeoning networks had disseminated the 
tools and techniques of misuse to a wider audience, many of whom saw, and acted 
upon, the potential to use this information with their own technical knowledge to 
misuse technology for their own gain: whether this be purely intellectual satisfaction or 
something more insidious. Moreover, many misusers began to realise the distinction 
between the physical world of criminal behaviour and the relative safety of their 
actions, mediated by distance and technology. As a result, public concern over hacking 
and viruses also began to grow during the 1980s. The next section will examine the 
extent to which this public concern could be addressed by the application of the 
criminal law at the time. 
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2.3 Pre-1990 regulation 
It is true to say that the criminal law was able to deal with some of the problems 
resulting from computer misuse before the Computer Misuse Act 1990 came into 
being.34 For instance, case law tended to suggest that erasing computer data held on a 
magnetic disk would fall within the ambit of section 1(1) of the Criminal Damage Act 
1971: 
A person who without lawful excuse destroys or damages any physical property 
belonging to another intending to destroy or damage such property or being 
reckless as to whether any such property would be destroyed or damaged shall 
be guilty of an offence. 
This was so despite the fact that this could be done without causing physical damage to 
property ‘of a tangible nature’ as required by the Act.35 This required a certain degree of 
creativity in the interpretation of tangible property in relation to the facts of the case. 
In R v. Talboys,36 the defendant was convicted of charges brought under the Criminal 
Damage Act 1971 after a programming prank went wrong. Talboys re-programmed his 
employer’s computer to display a farewell message every time his colleagues entered his 
leaving date. Unfortunately, no message was displayed: instead, the screens were entirely 
blanked. As a result of Talboys’ guilty plea no legal argument was heard; he was given a 
conditional discharge and ordered to reimburse his employer £1,000 to cover the costs 
of investigating and rectifying the problem.  
The similar case of Cox v. Riley37 did lead to a judicial view. Here, the defendant 
deliberately erased all computer programs from the plastic circuit card of a 
computerised saw which relied upon it for its operation, each program corresponding to 
a window frame profile of a different design.38 This rendered the saw inoperable, apart 
from limited manual operation, which would cause production to be slowed 
dramatically. At first instance, the defendant was convicted under section 1(1) of the 
Criminal Damage Act 1971, the magistrates reasoning that since the printed circuit card 
was tangible it was ‘property’ within the meaning of section 10(1) and that damage was 
caused to the card since it would no longer operate the computerised saw until it had 
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been re-programmed.39 The defendant appealed on the basis that the programs erased 
were not tangible property within the Criminal Damage Act 1971. Unfortunately the 
defendant had been charged with damage to the card, which the court viewed as 
‘undoubtedly… property of a tangible nature’, rather than damage to the program. The 
Divisional Court concluded with the opinion: 
[We] would answer the question posed by the justices ‘Can the erasing of a 
program from a printed circuit card which is used to operate a computerised 
saw constitute damage within the meaning of the Criminal Damage Act 1971?’ 
with the emphatic answer yes.40 (emphasis added) 
Stephen Brown LJ commented that: 
It seems to me to be quite untenable to argue that what this appellant did on 
this occasion did not amount to causing damage to property.41 
Indeed this was a view initially shared by the Law Commission. In its subsequent 
Working Paper on Computer Misuse it stated that: 
In essence, any interference with the operation of a computer or its software 
which causes loss or inconvenience to its legitimate users can probably now be 
charged as criminal damage…The law of criminal damage now seems to extend 
to persons who damage a computer system, without the need for any further 
reform of the law.42 
R v. Whiteley43 concerned an eighteen-year-old hacker who had gained unauthorised 
access to the JANET44 computer network. He deleted and replaced files with messages 
of ‘schoolboy humour’ that taunted and insulted the computer centre staff. It was held 
that he had been properly convicted of criminal damage since the deletion of various 
files and their replacements caused an alteration of the state of the magnetic particles 
on the computer discs. The discs and the particles were considered to be a single entity 
capable of being damaged and their usefulness had been impaired. The defendant 
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argued that only the intangible information had been damaged and that there should be 
a distinction drawn between the physical disc itself and the information thereon. This 
argument failed and Whiteley was sentenced to twelve months imprisonment, eight of 
which were suspended. 
Despite the issues surrounding tangibility, criminal damage seemed to be a potential 
route to the imposition of criminal liability. A further, although somewhat more 
creative, possibility lay in the offence of abstraction of electricity, contrary to section 13 
of the Theft Act 1968 which provides that: 
A person who dishonestly uses without due authority, or dishonestly causes to 
be wasted or diverted, any electricity shall on conviction be liable to 
imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years. 
Therefore, even though the offence is primarily aimed at the dishonest by-passing of an 
electricity meter,45 a person who dishonestly uses another’s computer without due 
authority may also commit the offence on the basis of the unauthorised use of 
electricity that is an inevitable result of its use.46 Perhaps unsurprisingly, there is little 
authority on this point in England and Wales, although in Sui-Tak Chee47 a Hong Kong 
case, the defendant was charged with, and found guilty of, abstracting electricity under 
section 15 of the Theft Ordinance48 (which is worded identically to section 13 of the 
Theft Act 1968) after accidentally discovering passwords, and thereafter accessing 
(allegedly out of curiosity rather than motivation for gain), a Cable and Wireless plc e-
mail system. The defendant received an absolute discharge from the magistrate, who 
ordered that no conviction should be imposed and that, in his opinion, the prosecution 
should never have been brought; the value of the electricity abstracted having been 
proved at around one-eighth of a Hong Kong cent, or approximately one-thousandth of 
a British penny. As Wasik suggests, the mischief that the offence seeks to counter is 
quite different from the substance of the offence when applied to computer misuse.49 It 
is perhaps interesting to note that the argument of mismatch of mischief to 
circumstances was not employed when considering the prosecutions for computer 
misuse under the criminal damage legislation in Cox v. Riley and Whiteley; this 
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probably lies in the fact that ‘damage’ is a term more readily understood and employed 
in this context whereas stretching the ambit of abstraction of electricity to cover the 
miniscule cost of powering a few cycles on a misused computer chip seemed to be a 
little too extreme. The magistrate in Sui-Tak Chee clearly considered that a de minimis 
approach would be sensible and appropriate. However, Bainbridge argued that the 
abstraction of even the tiniest amount of electricity should attract liability, stating that: 
The very art of hacking will result in the host computer…performing work…If 
the information is kept on magnetic disks, the disk drive heads will physically 
move, tracking across the disks, locating then reading the information which 
will then be moved into the computer’s volatile memory by means of tiny 
electrical impulses. More electricity will be used in transmitting the information 
to the hacker’s computer terminal.50 
This analysis led Bainbridge to the inevitable conclusion that: 
Every hacker is committing [the offence of abstracting electricity] regardless of 
the nature of his actions.51 
Despite this view, relying on abstracting electricity as a means to counter computer 
misuse seems convoluted, especially when considering the miniscule amounts of 
electricity involved and the mischief at which the offence was aimed. Abstracting 
electricity fails to encapsulate the wrongness of the defendant’s conduct and takes no 
heed of his actions in potentially disrupting the computer system or corrupting or 
destroying valuable data: the situation is analogous to charging someone who had stolen 
a car with the theft of petrol.  
It is not only the existing criminal damage and abstraction of electricity legislation that 
has been used in an attempt to impose criminal liability for computer misuse: the 
Forgery and Counterfeiting Act 1981 has also been employed. In R v. Gold and 
Schifreen,52 the defendants gained access to the British Telecom Prestel53 computer 
network by using the Customer Identification Number ‘22222222’ and password ‘1234’. 
This gave them access to a test computer, thence the password of the British Telecom 
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system manager and ultimately the passwords of everyone on the Prestel system. As 
Schifreen described in a 2003 interview: 
I stumbled upon a correct password that wasn’t mine… [t]he BT Prestel system 
recognised me as a legitimate customer and suddenly I found the door was open 
for me into one of the biggest computer systems in the world.54 
The defendants altered files on the system and (in)famously accessed Prince Philip’s 
private mailbox, seeing the message ‘Good evening, HRH Duke of Edinburgh’; they 
then left a message for the real system manager saying ‘I do so enjoy puzzles and games. 
Ta ta. Pip pip! HRH Royal Hacker’. Schifreen decided to inform Prestel although they 
were reluctant to believe him: 
Why would they? Someone…tells them that they used a £400 computer to 
circumvent their inbuilt security and penetrate a mainframe system worth 
millions? It had to be a hoax.55 
The defendants were ultimately believed after amending the word ‘Index’ on the first 
page to read ‘Idnex’: this alerted Prestel to the fact that their security had indeed been 
breached. It notified all customers to change their passwords, changed the system 
manager codes to block the defendants and called in the police. As Schifreen said 
‘Everything went nuclear after that’.56  
The defendants were convicted at first instance on nine counts of forgery contrary to 
section 1(1) of the Forgery and Counterfeiting Act 1981 which provides that: 
A person is guilty of forgery if he makes a false instrument, with the intention 
that he or another shall use it to induce somebody to accept it as genuine, and 
by reason of so accepting it to do or not to do some act to his own or any other 
person’s prejudice. 
In the usual realm of the offence, a false instrument is usually a tangible item. However, 
here the ‘false instrument’ was argued to have been ‘made’ by entering a genuine 
Customer Information Number and password into the system with the intention that 
the system accepted it as genuine to the prejudice of British Telecom who were induced 
to provide Prestel services to the value of £379 without charge. At first instance, the 
defendants were convicted on all counts, fined and ordered to pay costs. 
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However, on appeal, the central issue revolved around the definition of ‘false 
instrument’: an instrument being defined by section 8(1) of the 1981 Act as: 
(a) any document, whether of a formal or informal character; 
(b) any stamp issued or sold by the Post Office; 
(c) any Inland Revenue stamp; and 
(d) any disc, tape, sound track or other device on or in which information is 
recorded or stored by mechanical, electronic or other means. 
The Court of Appeal first considered, presumably using the noscitur a sociis rule of 
statutory interpretation, that the electronic impulses generated by physically entering 
the Customer Information Number and password into the Prestel system could not 
constitute the false instrument, since all the examples provided in the Act were tangible 
and the impulses were not. The prosecution argued that ‘user segment’ of the computer 
momentarily became a false instrument once the Customer Information Number and 
password were entered into it for the purposes of user authentication. However, this 
argument failed. The court considered that the signals that caused the user segment to 
verify them as authorised users were never ‘recorded or stored’ with any degree of 
continuity within section 8(1)(d) of the 1981 Act since they appeared only momentarily 
on a screen before immediately being deleted. The House of Lords concurred, Lord 
Brandon of Oakbrook commenting that: 
We have accordingly come to the conclusion that the language of the Act was 
not intended to apply to the situation which was shown to exist in this case…It 
is a conclusion that we reach without regret. The Procrustean attempt to force 
these facts into the language of an Act not designed to fit them produced grave 
difficulties for both judge and jury which we would not wish to see repeated.57 
It is clear, then, at this stage, there were cracks appearing in the ability of the existing 
criminal law to deal with some manifestations of computer misuse, in particular those 
resulting from the intangible nature of the subject matter.  Despite this increasingly-
apparent inadequacy, there were still conflicting views on whether Parliament should 
intervene with specific legislation to counter such activity. For instance, Bainbridge 
argued that the existing body of criminal law was adequate, claiming that Gold and 
Schifreen ‘should have been charged with abstraction of electricity and criminal 
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damage’58 since the messages left were ‘a form of graffiti’,59  whereas Lloyd’s opposing 
view was that ‘legislative action should not be long delayed’.60 
2.4 The genesis of the Computer Misuse Act 1990 
The legislative action desired by Lloyd and opposed by Bainbridge had already been 
under investigation by both the Scottish Law Commission and that of England and 
Wales.  
2.4.1 The Scottish Law Commission 
The first substantial consideration of computer misuse by a reform body was 
undertaken by the Scottish Law Commission in March 1986 in its Consultative 
Memorandum Computer Crime.61 This was issued in response to a July 1984 proposal 
from the Law Society of Scotland: 
To consider the applicability and effectiveness of the criminal law in Scotland in 
relation to the use and abuse of computers, computer systems and other data 
storing, data processing and telecommunications systems…62 
This provided an eight-fold categorisation of the different kinds of computer misuse 
perceived at the time to be: 
Erasure or falsification of data or programs so as to obtain a pecuniary or other 
advantage; 
Obtaining unauthorised access to a computer; 
Eavesdropping on a computer; 
Taking of information without physical removal; 
Unauthorised borrowing of computer discs or tapes; 
Making unauthorised use of computer time or facilities; 
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Malicious or reckless corruption or erasure of data or programs; 
Denial of access to authorised users.63 
Following a period of consultation with a range of individuals, academic and 
commercial organisations and professional bodies, the resulting 1987 Report on 
Computer Crime64 was published. This made it clear that the Scottish Law Commission 
remained doubtful that there existed ‘sufficient hard evidence as to the scale…of 
computer misuse which would of itself suggest an impending crisis of a kind that 
demanded prompt legislative action’65 and considered that caution should be taken ‘not 
to over-dramatise the scale and extent of computer misuse at present’.66 However, 
despite this uncertainty regarding the nature and extent of the risk arising from a failure 
to criminalise computer misuse, it recommended the creation of an offence directed at 
obtaining unauthorised access to a computer67 where there was  specific ulterior intent 
to obtain an advantage for the defendant (or another) or to damage another’s interests 
or where, following unauthorised access, another’s interests had actually been damaged 
by the reckless modification or erasure of programs or data. 68 
The accompanying draft Computer Crime (Scotland) Bill69 proposed these offences as 
follows: 
1.—(1) A person commits an offence if, not having authority to obtain access to 
a program or data stored in a computer, or to a part of such program or data, he 
obtains such unauthorised access in order to inspect or otherwise to acquire 
knowledge of the program or data or to add to, erase or otherwise alter the 
program or the data with the intention— 
 (a) of procuring an advantage for himself or another person; 
 (b) of damaging another person’s interests. 
(2) A person commits an offence if, not having authority to obtain access to a 
program or data stored in a computer, or to a part of such program or data, he 
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obtains such unauthorised access and damages another person’s interests by 
recklessly adding to, erasing or otherwise altering the program or data. 
…70 
The Scottish Law Commission did not consider it necessary to propose legislation 
specifically aimed at any of the other categories of misuse identified in its consultative 
typology71; neither did it proposed criminalising unauthorised access per se. 
2.4.2 The Law Commission of England and Wales 
A Private Member’s Bill sponsored by Emma Nicholson MP was introduced in April 
1989 shortly after the findings of the Scottish Law Commission were published. The 
Bill’s proposals ran along similar lines to that of the Scottish Law Commission. 
However, this Bill was promptly withdrawn in August 1989 when the government 
undertook to legislate on the matter in the light of the forthcoming Report of the Law 
Commission of England and Wales.72 This was published in October 1989 and followed 
on from its 1988 Working Paper on Computer Misuse.73  
Unlike its Scottish counterpart, the England and Wales Law Commission did not 
provide a draft Bill to accompany its report, although it concluded with the 
recommendation that three new offences of computer misuse be created: unauthorised 
access to a computer; unauthorised access to a computer with intent to commit or 
facilitate the commission of a serious crime, and; unauthorised modification of 
computer material.74 
The government did not manage to introduce a Bill to implement these proposals. 
Instead, the late Michael Colvin MP sponsored a Bill75 which followed the approach of 
the Law Commission of England and Wales.  
2.4.3 The passage of the Computer Misuse Act 1990 
Michael Colvin’s Computer Misuse Bill received its second reading in the House of 
Commons on 9 February 1990. A large part of the debate was based around a number of 
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key issues: the impact of computer misuse on industry and commerce; the inadequacy 
of the pre-existing criminal law; and the prevailing media reporting of the dangers 
posed by hackers at the time. 
At the time, the Government was ‘seeking to encourage the greater use of information 
technology to create wealth…[with] a single Europe in mind’76 and could not 
underestimate the potential impact on industry. Accordingly, the sponsor of the Bill 
reported that: 
Computer misuse probably costs the United Kingdom between £400 million – 
the CBI’s77 figure – and perhaps as much as £2 billion a year, in terms of damage 
to systems.78 
Moreover, the costs associated with ‘cleaning up such a network can amount to 
hundreds of thousands of pounds’.79 The source of the extra £1.6 billion of commercial 
risk over and above the CBI’s estimate or the six-figure cost of rectification is, however, 
unclear and was not challenged in debate.  
Aside from the legislative and interpretative difficulties with the pre-existing law which 
have already been identified, attention was also drawn to the practical difficulties 
associated with prosecuting computer misuse: 
It is significant, for example, that of 270 cases that have been verified by the 
Department of Trade and Industry as involving computer misuse over the past 
five years, only six were brought to court for prosecution and only three of 
those were successfully prosecuted…80 
It was therefore envisaged that the new Bill would ease the difficulties associated with 
bringing a successful prosecution for computer misuse. Its success in this regard will be 
further considered in section 3.2 below. 
Perhaps the most disquieting facet of the debate was the MP’s perception of computer 
misusers. They were considered not to be ‘some sort of Raffles of the microchip’81, but 
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rather belonging to ‘the twisted culture that the Bill is trying to stamp out’82, living a 
drug-fuelled lifestyle, because: 
…hackers are very clever. They will find a way round protection that one buys 
or creates. That is what they are there for. They make a great deal of money out 
of it and the German hackers, at any rate, support a drug-based lifestyle on their 
activities…Because drugs are expensive, hackers need to make a great deal of 
money to support their lifestyle.83 
Not content with labelling all computer misusers as twisted drug-addicts, MPs moved 
on to consider their sexual adequacy and personality profile: 
The motives for malice are very complex…They are similar to people who make 
obscene telephone calls or misuse short-wave radio….I believe that a profound 
sexual inadequacy is often related to such behaviour.84 
[Hackers] may well be unemployed because they spend all night hacking, and 
lose their job because of poor performance or bad time-keeping, or they may 
have been sacked for hacking whilst at work…consequently they are often 
poor…They either go in for fraud or become security consultants…85 
The consistent theme in the debate was that the expansion of technology into the 
realm of the non-specialist was the root cause of the misuse problem: 
At one time, computers were used by only a few professors and very disciplined 
professionals, but the tremendous growth in microcomputing has meant the 
entry into the arena of the unspeakable.86 
Examples of the risks associated with computer misuse which were put forward during 
debate could be argued to be  somewhat sensationalist, including posting of 
pornography on bulletin boards used by an international club of disabled children;87 
hacking into NASA and CERN;88 blackmail of AIDS victims;89 the remote turning-off 
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of a life support system in a hospital intensive care unit90 and a factory worker almost 
killed by a hacked robot.91 
The Bill was not universally welcomed and a large number of amendments were 
proposed at the Standing Committee stage, most notably by Harry Cohen MP. In 
particular, Cohen wished to amend the Bill such that it would be a defence to the basic 
hacking offence to prove that ‘such care as in all the circumstances, was reasonably 
required to prevent the access or intended access in question, was not taken’.92 This was 
argued to be in line with data protection principles and modelled on section 23(3) of 
the Data Protection Act 1984 which provides a defence to data loss if the defendant 
exercised reasonable care in all the circumstances to prevent it. Cohen argued that the 
amendment would encourage users to make their systems secure since the 
criminalisation of computer misuse would mean that individuals might feel less 
compelled to take care of the security of their own systems. In other words, the 
presence of a criminal offence could be seen as adequate protection. This amendment 
was withdrawn on the basis that it would ‘introduce into English law the novel principle 
of contributory negligence as a defence in a criminal case’.93 However, it does 
demonstrate that there was some feeling even at the time of debating the Bill that 
criminal legislation as the only means of regulation might be in some way insufficient. 
The Bill received Royal Assent on 29 June 1990. 
2.5 The Computer Misuse Act 199094 
The Computer Misuse Act 1990 describes itself as: 
An Act to make provision for securing computer material against unauthorised 
access or modification; and for connected purposes.95 
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As such it created three main offences: unauthorised access to computer material96, 
unauthorised access to computer material with intent to commit or facilitate further 
offences97 and unauthorised modification of computer material.98  
Although there was some disparity between the Scottish Law Commission’s 
recommendations and those of the Law Commission of England and Wales, the Act 
extended to Scotland and Northern Ireland.99 Before considering how the Act was 
applied, it is necessary to provide a brief overview of the details of each of the offences 
it created. 
2.5.1 Section 1 – Unauthorised access to computer material 
Section 1 of the Act provides that: 
(1) A person is guilty of an offence if – 
(a) he causes a computer to perform any function with intent to 
secure access to any program or data held in any computer; 
(b)  the access he intends to secure is unauthorised; and 
(c)  he knows at the time when he causes the computer to perform 
the function that that is the case. 
(2) The intent a person has to have to commit an offence under this section 
need not be directed at – 
(a) any particular program or data; 
(b) a program or data of any particular kind; or 
(c) a program or data held in any particular computer. 
The section 1 offence is a summary offence which carries a penalty on summary 
conviction of imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months or to a fine not 
exceeding level 5 on the standard scale or to both.100 
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97 Computer Misuse Act 1990, s 2. 
98 Computer Misuse Act 1990, s 3. 
99 Computer Misuse Act 1990, s 13 (Scotland) and s 16 (Northern Ireland). 
100 Computer Misuse Act 1990, s 1(3). 
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‘Securing access’ is defined within section 17(2) of the Act as altering or erasing a 
program or data; copying or moving it to a different location on its storage medium or 
to a new storage medium; using it, or; having it output from the computer in which it is 
held. Section 17(5) deals with ‘unauthorised’ access. Access is unauthorised if the person 
gaining access is not entitled to control access to the program or data and does not have 
the consent to access the program or data from someone who is so entitled. 
It is perhaps interesting to note that section 17 does not define either ‘computer’ or 
‘misuse’. With respect to the definition of ‘computer’ the Scottish Law Commission 
was of the view that it: 
might be preferable not to offer any definition of that word on the basis that, 
since computer technology is advancing so fast, any definition, even if expressed 
in terms of function rather than construction, would rapidly become 
obsolete.101 
It also noted that the relatively new (at the time) computer evidence provisions within 
the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984102 did not seek to provide a definition. 
Moreover, the Law Commission of England and Wales considered that attempting to 
define ‘computer’ would have been wrong since any attempt would be necessarily 
complex, potentially flawed and susceptible to the creeping inaccuracy introduced by 
technological advances: 
[It] would be unnecessary, and indeed might be foolish, to attempt to define 
computer…In view of the nature of the proposed hacking offence…we cannot 
think that there will ever be serious grounds for arguments based on the 
ordinary meaning of  the term ‘computer’. By contrast, all the attempted 
definitions that we have seen are so complex, in an endeavour to be all-
embracing, that they are likely to produce extensive arguments, and thus 
confusion for magistrates, juries and judges…103 
In DPP v. McKeown; DPP v. Jones,104 Lord Hoffman defined a computer simply as ‘a 
device for storing, processing and retrieving information’.105 
                                                        
101 Scottish Law Commission, ‘Report on Computer Crime’ (Cm 174, July 1987) [4.17]. 
102 Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, ss 69, 70. 
103 Law Commission, ‘Criminal Law – Computer Misuse’ (Law Com No 186 Cm 819, 
1989) [3.39]. 
104 DPP v. McKeown; DPP v. Jones [1997] 1 WLR 295 (HL). 
105 Ibid, 302. 
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Indeed, attempts at a legislative definition of ‘computer’ from other jurisdictions are 
often cumbersome. For instance, the United States Code defines a ‘computer’ as: 
…an electronic, magnetic, optical, electrochemical, or other high speed data 
processing device performing logical, arithmetic, or storage functions, and 
includes any data storage facility or communications facility directly related to 
or operating in conjunction with such device, but such term does not include an 
automated typewriter or typesetter, a portable hand held calculator, or other 
similar device.106 
As the Law Commission speculated, such a complex definition has been open to much 
discussion in the United States.107 
The view of the Law Commission that no definition was necessary was largely echoed 
throughout the debate on the Computer Misuse Bill, although in Standing Committee, 
Harry Cohen MP attempted, without success, to amend the Bill to provide a definition 
as follows: 
(1A) A computer means equipment which can, in the form of one or more 
continuous variables, accept data, store data or programs in a storage medium, 
process data by means of a program and provide for the output of data. 
(1B) Where a computer is embedded within other equipment, the computer 
shall form a unit which can be: (a) identified as being a distinct part of the 
equipment and (b) routinely accessed in order to allow modifications to 
programs or data to be made.108 
This definition is expressed in terms of functionality and not devices. In this sense, it is 
similar to the definition of ‘data’ provided in the Data Protection Act 1998 which 
expresses itself in terms of processing and not devices.109 
The Oxford English Dictionary defines a computer as: 
An electronic device which is capable of receiving information (data) and 
performing a sequence of logical operations in accordance with a predetermined 
                                                        
106 Counterfeit Access Device and Computer Fraud and Abuse Act 18 USC § 1030(e)(1) 
107 Tompkins, J and Mar, L, ‘The 1984 Federal Computer Crime Statute: A Partial 
Answer to a Pervasive Problem’ (1985) 6 Computer and Law Journal 459; Kutz, R, 
‘Computer Crime in Virginia’ (1986) 27 William and Mary Law Review 783.  
108 Standing Committee C, ‘Computer Misuse Bill’ HC (1989-90) col 81 (28 March 1990). 
109 Data Protection Act 1998, s 1(1). 
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but variable set of procedural instructions (program) to produce a result in the 
form of information or signals.110 
The establishes the defining characteristics as data storage and retrieval and the ability 
to process information within an electronic device. An alternative definition, albeit for 
‘computer systems’ rather than ‘computer’ per se, can be found in the Council of 
Europe Convention on Cybercrime which defines such ‘computer systems’ as: 
Any device or group of inter-connected or related devices, one or more of 
which, pursuant to a program, performs automatic processing of data.111 
These definitions also neatly illustrate the difficulties facing the draftsman: although 
computers are now electronic, Babbage’s ‘analytical engine’ designed in 1822 is surely 
also a computer despite its being mechanical.112 Moreover, a microwave oven which 
calculates cooking time based on the weight and type of the food placed within it could 
be said to fall within both the dictionary definition and the Council of Europe 
definition, since it undeniably makes decisions on the basis of information received and 
is therefore processing data; even though this is secondary to the attainment of its 
primary purpose of cooking food. Moreover, it could potentially fall within the 
wording of Cohen’s proposed amendment to the Bill, since the computing part of a 
microwave oven, where instructions are input, could be said to be clearly distinct from 
its cooking part where the food rotates on its platter. However it would be patently 
absurd to refer to such a device as a ‘computer’ and even less a ‘computer system’ in the 
normal everyday meaning of the terms. 
Despite the seeming difficulties with the definition of ‘computer’, an All Party 
Parliamentary Internet Group (APIG) study in 2004 considered that there had been no 
difficulties resulting from the lack of statutory definition. Moreover, the Home Office 
reported that they had ‘never come across a case’ where the courts had failed to use a 
‘broad definition’ of the term, concluding that: 
We recommend that the Government resist calls for words such as ‘computer’ 
to be defined on the face of the Computer Misuse Act and continue with the 
                                                        
110 <http://www.oed.com> accessed 25 September 2008. 
111 Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime (signed 23 November 2001) ETS 185, 
art 1a. 
112 Ormerod, D, Smith and Hogan Criminal Law (11th edn OUP, Oxford, 2004) 926 (n 
15). 
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scheme whereby they will be understood by the courts to have the appropriate 
contemporary meaning.113  
What constitutes a computer therefore remains for the court to decide. 
Having considered the meaning of computer, the second element of the actus reus of 
the section 1 offence is ‘causing a computer to perform any function’. This 
encompasses those who use the computer but are denied access as well as the more 
successful hacker. Merely switching the computer on or using a non-open access 
computer without permission114 is sufficient to satisfy the actus reus. The section 1 
offence is a summary offence115 and, since there is no express provision to the contrary, 
there can be no liability for attempting to commit it.116 Therefore, if the actus reus was 
defined in terms of ‘unauthorised access’ alone, it would fail to extend to the 
unsuccessful hacker who had merely attempted to make an unauthorised access; hence 
the broadening of the actus reus to cover ‘any function’. 
The mens rea of the section 1 offence is twofold: the defendant must know that his 
intended access was unauthorised and he must intend to secure access to any program 
or data held in the computer. Reckless access is insufficient.117  
2.5.2 Section 2 – Unauthorised access with intent to commit or facilitate further 
offences 
Section 2 of the Act provides that: 
(1) A person is guilty of an offence under this section if he commits an 
offence under section 1…with intent – 
(a) to commit an offence to which this section applies [generally 
arrestable offences];118 or 
                                                        
113 All Party Internet Group, ‘Revision of the Computer Misuse Act: Report of an 
Inquiry by the All Party Internet Group’ (June 2004) [15]. 
114 Ellis v. DPP [2001] EWHC Admin 362. 
115 Computer Misuse Act 1990, s 1(3). 
116 Criminal Attempts Act 1981, s 1(4). 
117 Although this was proposed under Emma Nicholson’s Private Member’s Bill, cl 
1(1)(b). 
118 Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, s 24 as substituted by Serious Organised 
Crime and Police Act 2005, s 110. 
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(b) to facilitate the commission of such an offence (whether by 
himself or by any other person); 
and the offence he intends to commit or facilitate is referred to…as the 
further offence. 
This is a more serious offence than the basic section 1 offence and, as such, carries a 
maximum penalty on conviction on indictment to five years imprisonment, a fine or 
both. As with section 1, this offence is defined in terms of preparatory conduct: it is 
not necessary to prove that the intended further offence has been committed; 
moreover, the further offence need not be committed by computer or at the same time 
as the unauthorised access.119 In this sense, it is analogous to burglary under section 
9(1)(a) of the Theft Act 1968: an initial unauthorised entry with the requisite intent to 
commit a further offence.120 
2.5.3 Section 3 – Unauthorised modification of computer material 
Section 3 of the Act provides that: 
(1) A person is guilty of an offence if –  
(a) he does any act which causes an unauthorised modification of 
the contents of any computer; and 
(b) at the time when he does the act he has the requisite intent and 
the requisite knowledge. 
(2) For the purposes of subsection (1)(b) above the requisite intent is an 
intent to cause a modification of the contents of any computer and by 
so doing – 
(a) to impair the operation of any computer 
(b) to prevent or hinder access to any program or data held in any 
computer; or 
(c) to impair the operation of any such program or the reliability of 
any such data. 
                                                        
119 Computer Misuse Act 1990, s 2(3). 
120 For burglary, these are listed in s 9(2) of the Theft Act 1968: the list is much 
narrower than that under section 2 of the Computer Misuse Act 1990. 
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(3) The intent need not be directed at – 
(a) any particular computer; 
(b) any particular program or data or a program or data of any 
particular kind; or 
(c) any particular modification or a modification of any particular 
kind. 
(4) For the purposes of subsection (1)(b) above, the requisite knowledge is 
knowledge that any modification he intends to cause is unauthorised. 
Sections 17(7) and 17(8) of the 1990 Act provide the statutory definition of an 
‘unauthorised modification’ of the contents of a computer. A ‘modification’ takes place 
if any program or data held in the computer concerned is added to, altered, or erased. 
An unauthorised modification is one where the person causing it is not entitled to 
determine whether it should be made and does not have the consent of a person who is 
entitled to determine whether or not the modification should be made. 
The section 3 offence is designed to encompass activities involving computer viruses,121 
‘Trojan horses’122 and worms123 as well as interference with websites124 or accessing 
subscription cable television channels without paying the subscription.125 This is a 
different mischief to that tackled by sections 1 and 2. Here, the offence is concerned 
with forms of electronic sabotage which may be carried out without the unauthorised 
access required in the other offences. Moreover, it deals with the potential for 
overlapping liability with the criminal damage charges arising from Cox v. Riley and 
Whiteley by introducing section 3(6) which provides that: 
                                                        
121 A small program written to alter the way a computer operates without the 
permission of the user. It must execute and replicate itself. (Symantec, Norton 
AntiVirus Knowledge Base version 7.0, 30 March 2005). 
122 A file that claims to be something desirable but is, in fact, malicious. Unlike true 
viruses, Trojan horse programs do not replicate themselves. (Symantec, Norton 
AntiVirus Knowledge Base version 7.0, 30 March 2005). 
123 Programs that replicate themselves from system to system without the use of a host 
file, in contrast to viruses which require the spreading of an infected host file. 
(Symantec, Norton AntiVirus Knowledge Base version 7.0, 30 March 2005). 
124 R v. Lindesay [2002] 1 Cr App R (S) 370 (CA). 
125 R v. Parr-Moore [2003] 1 Cr App R (S) 425 (CA). 
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For the purposes of the Criminal Damage Act 1971, a modification of the 
contents of a computer shall not be regarded as damaging any computer or 
computer storage medium unless its effect on that computer or computer 
storage medium impairs its physical condition. 
By effectively reversing Cox v. Riley, the Act partitions electronic vandalism from 
physical vandalism, although it should be noted that the maximum penalties following 
conviction on indictment for the offences are different: five years imprisonment under 
the Computer Misuse Act and ten years under the Criminal Damage Act. Many would 
contend, particularly systems administrators, that the levels of damage and consequent 
expenditure of highly-skilled labour required after an electronic attack are at least 
comparable to a physical attack. For the purposes of section 3(2), a computer's 
reliability is impaired if it is used to record information as deriving from a particular 
person when it in, in fact, derived from someone else.126 
2.5.4 Jurisdiction 
The Law Commission recognised that the nature of computer misuse often transcended 
national boundaries: 
A hacker, with or without dishonest intentions, may for instance sit in London 
and, through an international telephone system, enter or try to enter a 
computer in New York or vice versa. More complex ‘chains’, involving 
computer systems in an number of countries before the ‘target’ computer is 
accessed are entirely possible.127 
The 1990 Act gives jurisdiction to prosecute all offences where there is at least one 
significant link with domestic jurisdiction in the circumstances of the case.128 Such a 
link is defined as either that the accused was in the ‘home country’129 at the time that 
he did the act which caused the computer to perform the function130 or that the 
computer to which the accused secured (or intended to secure) access was in the home 
country at that time.131 Therefore the courts have jurisdiction where the misuse 
originates in the home country or is directed at a computer within it. However, this 
                                                        
126 Zezev v. Governor of HM Prison Brixton [2002] EWHC 589 (Admin). 
127 Law Commission, ‘Criminal Law – Computer Misuse’ (Law Com No 186 Cm 819, 
1989) [4.1]. 
128 Computer Misuse Act 1990, s 4(2). 
129 England and Wales, Scotland or Northern Ireland; Computer Misuse Act 1990, s 4(6). 
130 Computer Misuse Act 1990, s 5(2)(a). 
131 Computer Misuse Act 1990, s 5(2)(b). 
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jurisdiction is subject to dual criminality, such that where a section 2 offence is 
committed within the home country but the further offence is to take place outside the 
national boundaries, the courts only have jurisdiction if the further offence is also a 
criminal offence in the target country as well as in the home country.132 The Court of 
Appeal has taken this approach in relation to obscene articles, holding that website 
content hosted abroad falls within domestic jurisdiction when downloaded in the 
United Kingdom.133  
2.6 Conclusion 
In the period up until 1990, computer technology advanced in terms of storage capacity, 
processing power, user-friendliness and accessibility. It also became progressively 
cheaper to produce and therefore more widely available in the commercial and private 
marketplace. Computer technology moved from the realm of the specialist and the 
scientist into private industry and the home. Computers also gave rise to networks; not 
only the early networks of interconnected computers such as ARPANET and BITNET 
but also the social networks organised by user communities and enthusiasts. 
In parallel with the technological advancements, computers also began to be used for 
unauthorised purposes. Initially this unauthorised activity, pursued by enthusiastic 
insiders keen to understand and engage further with the new possibilities offered by 
computing, was ignored. Indeed, in some instances it was encouraged as a means of 
attracting talented operatives. However, via the phone phreaks, a hacker culture 
emerged. While the activities of the hacker were often predominantly led by the 
intellectual challenge of gaining unauthorised access to a system, fears around data 
security and public safety increasingly became matters of public concern. Malicious 
hacking began to become more prevalent during the 1980s, at which time the first 
computer viruses also came into circulation.  
The domestic criminal law which existed at the time had some success in dealing with 
unauthorised access and unauthorised modification of data. Prosecutions were often 
brought on the basis of the Criminal Damage Act 1971. However, the failure of the 
Forgery and Counterfeiting Act 1981 to deal with the ‘Prestel hack’ by Gold and 
Schifreen, helped to give impetus to the proposals put forward by the Law Commissions 
of Scotland and, later, England and Wales. The Computer Misuse Act 1990 created 
three new criminal offences: unauthorised access to computer material, unauthorised 
access to computer material with the intent to commit or facilitate further offences and 
                                                        
132 Computer Misuse Act 1990, ss 4(4), 8(1). 
133 R v. Waddon (6 April 2000) (CA); R v. Perrin [2002] EWCA Crim 747. 
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unauthorised modification of computer material. It also gave jurisdiction to prosecute 
offences where there is a significant link with domestic jurisdiction.  
Having charted the technological and legal landscape up to the enactment of the 1990 
Act, the next chapter will explore technological developments since its enactment, 
survey how the Act has been used in practice and consider recent proposals for its 
reform. 
  
3 
The evolution of the problem of computer misuse 
 
Humanity is acquiring all the right technology for all the wrong reasons. 
R Buckminster Fuller, developer of the geodesic dome (1895 - 1983) 
 
The previous chapter charted the evolution of computers and computer misuse up to 
the enactment of the Computer Misuse Act 1990. This chapter will continue those two 
parallel evolutionary strands: the continued progression in computing power, reach and 
accessibility post-1990 and the consequent expansion of the types of computer misuse. 
Following on from the conclusion of the last chapter which discussed the offences 
created by the 1990 Act, this chapter will examine whether or not the Act was effective 
in controlling the problem together with any potential reasons for any ineffectiveness. 
It will consider both prosecution rates and judicial interpretation. This chapter will 
conclude with a survey of the various attempts that have been made to update the 1990 
Act, discussing the driving forces behind these attempts and their outcomes, analysing 
the amendments to the 1990 Act made by the Police and Justice Act 2006 and 
considering the possible ramifications of those amendments. 
3.1 The evolution of computing and computer misuse post-1990 
3.1.1 Computing and networking 
As discussed in chapter 2, local networking of hitherto standalone ‘personal’ computers 
had become commonplace in the office environment at the time of the 1990 Act. 
However, the underlying technology which facilitated local networking also enabled the 
development of the Internet. 
The Internet evolved from the ARPANET,1 although there are key differences between 
the two. The Internet is not a single network. It comprises a ‘network of networks’ 
spread across the globe, with a number of these networks allowing public access, rather 
than restricting access to a particular community. On a technical level, the Internet 
allows communications between these networks using a single common protocol, 
                                                        
1 See section 2.1.2. 
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known as TCP/IP2 whereas ARPANET was originally based on a communications 
technology called NCP.3 NCP, however, could not enable communications between 
separate networks and the ARPANET migrated to use the prevailing TCP/IP protocol 
in January 1983. 
The growth of the Internet was driven by a combination of both social and 
technological factors. State financial and administrative support was moved away from 
ARPA on to the National Science Foundation in the 1980s and in the 1990s to 
organisations who allowed Internet access to anyone, including commercial concerns. 
By 1995 commercial users (the ‘dot coms’) vastly outnumbered the Internet’s original 
governmental, military and educational users. In addition, the enabling TCP/IP protocol 
was supported by ARPA and thus became widely available in academic institutions. The 
fact that this protocol was not proprietary to IBM or DEC enabled its swift propagation 
throughout the development community. The increasing prevalence of local area 
networks also enabled increasingly large numbers of people to access the Internet 
without each individual computer requiring a direct connection.  
The World Wide Web is distinct from the Internet in that it is a system of interlinked, 
hypertext documents that runs over the Internet. In other words, the Internet itself is 
the enabling technology that allows the World Wide Web to function. The original 
prototype for the Web was developed in 1990 by Sir Tim Berners-Lee at CERN, the 
European particle physics laboratory. He later stated that: 
The Web’s major goal was to be a shared information space through which 
people and machines could communicate. This space was to be inclusive, rather 
than exclusive.4 
The design of the Internet has allowed it to scale enormously without severe disruption. 
In parallel with this networked expansion, the processing and storage capabilities of 
computers have continued to grow while their price has fallen. The increasing 
commoditisation of computer technology coupled with the scalability and accessibility 
of the Internet has resulted in over one billion people worldwide (16.6 per cent of the 
total global population) becoming Internet users. The growth in world internet usage is 
illustrated in Figure 3-1: 
                                                        
2 Transmission control protocol/internet protocol. 
3 Network control protocol. 
4 Berners-Lee, T, ‘WWW: Past, Present and Future’ (1996) 29 IEE Computer 69, 70. 
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Figure 3-1 – World Internet usage (millions) 1995-20075  
 
 
It can be seen that extent of internet usage has grown dramatically since the enactment 
of the 1990 Act. This expansion of networked technology has also given rise to a much 
greater number of potential targets for computer misuse which may be accessed 
remotely via the network.  
3.1.2 The expansion of computer misuse 
The number of incidents of computer misuse grew in parallel with the increased 
availability of networked technologies. The Computer Emergency Response Team 
(CERT)6 collects statistical information on security vulnerabilities which may render 
computers susceptible as targets of misuse. These vulnerability statistics are compiled 
from reliable public sources and incidents notified to the CERT directly. While these 
statistics may not encapsulate the entire spectrum of potential vulnerabilities, they do 
allow some insight into the increasing trend in their number over the past thirteen years 
as shown in Figure 3-2: 
                                                        
5 Miniwatts Marketing Group, ‘World Internet Usage Statistics’ 
<http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats.htm> accessed 25 September 2008. 
6 See section 7.2.1 for a detailed discussion of the role of CERTs. 
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Figure 3-2 – Vulnerabilities catalogued by CERT 1994-20077 
 
 
The CERT also collected statistics relating to the number of incident reports received 
up until 2003. By this time, the prevalence of automated attack tools used against 
Internet-connected systems had become so commonplace that counts of the number of 
incidents reported provide little information with regard to assessing the scope and 
impact of attacks. However, it can be clearly seen in Figure 3-3 that the number of 
incidents had increased greatly until the point that data collection was discontinued: 
                                                        
7 <http://www.cert.org/stats/fullstats.html> accessed 25 September 2008. 
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Figure 3-3 – Incident reports received by CERT 1988-20038 
 
 
In summary, there has been a vast expansion in the prevalence of networked computer 
technology since 1990 which has been mirrored by a corresponding increase in the 
numbers of potential vulnerabilities to computer misuse vulnerabilities and the numbers 
of incidents reported. Given this, it is next necessary to explore whether the 1990 Act 
has produced a corresponding rise in prosecution rates. 
3.2 Prosecutions under the Computer Misuse Act 1990 
At the time that the 1990 Act was enacted, it was lamented that only six cases in the 
preceding five years had been brought to court and, of those, only three were 
successfully prosecuted. It was hoped that the 1990 Act would alleviate these 
difficulties; however, official statistics tend to suggest otherwise:9  
                                                        
8 Ibid. 
9 Akdeniz, Y, ‘CyberCrime’ in Stokes, S and Carolina, R (eds), E-Commerce Law and 
Regulation Encyclopedia (Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2003) 15-18. 
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Table 3.1 – Numbers of persons cautioned by the police for principal offences under 
the Computer Misuse Act 1990 (England and Wales) 1999-2001 
 Section 1 Section 2 Section 3 
1991 — — — 
1992 — — — 
1993 — 1 1 
1994 — — — 
1995 — — 2 
1996 — — 6 
1997 — — 1 
1998 — — — 
1999 9 2 7 
2000 4 5 15 
2001 10 — 10 
Total (1991-2001) 23 8 42 
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Table 3.2 – Number of persons proceeded against for principal offences under the 
Computer Misuse Act 1990 (England and Wales) 1991 – 2002 
 Section 1 Section 2 Section 3 
1991 — — 4 
1992 — 1 6 
1993 — 1 7 
1994 — 1 3 
1995 — 1 5 
1996 — 2 2 
1997 — — 7 
1998 6 6 4 
1999 6 3 4 
2000 8 3 8 
2001 9 4 12 
2002 4 6 8 
Total (1991-2002) 33 28 70 
 
These figures are, perhaps, surprisingly low. There are a number of potential 
explanations for this.10 In particular, major organisations believe that they would not 
benefit from bringing a prosecution under the 1990 Act, instead relying on internal 
disciplinary matters in the case of misuse committed by employees.11 According to the 
DTI: 
Companies were generally good at taking disciplinary action against staff when 
policies were breached. However, very few took any form of legal action. For 
virus infections, there was a general perception that no-one had broken the law. 
                                                        
10 Ibid, 15-21. 
11 For example, Denco Ltd v. Joinson [1992] 1 All ER 463 (EAT) which involved 
unauthorised access to data on an employer’s computer system via a colleague’s 
password. 
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There was little appetite to pursue the virus writers. When staff caused 
breaches, internal disciplinary measures were normally considered sufficient.12 
This may be because there is no prospect of restitutionary damages or compensation for 
loss in a criminal prosecution under the 1990 Act. For most organisations, the prospect 
of adverse publicity resulting from a security breach seems to outweigh the benefit of 
prosecution. As User 8 said: 
If someone got into our data, the last thing we’d want is for it to be all over the 
courts and the papers. Software is our business. Do you really think we’d want 
our customers to hear we’d been caught out? That would be commercial 
suicide. 
Moreover there are concerns that the police will not have the resources or expertise to 
assist. This was a common theme in the interviews with both police officers and 
technology users alike: 
If someone came up to my desk and told me that they had a virus, I’d tell them 
to go to their doctor. It would be different if they’d had their car nicked, I 
suppose, but we can’t go looking for things that don’t exist, can we?13 
We just haven’t got the time. We can’t handle burglaries, let alone all these 
computer attacks. I’m not saying that we shouldn’t. We just can’t.14 
What would be the point in going to the police? They’re not going to recover 
our data. Even if there’s a miracle and they do catch whoever’s done it, we’ll 
still be out of pocket. Locking someone up won’t help us.15 
It seems therefore that the 1990 Act has not been greatly exercised in comparison to the 
growth of the problem of computer misuse. In order to explore why this might be the 
case, the next section will consider the ways in which it is has been applied and examine 
whether the Act presents particular interpretative challenges for the court. 
                                                        
12 DTI, ‘Information Security Breaches Survey 2004’ 
<http://www.pwc.com/images/gx/eng/about/svcs/grms/2004Technical_Report.pdf> 
accessed 25 September 2008. 
13 Police Officer 2. 
14 Police Officer 1. 
15 User 3. 
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3.3 Interpretation of the Computer Misuse Act 199016 
3.3.1 Section 1 – the basic hacking offence 
Early judicial interpretation of this section was somewhat curious. In R v. Cropp,17 the 
defendant visited his former employer and obtained a 70 per cent discount on goods by 
entering the discount on the computerised till part way through a transaction, while the 
sales assistant was absent in the store-room checking details of the serial number of the 
goods in question. This resulted in an invoice for £204.60 plus VAT instead of the 
correct sum of £710.96 plus VAT. Cropp was charged under section 2(1) of the 1990 
Act, allegedly having secured unauthorised access to a computer in contravention of 
section 1(1) of the 1990 Act with intent to commit the further offence of false 
accounting.18 However, at first instance, it was held that section 1(1) did not apply to 
the facts of this case, since, in order to contravene the section, it was necessary to 
establish that the defendant had used one computer with intent to secure unauthorised 
access into another computer. Aglionby J held: 
It seems to me, doing the best that I can in elucidating the meaning of section 
1(1)(a), that a second computer must be involved. It seems to me to be straining 
language to say that only one computer is necessary when one looks to see the 
actual wording of the subsection: ‘Causing a computer to perform any function 
with intent to secure access to any program or data held in any computer’. 
This decision seemed incongruous with the purpose that the Act declared in its own 
long title: securing computer material against unauthorised access. If Cropp was to be 
followed, this would have the effect of limiting the scope of the Act to networked 
systems alone; whilst this would not seem to be too problematic in the modern 
networked society, it is particularly surprising in the context of the time when many 
more computers were standalone. The prospect of excluding computer material on 
standalone machines from the protection of the Act led to the swift intervention of the 
Attorney-General and consideration by the Court of Appeal who ruled that Aglionby J 
had erred in law. Lord Taylor of Gosforth CJ commented: 
                                                        
16 See also Fafinski, S, ‘Access Denied: Computer Misuse in an Era of Technological 
Change’ (2006) 70 Journal of Criminal Law 424 (reproduced in Appendix B). 
17 R v. Cropp (unreported) 4 July 1990 in Teichner, F, ‘Regulating Cyberspace’ 15th 
BILETA Conference (14 April 2000) 
<http://www.bileta.ac.uk/Document%20Library/1/Regulating%20Cyberspace.pdf> 
accessed 25 September 2008. 
18 Theft Act 1968, s 17(1)(a). 
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[Counsel for the Attorney-General] pointed to the surprising, and indeed 
unlikely lacunae which this Act would have left in the field of interference with 
computers if the construction for which [counsel for the respondent] contends 
were correct… [The] kind of activity of going straight to the in-house computer 
and extracting confidential information from it could be committed with 
impunity so far as the three offences in this Act are concerned. 19 
In effect, the Court of Appeal implied the words ‘including itself’ at the end of the 
section 1(1)(a), closing the door that Aglionby J opened in Cropp. 
However, it is interesting to note that an amendment to the Bill was moved during the 
Standing Committee which would have had precisely the same effect as the decision in 
Cropp: 
[The amendment] ensures that at least two computers are involved in a clause 1 
offence: the computer used by the hacker and the target computer that is 
misused.20 
This amendment was unsuccessful, although its existence demonstrates that there was 
at least some Parliamentary support for Aglionby J. 
In Bedworth21 it was alleged that the defendant and two others modified code within 
the Financial Times share index database and disrupted research work at the European 
Organisation for the Research and Treatment of Cancer. Bedworth was charged inter 
alia with two counts of conspiracy under the Act relating to both the section 1 and 
section 3 offences. However Bedworth argued that he had developed an addiction to 
computer use, calling expert witnesses to corroborate his claim to suffering from 
‘computer tendency syndrome’ and as a result was unable to form the requisite intent. 
The jury accepted this argument and Bedworth was acquitted; a decision ‘described by 
some as a “licence to hack”’.22 
DPP v. Bignell23 imposed a significant limitation on the ambit of the Act. This case 
concerned a husband and wife who were both officers in the Metropolitan police force. 
They instructed police computer operators to extract the registration and ownership 
                                                        
19 Attorney-General’s Reference (No. 1 of 1991) [1993] QB 94 (CA) 100. 
20 Standing Committee C, ‘Computer Misuse Bill’ HC (1989-90) (14 March 1990). 
21 R v. Bedworth (unreported) 1991 in Akdeniz, Y, ‘Section 3 of the Computer Misuse 
Act 1990: an antidote for computer viruses!’ [1996] 3 Web Journal of Current Legal 
Issues <http://webjcli.ncl.ac.uk/1996/issue3/akdeniz3.html> accessed 25 September 2008. 
22 Charlesworth, A, ‘Addiction and hacking’ (1993) 143 New Law Journal 540. 
23 DPP v. Bignell [1998] 1 Cr App R 1 (DC). 
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details of two cars parked outside the house of the husband’s ex-wife from the Police 
National Computer. They were convicted on six counts of the section 1 unauthorised 
access offence by a district judge (magistrates’ court) and fined. The defendants 
appealed on the basis that their access was not unlawful; their access had been with 
authority, even though the authority was used for an unauthorised purpose: this was 
upheld, but the prosecution appealed by way of case stated. This prosecution appeal 
was unsuccessful, with Astill J considering that: 
[T]he starting point is to consider the purpose of the Computer Misuse Act 
1990. It is common ground that it was enacted to criminalise the breaking into 
or ‘hacking’ or computer systems.24 
Therefore, the police officers involved had not acted unlawfully, since they were 
authorised to access the system: 
A person who is authorised to secure access to a program or data does not 
commit an offence under s 1 of the Computer Misuse Act 1990 if he accesses 
the computer at the authorised level.25 
Wasik commented that this decision was ‘inconvenient and…open to criticism’ since: 
…on ordinary construction of language, authorising a person’s access for one 
(legitimate) purpose ought not to be regarded as authorising his access for 
another (non-legitimate) purpose.26 
The decision is also at odds with the situation in relation to burglary in the physical 
world. In R v. Jones and Smith,27 the Court of Appeal held that a general permission to 
enter a property did not encompass permission with intention to steal. However, Bignell 
effectively confined the concept of unauthorised access to ‘outside’ hackers who have 
no authority to access a particular computer system. It is particularly noteworthy given 
that much misuse was, and still is, committed by ‘insiders’ and that many of the 
computers subject to misuse have been standalone. Examples of this include the 
computerised saw in Cox v. Riley and the electronic cash register in Cropp.  
However, Astill J’s dicta were disapproved by the House of Lords in R v. Bow Street 
Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate and Allison, ex parte Government of the United 
                                                        
24 DPP v. Bignell [1998] 1 Cr App R 1 (DC), 12. 
25 Ibid, 13. 
26 Wasik, M, ‘Computer misuse and misconduct in public office’ (2008) 22 International 
Review of Law, Computers and Technology 135, 137. 
27 R v. Jones and Smith [1976] 1 WLR 672 (CA). 
  
61 
States of America.28 This case involved the attempted extradition from England to the 
United States of an individual who had allegedly obtained 189 sets of account 
information from a credit analyst employed by American Express and used that 
information to forge credit cards and subsequently withdraw around US$1,000,000 from 
automatic teller machines. The extradition order specified inter alia two proposed 
charges of conspiring with the employee to commit the section 2(1) offence; specifically 
that of securing unauthorised access to the American Express computer system contrary 
to section 1(1) of the 1990 Act with the further intent to commit forgery and theft. 
This set of facts seemed analogous to those in Bignell; both cases involving the misuse 
of information obtained by a person authorised to secure access to that information. 
The magistrate refused to commit the defendant on these charges, holding a view 
consistent with Bignell that ‘unauthorised access’ did not extend to an authorised user 
who misused the information obtained. The US Government sought judicial review of 
the decision not to extradite. 
In considering whether the defendant had committed an offence under section 1(1) of 
the 1990 Act (and thereby potentially having conspired to commit the section 2(1) 
offence; a sufficient crime for extradition to the US to be granted), the Divisional 
Court upheld the decision at first instance.29 On further appeal, the House of Lords 
considered that the court in Bignell, and indeed the Divisional Court, had confused the 
concept of being entitled to access a particular computer or network with that of being 
entitled to access programs and data on a machine: 
[The decision of the Divisional Court in Bignell] seems to derive 
from…confusion between kinds of access and kinds of data. Nor is section 1 of 
the Act concerned with authority to access kinds of data. It is concerned with 
authority to access the actual data involved. Because section 1(1) creates an 
offence which can be committed as a result of having an intent to secure 
unauthorised access without…actually succeeding, section 1(2) does not require 
that the relevant intent relate to any specific data. But that does not mean that 
access to the data in question does not have to be authorised. 
Therefore, any ambiguity regarding the definition of ‘unauthorised’ was resolved: the 
term relates to the specific data accessed rather than the same ‘kind of data’ suggested 
by Astill J in Bignell. However, Lord Hobhouse also considered that Bignell was 
                                                        
28 R v. Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate and Allison, ex parte 
Government of the United States of America [2000] 2 AC 216 (HL). 
29 R v. Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate and Allison, ex parte 
Government of the United States of America [1999] QB 847 (DC). 
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probably decided correctly, in that the defendants had ‘merely requested’ another to 
obtain the information, and that the operator has not exceeded the authority 
permitting him to access data in response to requests made to him in proper form by a 
police officer. This has been criticised by JC Smith as a ‘rather narrow view of the 
activity of the defendants’30, the operators seemingly acting as innocent agents: 
Were they any different from a janitor who is instructed to unlock the door of a 
cell? Was it not really the defendants who were accessing data on the 
computer?... [It] may be that they were authorised to access the data in 
question in the way that they did. 31 
The decision in Allison also made it clear that the Act’s application extended to 
employees, meaning that, if an employee is subject to a limitation on their authorisation 
to access data on a computer and that authorisation is exceeded, this activity may fall 
within the ambit of the 1990 Act. This decision was welcomed ‘signalling that the Act, 
after seeing little use in its first decade, has come of age and will now be a useful tool 
for prosecuting authorities’.32  
However, the 1990 Act was not used in R v. Hardy.33 This involved similar facts to 
Bignell. In Hardy, the defendant had used the Police National Computer to download 
information on three people. He passed this information to his co-defendant, Jolley, a 
known criminal with previous convictions for offences of violence, in order that the 
Jolley could deal with those who he believed to have committed offences against 
himself and his partner. Hardy was charged with, and pleaded guilty to, misconduct in 
public office34 rather than the section 1 offence. Section 4(1) of the Official Secrets Act 
                                                        
30 Smith, JC, ‘R v. Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate and Another, ex 
parte Government of the United States of America’ (case note) [1999] Criminal Law 
Review 970, 971. 
31 Ibid, 972. 
32 Stein, K, ‘“Unauthorised access” and the UK Computer Misuse Act 1990: House of 
Lords “leaves no room” for ambiguity’ (2000) 6 Computer and Telecommunications 
Law Review 63. 
33 R v. Hardy (Attorney-General’s Reference (No. 1 of 2007)) [2007] EWCA Crim 760. 
34 R v. Dytham [1979] QB 722 (CA) deals with the offence in relation to failure of a 
police officer in his duty to preserve the Queen’s peace; the offence is now defined in 
Attorney General’s Reference (No. 3 of 2003) [2004] EWCA Crim 868 [30], such that 
the defendant must be subjectively aware of the duty and subjectively reckless in its 
fulfilment. 
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1989 might also have been used as the offender was a Crown servant35 who disclosed 
information obtained by virtue of his position without lawful authority which would be 
likely to result in the commission of an offence;36 however this would have applied to 
the consequences of the disclosure rather than the acquisition of the information in its 
own right. When questioned as to why Hardy was not charged under the 1990 Act 
following Allison and Bignell, counsel for the Attorney-General commented that the 
answer was three-fold. The first possibility was through ignorance, in that ‘most 
criminal lawyers are unfamiliar with and wary of “computer” offences, as they expect 
them to hold hidden dangers for all but the über-geek’.37 The second was that the 
‘gravamen of the misconduct was not really the misuse of the computer but the abuse 
of the officer’s position of trust’.38 The final option was that the person selecting the 
charge was ‘ignorant of [Allison and Bignell] (as was I) or at least did not have it in 
mind at the relevant time’.39 This provides an interesting insight into the reluctance of 
the prosecuting authorities to use the 1990 Act, preferring instead to rely upon a 
relatively unusual common law offence. However, as Wasik comments, the offence of 
misconduct in public office has been used successfully against police officers in a very 
wide range of factual circumstances. It has been used relatively frequently in relation to 
police misuse of police computers.40 It remains a convenient recourse for prosecutors 
because, as a common law offence, it carries a penalty of up to life imprisonment and is 
therefore more appropriate for use in the more serious cases where the conduct merits a 
penalty well in excess of that available under statute. Being loosely defined, it also 
avoids many of the definitional problems already identified within the 1990 Act.41 
Moreover, there may have been an alternative (but less attractive) basis for prosecution 
under section 55 of the Data Protection Act 1998 as will be examined further in section 
3.6.2 below. 
                                                        
35 This includes police officers; Official Secrets Act 1989, s 12(1)(e). 
36 Official Secrets Act 1989, s 4(2)(b). 
37 Statement by Adrian Darbishire (Personal email correspondence 17 April 2007). 
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid. 
40 See R v. O’Leary [2007] EWCA Crim 186; R v. Kassim [2006] EWCA Crim 1020; R v. 
Keyte [1998] 2 Cr App R (S) 165 (CA) in Wasik, M, ‘Computer misuse and misconduct 
in public office’ (2008) 22 International Review of Law, Computers and Technology 
135, 138-140. 
41 Ibid, 140-1. 
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3.3.2 Section 2 – unauthorised access with intent to commit or facilitate further 
offences 
An illustration of the section 2 offence can be found in R v. Delamare (Ian).42 Here, the 
defendant worked in the Poole branch of Barclays Bank and was approached by an old 
school acquaintance who asked him to disclose the details of two bank account holders 
for £50 each and in discharge of a favour he owed this acquaintance as a result of events 
during their schooldays. This led to an attempt to impersonate one of the account 
holders and obtain £10,000 from the bank. Delamare was convicted (after pleading 
guilty) on two counts of the section 2(1) offence and sentenced to eighteen months in a 
young offender institution, reduced to four months on appeal. This illustrates how the 
using the bank’s computer to access information with a view to facilitating, in this case, 
a fraud, falls squarely within the ambit of section 2(1). Jackson J commented: 
Bank customers must be able to open accounts and to carry on their affairs in 
full confidence that their private details will not be disclosed to outsiders. It 
must be clearly understood that breaches of trust by bank officials of the kind 
which occurred in this case are likely to attract prison sentences.43 
This further demonstrates the increased severity with which the courts view the section 
2 offence; just as burglary is a broader and more serious offence than simple theft. 
3.3.3 Section 3 – unauthorised modification 
The 1990 Act did prove somewhat more successful in addressing misuse relating to 
viruses. In R v. Pile,44 the first case in which the author of computer viruses was 
prosecuted in England and Wales, the defendant was charged with five counts of the 
section 1 offence for gaining unauthorised access to computers, five counts of the 
section 3 offence for making unauthorised modifications and one count of incitement 
after encouraging others to spread the viruses he had written; two ‘vicious and very 
dangerous viruses named Pathogen and Queeg’.45 This fell squarely within the sort of 
mischief that the 1990 Act was designed to address. Pile, also known as the ‘Black 
Baron’, was sentenced to eighteen months imprisonment after pleading guilty. 
                                                        
42 R v. Delamare (Ian) [2003] EWCA Crim 424. 
43 Ibid, [8]. 
44 R v. Pile (unreported) 15 November 1995 in Akdeniz, Y ‘Section 3 of the Computer 
Misuse Act 1990: an antidote for computer viruses!’ [1996] 3 Web Journal of Current 
Legal Issues <http://webjcli.ncl.ac.uk/1996/issue3/akdeniz3.html> accessed 25 September 
2008. 
45 Ibid. 
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Notwithstanding this success (albeit following a guilty plea), the interpretation of the 
1990 Act continues to be problematic. Two contrasting cases provide an illustration of 
the reluctance of the courts to be flexible in the application of the Act, even when 
faced with novel circumstances arising from technological advances and despite the fact 
that unusual decisions might result.46  
3.3.3.1 R v. Cuthbert 
In R v. Cuthbert,47 a computer consultant was fined £400 with £600 costs after being 
convicted under section 1 of the Act for gaining unauthorised access to the Disasters 
Emergency Committee fundraising website. This site was collecting donations for 
victims of the 2004 Asian tsunami. At the time of the offence, Cuthbert was employed 
as a security system penetration tester. He had donated £30 to the tsunami appeal  but 
became concerned that he may have fallen foul of a ‘phishing’ scam48 after receiving no 
final confirmation page from a website which he considered to have suspiciously slow 
response times and poor graphics. He therefore checked the security of the site and 
satisfied himself that the site was safe, receiving no error messages in response to his 
tests, nor warnings that he had accessed an unauthorised area. 
However, the tests set off alarms in an intrusion detection system and Cuthbert was 
traced extremely easily, having just entered his name, address and credit card details and 
having had his IP address49 captured. In his defence, Cuthbert argued that he had merely 
‘knocked on the door’ of the site, pointing out that he had the skills to break into it if 
he wanted. However, the court took a literal interpretation of the section 1 offence of 
making unauthorised access; there being no burden on the prosecution to prove that 
the defendant had intended to cause any damage. Indeed, Purdy J accepted that 
                                                        
46 Detailed technical accounts of the two cases can be found in Sommer, P, ‘Computer 
Misuse Prosecutions’ (Society of Computers and Law, 2005) 
<http://www.scl.org.uk/services/default.asp?p=154&c=-
9999&cID=1140001017&ctID=12>, accessed 25 September 2008. 
47 R v. Cuthbert (Horseferry magistrates’ court, unreported) 29 September 2005. 
48 Defined by the Anti-Phishing Working Group as an attack using ‘both social 
engineering and technical subterfuge to steal consumers' personal identity data and 
financial account credentials. Social-engineering schemes use ‘spoofed’ e-mails to lead 
consumers to counterfeit websites designed to trick recipients into divulging financial 
data such as credit card numbers, account usernames, passwords and social security 
numbers.’ <http://www.antiphishing.org> accessed 25 September 2008. 
49  A unique number that devices use in order to identify and communicate with each 
other on a network. 
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Cuthbert had not intended to cause any damage and considered it a matter of ‘deep 
regret that he was finding him guilty’, lamenting the fact that there was ‘almost no case 
law in this area’. 
3.3.3.2 DPP v. Lennon50 
A case heard at Wimbledon magistrates’ court the following month found that a 
teenager had no case to answer after admitting that he used a mail-bomber program to 
flood the email system of his former employer with over five million emails. 
David Lennon was dismissed by Domestic and General Group plc (D&G) after failing to 
complete a time sheet. He was 16 years of age at the time. One Friday evening, Lennon 
started sending emails to D&G using a mail-bombing program (Avalanche v. 3.6) which 
he had downloaded via the Internet. Mail-bombing is characterised by the repeated 
sending of email messages to a particular email address (or addresses) within an 
organisation. In many instances, these messages are large and constructed from 
meaningless data in an effort to consume additional system and network resources. This 
is an example of a ‘denial-of-service’ attack, defined by APIG as occurring: 
when a deliberate attempt is made to stop a machine from performing its usual 
activities by having another computer create large volumes of specious traffic. 
The traffic may be valid requests made in an overwhelming volume or specially 
crafted protocol fragments that cause the serving machine to tie up significant 
resources to no useful purpose.51 
The Avalanche program was set to ‘mail until stopped’. In other words, email would be 
sent to D&G automatically and continuously until stopped by some sort of manual 
intervention. The emails sent appeared to be from Betty Rhodes, personnel manager at 
D&G, rather than from Lennon. Each email sent was also copied to a list of other D&G 
employees, thereby increasing the overall number of messages needing to be handled by 
D&G’s network and email servers. Toward the end of the mail-bombing, different 
addresses were used in an attempt to circumvent any measures that might be put in 
place by D&G to block their arrival. The last message said ‘It won’t stop’ and was 
addressed to Ms Rhodes. 
                                                        
50 DPP v. Lennon (Wimbledon magistrates’ court, unreported) 2 November 2005; 
Fafinski, S, ‘Computer Misuse: Denial-of-service Attacks’ (2006) 70 Journal of Criminal 
Law 474 (reproduced in Appendix B). 
51 All Party Internet Group, ‘Revision of the Computer Misuse Act: Report of an 
Inquiry by the All Party Internet Group’ (June 2004) [56]. 
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Over the course of the weekend it was estimated that approximately five million emails 
had been received by D&G’s servers which were consequently overwhelmed and taken 
out of service along with the corporate web site. The attack was subsequently 
neutralised. Lennon was arrested. He admitted to sending the emails purporting to be 
from Betty Rhodes with the intention of causing a ‘bit of a mess up’ within D&G. 
However, he did not believe that what he had done was criminal, neither did he realise 
the impact of his actions, nor the intention to cause the damage that was in fact 
sustained by D&G, estimated at around £18,000.  
He did, however, state that he could have carried out a ‘ping’ attack. ‘Ping’ is a simple 
computer network tool which determines whether a particular computer is reachable 
over a network. The test computer sends an ‘echo request’ message to the target, 
which, if reached, sends back an ‘echo reply’. In other words ‘are you there?’ receives 
‘yes’ or silence. In a ping attack the target system is overwhelmed with echo request 
messages requiring vast numbers of echo replies to be sent in return. This consumes 
both incoming and outgoing network resources. However, ping flooding is a relatively 
unsophisticated means of launching a denial-of-service attack and its effects are often 
mitigated by a simple firewall. Lennon recognised this, saying that the reason that he 
did not instigate a ping flood was that it would only have slowed D&G’s network for a 
few hours. In doing so he therefore acknowledged that he at least considered the 
relative potential for disruption of two courses of action and  chose the one more likely 
to cause difficulties for D&G. 
Lennon was charged under section 3(1) of the 1990 Act. At first instance52 the 
prosecution submitted that Lennon had satisfied the elements of the section 3(1) 
offence since he had caused a ‘modification’ of the contents of D&G’s email servers by 
adding the data associated with the five million emails to their contents. He had the 
requisite intent to impair their operation, by admitting that he wanted to cause ‘a bit of 
a mess up’ and the requisite knowledge that the modifications effected by sending the 
emails was unauthorised. However, the case turned on the matter of ‘authorisation’. 
The defendant argued that since the function of an email server was to receive email, 
D&G consented to receive emails on its servers. This consent amounted to 
authorisation to potential senders of emails to modify the contents of the receiving 
computer by adding to the data already stored therein. Therefore, by virtue of section 
17(8)(b) of the 1990 Act, Lennon, as a potential sender of email to D&G’s email system, 
did have consent to the modification from D&G. The prosecution countered this on 
four potential grounds. The first ground was that there can only be consent to bona 
fide emails and Lennon’s were not. The second being that, in any event, the emails were 
                                                        
52 DPP v. Lennon (Wimbledon magistrates’ court, unreported) 2 November 2005. 
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unauthorised from the moment that Avalanche was instructed to send them. 
Alternatively, even if there was a number of emails that were impliedly authorised, 
there was a threshold at which their number transgressed into being unauthorised. The 
final possibility was that all the emails were unauthorised since they came from Lennon 
rather than the purported sender, Ms Rhodes. 
District Judge Grant, sitting as a youth court, held that there was no case to answer 
since the purpose of section 3 was to deal with the sending of malicious material such as 
viruses, worms and Trojan horses which modify data, and not to deal with the sending 
of email. Moreover, considering each email sent by Lennon on an individual basis, the 
implied consent to each resulted in implied consent collectively and therefore the 
modifications made were authorised. Charges against Lennon were dismissed. As with 
Cuthbert, the court ignored pleas to consider the wider mischief beyond the strict 
wording of the 1990 Act, accepting the defence argument in a written ruling: 
In this case, the individual emails each caused a modification which was in each 
case an ‘authorised’ modification. Although they were sent in bulk resulting in 
the overwhelming of the server, the effect on the server is not a modification 
addressed by section 3. 
Judge Grant also echoed the words of Judge Purdy in Cuthbert by stating that ‘the 
computer world has considerably changed since the 1990 Act’ and that there is little 
legal precedent to which to refer. 
The Director of Public Prosecutions appealed against the decision by way of case stated, 
asking whether the magistrate was right to find that there was no case to answer. The 
Divisional Court allowed the appeal53 and remitted the case back to the magistrates to 
continue the hearing. They considered that the district judge had ‘rather missed’ the 
‘reality of the situation’ by wrongly finding that there was no case to answer. The court 
considered whether the addition of data was unauthorised within the meaning of 
section 17(8) of the Act. The first limb of the test was unproblematic, since Lennon was 
not himself in a position to determine whether or not  such modification should be 
made. With regard to the issue of consent, the court considered that the implied 
consent of a computer owner to receive emails is not without limit and is withdrawn 
where emails are sent ‘for the purpose of interrupting the proper operation and use of 
his system’: as such it is not necessary to ‘define the limits of the consent’. The conduct 
should be considered as a whole and not on an email-by-email basis.  
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The deliberate and informed act of bringing down computer systems under a barrage of 
email, or indeed any other manifestation of a denial-of-service attack, instinctively feels 
like the sort of behaviour that should fall within the criminal law particularly when it 
results in loss, such as the financial loss suffered by D&G. As such, the finding of no 
case to answer at first instance seems surprising; a view echoed in the professional 
media at the time.54 
The Divisional Court drew reference to a number of analogies when considering the 
issue of consent in this case. For example, they stated that ‘the householder does not 
consent to having his letterbox choked with rubbish’. It does, however, appear that the 
Divisional Court has continued with its approach to a threshold of implied consent that 
is seen in other areas of both criminal and civil law. For instance, in The Calgarth,55 
Scrutton LJ famously remarked ‘when you invite a person into your house to use the 
staircase, you do not invite him to slide down the banisters’: an analogy that could have 
been restated as ‘when you allow someone to send you an email, you do not invite him 
to overwhelm your systems’. In relation to battery, there is implied consent to physical 
contact to one’s person resulting from the exigencies of everyday life, such as jostling 
on a crowded train or physical contact within certain sports. However, such consent 
may not be implied where there is an element of persistence in the contact or where it 
has gone beyond generally acceptable standards.56 Therefore, the court considered that 
there is implied consent to ordinary unsolicited email of the sort that is incidental to 
using a computer, but not to an unacceptable mass delivery. 
As an aside, the Divisional Court also drew a distinction between unwanted email 
which does not harm the server – low volume ‘spam’ email – and bulk email which does 
overwhelm it. Keen LJ obiter speculated, in respect of spam, that the recipient may be 
taken to have consented to its receipt if ‘he does not configure the server so as to 
exclude [it]’. This is perhaps a tacit acknowledgement that the courts may look less 
favourably on claimants who have failed to take adequate precautions for the security 
of their own systems. It is not a new idea, having already formed the basis for an 
amendment to the Computer Misuse Bill.57 Keen LJ’s dicta that a lack of security might 
imply consent to receive unwanted or malicious traffic is not dissimilar, albeit veiled in 
terms of consent rather than  (contributory) negligence. However, there is no analogous 
                                                        
54 Neal, D, ‘Judge says law allows denial-of-service attacks’ IT Week (7 November 2005) 
<http://www.itweek.co.uk/itweek/news/2145679/judge-law-allows-dos-attacks> accessed 
25 September 2008. 
55 The Calgarth [1927] P 93, 110 (CA). 
56 Collins v. Wilcock [1984] 1 WLR 1172 (DC); R v. Barnes [2004] EWCA Crim 3246. 
57 See section 2.4.3. 
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defence of ‘failing to install an alarm’ which negates liability for burglary, although 
failure to do so may invalidate an insurance policy. 
At the continued hearing at Wimbledon magistrates’ court, Lennon entered a plea of 
guilty and was sentenced to a two month curfew order (between the hours of 00:30 and 
07:30 during the week and 00:30 and 10:30 at weekends) enforced by electronic tagging. 
The actus reus of the section 3(1) offence is committing any act which causes an 
addition to the contents of any program or data without consent which in turn causes 
permanent or temporary impairment of the operation of that computer. The mens rea 
is twofold: the intention of committing the actus reus and  knowledge that the 
modification has been undertaken without consent. The Divisional Court focused on 
the mens rea. In particular, their ‘guidance’ given to the district judge suggested that he 
consider the answer ‘which Mr Lennon would have expected had he asked D&G 
whether he might start Avalanche’ suggested that, in their opinion, since Lennon knew 
that D&G would not consent to him sending five million emails then this would render 
his act non-consensual and thereby satisfy the contentious element of the actus reus. In 
other words, knowledge that D&G would not consent meant that it did not, in fact, 
consent. 
However, the Divisional Court failed to address the point relating to implied consent to 
the receipt of email. Moreover, there was no consideration as to whether the actus reus 
is taken to be a composite act (launching Avalanche as a single action which 
precipitated the sending of five million emails without further intervention) or as a 
series of individual acts (considering one email at a time). If instructing Avalanche to 
begin bombardment without further intervention satisfies the actus reus, then a 
loophole immediately arises. If Lennon had manually sent the emails individually, or via 
a number of discrete Avalanche attacks none of which would have in isolation brought 
down D&G’s system, then there could be no impairment of their computer’s operation: 
hence no actus reus and no offence, irrespective of actual or implied consent. There is 
no notion within the 1990 Act of embarking on a course of conduct. In cases where a 
system does not suffer total breakdown, further difficulties arise in measuring and 
determining the threshold at which its performance crosses the threshold between 
‘slow’ and criminally ‘impaired’. 
In Lennon, the Divisional Court attempted to find a construction of the 1990 Act which 
suited the notion of wrongdoing encapsulated in Lennon’s actions. It is perhaps 
unfortunate that his guilty plea denied the opportunity for further legal argument. 
However, the issues raised by Lennon formed much of the discussion surrounding the 
amendments to the 1990 Act which must now be considered. 
  
71 
3.4 Limitations and proposals for reform 
The 1990 Act has produced relatively low prosecution rates and some interpretative 
challenges for the courts. It is particularly interesting to note that it came into being 
from the pre-existing law’s difficulties in being stretched to encompass hitherto 
unencountered mischief resulting from technological advances and yet, sixteen years on, 
it had begun to suffer itself from similar problems of scope. This situation is perhaps 
unsurprising. The 1990 Act was drafted without foresight of the immense advances in 
technology during its lifetime and their potential to cause harm. Moreover, it was based 
on an amalgam of existing property offences rather than being specific to any particular 
technological situation. 
In the same way that the 1990 Act was brought into existence as a response to the 
public concern following Gold and Schifreen,58 the new millennium saw increasing  
pressure to amend the existing legislation in response to public concern around denial-
of-service attacks, such as those encountered in Lennon,59 lobbying by the All-Party 
Internet Group (APIG),60 and the UK’s obligations as a signatory to the Council of 
Europe Convention on Cybercrime.61 
In April 2005, Derek Wyatt MP, chair of APIG, introduced the Computer Misuse Act 
1990 (Amendment) Bill62 which sought to enact the amendments proposed by APIG in 
inserting new sections specifically to address denial-of-service attacks and to increase 
the maximum penalty for the basic section 1 offence to two years’ imprisonment. 
Increasing the penalty to two years would have the joint effect of bringing the domestic 
legislation in line with Convention requirements and making the offence extraditable. 
Making it an indictable offence would also allow prosecutions for attempted 
commission.63 This was the second attempt to tack a denial-of-service extension onto 
the 1990 Act. The first was a Private Member’s Bill introduced by the Earl of Northesk 
in 2002. Both these attempts failed for lack of Parliamentary time. 
In July 2005, Tom Harris MP introduced another ten-minute rule Bill along similar 
lines. This prompted swift response from the Home Office who stated the following 
                                                        
58 See section 2.3. 
59 See section 3.3.3.2; Richards, J, ‘Georgia accuses Russia of waging “cyber-war”’ The 
Times (11 August 2008). 
60 All Party Internet Group, ‘Revision of the Computer Misuse Act: Report of an 
Inquiry by the All Party Internet Group’ (June 2004). 
61 Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime (signed 23 November 2001) ETS 185. 
62 Computer Misuse Act 1990 Amendment HC Bill (2004-05) [102]. 
63 Criminal Attempts Act 1981, s 1(1). 
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week that ‘changes will be proposed as soon as the parliamentary diary will allow’.64 The 
parliamentary diary became free in January 2006, with the introduction of the Police 
and Justice Bill65 which received Royal Assent to become the Police and Justice Act 
2006 on 8 November 2006. 
3.5 The Police and Justice Act 200666 
The Police and Justice Act 2006 introduced three amendments to the 1990 Act which 
came into force on 1 October 2008.67 The section 1 offence relating to the unauthorised 
access to computer material is broadened and attracts an increased tariff.68 The section 
3 offence covering the unauthorised modification of computer material is replaced by a 
new provision concerning unauthorised acts with intent to impair the operation of a 
computer.69. A new section 3A offence is also introduced which criminalises making, 
supplying or obtaining articles for use in computer misuse offences.70 This section will 
consider the rationale behind the 2006 Act before considering the legislative passage and 
potential impact of each of the new provisions in turn. 
3.5.1 The rationale behind the 2006 Act 
The 2006 Act is predominantly concerned, as its name suggests, with various policing 
reforms and, as such, the amendments it proposed to the 1990 Act were largely 
peripheral to the main debate. Indeed, when the Home Secretary, Charles Clarke MP, 
introduced the Second Reading of the Police and Justice Bill in the House of 
Commons, he made no mention of the computer misuse amendments, stressing instead 
that: 
The central objective of the Bill is to help build safer communities…by taking 
forward our agenda for delivering real, sustained and lasting reforms to the 
                                                        
64 Thomas, D, ‘Home Office seeks to increase jail terms for hackers’ Computing (20 
July 2005). 
65 Police and Justice HC Bill (2005-06) [119]. 
66 See Fafinski, S, ‘Computer Misuse: The Implications of the Police and Justice Act 
2006’ (2008) 72 Journal of Criminal Law 53 (reproduced in Appendix B). 
67 Police and Justice Act 2006 (Commencement No. 9) Order 2008 SI 2008/2503. 
68 Police and Justice Act 2006, s 35. 
69 Police and Justice Act 2006, s 36. 
70 Police and Justice Act 2006, s 37. 
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police service [and]…by helping to create a modern culture of respect based on 
the needs, rights and responsibilities of the law-abiding majority.71 
Clarke eventually gave some insight into the rationale behind the seemingly incongruous 
inclusion of computer law into an Act predominantly concerning policing reforms by 
stating that: 
We must recognise that in an increasingly interdependent world, work with 
international partners to tackle terrorism and serious organised crime will be 
increasingly important. We have therefore included a number of measures to 
strengthen policing at international level. Computer misuse—the continued 
threat posed by computer hacking and denial-of-service attacks—is one of the 
growing new threats that can be tackled only through extensive international 
co-operation. To that end, the Bill takes up a private Member’s Bill tabled by 
my hon. Friend the Member for Glasgow, South (Mr. Harris) to amend the 
Computer Misuse Act 1990. I am grateful to my hon. Friend for his initiative.72 
It is perhaps interesting to note that the 1990 Act was introduced to counter the risks 
posed by hacking and virus propagation and the amendments to counter the ‘continued 
threat posed by computer hacking and denial-of-service attacks’. This could be taken as 
tacit Government acknowledgement that the 1990 Act had been ineffective at 
controlling the hacker threat: an acknowledgement that is supported, as shown in 
section 3.2 above by the low prosecution and conviction statistics for the original 
section 1 offence. 
In a five-hour debate, the Second Reading offered little further insight into the 
proposed amendments, other than general support for the hacking initiative. For Lynne 
Featherstone MP the changes were a necessary counter to the risks associated with the 
security of the proposed national identity register database: 
…we support the Government in their attempt to tackle better the problems 
caused by computer hacking. Given their penchant for creating surveillance 
databases, whether on national identity73 or DNA, the security of those 
databases is paramount.74 
                                                        
71 Hansard HC vol 443 col 608 (6 March 2006). 
72 Hansard HC vol 443 col 618 (6 March 2006). 
73 Identity Cards Act 2006, s 1(1). 
74 Hansard HC vol 443 col 631 (6 March 2006). 
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A greater perceived risk was introduced by Mark Pritchard MP, parliamentary vice-
chairman of the Conservative technology forum, that to the critical national 
infrastructure: 
…al-Qaeda suspects have admitted that cyber crime and cyber terrorism were 
one of their key objectives. The have admitted trying to infiltrate critical British 
infrastructures for the intelligence agencies and, allegedly, our nuclear and 
energy infrastructures.75 
The Second Reading of the Police and Justice Bill echoed the 1990 debate,76 with the 
exception that the original threat posed by hackers was related to the cost to industry 
(of great public interest in late-Thatcherite Britain), whereas the new threat – from the 
same conduct – was connected with the post-September 11 concerns of terrorism and 
national security. However, outside the House, the commercial cost argument still 
prevailed. At the time that the Bill was introduced, a Home Office spokeswoman said: 
The estimated cost to UK business from these sorts of electronic attacks and 
denial-of-service is estimated to be over £3 billion and they continue to grow in 
sophistication…The Bill will increase penalties for hacking, viruses and other 
cybercrimes to reflect their severity…In addition we are looking to amend 
section 3 of the Computer Misuse Act to clarify that all means of interference 
to a computer system are criminalised.77 
Moreover, as will be seen in section 3.6.6 below, technological attacks on critical 
security systems may already fall within the reach of the Terrorism Act 2000. In general, 
use of the anti-terrorism legislation should be reserved for that which is properly 
terrorist. 
This examination of the broad rationale behind the amendments within the 2006 Act 
will now be expanded with a more detailed consideration of the debate surrounding 
each of the new provisions and their ramifications. 
3.5.2 Unauthorised access to computer material 
Clause 33 of the Bill78 proposed an increase in the penalty for the section 1 offence of 
unauthorised access to computer systems or data (the basic hacking offence). The 
                                                        
75 Hansard HC vol 443 col 657 (6 March 2006). 
76 See section 2.4.3. 
77 Thomas, D, ‘New bill to beef up e-crime law: Home Office proposes tougher 
sentences for hackers and virus writers’ Computing (25 January 2006). 
78 As introduced into the House of Commons. 
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offence was made indictable and the maximum penalty increased from six months to 
twelve months imprisonment on summary conviction or to two years on conviction on 
indictment.79 The clause passed through the Commons without discussion. 
During the Committee stage in the Lords, a Government amendment proposed further 
changes to the wording of the section 1 offence such that the basic hacking offence 
would be complete if a person caused a computer to perform any function with intent 
to secure or enable to be secured knowingly-unauthorised access to a program or data 
on any computer. The broadening of the offence to encompass enabling access to be 
gained without authority criminalised the act of ‘opening the door’ to unauthorised 
access without stepping through it and attracted little further debate of consequence.80 
As such, the clause became section 35 of the 2006 Act. 
This provision was subsequently amended by the Serious Crime Act 2007 such that the 
‘enabling’ provisions in section 35(2) of the 2006 Act were omitted. The enabling 
offences are covered by the new general offence of intentionally encouraging or 
assisting an offence or believing that such an offence will be committed.81  
The increase in tariff for the section 1 offence is a clear indication that the law 
recognises the serious consequences that can result from unauthorised access to systems 
and has the effect of making the offence extraditable. This is desirable given the cross-
border nature of many hacking attacks. The increase in tariff may also have an 
increased deterrent effect, although whether the potential for a longer jail sentence 
proves to discourage the committed computer misuser remains to be seen. Its 
classification as an indictable offence also enables prosecution for attempted 
commission.82  
3.5.3 Unauthorised acts with intent to impair operation of computer 
Clause 34 of the Bill83 proposed a replacement for section 3 of the 1990 Act which 
previously dealt with the unauthorised modification of computer material as follows: 
                                                        
79 Note, however, that the proposed increase in the maximum sentencing powers of the 
magistrates’ courts from six to twelve months imprisonment (Criminal Justice Act 2003, 
s 154(1) is not yet in force). The maximum prison sentence within the magistrates’ 
courts powers therefore remains six months (Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) 
Act 2000, s 78(1)). 
80 Hansard HL vol 684 col 604 (11 July 2006). 
81 Serious Crime Act 2007, ss 44, 45. 
82 Criminal Attempts Act 1981, s 1(1). 
83 As introduced into the House of Commons. 
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34 Unauthorised acts with intent to impair operation of computer, etc 
For section 3 of the 1990 Act (unauthorised modification of computer material) 
there is substituted— 
“3 Unauthorised acts with intent to impair operation of computer, etc. 
(1) A person is guilty of an offence if— 
(a) he does any unauthorised act in relation to a computer; and 
(b) at the time when he does the act he has the requisite intent and the 
requisite knowledge. 
(2) For the purposes of subsection (1)(b) above the requisite intent is an intent 
to do the act in question and by so doing— 
(a) to impair the operation of any computer, 
(b) to prevent or hinder access to any program or data held in any 
computer, or 
(c) to impair the operation of any such program or the reliability of any 
such data, whether permanently or temporarily. 
(3) The intent need not be directed at— 
(a) any particular computer; 
(b) any particular program or data; or 
(c) a program or data of any particular kind. 
(4) For the purposes of subsection (1)(b) above the requisite knowledge is 
knowledge that the act in question is unauthorised. 
(5) In this section— 
(a) a reference to doing an act includes a reference to causing an act to 
be done; 
(b) “act” includes a series of acts…” 
This new clause attempts to ensure that denial-of-service attacks are criminalised by 
broadening the actus reus of the offence from ‘any act which causes an unauthorised 
modification of the contents of any computer’ to ‘any unauthorised act in relation to a 
computer’. Moreover, it expressly states that an ‘act’ includes a ‘series of acts’. It also 
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increases the maximum tariff for this offence from five years to ten years imprisonment 
following conviction on indictment.84 Despite the view of the Home Office and the 
National Hi-Tech Crime Unit85 that the pre-existing Act covered the relatively recent 
phenomenon of denial-of-service attacks this was not a view shared within the industry 
or indeed by APIG even though it was seemingly approved by the Divisional Court in 
Lennon.86 The new wording of section 3, being wider in scope, removed the 
‘modification’ requirement and thus seemed to address these shared concerns. 
Moreover, the amendment satisfies the requirement imposed by the EU Council 
Framework Decision on attacks against information systems to legislate against illegal 
system interference by 16 March 2007.87 This clause also passed through the Commons 
without discussion to meet amendment in the Lords.  
The concept of recklessness was introduced to the offence in a Government 
amendment and was agreed without debate.88 It therefore remains to be seen whether 
the courts will adopt the approach to recklessness from R v. Cunningham89 or from R v. 
G90 in relation to this clause. Cunningham recklessness requires that the defendant had 
foreseen that the particular kind of harm might be done, and yet had gone on to take 
the risk of it. The test (in relation to criminal damage) from R v. G is based upon clause 
18(c) of the Draft Criminal Code,91 providing that the defendant is reckless where he is 
aware of a risk that a circumstance exists or will exist, or aware of a risk that a result 
will occur and it is, in the circumstances known to him, unreasonable to take that risk. 
Although R v. G explicitly applies to criminal damage, the Court of Appeal emphasised 
that it laid down ‘general principle’.92 Therefore, its subsequent application to 
computer misuse should not be ruled out. Indeed, the objective standard from 
Metropolitan Police Commissioner v. Caldwell93 has been held to be applicable to data 
                                                        
84 Police and Justice HC Bill (2005-06) [119] cl 34(6). 
85 Now part of the Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA); Serious Organised Crime 
and Police Act 2006, s 1(1). 
86 See section 3.3.3.2. 
87 Council Framework Decision (EU) 2005/222/JHA of 24 February 2005 on attacks 
against information systems [2005] OJ L69/67, art 3. 
88 Hansard HL vol 684 col 610 (11 July 2006). 
89 R v. Cunningham [1957] 2 QB 396 (CA). 
90 R v. G [2003] UKHL 50. 
91 Law Commission, ‘Criminal Code for England and Wales’ (Law Com No 177, Cm 299, 
1989). 
92 Attorney-General’s Reference (No. 3 of 2003) [2004] EWCA Crim 868 [12]. 
93 Metropolitan Police Commissioner v. Caldwell [1982] AC 341 (HL). 
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protection law.94 The introduction of recklessness into the mens rea of the offence 
would have meant that, in Lennon, even a realisation that there was a possibility that 
the unauthorised e-mail bombardment might impair the operation of the target 
computer would suffice. However, the problems relating to implied consent (and 
therefore authorisation) to the receipt of e-mail identified in Lennon still remain. 
The second amendment was moved by Lord Bassam of Brighton such that the requisite 
intent included that of enabling any of the forms of impairment to be done.95 This was 
agreed without further debate. 
The final amendment came from the Earl of Northesk who wished to clarify that ‘a 
reference to impairing, preventing or hindering something includes a reference to doing 
so temporarily’.96 This was also agreed without debate. Northesk’s amendment ensures 
that transient effects of attacks are sufficient to attract criminal liability without the 
requirement for erasure or modification of data, thereby acknowledging the real-time 
nature of modern data processing.  
With these amendments, the clause became section 36 of the 2006 Act. As it stands, the 
section 3 offence now hinges on ‘impairment’, which is, unfortunately, an entirely 
undefined concept. To complicate matters further, this impairment need only be 
temporary. The previous section 3 offence concerned the unauthorised modification of 
computer material. While modification of data was relatively straightforward to 
establish, the threshold at which a transient decline in system performance crosses the 
boundary into ‘temporary impairment’ is likely to trouble the courts when considering 
offences under the new section. The Oxford English Dictionary definition of 
‘impairment’ is of little assistance: 
Rendered worse; injured in amount, quality, or value; deteriorated, weakened, 
damaged.97 
Perhaps a meaningful legal definition of impairment in this instance might be 
‘deterioration in performance that is noticeable to the senses’: setting the threshold of 
the offence sufficiently high such that an impairment measured in microseconds would 
be unlikely to attract liability, since it would most likely go unnoticed and cause no 
harm. Once a system is fixed and running normally, it may also be problematic to prove 
                                                        
94 Data Protection Registrar v. Amnesty International (British Section) (unreported) 8 
November 1994 (DC). 
95 Hansard HL vol 684 col 609 (11 July 2006). 
96 Hansard HL vol 684 col 610 (11 July 2006). 
97 ——, Oxford English Dictionary Online <www.oed.com> accessed 16 August 2007. 
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system impairment: the CPS would have to present evidence that demonstrated 
sufficient temporary impairment at the appropriate time and link it to the unauthorised 
act. Although processor usage logs might assist, it remains to be seen how the courts 
will set the threshold. This may prove to be less than straightforward. 
This provision was also amended by the Serious Crime Act 200798 to remove the 
‘enabling’ provision in section 36(2)(d) of the 2006 Act in favour of the new inchoate 
offences within the 2007 Act.99 
3.5.4 Making, supplying or obtaining articles for use in computer misuse offences  
Clause 35 of the Bill100 proposed the insertion of a new section 3A into the 1990 Act. 
This section introduces an offence of making, supplying or offering to supply articles 
for use in computer misuse offences, or obtaining such tools with the intention to use 
them to facilitate the commission of such an offence as follows: 
35 Making, supplying or obtaining articles for use in computer misuse offences 
After section 3 of the 1990 Act insert— 
“3A Making, supplying or obtaining articles for use in offence under section 1 
or 3 
(1) A person is guilty of an offence if he makes, adapts, supplies or offers to 
supply any article— 
(a) knowing that it is designed or adapted for use in the course of or in 
connection with an offence under section 1 or 3; or 
(b) intending it to be used to commit, or to assist in the commission of, 
an offence under section 1 or 3. 
(2) A person is guilty of an offence if he obtains any article with a view to its 
being supplied for use to commit, or to assist in the commission of, an offence 
under section 1 or 3. 
(3) In this section “article” includes any program or data held in electronic 
form… 
                                                        
98 Serious Crime Act 2007, s 61(3). 
99 Serious Crime Act 2007, ss 44, 45. 
100 As introduced into the House of Commons. 
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This provision makes it quite clear that ‘articles’ include software.101 This offence 
carries a maximum two year prison sentence following conviction on indictment. The 
new clause 3A was designed to satisfy the requirement of the Council of Europe 
Convention on Cybercrime to criminalise ‘the production, sale, procurement for use, 
import, distribution or otherwise making available of…a computer password, access 
code, or similar data by which the whole or any part of a computer system is capable of 
being accessed’ when ‘committed intentionally and without right’102 for the purposes of 
committing illegal access,103 interception104 or data105 or system interference106 offences – 
in other words, the ulterior intent to commit a further section 1 or 3 offence. 
The new section 3A offence sought to criminalise the creation, supply or application of 
‘hacker tools’ for use in computer misuse offences. However, the clause as originally 
drafted attracted widespread criticism from within the software industry amid fears 
that it ‘could effectively criminalise IT professionals who use penetration testing – also 
known as ethical hacking – to identify security weaknesses.’107 Technician 2 commented 
that: 
That’s the end for penetration testing then. Why would I risk ending up in jail 
for doing my job? It’s madness. It takes away the incentive for making systems 
secure and plays right into the hands of the criminals. 
However Policy Maker 3 offered a less alarmed, if potentially misguided, view: 
I can’t imagine that the courts would throw someone into jail for doing the 
right thing. 
The fears of Technician 2 were supported by the fact that the existing Act had been 
shown in Lennon108 and Cuthbert109 to make no distinction between malicious and 
benign intentions. 
                                                        
101 Police and Justice HC Bill (2005-06) [119] cl 35(3). 
102 Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime (signed 23 November 2001) ETS 185, 
art 6. 
103 Ibid, art 2. 
104 Ibid, art 3. 
105 Ibid, art 4. 
106 Ibid, art 5. 
107 Goodwin, W, ‘Computer Misuse Act amendment could criminalise tools used by IT 
professionals’ Computer Weekly (21 February 2006). 
108 See section 3.3.3.2. 
109 See section 3.3.3.1. 
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Many of the tools which are used by systems administrators and computer forensics 
investigators are commercially available products used in the course of load, penetration 
and network and resilience testing. The distinction between the lawful and unlawful 
use of such tools is a fine one. For instance, software tools such as Nmap110 can be used 
to examine the security of computers and to discover services or servers on a computer 
network as well as to find insecurities to exploit. In the extreme, it has been suggested 
that even web browsers, such as Internet Explorer, could fall foul of the new offence 
since they can be used to gain unauthorised access to insecure systems. 
Analogies may be drawn between software tools and everyday physical articles. For 
example, the offence of ‘going equipped for stealing, etc’ is committed if a person 
‘when not at his place of abode…has with him any article for use in the course of or in 
connection with any burglary, theft or cheat’.111 This wording was not able to be 
immediately transferred verbatim into the new section 3A such that test tools only 
become hacker tools outside the user’s place of abode. With a network connection and 
suitable hardware and software, all manner of computer misuse can be carried out from 
home. A parallel may also be drawn with aggravated burglary which covers the situation 
in which a burglary is committed by a person who has with him inter alia, a ‘weapon of 
offence’.112 A weapon of offence is any article made or adapted for causing injury or 
incapacitation or intended for such use.113 Here, the offence turns on the article itself 
or the intention behind the use to which it may be put. There are therefore some items 
which are inherently weapons of offence, but there are other innocuous articles 
commonly used for legitimate purposes which only become weapons of offence due to 
the intention of the defendant to use them in a particular unlawful way. 
It was suggested by EURIM that a similar technology-appropriate form of words be 
found in order to ‘disrupt the growing “trade” in producing and distributing tools that 
have limited legitimate use and are more commonly intended to support computer-
assisted extortion and fraud’.114 Interestingly, the analogous provisions in the Council of 
Europe Convention on Cybercrime draw specific reference to the fact that articles 
                                                        
110 Nmap (‘Network Mapper’) is a free open source software utility that can be used for 
network exploration or security auditing. 
111 Theft Act 1968, s 25(1) as amended by the Fraud Act 2006, sch 1, para 8(a). 
112 Theft Act 1968, s 10(1). 
113 Theft Act 1968, s 10(1)(b). 
114 EURIM, Newsletter (March 2006). Software tools used to support fraud would now 
fall within the Fraud Act 2006; see section 3.6.7. 
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produced for the authorised testing or protection of a computer system are produced 
for legitimate purposes and that their use is considered to be ‘with right’.115 
The additional difficulty presented by the clause as originally drafted was that of 
proving the requisite degree of intention. Given the dual-usability of many security 
software tools, it would always be open to the defendant to claim that the prohibited 
result was not his aim, purpose or goal, or that he did not know that the result was a 
virtually certain consequence of his actions. CBS Songs Ltd v. Amstrad Consumer 
Electronics plc116 concerned a dual-cassette recorder capable of duplicating cassettes. 
The owners of copyright in the music claimed inter alia that the respondents has incited 
the making of infringing copies of protected works contrary to section 21(3) of the 
Copyright Act 1956. However, the House of Lords held that although the machines 
were capable of both lawful and unlawful use, the respondents had no control over the 
use once the machine had been sold and could not therefore be held liable. Similar 
reasoning has also been used in the United States.117 
The clause was first amended during the Commons Committee Stage: Lynne 
Featherstone MP simply suggested changing the ‘or’ to ‘and’, thereby requiring both 
knowledge that an article was designed or adapted for use in an offence under section 1 
or 3 and the intention that it be so used; this would ensure 
…that an offence is committed only when there is possession and intent to use 
the programs for the purposes of hacking, and so a security consultant using 
them legitimately to check that a system is secure would not be caught by the 
drafting.118 
However, this was rejected on the basis that it set ‘too stringent a test’119 in favour of a 
late Government amendment which removed the ‘knowledge’ limb of the of the 
offence all together, replacing it with a belief ‘that it is likely to be so used’.120 The 
offence therefore became: 
(1) A person is guilty of an offence if he makes, adapts, supplies or offers to 
supply any article— 
                                                        
115 See section 6.2.1.1. 
116 CBS Songs Ltd v. Amstrad Consumer Electronics plc [1988] AC 1013 (HL). 
117 Sony Corporation of America v. Universal City Studios Inc 464 US 417 (U.S.S.C. 
1984). 
118 Hansard HC (Standing Committee D) col 260 (28 March 2006). 
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(a) intending it to be used to commit, or to assist in the commission of, 
an offence under section 1 or 3; or 
(b) believing that it is likely to be so used. 
Therefore, the amendment proposed by Featherstone would have set a higher threshold 
of wrongdoing to attract liability than before; the Government’s amendment lowered it. 
The offence is therefore more akin to that of aggravated burglary which requires either 
possession of an injurious article or (rather than and) the intention that an article be 
used to injure or incapacitate. The Government amendment was passed in Committee, 
although concern was expressed regarding the interpretation of ‘likely’, James 
Brokenshire MP asking: 
What proof would be required to show that somebody thought that the article 
was likely to be used to commit an offence? What test would the prosecutors 
adopt? We need clarity on the extent and ambit of the provision to ensure that 
it catches those people who are reckless with the coding or other tools that they 
create to facilitate the perpetration of cybercrime…121 
The Government’s response to these questions was vague at best, with the Minister for 
Policing, Security and Community Safety, Hazel Blears MP, simply stating that ‘[t]he 
word “likely” is pretty well known in our legal system…it is a matter for the courts to 
decide’.122 Considering the difficulties that the courts had in discerning a meaning for 
the everyday words ‘intention’123 and ‘recklessness’124 in the criminal law involving 
decades of argument, this may have been overly dismissive. As Lord Edmund Davies 
stated in Metropolitan Police Commissioner v. Caldwell (dissenting): 
The law in action compiles its own dictionary. In time what was originally the 
common coinage of speech acquires a different value in the pocket of the 
lawyer than when in the layman’s purse.125 
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Moreover, despite the Minister’s assertion, ‘likely’ has a range of definitions in law. For 
example, it has been held to mean more than a bare possibility but less than probable;126 
more probable than not but with no requirement of foreseeability;127 more than 51 per 
cent probable;128 a ‘real prospect’;129 excluding only that which would fairly be described 
as highly unlikely;130 or ‘probable’ or ‘more probable than not’ but could mean an event 
‘such as might well happen’.131 The Commons did not further concern itself with the 
1990 Act amendments in the Third Reading, other than with a passing reference to the 
nature of computer hacking as a ‘21st century crime’;132 the previous thirty years having 
seemingly gone unnoticed. 
The Committee Stage in the House of Lords continued the debate on the wording of 
the proposed new section 3A. The Earl of Northesk, one of the proponents of an earlier 
Bill to amend the 1990 Act,133 moved an amendment to remove paragraph (b) 
altogether, describing it as ‘unnecessarily and dangerously broad’134 in debate: having 
previously referred to it outside the House as ‘pure idiocy’ and ‘absolute madness’.135 
He also shed some light on the Home Office view on the probable judicial 
interpretation of ‘likely’ which had previously been raised in the Commons. A Home 
Office letter stated that it: 
                                                        
126 Bennington v. Peter [1984] RTR 383 (DC) interpreting the Heavy Goods Vehicle 
(Drivers’ Licences) Regulations 1977 SI 1977/1309, r 4. 
127 Bailey v. Rolls Royce (1971) Ltd [1984] ICR 688 (CA) interpreting the Factories Act 
1961, s 72(1) ‘likely to cause injury’. 
128 Taplin v. Shippam [1978] ICR 1068 (EAT) interpreting the Employment Protection 
Act 1975, s 78(5). 
129 Re SCL Building Services (1989) 5 BCC 746 (DC); Re Primlaks (UK )Ltd [1989] BCLC 
734 (DC) interpreting the Insolvency Act 1986, s 8(1)(b). 
130 R v. Wills [1990] Crim LR 714 (CA) interpreting the Children and Young Persons 
Act 1933, s 1 ‘likely to cause…suffering or injury’. 
131 Smith v. Ainger, The Times June 5 1990 (CA). 
132 Hansard HC vol 446 col 431 (10 May 2006). 
133 See section 3.4. 
134 Hansard HL vol 684 col 611 (11 July 2006). 
135 Espiner, T, ‘Lord vows to fight cybercrime laws’ (25 May 2006) 
<http://news.zdnet.co.uk/security/0,1000000189,39271086,00.htm> accessed 25 September 
2008. 
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…boils down to the court deciding whether it is more likely than not each 
individual instance of the article will be used to commit an offence, i.e. the 
offence is only committed if it will be used criminally more than legally.136 
This resurrected the issue of how a court would measure such ‘percentages of usage’ 
which had been first raised by Brokenshire. The Earl of Erroll concurred with Northesk, 
fearing that the use of ‘likely’ may lead to ‘very clever barristers [using] very clever 
verbal gymnastics to twist the meaning of the word “likely” to suit their case’.137 He 
proposed alternatives such as ‘primarily’, ‘largely intended for’ or ‘principally’. 
However, Lord Bassam of Brighton maintained that the Government was ‘satisfied’ that 
it had ‘struck the right balance between protecting those who develop or supply tools 
for legitimate use and criminalising those who deliberately…develop or supply them for 
criminal use’.138 Here, Bassam drew reference to ‘deliberate’ development or supply of 
tools, even though the new provision did not make explicit reference to deliberate 
activity.  
The proposed amendments were withdrawn, despite Northesk stating that: 
The Minister has not clarified the issue for me one iota.139 
At the subsequent report stage, Baroness Anelay of St Johns revisited the point yet 
again,140 claiming that the provision would not prove a deterrent to ‘script kiddies’141 or 
‘code monkeys’142 (since legal regulation against hacking per se had not deterred the 
committed hacker) and that alleged offences under the new section 3A could not be 
adequate investigated or prosecuted successfully in practice.143 The Earl of Erroll 
concurred, stating: 
                                                        
136 Hansard HL vol 684 col 612 (11 July 2006). 
137 Hansard HL vol 684 col 613 (11 July 2006). 
138 Hansard HL vol 684 col 616 (11 July 2006). 
139 Hansard HL vol 684 col 616 (11 July 2006). 
140 On behalf of the Earl of Northesk who was not present. 
141 A derogatory term used within the hacker community for inexperienced hackers who 
use scripts and programs developed by others, without knowing what they are or how 
they work, for the purpose of compromising computer accounts and files, and for 
launching attacks on whole computer systems. 
142 A derogatory term for an amateur (or low-level professional) software developer. 
143 Hansard HL vol 685 col 213 (10 October 2006). 
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Will it work? It will not, I am afraid. It is one of those things that sounds good 
but will do nothing.144 
The threshold of ‘likelihood’ was debated further, with a further alternative wording 
being proffered in the form of ‘more likely than not’.145 Again, these amendments 
proved to be unsuccessful and were withdrawn. Lord Bassam of Brighton did, however, 
provide some further illumination of the meaning of ‘likely’ when he stated that: 
[I]n our view, ‘likely’ reflects a belief that there is a strong possibility that the 
articles will be used for Computer Misuse Act offences.146 
This ‘strong possibility’ represented a higher threshold than the Home Office view of 
‘more likely than not’ and demonstrated the malleability of the terminology used. 
Despite the degree of discomfort felt by many of the Lords that the clause has gone 
‘much further than this House should be comfortable with’147 since any piece of 
security testing software can be used for hacking and thus ‘the word “likely” means that 
everyone is prosecutable by the courts’,148 the likelihood test remained in the final 
wording of the clause, which became section 37 of the 2006 Act as follows: 
37 Making, supplying or obtaining articles for use in computer misuse offences 
After section 3 of the 1990 Act there is inserted –  
“3A Making, supplying or obtaining articles for use in offence under section 1 
or 3 
(1) A person is guilty of an offence if he makes, adapts, supplies or 
offers to supply any article intending it to be used to commit, or to 
assist in the commission of, an offence under section 1 or 3. 
(2) A person is guilty of an offence if he supplies or offers to supply any 
article believing that it is likely to be used to commit, or to assist in the 
commission of, an offence under section 1 or 3. 
                                                        
144 Hansard HL vol 685 col 214 (10 October 2006). 
145 Hansard HL vol 685 col 215 (10 October 2006). 
146 Hansard HL vol 685 col 216 (10 October 2006). 
147 Hansard HL vol 685 col 218 (10 October 2006) (Lord Lawson of Blaby). 
148 Hansard HL vol 685 col 219 (10 October 2006) (Earl of Erroll). 
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(3) A person is guilty of an offence if he obtains any article with a view 
to its being supplied for use to commit, or to assist in the commission 
of, an offence under section 1 or 3. 
(4) In this section "article" includes any program or data held in 
electronic form…” 
The broad term ‘any article’ could also potentially include information alerting users to 
known security vulnerabilities in pieces of software. The threshold of belief that an 
article is likely to be used to commit an offence is also unclear and untested; however, 
the section does appear to put the onus on manufacturers and distributors to decide 
whether they are supplying to legitimate users or likely criminals. Publicly-available 
security alerts may need to be carefully drafted so as not to give away too much 
information, so that vendors may claim that they did not believe that they were likely 
to be used to commit an offence. Equally, posting password details to a security bulletin 
board, such as Bugtraq,149 believing that those details likely to be used to commit a 
computer misuse offence could also fall within the section 3A offence. Moreover, it is 
unclear where liability will lie in the supply chain. Since supplying a tool with belief that 
it is likely be used in the commission of a Computer Misuse Act offence would itself 
become an offence, then liability could attach to manufacturer, wholesaler and retailer. 
It could be problematic for a supplier to establish that it was confident in its belief that 
the purchaser’s intentions were honourable. So-called spyware could also be rendered 
illegal.150 Since spyware can be used to track activity on a computer system (ostensibly 
for advertising or marketing purposes), then if it is supplied in the belief that it is likely 
to harvest information that could be used to hack into or impair the performance of 
system then this could be sufficient to make out a section 3A offence. 
The Crown Prosecution Service subsequently issued guidance on the new provisions 
within the 1990 Act.151 This advises prosecutors to consider the functionality of the 
article and what thought the suspect gave to who would use it. It also gives a list of 
factors which a prosecutor should consider in determining the likelihood of an article 
being misused to commit a criminal offence: 
                                                        
149 Available at <http://www.securityfocus.com> accessed 25 September 2008. 
150 Computer software that collects personal information about users without their 
informed consent. 
151 Crown Prosecution Service, ‘Computer Misuse Act 1990’ 
<http://www.cps.gov.uk/legal/section12/chapter_s.html> accessed 25 September 2008. 
  
88 
• Has the article been developed primarily, deliberately and for the sole 
purpose of committing a CMA offence (i.e. unauthorised access to 
computer material)? 
• Is the article available on a wide scale commercial basis and sold through 
legitimate channels? 
• Is the article widely used for legitimate purposes? 
• Does it have a substantial installation base? 
• What was the context in which the article was used to commit the offence 
compared with its original indented purpose?152 
The guidance also points out that if the article was supplied in connection with fraud, 
then there may also be liability under sections 6 or 7 of the Fraud Act 2006 which 
criminalise the possession, making and supply of articles for use in frauds. 
It is clear, then, that despite the amendments made during its legislative passage, the 
new section 3A remains beset with problematic drafting. Despite these potential flaws, 
the Bill, as introduced, was ‘welcomed by businesses and politicians’153 as a means of 
reducing the impact on UK businesses resulting from computer misuse. Policy Maker 1 
commented that: 
It seems like a sensible way of bringing the [1990] Act up to date at last. It 
should certainly catch denial-of-service attacks. We need to do all we can to 
protect our businesses and this law couldn’t have come quickly enough. 
This justification harked back to the economic risks put forward as a justification for 
the original 1990 Act154 rather than the contemporary concerns of national security and 
terrorist threat. 
3.6 Alternative domestic criminal legislation 
This chapter has shown that the 1990 Act has not been used in large numbers of 
prosecutions and has suffered from some potential defects of drafting and judicial 
interpretation. Although the numbers of prosecutions and the instances of problematic 
interpretation are potentially disappointing, it does not necessarily follow that the 1990 
                                                        
152 Ibid, 6. 
153 Thomas, D, ‘Clamping down on the cyber criminals’ Computing (2 February 2006). 
154 See section 2.4.3. 
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Act itself is without merit. It may, for instance, have had a deterrent effect. This notion 
will be returned to in Chapter 4. However, it does suggest that there may be more 
important, or at least more familiar, avenues within the law that are more frequently 
exercised in situations where the 1990 Act might be applied. The use of the common 
law offence of misconduct in a public office has already been discussed in section 3.3.1 
above. This section will explore other potential sources of domestic legislation that 
might potentially be relevant to the problems posed by computer misuse. 
3.6.1 Theft Act 1968 
‘Ransomware’ is a form of malicious code which encrypts or threatens to delete a 
number of files on the victim’s computer.155 It leaves behind a ransom note for the 
victim, demanding payment of a sum in return for the decryption key with which the 
affected ‘kidnapped’ files may be recovered. While this will naturally fall within section 
3(1) of the 1990 Act156 it may also amount to blackmail for the purposes of section 21 of 
the Theft Act 1968 which provides that: 
(1) A person is guilty of blackmail if, with a view to gain…or with intent to 
cause loss…, he makes any unwarranted demand with menaces… 
Menaces need not be physical: ‘any action detrimental to or unpleasant to the person 
addressed’ will suffice.157 Therefore, given the likely detriment of data loss or the 
unpleasant inconvenience of data encryption, it is possible that ransomware may 
adequately be dealt with by the existing blackmail legislation, although this point 
remains untested by the courts. 
3.6.2 Data Protection Act 1998 
The Data Protection Act 1998 repealed the earlier Data Protection Act 1984.158 The 1984 
Act implemented the Council of Europe’s Convention for the Protection of Individuals 
with Regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data159 which was signed by the UK in 
                                                        
155 In March 2006, the Zippo Trojan horse demanded US$300 from victims for the safe 
return of their encrypted data. The Ransom-A Trojan horse threatened to delete 
compromised files one-by-one until extortion demands were met. 
156 Also possibly within section 1, depending on how the ransomware was introduced to 
the computer. 
157 Thorne v. Motor Trade Association [1937] AC 797 (HL) 817 (Lord Wright). 
158 Data Protection Act 1998, sch 16(I) para. 1. 
159 Council of Europe Convention for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to 
Automatic Processing of Personal Data (signed 28 January 1981) ETS 108.  
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1981 and ratified in 1987. This established the Data Protection Registrar and the Data 
Protection Tribunal to ‘represent the interests’ of data users and of data subjects.160 
The 1998 Act implements Council Directive 95/46/EC on the protection of individuals 
with regard to the processing of personal data and of the free movement of such data.161 
It also expanded the remit of the enforcement agency and renamed the Data Protection 
Registrar and Tribunal as the Information Commissioner and Information Tribunal 
respectively.162 The Act itself does not make extensive use of the criminal law, although 
it does create a number of criminal offences. The Act contains offences concerning 
enforced subject access notification,163 information and enforcement notices164 and 
obstructing certain lawful inspections165 but these deal with transgressions of a more 
administrative nature. Those relating to obtaining, disclosing and procuring personal 
data have the greatest degree of potential overlap with the 1990 Act.166 
The Data Protection Act 1984 was amended by the Criminal Justice and Public Order 
Act 1994.167 This inserted provisions relating to procuring the disclosure and selling (or 
offering to sell) computer-held personal information. This is now dealt with by section 
55 of the 1998 Act. This provides that: 
(1) A person must not knowingly or recklessly, without the consent of the data 
controller –  
(a) obtain or disclose personal data or the information contained in 
personal data; or 
                                                        
160 Data Protection Act 1984, s 3. 
161 Council Directive (EC) 2000/31 of 23 November 1995 on the protection of individuals 
with regard to the processing of personal data and of the free movement of such data 
[1995] OJ L281/31. 
162 Data Protection Act 1998, s 6. 
163 Data Protection Act 1998, s 56(5). This is partly in force from 7 July 2008 under 
limited circumstances relating only to ‘vulnerable groups’; Data Protection Act 1998 
(Commencement No. 2) Order 2008 SI 2008/1592, art 2. 
164 Data Protection Act 1998, ss 21, 22, 24, 47. 
165 Data Protection Act 1998, s 54A (inserted by the Crime (International Cooperation) 
Act 2003), s 81). 
166 Wasik, M, ‘Dealing in the Information Market: Procuring, Selling and Offering to 
Sell Personal Data’ (1995) 9 International Yearbook of Law, Computers and Technology 
193. 
167 Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994, s 161 
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(b) procure the disclosure to another person of the information 
contained in personal data. 
… 
(3) A person who contravenes subsection (1) is guilty of an offence. 
Selling168 or offering to sell169 personal data obtained in contravention of section 55(1) 
are also offences. 
There are exceptions relating to prevention and detection of crime;170 where disclosure 
is authorised by law;171 where disclosure is in the public interest,172 and; where there was 
reasonable belief that the data was being obtained, disclosed or procured lawfully,173 or; 
that the data controller would have consented if he had known of the circumstances of 
the disclosure.174 
This offence historically carried a maximum penalty of a fine of up to £5,000 in the 
magistrates’ court and an unlimited fine in the Crown Court. This maximum penalty 
may be increased by order of the Secretary of State (following proposals from the 
Information Commissioner175 and subsequent public consultation)176 to six months 
imprisonment in the magistrates’ courts and two years imprisonment in the Crown 
Court. 177 The Information Commissioner commented that this increase was to 
discourage the ‘unlawful trade’ in personal information: 
This can be achieved only by increasing the penalty in a way that underlines the 
seriousness of the offence and makes reputable businesses and individuals 
reflect on the possible consequences of their actions: by introducing the 
                                                        
168 Data Protection Act 1998, s 55(4). 
169 Data Protection Act 1998, s 55(5); including via advertisement, s 55(6). 
170 Data Protection Act 1998, s 55(2)(a)(i). 
171 Data Protection Act 1998, s 55(2)(a)(ii). 
172 Data Protection Act 1998, s 55(2)(d). 
173 Data Protection Act 1998, s 55(2)(b). 
174 Data Protection Act 1998, s 55(2)(c). 
175 Information Commissioner, ‘What Price Privacy? The Unlawful Trade in 
Confidential Personal Information’ (The Stationery Office, London, 10 May 2006) [7.8]. 
176 Department for Constitutional Affairs, ‘Increasing Penalties for Deliberate and 
Wilful Misuse of Personal Data’ Consultation Paper CP 9/06 (24 July 2006). 
177 Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008, s 77. 
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possibility of a custodial sentence for convictions obtained in the Crown Court 
and the Magistrates’ Courts.178 
As well as unlawful trade, the section 55 offences could potentially cover the situation 
described in section 3.3.1 where official information is misused (particularly by police 
officers) for private purposes. This would amount to the obtaining or disclosure of 
personal information without the consent of the data controller, since it is presumed 
that the data controller would not consent to disclosure of personal data for an 
unauthorised purpose. Walden comments that the criminal provisions focus more on 
the commercial value of data as an information asset rather than as an element of the 
data subject’s private life.179 
There are, however, limitation to the usefulness of the use of section 55 to such 
circumstances. As Wasik comments, the ‘relatively low’ penalties before the increase in 
tariff may make the 1998 Act offences less useful to a prosecutor.180 The Information 
Commissioner reported that: 
Prosecutions brought under the Act have generally resulted in low penalties: 
either minimal fines or conditional discharges. Between November 2002 and 
January 2006, only two out of 22 cases produced total fines amounting to more 
than £5,000. Other investigations led to frustrating outcomes, despite the 
detriment caused to individuals and to public confidence generally.181 
Moreover, in R v. Brown,182 the House of Lords held that mere browsing of data did 
not constitute its use. However, such browsing could fall within section 1 of the 1990 
Act provided that the access was knowingly unauthorised. In this instance though, the 
facts of Brown took place before the 1990 Act was in force. A prosecution (on three 
counts from eleven of the section 55(1) offence) was successful in R v. Rooney.183 Here, 
                                                        
178 Information Commissioner, ‘What Price Privacy? The Unlawful Trade in 
Confidential Personal Information’ (The Stationery Office, London, 10 May 2006) [7.6]. 
179 Walden, I, Computer Crimes and Digital Investigations (Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 2007) 104. 
180 Wasik, M, ‘Computer misuse and misconduct in public office’ (2008) 22 
International Review of Law, Computers and Technology 135, 137. 
181 Information Commissioner, ‘What Price Privacy? The Unlawful Trade in 
Confidential Personal Information’ (The Stationery Office, London, 10 May 2006) 
[1.12]. 
182 R v. Brown [1996] 2 Cr App R 72 (HL). 
183 R v. Rooney [2006] EWCA Crim 1841. 
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a personnel administrator accessed personal information held on a database of 
employees relating to the address of her sister’s ex-fiancé. Her sister then sent 
unwanted mail to the new partner of her ex-fiancé. However, following Allison this 
could potentially have fallen within section 1 of the 1990 Act, or conceivably section 2 if 
the persistent sending of unwanted mail constituted a further offence.184 
The common law offence of misconduct in public office may therefore have provided a 
more satisfactory alternative to prosecuting certain cases rather that the 1990 Act or the 
1998 Act. However, as Wasik concludes,185 now that the maximum penalties have been 
increased, the CPS will have to reconsider its guidance in respect of the use of 
misconduct in public office as a basis for prosecution. 
3.6.3 Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 
In R v. Stanford,186 the defendant was charged, inter alia, with the unlawful and 
unauthorised interception of electronic mail communications to a public company, 
contrary to section 1(2) of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000: 
(2)     It shall be an offence for a person—  
(a)     intentionally and without lawful authority… 
to intercept, at any place in the United Kingdom, any communication in the 
course of its transmission by means of a private telecommunication system. 
The defendant had been deputy chairman of the company. After his resignation, he 
authorised an employee with an administrator username and password to set up an 
email rule to mirror email messages sent to a former colleague to another account 
which he then accessed. He wanted to use the material to oust the chairman of the 
company and take control of it for himself. Following the judge’s ruling that the 
defendant had no defence in law, the defendant pleaded guilty. There is therefore 
potential overlap with the concept of using authorised access for an unauthorised 
purpose within section 1 of the 1990 Act as discussed in Allison in section 3.3.1 above. 
                                                        
184 For example, Malicious Communications Act 1988, s 1(1) establishes the offence of 
sending letters with intent to cause distress or anxiety. Liability could also potentially 
arise under the Protection from Harassment Act 1997, s 2. 
185 Wasik, M, ‘Computer misuse and misconduct in public office’ (2008) 22 
International Review of Law, Computers and Technology 135, 141. 
186 R v. Stanford [2006] EWCA Crim 258. 
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3.6.4 Malicious Communications Act 1988 (as amended) 
Section 1 of the Malicious Communications Act 1988 introduced an offence of  sending 
letters with intent to cause distress or anxiety. It was amended by the Criminal Justice 
and Police Act 2001187 to include electronic communications: 
(1)     Any person who sends to another person— 
(a)     a [letter, electronic communication or article of any description] which 
conveys— 
(i)     a message which is indecent or grossly offensive; 
(ii)     a threat; or 
(iii)     information which is false and known or believed to be false by the 
sender; or 
(b)     any [article or electronic communication] which is, in whole or part, of 
an indecent or grossly offensive nature, 
is guilty of an offence if his purpose, or one of his purposes, in sending it is that 
it should, so far as falling within paragraph (a) or (b) above, cause distress or 
anxiety to the recipient or to any other person to whom he intends that it or its 
contents or nature should be communicated. 
Therefore, indecent, grossly offensive, threatening or false email messages sent 
knowingly and with intent to cause distress or anxiety could fall within section 1. There 
are currently no reported cases on this point. However, it is conceivable that this could 
have been stretched in an attempt to encapsulate the wrongdoing in Lennon. The 
emails sent contained knowingly false information in that they purported to come from 
a person other than their actual sender and Lennon knew this to be the case, having set 
up Avalanche accordingly. Lennon’s purpose could also have been argued to have 
caused anxiety to Ms Rhodes since, to the casual observer, it would appear that it was 
her actions that had caused D&G’s loss, not those of Lennon. Perhaps the addition of 
‘loss’ to ‘distress and anxiety’ would remove the necessity for any strained construction. 
                                                        
187 Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001, s 43(1)(a). 
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3.6.5 Communications Act 2003 
The Communications Act 2003 may also have provided an alternative means of 
prosecuting denial-of-service attacks which took place over the public network. Section 
127(2)(c) of the Communications Act 2003 provides that: 
A person is guilty of an offence if offence if, for the purpose of causing 
annoyance, inconvenience or needless anxiety to another, he… persistently 
makes use of a public electronic communications network. 
This could be construed as encompassing the mass sending of email, although 
interpretation may turn on the meaning of ‘persistently’ and whether one action in 
causing a mail-bombing program to run would be a persistent use or a single usage of 
the network. There are currently no reported cases on this point. Section 127 has  been 
judicially considered in the context of nuisance188 or grossly offensive material,189 but 
not persistent misuse or data bombardment. However, this is a summary offence which 
carries a maximum penalty of six months imprisonment. This is considerably less than 
the five year (ten year following amendment)190 tariff associated with section 3 of the 
1990 Act.  
3.6.6 Terrorism Act 2000 (as amended in 2006) 
Some manifestations of computer misuse may also fall within the Terrorism Act 2000. 
Section 1(1) of the Act (as amended by the Terrorism Act 2006)191 defines ‘terrorism’ as: 
[T]he use or threat of action where— 
(a) the action falls within subsection (2); 
(b) the use or threat is designed to influence the government or an 
international governmental organisation or to intimidate the public or a section 
of the public, and; 
(c) the use or threat is made for the purpose of advancing a political, religious 
or ideological cause. 
                                                        
188 R v. Rimmington [2005] UKHL 63. 
189 DPP v. Collins [2006] UKHL 40. 
190 See section 3.5.3. 
191 Terrorism Act 2006, s 34 inserted ‘or an international governmental organisation’ into 
section 1(1) of the Terrorism Act 2000. 
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The list of proscribed actions is provided by section 1(2) which includes, under section 
1(2)(e), that ‘designed seriously to interfere with or seriously to disrupt an electronic 
system’. The accompanying Explanatory Notes192 make it clear that the Act is designed 
to cover 
…actions which might not be violent in themselves but which can, in a modern 
society, have a devastating impact. These could include interfering with the 
supply of water or power where life, health or safety may be put at risk. 
Subsection (2)(e) covers the disrupting of key computer systems.193 
Therefore it is clear that a cyber attack on a key system within the critical national 
infrastructure194 may well fall within the Terrorism Act 2000 if used – or threatened to 
be used – in the furtherance of a political, religious or ideological cause. Such attacks 
would also give rise to a corresponding increase in police powers to investigate.195  
Attacking such systems could therefore give rise to  highly serious offences under the 
Terrorism Act 2000 even though they may not fall within the 1990 Act. However, even 
where the two pieces of legislation overlap it is, as Walker suggests, only the ‘truly 
terrorising that should require a special legal response’196 and that only threats to the 
well-being of an individual, rather than a machine should fall within the Terrorism Act 
2000: 
…activities such as defacing, corrupting or denying are unlikely to have the 
same impact on the lives of individuals, even if the potential disruption to the 
capacities of state agencies remains large and of increasing significance… We 
should hesitate to demonise [such activities] with the title ‘terrorism’ even if 
they infringe such elements of the criminal law as the Computer Misuse Act 
1990 or the Criminal Damage Act 1971.197 
                                                        
192 Terrorism Act 2000, Explanatory Note. 
193 Ibid, [10]. 
194 Those assets, services and systems that support the economic, political and social life 
of the UK whose importance is such that any entire or partial loss or compromise could 
cause large scale loss of life; have a serious impact on the national economy; have other 
grave social consequences for the community, or; be of immediate concern to the 
national government. 
195 Terrorism Act 2000, ss 114-116. 
196 Walker, C, ‘Cyber-terrorism: Legal principle and law in the United Kingdom’  (2006) 
110 Penn State Law Review 625, 642. 
197 Ibid, 643. 
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Legal technicalities aside, the Terrorism Act 2000 should therefore be reserved for that 
which is ‘properly’ terrorist. This leaves the rest of the law to deal with the more 
mundane instances of computer misuse, many of which in this context are better 
labelled as political activism rather than terrorism.  
3.6.7 Fraud Act 2006 
The application of the deception offences within the Theft Act 1968 to situations 
involving the use of computers often proved to be problematic since case law suggested 
that it was not possible to deceive a machine: 
For a deception to take place there must be some person or persons who will 
have been deceived.198 
Similarly, the offence of obtaining services by deception in section 1 of the Theft Act 
1978 provides that: 
[a] person who by any deception obtains services from another shall be guilty of 
an offence. (emphasis added). 
In Re Holmes the court also stated that: 
 
We…accept that “The prevailing opinion is that it is not possible in law to 
deceive a machine”199 
However, the Fraud Act 2006 repealed all the deception offences in the Theft Acts  
1968 and 1978 and replaced them with a single offence of fraud (section 1) which can be 
committed by false representation (section 2), failure to disclose information when 
there is a legal duty to do so (section 3) and abuse of position (section 4). Of these, the 
offence of fraud by false representation is the most interesting in relation to computer 
misuse. The actus reus is making a false representation. The mens rea requires 
dishonesty, knowledge that the representation is false and intention to make a gain or 
cause a loss. The intention may be express or implied.200 Most importantly, section 2(5) 
provides that: 
                                                        
198 DPP v. Ray [1974] AC 370 (HL) 384. 
199 Re Holmes [2004] EWHC 2020 (Admin); [2005] 1 WLR 1857, 1863. 
200 Fraud Act 2006, s 2(4). 
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a representation may be regarded as made if it (or anything implying it) is 
submitted in any form to any system or device designed to receive, convey or 
respond to communications (with or without human intervention).201 
Therefore, fraud can be committed by a false electronic representation. Moreover, 
sections 6 and 7 criminalise the possession, making or supply of articles for use in 
frauds, including ‘any program or data held in electronic form’.202 There is a degree of 
overlap here with possessing, making or supplying articles for use in computer misuse 
offences.203 
3.7 Conclusion 
While the availability of networked technology and instances of computer misuse have 
increased greatly since 1990, the Computer Misuse Act 1990 has produced relatively low 
prosecution rates. It has also given rise to some interpretative difficulties, particularly in 
relation to new manifestations of computer misuse. As Holder comments, specific 
legislation will only provide protection to those situations envisaged at the time,204 yet 
the nature of technological advance is such that its use (or misuse) may give rise to 
unenvisaged situations. This concept will be returned to in the discussion of 
manufactured uncertainty in the risk society in Chapter 5.  
The Police and Justice Act 2006 has introduced some amendments to the 1990 Act in a 
bid to remedy some of the interpretational difficulties and to facilitate the application 
of the Act to more recent forms of computer misuse, particularly denial-of-service 
attacks. However, it has been seen that even the recent provisions may give rise to 
interpretational challenges for the courts. As the Earl of Northesk commented during 
the debate on the 2006 Act: 
I am unconvinced that the insertion of these few odd confused clauses at the 
tail end of a portmanteau Bill demonstrates either adequate understanding of 
the complexities of the issues or firm resolve to attend to the whole corpus of 
internet crime…To be blunt, I fear that ultimately these clauses will create 
more problems than they solve.205  
                                                        
201 Fraud Act 2006, s 2(5). 
202 Fraud Act 2006, s 8(1). 
203 See section 3.5.4. 
204 Holder, C, ‘Staying One Step Ahead of the Criminals’ (2002) 10(3) IT Law Today 17. 
205 Hansard HL vol 684 col 607 (11 July 2006). 
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It has also been seen that ‘old’ legal principles and criminal offences remain relevant in 
the new technological age. The common law offence of misconduct in public office has 
been used in preference to the 1990 Act and there are a range of possible statutory 
alternatives which might be employed in circumstances where computer technology has 
been misused in some way. As Wasik comments: 
Despite the existence of the more specialist [computer misuse] offences…it has 
always been clear that the majority of cases involving misuse of information 
technology will continue to be prosecuted under more traditional…offences.206 
Computer misuse remains a current issue. This is not to say that the domestic criminal 
law has no part to play in its control or that it has been ineffective to date. Indeed, the 
1990 Act has stood the test of time reasonably well, only requiring statutory amendment 
after sixteen years. However, the majority of instances of computer misuse are not 
reported which gives the law no opportunity to prove its worth. It is therefore necessary 
to explore the extent to which computer misuse is amenable to governance by the 
domestic criminal law alone or whether alternative or additional modes of regulation 
might also form an appropriate response. 
 
                                                        
206 Wasik, M, ‘Hacking, viruses and fraud’ in Akdeniz, Y, Walker, C and Wall, DS (eds) 
The Internet, Law and Society (Pearson Education, Harlow, 2000). 
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Computer misuse and the criminal law 
 
Technology…is a queer thing.  
It brings you great gifts with one hand, and it stabs you in the back with the other. 
CP Snow, scientist and novelist, New York Times (15 March 1971) 
 
The previous two chapters have considered the parallel evolutionary strands of 
computer technology and computer misuse together with the attempts of the  domestic 
criminal law to regulate that misuse. Chapter 2 considered the emergence of the 
problem of computer misuse, the challenges which it presented for the domestic 
criminal law and the genesis of the Computer Misuse Act 1990 which  introduced three 
new specific offences aimed at computer misuse. The efficacy of the 1990 Act was 
considered in Chapter 3. This showed that the 1990 Act produced a relatively low 
number of prosecutions. Moreover, the application of the 1990 Act seemed to be 
inconsistent, with the courts struggling at times to interpret the Act in a way which 
furthered its general purpose to prevent computer misuse. Some of these difficulties 
arose as a result of technological advances. Just as the pre-existing criminal law had 
been stretched in an attempt to accommodate unforeseen mischief resulting from 
technologies emerging in the 1980s, so the 1990 Act began itself to suffer during its first 
sixteen years. The Police and Justice Act 2006 introduced some amendments to the 1990 
Act in an attempt to bring the legislation in line with technological capability. While 
the effect of these amendments remains to be seen, it is undoubtedly clear that the 
domestic criminal law is still seen to have a role to play in the regulation of computer 
misuse.  
It is, however, necessary to consider whether the regulation of computer misuse 
requires more than just the domestic criminal law. Therefore, this chapter will explore 
the nature and purpose of the criminal law both in the abstract and in the context of 
the problems arising from computer misuse established in Chapters 2 and 3, thereby 
facilitating a discussion of the interplay between computer misuse and the domestic 
criminal law. 
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4.1 Theories of criminal law 
The two main approaches which may be taken to provide a philosophical theory of the 
criminal law are analytical or normative.1 Analytical theorists attempt to provide an 
account of what the criminal law ‘is’2 along with explanations of closely-related 
concepts such as crime itself. By comparison, normative theorists go beyond seeking 
what the criminal law is to consider both what it ‘ought’ to be and, indeed, whether the 
criminal law ought to exist only as a last resort3 or, indeed, at all. The distinction 
between descriptive (‘is’) and prescriptive (‘ought’) statements was considered by 
Hume, who proposed that norms cannot be properly inferred from facts and, as such, 
normative theories are distinct from analytical theories.4 Hume’s proposition was made 
in the context of a major philosophical debate surrounding the fundamental notions of 
natural law and natural justice and, as such, served much wider purposes than that of 
the philosophical basis of the criminal law alone. The deduction of an ‘ought’ from an 
‘is’ (in other words, the attempted definition of a moral norm in terms of a fact) were 
condemned by Moore as the ‘naturalistic fallacy’.5 This is/ought dichotomy was also 
considered by Kant: 
For whereas, so far as nature is concerned, experience supplies the rules and is 
the source of truth, in respect of the moral laws it is, alas, the mother of 
illusion! Nothing is more reprehensible than to derive the laws prescribing what 
ought to be done from what is done…6 
As Milton comments ‘For Kant the distinction between is and ought was not something 
reluctantly conceded; it was indispensible’.7  
                                                        
1 Husak, DN, Philosophy of Criminal Law (Rowman & Littlefield, Totowa, 1987) 20 – 
26. 
2 Duff, RA, ‘Theorizing Criminal Law: a 25th Anniversary Essay’ (2005) 25 Oxford 
Journal of Legal Studies 353, 354. 
3 Husak, DN, ‘The Criminal Law as Last Resort’ (2004) 24 Oxford Journal of Legal 
Studies 207. 
4 Hume, D, (1777) A Treatise of Human Nature in Freeman, MDA, Lloyd’s 
Introduction to Jurisprudence (6th edn Sweet & Maxwell, London 1994) 34. 
5 Moore, GE, Principia Ethica (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1903). 
6 Kemp Smith, N (tr), Kant, I Critique of Pure Reason (1781) 
<http://www.hkbu.edu.hk/~ppp/cpr/toc.html> accessed 25 September 2008. 
7 Milton, P, ‘David Hume and the eighteenth-century conception of natural law’ [1982] 
Legal Studies 14, 32. 
  
102 
The predominant analytical theory building upon this position is that of legal 
positivism. Within positivist theory, the law is separate from morality, even though that 
law may well correspond to contemporary moral standards and be influenced by moral 
considerations. By contrast, normative theories consider the moral character of law: a 
system of morality being the body of requirements to which an action must conform in 
order to be right or virtuous. This is in contrast with positive laws, the obligation of 
which depends solely on the fact that they have been imposed by a rightful authority. 
Fuller contends that the purpose of law is to ‘subject human conduct to the governance 
of rules’8 and that a system of governance must necessarily contain certain desirable 
attributes, such as clarity, consistency and stability, in order to have legitimacy. These 
principles reflect the internal morality of law. Therefore, although in reality all systems 
of law must make compromises, the more closely a system is able to adhere to Fuller’s 
key procedural principles, the more likely that substantively just laws will result. This 
procedural naturalism was criticised by Hart.9 Not only did Hart consider Fuller’s 
principles merely to be ones of efficacy rather than morality but he also viewed Fuller’s 
philosophy as confusing purposive activity and morality. For Hart, all actions, virtuous 
or otherwise, have their own internal standards of efficacy which are distinct from 
moral standards, thus concluding that, although Fuller’s principles are existence 
conditions for a legal system, they do not conceptually connect law with morality.10 
However, Hart’s analysis overlooks the fact that most of Fuller’s principles represent 
moral ideals of fairness. For Fuller, the purpose and nature of law is mixed: some ‘legal’ 
purposes do not necessarily comply with an inner morality. Divergences from Fuller’s 
internal morality or Hart’s principles of efficacy, such as divergences from certainty, 
only become inconsistent with a system of governance when they are so great that they 
render the system incapable of guiding behaviour. Fuller’s position is vindicated by art 6 
of the European Convention on Human Rights11 which requires due process in 
determining civil rights and obligations and criminal charges. The way in which the law 
operates requires a moral foundation as well as efficacy.  
Whether analytical or normative, Duff suggests that philosophical theories of criminal 
law cannot subsist in isolation but must have some regard to the empirical actualities of 
                                                        
8 Fuller, LL, The Morality of Law (Yale University Press, New Haven, 1964) 106. 
9 Hart, HLA, ‘Book Review of The Morality of Law’ (1965) 78 Harvard Law Review 
1281. 
10 Ibid, 1285-86. 
11 Council of Europe Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms (signed 4 November 1950) ETS 005. 
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that which they theorise.12 Therefore the theories which follow will be discussed in the 
context of computer misuse relating to emerging technologies within a global 
networked society. Within this context, the criminal law may be conceptualised as an 
instrumentalist or moralistic construct. Here the instrumentalist view represents the ‘is’ 
being influenced by the ‘ought’ whereas the moralistic construct focuses predominantly 
on the ‘ought’. 
4.2 The instrumentalist construction of the criminal law 
The instrumentalist construction views the criminal law as an instrument or a technique 
which may serve several ends. It cannot, however, be said that the purpose of the 
criminal law is simply that of an instrument of crime prevention or deterrence. 
Adopting a strictly legalistic definition that a crime is ‘an intentional act in violation of 
the criminal law’,13 then without the criminal law there would be no crime since no 
conduct would be criminal. This is a circular argument. Indeed, as Michael and Adler 
contend: 
If crime is merely an instance of conduct that is proscribed by the criminal 
code, it follows that the criminal law is the cause of crime.14 
Therefore, in this sense, the traditional perception of criminal law as establishing 
prohibitive norms that proscribe certain conduct15 or creating disciplinary norms that 
bound acceptable behaviour16 is unhelpful. In order to achieve a clear understanding of 
the nature of crime and reasons for criminalisation, the social setting in which the 
conduct occurs should be considered. As Packer states: 
Crime is a socio-political artefact, not a natural phenomenon. We can have as 
much or as little crime as we please, depending on what we choose to count as 
criminal.17 
                                                        
12 Duff, RA, ‘Theories of Criminal Law’ Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy 
<http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/criminal-law/> accessed 25 September 2008. 
13 Tappan, PW, ‘Who is the criminal?’ (1947) 12 American Sociological Review 96, 100. 
14 Michael, J and Adler, M, Crime, Law and Social Science (Harcourt Brace Jonovich, 
New York, 1933) 5. 
15 Quinney, R, The Social Reality of Crime Boston (Little, Brown, 1970). 
16 Foucault, M, Discipline and Punish: the Birth of the Prison (Allen Lane, London, 
1977). 
17 Packer, HL, The Limits of the Criminal Sanction (Stanford University Press, Stanford, 
1968) 364. 
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The instrumentalist purpose of the criminal law can therefore be considered to be the 
protection of a particular set of public or private interests. For example. the American 
Model Penal Code18 provides that: 
The general purposes of the provisions governing the definition of offenses are: 
(a) to forbid and prevent conduct that unjustifiable and inexcusably inflicts or 
threatens substantial harm to individual or public interests.19 
Therefore, given a set of interests warranting protection from substantial harm, 
instrumentalists such as Devlin take the pragmatic view that the criminal law should 
uphold the ‘smooth functioning of society and the preservation of order’.20 However, it 
is worth noting the instrumentalist view typically limits the ambit of the criminal law to 
substantial harms. It is questionable whether the harm resulting from computer misuse 
is as substantial as those harms that have traditionally fallen within the instrumentalist 
view: for instance, non-consensual harm to others resulting from the acts of rape, 
criminal damage or burglary. These acts are historically linked in the social conscience 
as harmful since they result in violation of personal interests widely recognised as 
legitimate and demanding respect from other individuals and from the state. Whether 
the state labels these interests as rights is a separate issue. It is possible to conceive of 
harms of a similar nature being the product of computer misuse, albeit with less 
immediate physicality. Unauthorised access to a computer system or data represents a 
violation of the boundary of that system. Unauthorised access with intent to commit or 
facilitate the commission of a further offence is akin to the harmful trespass in 
burglary. Impairing the performance, operation or reliability of a system is damaging to 
that system as a whole. Therefore, it is possible that the instrumentalist view of 
substantial harm could be applied to computer misuse by analogy. However, the 
consequences of misuse tend to be viewed as less substantial than the more tangible and 
familiar results typically constructed as harm. 
This is similar to the position regarding the infringement of copyright, which is 
widespread, especially among younger Internet users who do not consider downloading 
copyright material to be illegal. Twenty-six per cent of all 10- to 25-year-old Internet 
                                                        
18 As adopted at the 1962 Annual Meeting of the American Law Institute. 
19 Model Penal Code and Commentaries (Official Draft and Revised Comments) (1985), 
§1.01(1). 
20 Devlin, P, The Enforcement of Morals (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1965) 5. 
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users reported that they had illegally downloaded software, music or films in 2004.21 
Although the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 198822 provides a number of criminal 
offences in relation to making or dealing with articles that have infringed copyright, it 
primarily provides civil remedies such as damages or injunction to those whose 
copyright has been infringed.23 From April 2007, enforcement of the criminal offences 
was primarily delegated to local weights and measures authorities rather than to the 
police.24 This transition of police responsibility to local enforcement authorities reflects 
the construction of much of the criminal harm caused by copyright infringement as 
insubstantial. The Gowers Review of Intellectual Property25 acknowledges the link 
between harm and criminal sanction, stating that ‘IP crime must carry penalties 
proportionate to the harm caused and the risk of being caught’.26 (emphasis added) 
Copyright infringement carries different maximum sentences depending upon whether 
the offence was committed online or in the physical world.27 Online offences carry a 
maximum of two years imprisonment; real-world offences have a maximum of ten 
years.28 It therefore follows that online offences are considered less culpable and thus 
attract a lower sentence.  
The possible reasons behind this perception of the consequences of computer misuse as 
being a relatively trifling harm are threefold. First, the harm cannot be easily proved: it 
is often secret, latent or hidden. For instance, key logging software or other spyware is 
not always detected. Malicious software may contain a payload set to activate at some 
future time. Cookies used for authenticating, tracking, and maintaining specific 
information about users may be considered a harm to privacy, but are often either 
                                                        
21 Wilson, D and others, ‘Fraud and technology crimes: findings from the 2003/04 British 
Crime Survey, the 2004 Offending, Crime and Justice Survey and administrative sources’ 
Home Office Online Report 09/06 < 
www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs06/rdsolr0906.pdf> (20 May 2007). 
22 Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, s 107. 
23 Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, ss 96 –106. 
24 Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, s 107A added by the Criminal Justice and 
Public Order Act 1994, s 165. 
25 Supplementary report to HM Treasury, ‘Investing in Britain's Potential: Building Our 
Long-term Future’ (Cm 6984, 2006). 
26 Ibid, [3.11]. 
27 Following implementation of Council Directive (EC) 2001/29 of 22 May 2001 on the 
harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information 
society [2001] OJ L167/10. 
28 Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1998, ss 107(2A), 198(1A). 
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unnoticed or even considered to be useful, since they enable repeat visits to favourite 
web sites. In this sense, computer misuse is analogous to white-collar crime where, 
similarly, harm is not always conceptualised or identified as such. White-collar crime 
usually targets a substantial number of victims who are often unaware of their 
victimisation. Even where this is not the case, as in organisations subject to fraud, there 
is often unwillingness to admit to vulnerability.29 The same reluctance to risk attracting 
adverse publicity has already been seen in relation to the low number of prosecutions 
brought under the 1990 Act.30  
Second, the victim may not understand that they have been harmed at all. This may be 
a consequence of the ‘invisible’ nature of some types of computer misuse previously 
discussed, or as a consequence of the victim’s own lack of technical knowledge. As User 
6 illustrated: 
We had spyware on our machines for weeks before we found it. We had no idea 
that it was there – or what information we’d lost while it was there. 
As previously discussed in 2.1.3 above, the collective diminution in general computing 
skill levels as technology became more widely available gave rise to a knowledge gap 
between the expert and non-expert user. Therefore, not only does this gap become a 
potential driver and facilitator of computer misuse, but it may also lead to a general 
perception that it is not a source of serious harm and therefore not worthy of criminal 
sanction.  
The final reason lies in the fact that certain manifestations of computer misuse may not 
be considered harmful at all. Peer-to-peer file sharing networks, such as eDonkey and 
Kazaa, which facilitate copyright infringement, or the plethora of websites offering 
activation codes for software by Microsoft or Adobe (many of which also host a variety 
of malicious software) are considered by some to be legitimate in that they allow true 
freedom of information. Boyle criticises the current regime of intellectual property 
rights, arguing that inter alia software should not be subject to copyright or patent law 
since it may tend to concentrate market power in the hands of a small number of 
companies, such as Microsoft.31 He considers that the system of grants of exclusivity is 
in tension with the development of a public domain of information: in other words, 
                                                        
29 Levi, M and Pithouse, A, ‘Victims of Fraud’ in Downes, D (ed) Unravelling Criminal 
Justice (Macmillan, London, 1992). 
30 See section 3.2. 
31 Boyle, J, Shamans, Software, and Spleens: Law and the Construction of the 
Information Society (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1996). 
  
107 
that ‘information wants to be free’.32 This theme is also picked up by Rheingold33 who 
considers how ‘virtual homesteading’ gives rise to virtual communities supported by free 
information propagated via online knowledge sharing infrastructures. Wagner 
challenges Boyle’s stance, considering that control: 
may in many cases actually increase open information or the public 
domain…Furthermore, control offers both flexibility in information-sharing or 
transfer arrangements and better coordination of activities that both produce 
and disseminate open information, to society’s benefit.34 
Nevertheless, it remains true that, for some, that which is criminalised is not considered 
harmful. 
Consideration of the notion of harm leads naturally to the consensus view of crime 
which proposes that behaviours which are defined as criminal (in other words, the 
boundaries of criminality) are determined by reference to those which deviate from the 
norms which are commonly agreed to be acceptable amongst the majority of people 
within a particular society. Therefore, conduct that is defined as criminal naturally 
reflects the values, beliefs and opinions of the social majority. The consensus approach 
reflects the utilitarian view encapsulated by John Stuart Mill, who believed that the 
state is only justified in regulating the behaviour of its citizens in the interests of the 
prevention of harm either to others or to society as a whole: 
[T]he sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in 
interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection. 
[…] The only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over a 
member of a civilised community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. 
His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant.35 
Therefore, according to Mill, and later Hart, who applied Mill’s principle to the limits 
of the criminal law,36 if an individual’s behaviour is likely to harm others, then his 
                                                        
32 Boyle, J, ‘Foucault In Cyberspace: Surveillance, Sovereignty, and Hard-Wired Censors’ 
(1997) <http://www.law.duke.edu/boylesite/foucault.htm> accessed 25 September 2008. 
33 Rheingold, H, The Virtual Community: Homesteading on the Electronic Frontier 
(MIT Press, London, 2000). 
34 Wagner, RP, ‘Information wants to be free: intellectual property and the mythologies 
of control’ (2003) 103 Columbia Law Review 995, 1034. 
35 Mill, JS, On Liberty and Other Essays (revd edn Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
1991) 14. 
36 Hart, HLA, Law, Liberty and Morality (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1963). 
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individual liberty to behave as he wishes should be sacrificed in the interests of society 
in general. It is clear from this that the consensus view makes a strong link between 
prohibited conduct and morality: conduct is prohibited because it is harmful or 
‘wrong’. While this is in accord with the instrumentalist prohibition on crimes which 
are mala in se37 such as murder or rape, the consensus view has greater difficulty in 
justifying the criminalisation of less substantially harmful conduct, or conduct which is 
mala prohibita,38 that is, prohibited for the protection of society, not because it is 
morally wrong.39 Examples of mala prohibita conduct are driving without a licence and 
illegal tax evasion. Consensus theorists argue that since the aim of the criminal law is to 
protect individuals and society from harm, it must necessarily cover an immense 
spectrum of harms. As such, it is injurious to both individuals and society that 
unlicensed drivers are on the roads and that revenues due are not being paid. Whilst 
individuals might not agree with the minutiae of these laws, in particular their 
application to themselves, there remains a general agreement with their overarching 
principles, in that there should be some controls over driving behaviour in the interests 
of public safety and that people should contribute to the cost of providing free services 
such as state healthcare and education. In some respects, it is true to say that social 
harm is the factor that distinguishes deviant behaviour, that is, any conduct that departs 
from the norms of society, and criminal behaviour. The liberal basis of the consensus 
view, based upon the idea of maximising freedom, autonomy and choice, would not see 
the criminalisation of deviant behaviour as justified unless it crossed the threshold of 
seriousness that rendered it harmful to others or to society. 
It is therefore necessary to examine whether computer misuse crosses the threshold of 
seriousness justifying its criminalisation on the basis of its harm to another or to society 
as a whole. The harm to society – in the form of harm to the national economy – was 
the view put forward by the proponents of the Computer Misuse Bill, in particular 
Michael Colvin MP, who quoted the cost of computer misuse to the UK as between 
£400 million and £2 billion annually during debate.40 Moreover, general media-led 
public concern over hacking and viruses also began to grow during the 1980s, giving 
weight to a general public consensus that such misuse was harmful in a general sense.  
                                                        
37 Conduct which is wrong in itself. 
38 Conduct which is wrong because it is prohibited. 
39 Lacey, N, Wells, C and Meure, D, Reconstructing Criminal Law: Critical Social 
Perspectives on Crime and the Criminal Process (Weidenfield & Nicolson, London, 
1990). 
40 Hansard HC vol 166 col 1134 (9 February 1990). 
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Therefore, while the utilitarian instrumentalist conception of the criminal law may 
provide a deterrent to substantial harm, it has not provided a deterrent to the harm 
perceived as resulting from computer misuse. Wall describes this as the ‘de minimis 
trap’:  computer misuse (as a subset of what Wall defines as cybercrime) often involves 
bulk, but low harm, victimisation and consequently that the use of finite police 
resources for individual instances of harm would be often hard to justify in the public 
interest.41 Similarly, the DTI found that ‘for virus infections, there was a general 
perception that no-one had broken the law’.42 From a consensus perspective, there is no 
agreement that computer misuse is harmful enough to be treated invariably as criminal. 
This supports the proposition that, save for those breaches that pose a threat to safety 
or national security, computer misuse is mala prohibita. Since people are more inclined 
to obey laws which prohibit behaviour that is mala in se, the proliferation of computer 
misuse strongly suggests that the criminal law may be an ineffective instrument of 
control. Therefore, if computer misuse does not seem to be mala in se, it should be 
examined in terms of its moral content to consider why this might be the case. 
However, the relationship between the criminal law and morality is uncertain in the 
instrumentalist view. As Duff comments: 
[A]n instrumentalist approach to the justification of criminal law seems to leave 
it as something of an open question whether the law should criminalise only 
immoral conduct, or should subject only morally culpable agents to criminal 
liability.43  
It is therefore necessary to consider computer misuse within a construction of the 
criminal law which centres on immorality and moral culpability. 
4.3 The moralistic construction of the criminal law 
Sir James Stephen infamously argued that criminal law is in ‘the nature of a persecution 
of the grosser forms of vice’ and that these: 
have in fact been forbidden and subjected to punishment not only because they 
are dangerous to society, and so ought to be prevented, but also for the sake of 
                                                        
41 Wall, DS, Cybercrime: The Transformation of Crime in the Digital Age (Polity Press, 
Cambridge, 2007) 161-2. 
42 DTI, ‘Information Security Breaches Survey 2004’ 
<http://www.pwc.com/images/gx/eng/about/svcs/grms/2004Technical_Report.pdf> 
accessed 25 September 2008. 
43 Duff, RA, ‘Theories of Criminal Law’ Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy 
<http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/criminal-law/> accessed 25 September 2008. 
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gratifying the feeling of hatred – call it revenge, resentment, or what you will – 
which the contemplation of such conduct excites in healthily constituted 
minds.44 
To Stephen, the criminal law exists to regulate conduct which is repugnant to the 
healthily constituted mind (that is, the mind of the right-thinking members of society) 
and, in doing so, serves an (indirectly) instrumentalist purpose of satisfying the 
collective social feelings of hatred towards gross forms of vice; a response which 
Stephen considered to be appropriate and natural. For Cohen, conduct such as 
pornography, prostitution and that involving abhorrent sexual practices should be 
criminalised because: 
It is one of the functions of the criminal law to give expression to the collective 
feeling of revulsion toward certain acts, even when they are not very 
dangerous.45 
This moralistic construction of avoiding collective revulsion is echoed by Moore who 
stated that the function of the criminal law is to punish: 
all and only those who are morally culpable in the doing of some morally 
wrongful action.46  
The moralist arguments of Stephen, Cohen and Moore are encapsulated by Devlin in a 
classic statement on the function of morality within the law: 
Without shared ideas on politics, morals and ethics, no society can exist … If 
men and women try to create a society in which there is no fundamental 
agreement about good and evil, they will fail; if having based it on common 
agreement, the agreement goes, the society will disintegrate. For society is not 
something that is kept together physically; it is held by the invisible bonds of 
common thought. If the bonds were too far relaxed, the members would drift 
apart. A common morality is part of the bondage. The bondage is the price of 
society; and mankind, which needs society must pay its price.47 
                                                        
44 Stephen, JF, Liberty, Equality, Fraternity (1873) reprinted in White, J (ed), Liberty, 
Equality, Fraternity (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1967) 148-9  
45 Cohen, MR, ‘Moral Aspects of the Criminal Law’ (1940) 49 The Yale Law Journal 
987, 991. 
46 Moore, MS, Placing Blame: A Theory of Criminal Law (Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 1997) 35. 
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Devlin therefore contended that there is a common public morality that must be 
protected by the criminal law and that to remove the regulation of morality from the 
reach of the criminal law would inevitably lead to the spread of immoral behaviour and 
the disintegration of society. It followed that conduct which was viewed as immoral by 
the majority at the time, such as homosexuality, needed to be suppressed in the 
interests of society.  
The doctrine that it is justifiable to make some kinds of conduct punishable by the 
criminal law simply because the conduct in question is commonly held to be immoral, 
irrespective of whether it does any harm, was criticised by Hart.48 This gave rise to the 
Hart-Devlin debate which followed the publication of the Wolfenden report.49 This 
report made recommendations which led to the decriminalisation of consensual 
homosexual activity between adult males in private. These were based on Mill’s 
libertarian view that legal power can only be exercised for the purpose of preventing 
harm to others and that no such harm was being done. Devlin was highly critical of 
both the decriminalisation of homosexuality and Hart’s view that the criminal law had 
no role to play in the enforcement of morality. Hart disagreed with Devlin over the 
existence of a common morality, preferring instead the idea of a ‘number of mutually 
tolerant moralities’50 and that the use of law to reflect a snapshot of the dominant 
morality of the time was, as Zedner comments, ‘conservative and potentially harmful’51 
particularly in the contemporary multi-cultural, multi-ethnic, multi-faith society. 52 Hart 
believed that the prohibition of conduct on the basis of a moral consensus was an 
unjustifiable interference with individual autonomy. Therefore, legislation designed to 
enforce moral standards can have a flawed basis due to the difficulties of defining 
morality and delineating between that which is immoral and that which is not. 
However, Hart did concede a role for the criminal law in the maintenance of morality, 
but only where necessary to protect those who would engage in such immoral activities. 
Hart’s reluctance to treat law as a moral issue was later criticised by Dworkin who 
considered that law could never be entirely divorced from morality.53 Similarly, Mitchell 
                                                        
48 Hart, HLA, Law, Liberty and Morality (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1963). 
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52 Ibid. 
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argued that law might be used to protect a utilitarian morality; that is, to reinforce it 
rather than enforce it.54 
In relation to computer misuse, it has been suggested by Spafford55 and Denning56 that 
the moral boundaries relating to technology are at odds with the moral standards of the 
physical world. In essence, the novelty of the technological realm suggests that the 
ethical considerations relating to personal property and privacy in the physical world do 
not apply in the electronic world. This allows people to engage in deviant behaviour 
involving computer misuse whereas they would be less likely to engage in the analogous 
physical world mischief. This view was consistently echoed across all categories of 
interview participant: 
Online criminals do things from the safety of their own homes that they 
wouldn’t dream of doing in the High Street. They will quite happily commit 
fraud and theft online, but you’d never see them in Lloyd’s with a mask on.57 
The world within the computer is different in almost every respect. You 
become disassociated from what you’re doing. And the consequences of what 
you’re doing, I suppose.58 
We must accept that online behaviour is different to everyday behaviour and 
deal with it accordingly.59 
Moreover, as Rogers et al60 established, computer misusers tend not to consider their 
actions as immoral. Technician 3 comments further: 
I used to hack. So what? As long as I didn’t cause any havoc while I was in 
there, then I don’t see that I was really doing anything wrong. You couldn’t call 
it immoral. Not unless I put loads of porn in someone’s account or something 
like that. Of course, I never did. 
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Suler links this lack of virtual moral consensus to ‘toxic disinhibition’, arising from the 
very nature of the interaction of the individual with the technology.61  
Therefore, it seems that there is little support for a theory which bases the 
criminalisation of computer misuse on moralistic grounds. It is therefore necessary to 
consider alternative theories of structural conflict and interactionism which may 
provide greater insight. 
4.4 The structural conflict theory of criminal law 
The consensus view of crime largely prevailed unchallenged until the 1960s and the 
advent of critical criminology. One of the key counter theories is the structural conflict 
view of crime. This builds upon the work of Marx, who outlined the fundamentals of 
the conflict approach as follows: 
In the social production of their life, men enter into definite relations that are 
indispensable and independent of their will, relations of production which 
correspond to a definite stage of development of their material productive 
forces. The sum total of these relations…constitutes the economic structure of 
society, the real foundation, on which rises a legal and political super-structure 
and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The more of 
production of material life conditions the social, political and intellectual life 
process in general. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their 
being, but, on the contrary, their social being that determines their 
consciousness.62 
It is, however, important to note that Marx wrote about the social organisation of 
society and did not theorise about crime. However, his ideas have formed the basis for 
the development of theories about crime put forward by others. Bonger attempted to 
explain crime from a Marxist perspective in a crudely deterministic fashion that over-
predicted the prevalence of crime occurring under capitalism resulting from a social 
structure which alienated the lower social classes.63 Sellin further argued that in a 
homogenous society, the norms – or rules of behaviour – which emerge from within a 
culture are embedded in its members and become laws where enforcement is necessary 
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to preserve that unitary culture.64 However, where separate cultures diverge, the laws 
which represent the norms, values and interests of the dominant cultural group may 
produce conflict. This idea was further developed by Vold who contended that the 
social group which proves most efficient in the control of political processes obtains the 
power to enact laws that limit the behaviour of other groups and, in some cases, 
prevent the fulfilment of minority group needs.65 Turk builds on this position, and the 
work of Dahrendorf,66 to conclude that social control is exercised by the ‘control of 
legal images’:67  the inherent discretion in the way in which formal laws are exercised 
allows the powerful to manipulate the legal system to protect their position whilst still 
appearing objectively impartial. The notion of social classes as the most significant 
relations of production are not defined explicitly by Marx, but Giddens infers that: 
Classes are constituted by the relationship of groupings of individuals to the 
ownership of private property in the means of production. This yields a model 
of class relations which is basically dichotomous: all class societies are built 
around a primary line of division between two antagonistic classes, one 
dominant and the other subordinate. In Marx’s usage, class of necessity involves 
a conflict relation.68 
In summary, then, Marxist theorists do not see society as built upon consensus but as 
characterised by conflict between diverse groups who compete for power. Those who 
hold power have the ability to influence the content of the law and therefore may 
exercise their power to protect their own interests and to advance their own social and 
economic position. As such, the criminal law reflects and protects established 
economic, racial, gender and political power groups and thus reinforces and perpetuates 
the power conflict in society.  
Conflict theorists see the interests of the powerful reflected not only in the content of 
the law but in the relative severity with which the crimes of the powerful and the 
powerless are viewed. For example, crimes against property committed by the lower 
classes, such as robbery and burglary, are viewed as significantly more serious than the 
so-called white collar crimes, such as insider dealing and security violations, despite the 
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fact that the latter are likely to involve significantly greater sums of money and have the 
potential to create more widespread social harm.69 Therefore, according to the conflict 
view, the definition of crime is controlled by those who possess power, wealth and 
position who have an interest in preserving their preferential status in society. Crime is 
shaped by the values of the ruling class and not be an objective moral consensus that 
reflects the needs of all people. Crime, according to this perspective, can be defined as a 
political concept designed to protect the power and position of the upper classes at the 
expense of the poor.  This view sees even crimes such as murder and rape as having 
political overtones as the prohibition of violent acts ensures domestic tranquillity and 
guarantees that the anger of the poor and disenfranchised will not be directed towards 
their wealthy capitalist exploiters. 
The criminalisation of computer misuse can be conceptualised within the framework of 
conflict theory. The predominant political argument advanced during the House of 
Commons debate centred on the cost to the UK economy. Moreover, the preceding 
Law Commission report recommended that hacking should be criminalised ‘because of 
the general importance of computer systems’70 which had ‘created radical alterations in 
the methods and conditions of information storage’71 deemed to be ‘strongly in the 
public interest’72 in order to ‘reduce the incidence of costs’.73 The resulting criminal 
offences that were created by the 1990 Act can be seen to have their roots in the 
protection of the capitalist state, and hence the protection of those with political 
power. Although it is perhaps less immediately apparent how this exercise in political 
power was achieved at the expense of the poor, it is worth remembering the comments 
of the MPs at the time of the debate: in particular that computer misusers were 
considered to be ‘often poor’74 and living in a ‘twisted [sub]culture that the Bill is trying 
to stamp out’.75 These comments provide a clear illustration of those with political and 
economic power protecting their interests by criminalising the activities which 
threatened those interests, perpetrated by a class viewed as poor and twisted. Moreover, 
the largest global software corporation, Microsoft, is criticised by advocates of free 
software for its embedded approach to Digital Rights Management technology and 
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regularly vilified for alleged unfair and anticompetitive commercial practices. These 
include the abuse of monopoly power in operating system and web browser sales in the 
United States76 and breach of European competition law in relation to Windows Media 
Player.77 Microsoft products have also been characterised as being unstable and prone to 
overall system insecurity which can be exploited by computer misusers. This can also be 
viewed in terms of a class struggle as the dispossessed fight back against their oppressor. 
However, Microsoft also has a role to play in terms of technological governance, as will 
be discussed in section 7.4 below. 
Therefore, the use of the criminal law as one means of regulating computer misuse may 
be firmly situated within the bounds of structural conflict. However, if the criminal law 
protects the interests of the powerful, it is questionable why the criminal law has not 
been used more to protect those interests. Despite the support by trade and industry 
bodies seen in chapter 2 and 3 to both the original 1990 Act and the amendments which 
were introduced by the Police and Justice Act 2006, companies generally tend to favour 
taking internal measures over legal action where possible. It is therefore reasonable to 
conclude that for the majority of incidents in the majority of organisations, companies 
consider that their interests in preventing and addressing the problem of computer 
misuse are better served by alternative means to the criminal law. Organisations 
perceive a lack of police manpower available to deal with such incidents. This is 
demonstrated by an increased focus on national rather than private security, particularly 
since the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001. For instance, the National Hi-Tech 
Crime Unit was formed in 2001 but was subsumed into the e-crime unit of the Serious 
Organised Crime Agency on 1 April 2006. The incorporation of a dedicated Internet 
crime unit into a general organised crime agency demonstrated a drift in policing focus 
away from technology crime. This view was borne out by comments from users and the 
police at interview: 
Unless someone hacks into the air traffic control system or tries to start a ‘fire 
sale’ like in Die Hard 4.0 then the policing agencies won’t want to know.78 
The police have limited resources. If we had a choice between protecting the 
public at large from the consequences of a major security breach, or using the 
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same resources to deal with someone who’d just lost their holiday photos from 
their hard disk, then common sense would have to prevail.79 
We can’t deal with every incident where a computer is involved. We’d be 
swamped.80 
Therefore, organisations are less likely to complain, believing that the police 
involvement would not be as effective as seeking a private remedy – or no remedy at all.  
4.5 The interactionist theory of criminal law 
The interactionist theory of criminal law is derived from the symbolic interactionism 
school of sociology that is associated with Mead,81 Cooley82 and Thomas,83 which 
analyses the way in which individuals conceptualise themselves and others with whom 
they interact. Symbolic interactionists consider that meanings emerge out of the social 
processes of interpretation by which definitions of objects are created and used.84 There 
is a three stage process by which people ascribe meaning. People act in accordance with 
their own view of reality based upon the meaning that they give to things. They then 
observe how others react to these things, whether positively or negatively. The final 
stage is that they re-examine and interpret their own behaviour according to the 
meaning that they have learned from others. As Thomas stated: 
It is not important whether or not the interpretation is correct – if men define 
situations as real, they are real in their consequences.85 
Therefore, according to this perspective, there is no objective reality. People, 
institutions and events are neither good nor bad in themselves but come to be viewed as 
such according to the subjective interpretation of the observer. For interactionists, the 
definition of crime reflects the preferences and opinions of people who hold social 
power within a particular legal jurisdiction: the property of ‘deviance’ is attributed to 
certain forms of conduct by an audience rather than being intrinsic to them. Those 
with social power use their influence to impose their definition of right and wrong on 
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the rest of the population. For many, the acceptance of the legitimate authority of 
those in power leads them unquestioningly to internalise those rules and consequently 
to adopt their views of right and wrong. Conversely, criminals are people who society 
has chosen to label as outcasts or deviants because they have violated social rules. This 
position was famously summarised by Becker: 
Social groups create deviance by making the rules whose infraction constitutes 
deviance and by applying those rules to particular people and labelling them as 
outsiders. From this point of view…the deviant is one to whom the label has 
successfully been applied; deviant behaviour is behaviour people so label.86 
Therefore, crimes are regarded as wrong because society has labelled them as wrong not 
because there is anything inherently wrong or evil about them. 
The interactionist view of crime coincides with the conflict view to the extent that 
both regard criminal laws as being made by the powerful to protect their interests and 
which are enforced on those without power. However, unlike the conflict view, the 
interactionists do not attribute economic and political motivations to the process of 
defining crime. Instead, they see the criminal law as conforming to the beliefs of moral 
entrepreneurs who use their influence to create rules for the benefit of the less 
fortunate in accordance with their views and beliefs. Laws against pornography, 
prostitution and drug use are illustrative of this view as they can be seen to be the result 
of successful moral crusades rather than originating from  capitalist sensibilities.  
Moreover, interactionists are interested in the shifting boundaries of the criminal law 
and their relationship with changes in the conventional morality of society: what Lacey 
refers to as the contingent nature of the boundaries of criminality.87 Crime is 
historically and culturally relative: the content of the criminal law is not universal and 
static but varies both over time within a single culture and across different cultures. Of 
course, changes in the boundaries of criminality over time are not solely dictated by 
changes in attitudes towards the acceptability of the conduct involved. It may be the 
case that new situations arise that are deemed to require the intervention of the 
criminal law. Technological change affects the opportunities for crime, the forms of 
crime that are prevalent and patterns of crime.88 As Heidensohn comments: 
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[C]riminality does take novel forms from time to time, reflecting technological 
development: no-one could hijack an aeroplane until powered flight was 
possible.89 
As discussed in section 3.5.1 above, the amendments to the 1990 Act within the Police 
and Justice Act 2006 also resulted from new manifestations of computer misuse made 
possible by technological advances.  
However, it is worth remembering that the conduct criminalised by the 1990 Act was 
not new. As seen in section 2.2 above, DARPA deliberately turned a blind eye to all the 
unauthorised activity on its computer systems in the 1970s. It understood that the extra 
overhead was ‘a small price to pay for attracting an entire generation of bright young 
people into the computing field’90 and therefore did not have a position of power to 
protect. On the contrary, it sought to gain power by allowing unauthorised activity as a 
means of growing its intellectual capital. As the central research and development 
organisation for the United States Department of Defense, it follows that its success 
was also inextricably linked with the political power inherently underlying the work of 
a State department. Therefore, non-criminalisation supported growth of both 
economic91 and political power. As time moved on, the social reaction to the conduct 
changed while the conduct itself was constant. As Young states: 
Crime…is not an objective ‘thing’ out there, but a product of socially created 
definitions: deviance is not inherent in an item of behaviour, it is a quality 
bestowed upon it by human evaluation.92 
It therefore follows that, since criminal law is based upon norms of social conduct, then 
it manifestly has to change to reflect social changes.93 
Interactionist theory also considers that the boundaries of criminality will move as more 
information becomes available about the effects of particular conduct. In light of this 
information, the conduct may then be reclassified from deviant to criminal or criminal 
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to deviant. As such, the content of the criminal law is contingent on the level of harm 
that is attached to any particular form of conduct. For those who wish to criminalise or 
decriminalise a particular form of conduct, the key objective is to demonstrate that it 
causes harm (or that it does not cause any harm) to individuals or to society. This 
theory has been applied to a diverse range of conduct including marijuana use,94 juvenile 
delinquency,95 domestic violence96 and stalking.97 
Interactionist theory can be applied to support the criminalisation of computer misuse. 
In the same way that conflict theory suggested that its criminalisation was an exercise 
of power (albeit political and economic power) to suppress the harmful conduct of the 
subservient classes, interactionist theory can also draw reference to an exercise of 
power. However, to the interactionist, this power is that of the moral entrepreneurs 
who constructed the problem as a criminal matter. This social power was held by 
corporations and institutions whose influence was exercised upon the Law Commission 
in their responses to the original Working Paper:98 these included representatives from 
academia,99 industry,100 the criminal justice system101 and learned societies.102 The 
collective construction of computer misuse as a wrong deserving of criminal sanction 
was therefore imposed as a reflection of the conventional morality of those involved: 
most of whom had by 1990, to a greater or lesser degree, a position to protect. As User 2 
commented: 
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The early 90s was the time when we started making serious money. We didn’t 
want a load of spotty hackers coming along and spoiling the party.  
Moreover, the constructionist approach also offers an explanation as to why computer 
misuse is not seen as a criminal problem for private individuals. The media is the main 
source of public knowledge about crime, yet computer misuse is not usually presented 
as a criminal problem. This distinction between the public and private spheres must be 
considered further, in order to consider where the criminal law should and can regulate 
and whether there is any inconsistency between the nature of computer misuse and the 
nature of the criminal law. 
4.6 Computer misuse as a public or private wrong 
Most legal systems distinguish criminal from civil wrongdoing. Criminal wrongs result 
in a prosecution and imposition of penalty by the state. The state decides whether a 
charge will be brought and, if so, what charge. On the other hand, civil wrongs are 
generally treated as private matters, in the sense that it is for the victim to investigate 
and instigate proceedings if they so choose. Civil remedies typically lie in damages to 
compensate for injury or loss or injunction to compel a party to desist from or to 
pursue some course of action. These differences serve to distinguish a civil or private 
paradigm in which causation of, and remedy for, harm is paramount and a criminal or 
public paradigm which focuses on public wrongdoing and the identification of who 
should be punished for that wrong. 
To the pure legal moralist, the criminal law exists to protect morality and thus any kind 
of immorality justifies criminalisation. However, there is conduct that is considered to 
be immoral that does not attract the attention of the criminal law: many would 
consider it immoral to commit adultery, yet adultery is not a criminal offence in 
England and Wales.103 This is representative of a class of private immorality that does 
not concern the intervention of the criminal law. At the other extreme, the utilitarian 
view is that the state may only regulate behaviour to prevent harm and therefore 
immorality of itself never provides sufficient reason for criminalisation. It has already 
been seen in section 4.3 above that there is little support for an argument to criminalise 
computer misuse on purely moral grounds. Therefore, even if computer use is immoral, 
it is of a private immorality which is inconsistent with categorisation as a public wrong. 
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Moreover, it is typified by bulk de minimis harms which, in isolation, could be viewed 
as too trivial to warrant public regulation. 
The criminal law is, therefore, traditionally reluctant to interfere within the private 
sphere. However, the conceptualisation of crimes as public wrongs which harm ‘the 
public’ as a collective body is inconsistent with certain conduct which is clearly harmful 
to individuals. For example, a husband who forced his wife to have sexual intercourse 
without consent was not guilty of rape until R v. R (Rape: Marital Exemption)104 in 
1991. Prior to that, sexual conduct within marriage was viewed as a domestic matter. A 
similar situation existed in relation to domestic violence. Although giving rise to 
criminal offences, the police were often reluctant to take domestic disputes seriously: 
even those of a violent nature.105 Moreover, where an arrest is made, the CPS only 
brings around ten per cent of domestic violence cases to trial,106 often as a result of the 
victim withdrawing their support for prosecution.107 A combination of victims not 
wishing to purse criminal prosecutions and the reluctance of the police and CPS to 
press for such prosecutions results in a low conviction rate.108 Marital rape and 
domestic violence are therefore examples of conduct which do not harm the public, but 
which properly concern the public and are therefore public wrongs.109  
In the same way that the boundary of the criminal law is historically relative, so the 
public or private nature of a wrong may also vary over time. For instance, 
homosexuality has transitioned from being a criminal offence which was actively 
policed as a matter of public concern from the late 19th century to the 1950s to a largely 
private matter today. It is not only decriminalised, but now enjoys private rights in 
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relation to prohibition of discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation110 and full 
legal recognition for same-sex civil partnerships.111 By contrast, domestic violence was 
once considered a private matter but is increasingly attracting more public concern. A 
1990 Home Office Circular112 recommended that police should approach domestic 
violence with a presumption in favour of arrest, later strengthened by further guidance 
that, in the absence of exceptional circumstances, there should be an arrest in all 
domestic violence cases.113 There are many factors that may influence this dynamic. 
These include the nature of the harm caused, the degree of harm, the moral consensus 
in relation to the conduct and the presence or absence of consent or coercion. The 
prevention of harm to people is self-evidently in the public interest, even in situations 
where those people themselves have consented to the infliction of physical harm.114 
Equally, it is plain that conduct causing substantial harm is of greater public concern 
than that causing lesser or de minimis harm. Conduct which involves coercing an 
individual to do something against their will or causes them to suffer an outcome to 
which they have not consented is instinctively that which will concern this public. In 
relation to consensual homosexuality where there is little physical harm caused115 and a 
prevailing social acceptance of the morality of the act, it is unsurprising that it has 
become a private matter.  Similarly, domestic violence can cause significant physical 
harm to a victim and is inflicted without consent. As equality in relationships has 
become the prevailing social attitude so has the view that domestic violence is morally 
unacceptable. This supports the trend towards the view of domestic violence as a public 
wrong. 
Computer misuse lies somewhere between homosexuality and domestic violence on the 
public/private continuum. As shown in section 4.2 above, there is no agreement from 
the consensus perspective that computer misuse is particularly harmful, with the 
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exception of those acts of computer misuse that pose a threat to safety or national 
security. Furthermore, the harm done is more likely to affect property rather than 
individuals. Neither, as seen in section 4.3 above, is computer misuse considered to be 
especially immoral. Victims of computer misuse have not, however, given consent to 
the harmful conduct.116 Therefore, computer misuse is better constructed as a private 
wrong, comprised in many instances of de minimis harms and with insufficient public 
interest on the whole to justify its regulation by the criminal law alone, except where 
the computer misuse results in a level of substantial public harm such as a threat to the 
critical national infrastructure. This has already been seen in section 3.6.6 above to be 
covered within the Terrorism Act 2000 which addressed the collectively-shared public 
concern of national security. 
This view of computer misuse as a private wrong is supported by the fact that victims 
of computer misuse are more likely to seek either a private remedy, or no remedy at all, 
rather than involving the police. Victims of computer misuse need their computer 
systems to be rectified if damaged and, assuming a perpetrator can be found, would 
more likely seek damages for the costs of repair than seek to press criminal charges, 
even if the police were amenable to proceeding.  
4.7 Computer misuse and jurisdiction 
The criminal law must be workable and viable. It is traditionally associated with 
sovereignty. For Hart,117 law was simply an aspect of sovereignty such that the necessary 
and sufficient conditions for the truth of a proposition of law were simply that the law 
was internally logical and consistent, and that state power was being exercised 
responsibly. This view was rejected by Dworkin118 who argued it is a fundamental 
political right of the individual to the equal respect and concern of the state. Dworkin 
proposed a theory of compliance, deference and enforcement, to identify legitimacy. 
The link between criminal law and sovereignty is reflected in the fact that, until 
recently, countries have not taken an interest in criminal activity beyond their borders. 
The inherent problem with jurisdiction in relation to computer misuse is summarised 
by Johnson and Post: 
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The rise of an electronic medium that disregards geographical boundaries 
throws the law into disarray by creating entirely new phenomena that need to 
become the subject of clear legal rules but that cannot be governed, 
satisfactorily, by any current territorially based sovereign.119 
The Computer Misuse Act 1990 gives the domestic courts jurisdiction where the misuse 
originates in the home country or is directed at a computer within it (subject to 
principle of dual criminality).120 While the rise in organised crime has provided more 
legislative means of expediting and facilitating international law enforcement, such as 
the European arrest warrant system under the Extradition Act 2003, it remains the case 
that this is not widely used in practice. In 2007, there were 9,313 warrants issued by 27 
member states: an average of 345 per state. Of these, 2,658 resulted in an arrest.121 
Therefore, given the global nature of the Internet and the fact that over 95 per cent of 
malicious activity originates outside the UK,122 it follows that the international nature 
of computer misuse renders the use of domestic criminal law cumbersome and 
unattractive as a means of control. The exception here is, as it is with public wrongs, 
that extra-territorial criminal law will only tend to be employed where there is a threat 
to national security. For example, in McKinnon v. USA,123 the House of Lords upheld 
the decision of the Secretary of State under Part 2 of the Extradition Act 2003 to 
extradite Gary McKinnon to the USA following his alleged unauthorised access to 97 
computers belonging to and used by the US Army, Navy and NASA from his own 
computer in London. Similarly, Babar Ahmad is awaiting extradition to the USA after 
allegedly running websites supporting terror and urging Muslims to fight a holy war124 
                                                        
119 Johnson, D and Post, D, ‘Law and Borders – The Rise of Law in Cyberspace’ (1996) 
48 Stanford Law Review 1367, 1375. 
120 Computer Misuse Act 1990, ss 4(4), 8(1). 
121 Council of the European Union, ‘Replies to questionnaire on quantitative 
information on the practical operation of the European arrest warrant – Year 2007’ 
COPEN 116 EJN 44 EUROJUST 58 (Brussels, 11 June 2008). 
122 The UK accounted for 4 per cent of malicious activity globally between July and 
December 2006: ‘Symantec Internet Security Threat Report: Trends for July – 
December 06’ Volume XI (March 2007) Symantec Corporation < 
http://eval.symantec.com/mktginfo/enterprise/white_papers/ent-
whitepaper_internet_security_threat_report_xi_03_2007.en-us.pdf> accessed 25 
September 2008. 
123 McKinnon v. USA [2008] UKHL 59. 
124 Ahmad and another v. United States of America [2006] EWHC 2927 (Admin). 
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and Younes Tsouli was convicted to ten years imprisonment125 under the Terrorism Act 
2000 after conducting a similar online campaign.126 This are, however, isolated and 
extreme manifestation of criminal computer misuse. It is unlikely that the majority of 
instances would trigger such a reaction. As Police Officer 2 commented: 
Do you seriously think we’d try and get someone extradited unless they’d done 
something very bad indeed? 
Therefore, with the exception of serious computer misuse, the domestic criminal law 
may encounter practical difficulties where the misuse operates beyond the national 
borders. 
4.8 Conclusion 
This chapter has considered a number of different theoretical standpoints in relation to 
the criminal law in general and its application to the problem of computer misuse in 
particular. Many of these theories struggle with the notion of harm arising from 
computer misuse; the consequences of which are viewed as less substantial than those 
arising from other more tangible and familiar criminalised conduct.  This perception of 
generally insubstantial harm is, in part, a consequence of the nature of many 
manifestations of computer misuse. The harm is often secret, latent or hidden. It may 
not be understood as harmful by the victim. It may be also be considered to be non-
criminal. 
Therefore, the instrumentalist standpoint, in which the criminal law serves as the means 
of protecting a set of individual or public interests from substantial harm, is not 
generally applicable to computer misuse where the harm is often insubstantial. 
Moreover, a liberal consensus view would not see the criminalisation of deviant 
behaviour as justified unless it crossed the threshold of seriousness that rendered it 
harmful to others or to society. Given that computer misuse generally comprises non-
serious, or de minimis, harms, then its criminalisation cannot be justified from a 
consensus perspective, save for those instances that pose a threat to safety or national 
security. 
There is also little support for the criminalisation of computer misuse on moralistic 
grounds, since computer misuse is not generally considered to be especially immoral. 
This viewpoint may arise from the relationship between the individual and the 
technology, within which conventional moral rules and norms do not apply. 
                                                        
125 Later increased to 16 years imprisonment. 
126 R v. Tsouli and others, The Times 6 July 2007 (Woolwich Crown Court). 
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Structural conflict theory may, however, provide an explanation in terms of protection 
of political and economic power. This was certainly the primary justification behind the 
enactment of the 1990 Act and was more recently cited in support of the amendments 
to the 1990 Act introduced by the Police and Justice Act 2006. However, if this is the 
case, it must still be questioned why the criminal law has not been used more to protect 
the interests of the powerful. While organisations consider that their interests in 
preventing and addressing the problem of computer misuse are better served by 
alternative means to the criminal law, then conflict theory alone will not provide an 
explanation. From the interactionist standpoint, it can be seen that the social reaction 
to the same sort of conduct has changed over time. That which was initially seen as 
harmless had, by the mid 1980s, become seen as positively harmful. Social pressure for 
criminalisation was been brought to bear by actors with less overtly political positions 
to protect, although the protection of commercial interests could also be considered by 
conflict theory as the protection of political capitalism. 
While there are some apparent explanations for criminal law having some role to play in 
the regulation of computer misuse, each theoretical position taken suffers from 
inadequacies to a greater or lesser extent. It is therefore difficult to propose a single 
coherent theoretical basis upon which to justify its criminalisation. Despite this 
difficulty, the domestic criminal law is still seen as an appropriate vehicle for effective 
regulation. This has been demonstrated in the expansion and amendment of the 1990 
Act in response to technological advances. However, it has been amply demonstrated 
that the pre-existing criminal law was not particularly vigorously exercised during its 
first sixteen years. This does not necessarily mean that the lack of prosecutions under 
the 1990 Act means that the criminal law is not required at all. Indeed, at the very least, 
the symbolic role of the law in setting standards of behaviour remains a positive reason 
for its existence. As Wasik comments: 
While the criminal law undoubtedly has a role to play in this general area [of 
computer misuse], its purpose and proper scope is problematic and its routine 
overuse must be avoided.127 
If the criminal law is little used and there is no firm theoretical basis for its use, then it 
must be considered whether there is something in the nature of computer misuse or the 
criminal law itself that renders its use problematic. The law generally demands 
certainty. The European Convention on Human Rights only allows interference with 
                                                        
127 Wasik, M, ‘The Role of the Criminal Law in the Control of Misuse of Information 
Technology’ (University of Manchester Working Paper No 8, July 1991) 13. 
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certain fundamental rights ‘in accordance with law’.128 It therefore follows that the law 
must be certain, published and accessible in order for individuals to ensure those rights 
are not unnecessarily infringed. Moreover, the House of Lords has long acknowledged 
the ‘special need for certainty in the criminal law’129 and has stated that judges should 
not change the law unless they can achieve finality and certainty.130 This echoes a key 
principle of both Fuller’s internal morality and Hart’s principles of efficacy. It therefore 
follows that the criminal law may have particular difficulty in dealing with uncertain 
material.  
Computer misuse suffers from an inherent ill-definition. Its possible manifestations 
have evolved as technology has advanced and will continue to do so. However, that is 
not to say that if an offence cannot be easily defined, it should not be an offence. 
There is little doubt that murder should be a criminal offence, but the common law 
definition of murder has not been constant, particularly with regard to its mens rea.131 
However, in relation to computer misuse, this ill-definition renders its boundaries 
uncertain. Moreover, unlike police powers or sentencing, for example, computer misuse 
is not the type of criminal law that is high priority, either for the government or for the 
general public. As demonstrated in Chapter 3, it took sixteen years for the original 1990 
Act to be amended to enable it to cope more effectively with new forms of misuse that 
had evolved over time.  
As has also been seen in section 4.6 above, computer misuse is better constructed as a 
private rather than a public wrong. This is consistent with the consensus view of it as 
being of low harm and not particularly immoral. It is therefore unworthy of public 
concern unless a particular incident poses a particular threat to public safety. This is 
reflected in the paucity of extradition proceedings for the more mundane instances of 
computer misuse which cross traditional jurisdictional boundaries, notwithstanding the 
                                                        
128 Articles 8 (the right to respect for private life), 9 (the right to freedom of conscience, 
thought and religion), 10 (the right to freedom of expression) and 11 (the right to 
freedom of assembly and association) all permit restrictions which are in accordance 
with law and ‘necessary in a democratic society’. 
129 Practice Statement: Judicial Precedent [1966] 1 WLR 1234 (HL). 
130 C (a minor) v. DPP [1996] AC 1 (HL). Despite the overriding quest for certainty, the 
House of Lords has itself occasionally changed its decisions in relatively short order: on 
the mens rea of murder in R v. Moloney [1985] AC 905 (HL) and R v. Hancock and 
Shankland [1986] AC 455 (HL) and on impossibility in attempted crimes in Anderton v. 
Ryan [1985] AC 560 (HL) and R v. Shivpuri [1987] 1 AC 1 (HL). 
131 Moloney and Hancock and Shankland, ibid; also R v. Nedrick [1986] 3 All ER 1 
(CA); R v. Woollin [1999] AC 82 (HL). 
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provisions within the 1990 Act which extend domestic jurisdiction for extra-territorial 
offences. 
In summary, various aspects of computer misuse and the criminal law can be listed side 
by side as shown in Table 4.1 below. It is apparent that there is a clear mismatch 
between the features of computer misuse and the criminal law: 
Table 4.1 – Correspondence between features of computer misuse and the domestic 
criminal law 
Computer misuse Criminal law Match? 
Potential to cause serious or 
financial loss or threat to national 
security  
Deals with significant issues of 
public concern 
  
Can be entirely within jurisdiction Focuses on domestic 
jurisdiction 
  
Often crosses jurisdictional 
boundaries 
Focuses on domestic 
jurisdiction 
  
Commonly causes bulk de minimis 
harms 
Concerned with substantial 
harms 
  
Uncertain in definition Requires certainty   
Commonly fleeting and uncertain Requires certainty   
Generally viewed as a private 
wrong 
Predominantly concerned with 
public wrong 
  
Not considered to be immoral Concerned with upholding 
public morality 
  
 
Therefore, when considering computer misuse in terms of its mechanics, it suffers from 
ill-definition and fluidity; when considering it in terms of its substance it is not 
generally particularly harmful. Since the use of the criminal law has difficulty in dealing 
with uncertainty and struggles to justify dealing with de minimis harms, it is doubtful 
that it is sort of problem with which the domestic criminal law is entirely capable of 
dealing. It follows, therefore, that: 
There are a number of incompatibilities between the nature of computer misuse and 
the nature of the criminal law. This means that computer misuse cannot be regulated 
effectively by the criminal law alone. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Part 2    
The governance of computer misuse 
  
5 
The risk of computer misuse and its governance 
 
Often a certain abdication of prudence and foresight is an element of success. 
Ralph Waldo Emerson (1803-1882) 
 
The first part of this study charted the evolution of both computer technology and 
computer misuse and surveyed the attempts of the domestic criminal law to control 
computer misuse. In doing so, it situated the problem within the framework of the 
existing criminal law and concluded that there are a number of incompatibilities 
between the nature of computer misuse and the nature of the domestic criminal law. 
These incompatibilities suggested that the domestic criminal law is only a partial means 
of control. This part of the study will build upon this conclusion by exploring the risks 
associated with computer misuse and evaluating the possibility of a multi-tiered 
governance approach as a potential solution to the problematised issues identified in 
the first part. 
This chapter will introduce the theoretical framework upon which this part of the 
study will be based. It will begin by considering theories relating to risk from various 
perspectives. This will begin with a consideration of risk from a realist perspective, 
exploring the inter-relationship between risk and insurance and examining the role of 
the state and the influence of moral hazard upon risk. The chapter will further consider 
risk from cultural and symbolic positions before introducing the concept of the ‘risk 
society’, its relationship with technology and its reflexive nature. This analysis of risk 
society will lead into a consideration of risk from the governmentality standpoint. 
Having introduced these theories of risk, the chapter will move on to consider the idea 
of a governance network as a means of managing risk before concluding with an  
examination of the domestic criminal law discussed in the first part of the study in the 
light of these theories.  
5.1 Risk 
The first part of this study considered computer misuse in the context of a variety of 
offences established by the domestic criminal law, particularly those arising from the 
Computer Misuse Act 1990. Society is naturally concerned about the risk of crime and 
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looks to the state to provide public assurance that the risk of crime is being controlled. 
However, risk itself is a much broader concept than that of crime. It encompasses 
pandemic risks; that is, risks that are global and which may be difficult to eradicate. 
Such risks include risks to health and risks to the environment, both of which figure 
prominently in the public discourse of contemporary Western societies. Therefore, it is 
necessary to consider what is meant by the concept of risk before surveying a range of 
theoretical perspectives within the ‘continuum of epistemological approaches’1 which 
have arisen on the topic. 
5.1.1 The concept of risk 
The concept of risk is not new. Ewald, for example, contends that the idea arose in the 
Middle Ages:  
At that time, risk designated the possibility of an objective danger, an Act of 
God, a force majeure, a tempest or other peril of the sea that could not be 
imputed to wrongful conduct.2 
This view sees risk as arising from ungovernable sources beyond human control and 
therefore as something unpreventable. It did not countenance the possibility of any 
human fault or responsibility and, as Walker and Broderick comment, represented ‘pre-
modern social attempts to understand catastrophes and hazards’.3 A definition of risk 
which is equally blame-free but broader than that which simply includes risks of nature 
is offered by Steele. This categorises risk as a simple state of affairs: 
…we are faced with a situation of ‘risk’ when circumstances may (or 
importantly, may not) turn out in a way that we do not wish for.4 
This concept of risk is characterised by a lack of human control and hence no 
attribution of blame.  
However, the notion of risk evolved to include some element of measurement. A 
pervasive idea during the Industrial Revolution of the late 18th and early 19th centuries 
was that rationalised counting and ordering would control disorder.5 Throughout the 
                                                        
1 Lupton, D, Risk (Routledge, Abingdon, 1999) 35. 
2 Ewald, F in Luhmann, N, Risk: A Sociological Theory (Aldine de Gruyter, New York, 
1993) 120. 
3 Walker, C and Broderick, J, The Civil Contingencies Act 2004: Risk, Resilience and 
the Law in the United Kingdom (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2006) 2. 
4 Steele, J, Risks and Legal Theory (Hart, Oxford, 2004) 6. 
5 Hacking, I, The Taming of Chance (Cambridge University Press, 1990). 
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Industrial Revolution and into modernity,6 the meaning and usage of risk changed to 
encompass a more scientific approach to quantifying and measuring events. Its 
boundaries were, as with Steele’s definition, also extended beyond the natural world to 
‘human beings, in their conduct, in their liberty, in the relations between them, in the 
fact of their association, in society’.7 This modern conception of risk as including  
things that were amenable to control therefore recognised that unanticipated outcomes 
may be the consequence of human action rather than ‘expressing the hidden meanings 
of nature or ineffable intentions of the Deity’.8 As a result, this notion of risk included 
an element of human responsibility and consequently the opportunity to attribute 
blame. 
The everyday notion of risk is that of hazard, danger, exposure to mischance or peril. 
Here, the idea of ‘mischance’ incorporates the ideas of scientific probability, 
quantification and measurement first postulated during the Industrial Revolution. 
However, there is a range of theoretical positions that can be taken over and above this 
everyday notion. Of these, perhaps the most commonly-encountered is the realist 
position which draws upon technical and scientific perspectives and theories of 
cognitive science. An alternative is the social constructionist approach which considers 
the social and cultural aspects of risk. Both weak and strong constructionist standpoints 
can be taken. The weak constructionist approach includes the ‘risk society’ analysis 
furthered by Ulrich Beck and Anthony Giddens as well as the ‘cultural/symbolic’ 
perspective favoured by anthropologist Mary Douglas. The strong constructionist 
stance is reflected in governmentality (a neologism for ‘government rationality’) theory 
which developed from the ideas of Michel Foucault.9 Since there is a degree of overlap 
between these theoretical positions, they should be treated more as a spectrum of 
viewpoints than as a set of discrete theories, from the realist at one end to the strong 
constructionist, or relativist, at the other. These different theoretical positions are 
relevant to the problem of computer misuse, since computer technology is itself a 
product of late modernity and gives rise to a number of potential risks. 
                                                        
6 The ‘institutions and modes of behaviour established first of all in post-feudal Europe, 
but which in the twentieth century increasingly have become world-historical in their 
impact’: Giddens, A, Modernity and Self-Identity (Polity Press, Cambridge, 1991) 14-15. 
7 Ewald, F, ‘Two infinities of risk’ in Burchell, G, Gordon, C and Miller, P (eds), The 
Politics of Everyday Fear (University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1993) 221, 226. 
8 Giddens, A, The Consequences of Modernity (Polity Press, Cambridge, 1990) 30. 
9 Baker, T and Simon, J, ‘Embracing Risk’ in Baker, T and Simon, J (eds), Embracing 
Risk: The Changing Culture of Insurance and Responsibility (University of Chicago 
Press, Chicago, 2002) 16. 
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5.2 The realist perspective on risk 
The realist perspective on risk draws on technical and scientific approaches to 
measurement and quantification. It considers risk in terms of the scale of its 
consequences and the likelihood that the risk will occur. From this standpoint, Bradley 
defines risk as ‘the product of the probability and consequences (magnitude and 
severity) of an adverse event [that is, a hazard]’.10 The success of such a definition will 
depend upon the accuracy with which the probability of the hazard has been identified 
and the scientific modelling of the magnitude and severity of the consequences should 
they occur.  
An example of this perspective is provided by the BSE Inquiry Report11 which reviewed 
the history of the emergence and identification of bovine spongiform encephalopathy 
(BSE) and new variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (CJD) in the United Kingdom and the 
action taken in response to it. This report demonstrates how risk is associated with 
quantitative scientific techniques for measuring the uncertainty of events: 
A risk is not the same as a hazard. A hazard is an intrinsic propensity to cause 
harm. Natural phenomena, physical substances, human activities will be 
hazardous if they have an intrinsic propensity to cause harm. A risk is the 
likelihood that a hazard will result in harm. A risk can usually be evaluated once 
the nature of the hazard and the degree of exposure to it are identified. Risk 
evaluation involves considering both the likelihood that a hazard will cause 
harm and the severity of the harm that is threatened.12 
In essence, measurement of likelihood and severity converts a hazard into a risk.  
There is a natural tension between the public concern over risks (predominantly health 
and environmental risks) which result from science, technology and industry and the 
scientific, technological, industrial and governmental institutions associated both with 
the production of those risks and the responsibility for managing or responding to 
them. As Brown suggests, the primary objective of the techno-scientific approach to 
risk is to provide an objective measurement of risks in order to facilitate understanding 
and therefore ‘to provide a route out of the ever-growing bitterness of clashes between 
                                                        
10 Bradbury, J, ‘The policy implications of differing concepts of risk’ (1989) 14 Science, 
Technology and Human Values 380, 382. 
11 The BSE Inquiry, ‘BSE Inquiry Report’ HC (1999-00) 887. 
12 Ibid, [162]. 
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affected publics and the managing institutions’.13 However, it should be noted that 
although these scientific or industry bodies do not produce all risks, many of the risks 
within the prevailing social consciousness are of technical or scientific origin. 
5.2.1 Risk and insurance 
The quantification and measurement of risk which is inherent in the realist position can 
be considered in terms of insurance. For Ewald, risk is merely a term that is derived 
from insurance and that its only precise meaning relates to insurance.14 Here, the term 
risk does not represent a hazard, but a means by which the occurrence of certain 
possibilities to certain individuals can be ordered and managed. Actuarial analysis (that 
is, measurement) of the likelihood of events and the quantification of contingent 
outcomes is undertaken in order to minimise losses, both emotional and financial, 
associated with uncertain and undesirable events. In other words, once the 
measurement of an uncertainty has converted it into a risk, then a budget can be 
identified and applied to that risk. Individuals and events are placed in ‘risk categories’. 
These categories are further actuarial constructs. 
An example of this risk categorisation approach can be found in psychiatry. The focus 
of debate in relation to patients with severe mental health problems moved during the 
1990s from assessing the ‘dangerousness’ of those patients to calculating the risks that 
they posed. As Rose states: 
[M]any within the criminal justice system argued for a shift from ‘clinical’ to 
‘actuarial’ methods in the prediction of future conduct.15 
Here, risk assessment becomes a tool for administrative decision making rather than 
providing a strict legal categorisation. The potential level of risk posed by an individual 
becomes related to the resources which are allocated and deployed in insuring against 
that risk. The danger posed by ‘high risk’ patients may be insured against by a higher 
level of physical security, the use of particular medication or increased vigilance and 
                                                        
13 Brown, J, ‘Introduction: approaches, tools and methods’ in Brown, J (ed), 
Environmental Threats: Perception, Analysis and Management (Belhaven Press, London, 
1989) 2.  
14 Ewald, F, ‘Insurance and risks’ in Burchell, G, Gordon, C and Miller, P (eds), The 
Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 
1991) 197.  
15 Rose, N, ‘At risk of madness’ in Baker, T and Simon, J (eds), Embracing Risk: The 
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intervention by medical staff. ‘Low risk’ patients will be managed in a different way. 
However, the risk categorisation is fluid. The risk posed by an individual is located on a 
continuum and is constantly fluctuating: 
In practice…all psychiatric patients can and should be allocated to a level of 
risk, risk assessed and risk re-assessed, risk classified, risk managed, risk 
monitored: high risk, medium risk, low risk – but rarely no risk.16 
Statutory assessment of ‘dangerousness’ is also required under the Criminal Justice Act 
2003 (as amended)17 for all offenders convicted of particular sexual and violent 
offences.18 Here a ‘dangerous offender’ is one who has been convicted of a specified 
offence19 and is assessed by the court as posing ‘a significant risk to members of the 
public of serious harm occasioned by the commission...of further such offences’.20 In 
cases which involve youth offenders, a structured risk assessment method called Asset is 
used.21 Although ‘significant risk’ is not defined in the Act, the Court of Appeal has 
stated that: 
[Significant risk] is a higher threshold than mere possibility of occurrence and in 
our view can be taken to mean (as in the Oxford Dictionary) “noteworthy, of 
considerable amount or importance.”22 
Therefore, in relation to ‘dangerousness’, risks could not exist independently of 
classification following measurement. Therefore, in an insurance framework, the 
creation of risks requires both measurement and classification which reflects the realist 
paradigm of risk as being something amenable to quantification. 
For Ewald, insurance creates ‘epistemological transformations’ leading to a ‘philosophy 
of risk’ in which risk is collective.23 Collective risk represents the aggregation of 
information derived from the application of statistical methods to human affairs rather 
than individual decisions based on an assessment of probability. Therefore, for Steele, 
                                                        
16 Ibid, 211. 
17 Criminal Justice Act 2003, ss 224-236 as amended by Criminal Justice and Immigration 
Act 2008, s 17. 
18 The ‘dangerousness’ provisions only apply to offences committed after 4 April 2005. 
19 Criminal Justice Act 2003, sch 15 provides 153 specified violent and sexual offences. 
20 Criminal Justice Act 2003, s 229(1)(b). 
21 Asset – Young Offender Assessment Profile <http://www.yjb.gov.uk/en-
gb/practitioners/Assessment/Asset.htm> accessed 25 September 2008. 
22 R v. Lang and Others [2005] EWCA Crim 2864, [17]. 
23 Steele, J, Risks and Legal Theory (Hart, Oxford, 2004) 34. 
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insurance ‘contributes more decisively to freedom, because it releases us from fear’.24 It 
is only by insuring against risks that the freedom to pursue an activity becomes possible.  
5.2.2 Risk, reinsurance and the welfare state 
Of course, the insurers also carry a portfolio of risks which require management. This is 
achieved by taking reinsurance with other insurers and therefore spreading the risk. 
Reinsurance may be taken to allow the insurer to assume greater individual risks than 
its size would otherwise allow and to protect itself by absorbing larger losses and 
therefore reducing the amount of capital needed to provide coverage. The insurer may 
also be motivated by arbitrage25 in purchasing reinsurance coverage at a lower rate than 
that which they charge the insured for the underlying risk. This network of insurers is 
therefore one means of dealing with pandemic risk. The reinsurance network becomes 
the risk-taker of last resort. However, where a risk becomes too great, it will not be 
accepted by the insurers. For instance, in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, the 
costliest hurricane to hit the United States,26 some insurance companies stopped 
insuring homeowners in the affected area.27 
Ewald further argues that the development of insurance for those who share a common 
exposure to risk gives rise to solidarity. This solidarity and security are then devices 
used by the state to guarantee its current existence and to gain support for its 
continued existence. The development of insurance led to the modern welfare state as a 
form of social insurance. Therefore, using Ewald’s reasoning, the welfare state gave rise 
to a collective solidarity within society which was reflected in securing the position of 
the state. In this model, the state becomes the (re)insurer of last resort. However, the 
UK welfare state which was created to provide lifelong care and to give financial 
support to the ‘sick, the unemployed, the widow and the orphan as well as the aged’28 
                                                        
24 Ibid, 35. 
25 The practice of taking advantage of a price differential between two or more markets. 
26 Knabb, RD, Rhome, JR and Brown, DP, ‘Tropical Cyclone Report Hurricane 
Katrina’ US National Hurricane Centre (10 August 2006) 
<http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/pdf/TCR-AL122005_Katrina.pdf> accessed 25 September 
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27 Miller, M, ‘More bad news blows in from Katrina’ CBS News (Brooklyn, New York, 
28 May 2006) 
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25 September 2008. 
28 Fraser, D, The Evolution of the British Welfare State (2nd edn Macmillan, Basingstoke, 
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has proven to be unsustainable for future generations. As Brans and Rossbach 
comment: 
As ‘welfare’ is…potentially unlimited, the modern welfare state is at a loss to 
provide any objective indicators for the boundaries of state activity. As a 
consequence, the political system is often the creator of the complexity it faces 
in its continuing operation. 29 
Therefore, increasing public expectation of what the welfare state could, or should, 
provide proved to be too great a burden, resulting in an unwieldy and inefficient 
system. The welfare state is returned to in section 5.5.1 in the context of the risk 
society. 
The potential inefficiencies of the welfare state were also considered by Hayek who 
considered that the costs associated with the welfare state required higher levels of 
taxation. These higher taxes, in turn, would reduce enterprise, limit freedoms, cripple 
prosperity and set society on a ‘road to serfdom’.30 For Hayek, the free market economy 
provided a more efficient and effective means of delivering protection than the welfare 
state, being more responsive to the needs of large numbers of individuals.  This view is 
in keeping with that of the Chicago School who advocated free market libertarianism 
over the Keynesian mixed-economy model within which both the state and the private 
sector have particular roles to play.31 
As well as identifying operational and economic inefficiencies in the welfare state, 
Hayek further argued that its advent would result in the decline of the rule of law. He 
offered two main grounds of contention. First, since the welfare state involves 
discriminating between the particular needs of different people, then this violates the 
principle of equality before the law. Second, that the administrative delivery of the 
welfare state can only be achieved by the extensive use of delegated discretionary 
powers which destroys the certainty required by the rule of law: 
The important question is whether the individual can foresee the action of the 
state and make use of this knowledge as a datum in forming his own plans.32 
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However, for Jones, the existence of the welfare state is not incompatible with 
upholding the rule of law. Instead, the purpose of the rule of law is in ensuring the fair 
operation of the welfare state: 
In the welfare state, the private citizen is forever encountering public officials 
of many kinds…It is the task of the rule of law to see to it that these multiplied 
and diverse encounters are as fair, as just, and as free from arbitrariness as are 
the familiar encounters of the right-asserting private citizen with the judicial 
officers of the traditional law.33 
Here Jones is advocating the role of judicial review by which, on the application of an 
individual, the courts may determine whether a public body has acted lawfully. Hayek 
concluded that the role of the state properly concerned the provision of a structure 
within which society can exist rather than acting in direct pursuit of social or welfare 
goals.34 
As the welfare state has become unable to fulfil its function as a state insurer, 
individuals have taken increasing responsibility for their own care provision in the form 
of private pensions and private healthcare insurance. The responsibility for the 
management of risk previously handled by the social insurance of the welfare state has 
shifted to the individual. For Baker and Simon: 
…private pensions, annuities and life insurance are engaged in a historic shift of 
investment risk from broad pools (the classic structure of risk spreading through 
insurance) to individual (middle-class) consumers and employees in return for 
the possibility of greater return.35 
The risks that have arisen from the failings of the welfare state, particularly in terms of 
healthcare and pension provision, have coincided with the state gradually withdrawing 
its responsibility for individual welfare. Indeed, Powell et al consider that ‘the welfare 
system as a system of social insurance is beginning to lose its legitimacy with the rise of 
private health insurance’.36 
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However, this is not to say that state no longer intervenes in insuring against certain 
risks. For instance, in the wake of the collapse of the Northern Rock bank in 2007, the 
Bank of England and HM Treasury intervened to guarantee all retail savings in its 
accounts. It is estimated that in early 2008, the bank borrowed approximately £30 
billion from the Bank of England37 ‘to win back investor confidence’.38 This financial 
guarantee is an example of the state insuring its citizens against a backdrop of rising 
interest rates and public concern over the economy. The state will also insure against 
major risks of collective national loss. An example of this is found in the Reinsurance 
(Acts of Terrorism) Act 1993 which underwrites any reinsurance liabilities entered into 
by the Secretary of State in respect of loss or damage to property resulting from of 
terrorism,39 although the Act recognises that ‘risk is to be managed rather than soothed 
away by the Keynsian welfare state or even by the sovereign instruments of security’.40 
5.2.3 Risk, insurance and moral hazard 
The concept of the ‘moral hazard’ refers to the effect of insurance on incentives,41 
implying that risk is not static, but reactive.42 In other words, the magnitude of a risk 
can be influenced by the presence of insurance. The effect of insurance can reduce the 
incentive to take care to avoid a loss and can also reduce the incentive to manage the 
costs associated with recovering from that loss.  
For instance, an individual with fully comprehensive motor insurance may be less 
troubled by parking their car in an unsafe location, because the negative consequences 
of an attempt to (say) force the locks are, subject to any policy excess, borne by the 
insurer. This behaviour is clearly undesirable to the insurer as it increases the burden of 
risk upon them. The event which is insured therefore becomes more likely precisely 
because of the presence of the insurance itself. Similarly, some individuals without 
private health insurance choose to be more careful about maintaining a healthy lifestyle 
through their own actions because they would otherwise have to bear the full financial 
cost of health care, or rely upon the health care provision offered by the state. By 
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implication, those covered by health insurance may take less care with their health, 
because not only do they not have to cover the costs of health care themselves, they are 
also more likely to be treated privately without recourse to the state. However, the 
effect of the moral hazard relies upon the personal cost-benefit analysis of the 
individuals concerned. Where the benefit does not outweigh the cost, there is a greater 
tendency to take care to avoid risk. Therefore, if an individual considers that the 
inconvenience of repairing a vandalised car outweighs the benefit of repair at no 
financial cost, they will park in a well-lit area rather than in a dark alleyway. Equally, it 
is difficult to imagine a situation in which a person will make a lifestyle choice which 
adversely impacts upon their health simply because they will receive treatment for the 
consequences without charge in a private hospital. 
However, for Heimer,43 the reaction to freedom from risk via insurance can be as 
harmful as the risk that the insurance attempts to prevent. An extreme example of such 
a moral hazard in action can be found in Vernon, Florida, also known as ‘Nub City’. 
Over fifty people in the town suffered ‘accidents’ involving the loss of various organs 
and body parts. Claims of up to US$300,000 had been paid out by insurers. One 
insurance investigator noted that ‘somehow they always shoot off parts they seem to 
need least’.44 For the inhabitants of Vernon, the loss of a body part was outweighed by 
the financial gain offered by insurance. Using Steele’s terminology, the prospect of a 
significant financial settlement, released the claimants from the fear of maiming 
themselves.45 Moral hazards also affect the welfare state. For example, the provision of 
incentives for the parents of children born out of wedlock, the unemployed and the 
poor, will encourage some actively to have unwanted children or to refrain from seeking 
gainful employment. For example, Hull City Council offers the following advice for 
pregnant teenagers: 
If you decide to keep the baby, you can get help and support on a range of 
issues, including benefits, childcare, housing, education and employment.46 
Therefore, a potentially unwanted child can provide the means of access to a range of 
welfare benefits which would be unavailable to a childless teenager. Similar issues arise 
in relation to state unemployment benefit. As Wang and Williamson comment: 
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It is widely recognised that unemployment insurance systems need to be 
designed with moral hazard in mind. Unemployment insurance provides 
consumption-smoothing benefits which an unfettered private economy 
presumably cannot provide, but too much consumption-smoothing can clearly 
have bad incentive effects.47 
In essence, where there is insufficient incentive to find work, then many unemployed 
people will prefer to remain unemployed. Employment is disincentivised through the 
availability of  benefits which negate the economic need to seek paid work. The newly-
elected Labour government’s 1997 budget focused on its ‘welfare to work’ programme, 
designed to get unemployed people off state benefits and back into employment by 
providing financial incentives to employers who recruited from the young or long-term 
unemployed, as well as offering training schemes to increase the long-term 
employability and earning potential of those returning to work. The Department for 
Work and Pensions describes the situation as follows: 
We have created Jobcentre Plus as a world leading welfare to work organisation. 
We have introduced innovative employment programmes such as the New Deal, 
and we are now helping people on incapacity benefits through Pathways to 
Work. And we have improved incentives to work by providing greater support 
through the tax credit system and the introduction of the minimum wage.48 
The avoidance of moral hazard in relation to unemployment benefit remains a key 
state initiative.49 
Heimer50 proposed that control provides the mechanism by which moral hazard is 
managed. Where there is no control over loss, there can be no moral hazard. Since the 
insured cannot influence the chances of incurring or avoiding an insurable loss, then the 
presence of an insurance incentive will not change the odds of loss. The less the control 
that the insured has over loss, the more likely that loss is to be insurable and the more 
complete the insurance can be, since the calculation of risk is more certain and less 
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dependent on the insured’s reaction to freedom from risk. However, where the insured 
has a substantial degree of control over the risk of loss, insurance will often include the 
insured giving up at least some of that control to the insurer. The insurers require the 
insured to comply with certain conditions to mitigate against their potential losses 
through moral hazard. For instance, certain expensive cars will not be insured unless 
they are installed with a recognised stolen vehicle recovery system and home insurance 
may require window locks compliant with a particular safety standard to be fitted. 
Heimer concludes that insurers require insured parties to retain some risks in what she 
calls a ‘community of fate’ between insurer and insured.51 This lessens the incentive to 
take less care in reaction to insurance. Further mechanisms which are used include 
policy excesses, where the insured meets part of the financial cost of a claim; the use of 
neutral third party loss adjusters to assess whether claimed losses are reasonable; and 
reflexive updating of policies so that the interests of the insured are not significantly 
changed by a divergence between market value and insured value. 
O’Malley considered the regulation imposed by household insurance contracts as a 
means of governance to minimise moral hazard as follows: 
To protect its profits, especially against forms of moral hazard that are not 
prohibited under criminal law (and thus potentially subject to state policing), 
the insurance company must establish its own legal order within the framework 
of the insurance contract. [This] establishes the coercive conditions for the 
operation of an enforcement network aimed at disciplining householders, in 
order to minimise the assumed moral hazard’.52 
The conditions imposed within insurance conditions are contractual in nature and are 
therefore enforceable via the civil law. Insurance contracts become, therefore, a legally-
enforceable means of regulating behaviour in order both to minimise risk and to 
mitigate against losses. 
5.3 Constructionist perspectives on risk 
The realist perspective, then, supposes that risk is an objective hazard, threat or danger 
that ‘exists and can be measured independently of social and cultural processes’ 
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although it ‘may be distorted or biased through social and cultural frameworks of 
interpretation’.53 For example, in measuring social or cultural interpretations of risk, 
cognitive science theory takes the approach in which the ‘hazard is taken as the 
independent variable and people’s response to it as dependent’.54 In other words, the 
hazard is varied by the experimenter and the response of the subject in relation to that 
hazard is measured to determine which hazards are subjectively ‘riskier’. In this way, 
psychometric researchers have attempted to identify reactions to risks depending on the 
nature of the risk itself and the circumstances of the lay subject. For instance, in one 
study, familiar and voluntary hazards such as those from microwave ovens, food 
colourings and alcohol were viewed as less risky, while catastrophic and imposed or 
unavoidable hazards such as war, genetic engineering, ozone depletion and nuclear 
power were viewed as highly risky.55 While the realist perspective of risk as quantified 
uncertainty appears to provide a rational, logical and scientific approach to risk 
management, it can be argued that it overlooks the construction of risks as social fact. 
There is also an inherent subjectivity in the measurement of risk. Scientific or actuarial 
opinion may differ as to the likelihood of a particular event, the range of contingent 
outcomes and the impact of those contingent outcomes. Subjective assumptions can be 
made which have a bearing in the final risk analysis. Nevertheless, the outcome of these 
risk measurements are often treated as ‘objective facts’ or ‘absolute truths’ in society. 56 
The social and cultural influences upon risk have been acknowledged in some 
psychometric studies of risk57 which concluded that ‘further research was needed’58 on 
socio-political factors, such as power, status, political orientation and perception of 
risk. Subjective perception of risks such as terrorism which pose a vivid and readily-
imaginable danger is hampered by the cognitive limitations of an emergency which may 
hinder accurate assessment of the magnitude and probability of certain types of risk. 
Gross argues that these cognitive limits can result in an over-exaggeration of risk since 
they ‘color our risk assessment in times of crisis and create a strong tilt toward putting 
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undue emphasis on certain potential risks’.59 This subjective misperception of risk can 
in turn lead to undue public fear.60 Sunstein refers to this as ‘probability neglect’, since 
‘when intense emotions are engaged, people tend to focus on the adverse outcome, not 
on its likelihood’.61 
The distinction between objective and subjective risk is illustrated in the Royal Society 
report on risk62 which argues that any situation gives rise to a range of objective risks to 
which individuals react in subjective ways. The risk itself remains objective and 
calculated by ‘experts’, while the judgements and responses of lay people are inevitably 
mediated through their social or cultural frameworks of interpretation of that risk. As 
Bradbury had already commented, individual responses to risk are a ‘subjectivist 
interpretation within a realist paradigm’.63 
However, reaction to the Royal Society report was mixed, with favour being found in 
the chapters which aligned risks and risk management with technical and scientific 
thought (and thus the objectivity of the realist perspective) rather than in the chapters 
considering the more subjective socio-cultural spheres of politics and economics: 
Four chapters good, two chapters bad (with apologies to George Orwell) 
appears to have been the orthodoxy’s response…The ‘good’ four chapters were 
those written by distinguished engineers, statisticians and natural scientists, 
which reflected a view of public risk management as properly the domain of 
science and engineering rather than of politics and economics. 64 
Traditional hard science does not generally consider the symbolic meanings attributed 
to events or the cultural frameworks through which responses and judgments are 
mediated. Instead, individuals are represented as self-interested, nuclear and rational. It 
can therefore be argued that this conception of a individual is unrepresentative of 
reality and that there is, to a greater or lesser extent, an element of social 
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constructionism in risk. There are various theories which adopt the constructionist 
position with varying degrees of strength. The weak constructionist position includes 
the cultural and symbolic perspectives favoured by anthropologist Mary Douglas and 
the concept of the ‘risk society’ which draws on the work of Ulrich Beck and Anthony 
Giddens. There is also the Foucault-inspired strong constructionist governmentality 
perspective. 
5.4 Cultural and symbolic perspectives on risk 
Douglas is highly critical of the realist perspectives on risk, particularly in relation to the 
attempts taken by cognitive science to measure, and thereby understand, perceptions 
and responses to risks: 
The professional discussion of cognition and choice has no sustained theorising 
about the social influences which select particular risks for attention. Yet it is 
hard to maintain seriously that perception of risk is private.65 
One of Douglas’ main criticisms is that the cognitive science approach presupposes that 
individuals are rational and logical in their assessment of, and their reaction to, risk: 
Warm-blooded, passionate, inherently social beings though we think we are, 
humans are presented in this context as hedonic calculators calmly seeking to 
pursue private interests. We are said to be risk-averse, but, alas, so inefficient in 
handling information that we are unintentional risk-takers; basically we are 
fools. 66 
Douglas argues that the realist perspective erroneously assumes that individuals 
rationally gauge their response to a risk in a detached and objective fashion. Moreover, 
she considers that, in any case, individuals are ill-equipped to make rational judgements 
on the basis of scientific data as cultural concerns also influence the ways in which risks 
are perceived. For Douglas, risk is a ‘contemporary western strategy for dealing with 
danger and Otherness’67 and is concerned with the reasons why some hazards are 
identified as risks and others are not. 
Engaging in risky behaviour is, for Douglas, not the product of lay deficiency of 
understanding, but a preference. She contends that ‘to account for preferences there is 
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only cultural theory’.68 Therefore, risks are culturally relative and scientific techniques 
for their measurement do not acknowledge the related cultural issue of whether a risk is 
to be judged acceptable or not. Indeed, some individuals choose to participate in 
activities that are considered to be risky to ‘escape and resist reality’.69 Douglas links risk 
and blame, considering risk to be a political means of attributing blame for a hazard 
that threatens a particular social group. However, despite the inclusion of cultural 
factors in her approach to risk, Douglas’ perspective represents a weak constructionist 
position in that she accepts that risks do objectively exist independent of culture: 
…the reality of dangers is not at issue. The dangers are only too horribly real, in 
both cases, modern and pre-modern. This argument is not about the reality of 
dangers, but about how they are politicised. This point cannot be emphasised 
too much.70 
Douglas’ early work considers the rituals of pollution and cleanliness across a range of 
societies and considers how taboos act to protect cultures from potentially destabilising 
behaviour. Building upon this analysis, Douglas treats the human body as analogous to a 
community and draws parallels between the boundaries of the human body and the 
boundaries of society. In this analysis, dirt symbolically represents disorder and 
cleanliness represents order: 
[Dirt] is essentially disorder. There is no such thing as absolute dirt: it exists in 
the eye of the beholder…Dirt offends against order. Eliminating it is not a 
negative movement, but a positive effort to organise the environment.71 
For Douglas, risk is a cultural response to transgressing a boundary and is used as a 
political means of blaming an Other who poses a risk to the integrity of the self. In 
contemporary western culture, the preoccupation with technological and environmental 
hazards is interpreted against a moral and political cultural framework that inextricably 
links risk and blame: 
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In all places at all times the universe is moralised and politicised. Disasters that 
befoul the air and soil and poison the water are generally turned to political 
account: someone already unpopular is going to be blamed for it.72 
Douglas considers that current concerns about risk have emerged as a product of 
globalisation, which has resulted in ‘inter-community discourse and a sense of 
vulnerability in being part of a world system’.73 She believes that ‘new concern with risk’ 
is part of ‘a public backlash against the great corporations’.74 The public at risk 
represents the self which demonises and blames the corporations or the state as an 
Other. Therefore risk is used as a tool of social control to maintain moral and social 
order. Social structures generate cultural biases toward the world that serve to uphold 
those social structures. 
The grid-group model considers different approaches to risk perception as expressed in 
these social structures. It proposes that social structures differ along two axes. ‘Group’ 
refers to the degree of solidarity between members of the society; that is, ‘the outside 
boundary that people have erected between themselves and the outside world’.75 ‘Grid’ 
refers to the extent to which individual behaviours are influenced by social position; 
that is, ‘all the other social distinctions and delegations of authority that [people] use to 
limit how people behave to one another’.76 Each axis has two categories - high and low 
– which gives rise to four approaches to risk as shown in Table 5.1 
Table 5.1 – The grid-group model of risk perception 
 Low grid High grid 
Low group Individualist Fatalist 
High group Egalitarian Hierarchist 
 
Individualists are entrepreneurial. Their choices are not constrained by social position 
and they are not closely bound to others within a social group. They trust individuals 
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rather than corporations and support self-regulation of risk. Fatalists are, like 
individualists, without strong social cohesion but are constrained by their position in 
the face of an external world which imposes those constraints on upon them. They 
therefore take a passive stance in relation to risk, believing that they have little personal 
control over it, trusting instead to luck and fate. Egalitarians have a strong sense of 
solidarity but little concern with social position. They have a strong sense of group self 
and blame outsiders for risk. They tend to distrust external constraints and are sensitive 
to risks with low probability but high consequence and use those risks to forward 
concerns of an impending apocalyptic outcome. Egalitarians also advocate the 
precautionary principle, discussed further in section 5.8 below, and are adverse to the 
risks potentially introduced by new technology. Hierarchists have well-defined roles for 
each member of society, respect authority, fear social deviance, trust in established 
organisations and conform to group norms relating to risk. 
While providing a readily accessible conceptualisation of socially mediated approaches 
to risk, the model can be criticised for its rigidity and inflexibility in dealing with 
individuals who constantly cross between the categories. It also treats the risk as a 
constant. The response to the risk is predicated on the societal categorisation rather 
than the nature of the risk itself. However, it can also be argued that it is the world-
view that determines what is categorised as risk in the first place. In any event, it 
provides a basis upon which the interplay between risk and culture can be 
conceptualised. 
The cultural and symbolic perspectives on risk adopt a functional structuralist approach 
to examine the ways in which socio-cultural systems and organisations view and manage 
risk to maintain social order and deal with deviance from accepted social norms. 
Alternatively a critical structuralist approach can be adopted which examines the way in 
which social institutions exercise power over individuals. The ‘risk society’ theories of 
Beck and Giddens generally take such a critical structuralist approach. 
5.5 The ‘risk society’ 
Both Beck and Giddens consider that contemporary western societies are transforming 
from industrial societies to ‘risk societies’. The risk society perspective concerns itself 
with the ways in which risk interrelates with late modernity. In that sense, it adopts a 
weak constructionist approach. In common with the realist view, the risk society 
perspective considers risks to be objective hazards. However, it further considers that 
risks are inevitably mediated through social and cultural processes and cannot be 
measured or evaluated in isolation from those processes.  
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In risk societies, the production of wealth is accompanied by the production of risks, 
the number of which have grown as a consequence of modernisation. The focus of risk 
societies has moved from the production and distribution of wealth prevalent in early 
modernity (and which remains so in contemporary developing countries) to the 
prevention or limitation of risks. Therefore, a risk society is preoccupied with managing 
risk rather than producing or distributing wealth, since it is risk itself that can inhibit 
the generation of wealth. In turn, the proliferation of risks has resulted in individuals 
living in risk societies becoming increasingly risk-aware. 
5.5.1 Risk society and the welfare state 
Beck’s analysis builds on Ewald’s notion of the ‘provident’ state77 considered in section 
5.2.1 above. The provident state makes various forms of insurance available against 
rationalised calculated uncertainties. The growth of risks in line with wealth production 
has led to risks permeating many aspects of the day-to-day existence of risk-aware 
individuals. Consequently, society as a whole becomes a risk group with the state as its 
insurer. The provident state model is a basis upon which models of the welfare state 
can be founded. The UK welfare state was introduced by the Labour government of 
1945, founded on the principles outlined in the 1942 Beveridge report into the ways that 
Britain should be rebuilt after the Second World War.78 Beveridge proposed a system 
which was designed to counter the five ‘giant evils’ of illness, ignorance, disease, squalor 
and want. The report considered the whole question of social insurance, arguing that 
want could be abolished by a system of social security organised for the individual by 
the state: 
The proposals of the Report mark another step forward to the development of 
State insurance as a new type of human institution, differing both from the 
former methods of preventing or alleviating distress and from voluntary 
insurance. The term “social insurance” to describe this institution implies both 
that it is compulsory and that men stand together with their fellows. The term 
implies a pooling of risks except so far as separation of risks serves a social 
purpose.79 
The notion of men standing (compulsorily) together with their fellows echoes Heimer’s 
community of fate considered in section 5.2.3 above, which in this case is between the 
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state and its collective society. As Giddens comments, wealth redistribution via the new 
welfare state became the new solution to counter social ills: 
The welfare state became the left’s project in the post 1945-period – it became 
seen above all as a means of achieving social justice and income redistribution. 
By and large, however, it did not originate as such. It developed as a security 
state, a way of protecting against risk, where collective rather than private 
insurance was necessary.80 
Beck considers that the welfare state transitions into a risk society where the 
production of risks becomes so great that it threatens to overload the state insurer’s 
ability to deal with those risks: 
The entry into risk society occurs at the moment when the hazards which are 
now decided and consequently produced by society undermine and/or cancel 
the established safety systems of the provident state’s existing risk calculations.81 
It could therefore be argued that the problems encountered by the UK’s welfare state 
(which Brans and Rossbach partially attributed to the ‘potentially unlimited’ nature of 
welfare in section 5.2.2 above) were symptomatic of a transition to risk society. In risk 
society terms, as both the quantity and the public awareness of risks has increased, 
society has made greater demands of the welfare state to provide more comprehensive 
insurance against those risks. In doing so, public expectation of the scope of the welfare 
state’s provision also increased, which led to strain upon the system as a whole. 
More recently, even the Labour party have come to accept that the foundations of 
socialist ideals, such as welfare state and nationalised industry have become untenable. 
The ‘Third Way’ philosophy of governance is also closely associated with the work of 
Giddens.82 It has characterised ‘New Labour’ from the mid-1990s, mixing both market 
(capitalist) and interventionist (socialist) philosophies and stressing technological 
development, education and competition as the vehicles by which to pursue economic 
progress and state objectives. Within this Third Way, the role of the state is to provide 
proactive welfare which enables individuals to respond to the risks of globalisation. For 
Driver and Martell: 
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[W]here globalisation is bound up with the new digital information and 
communication technologies and the ‘knowledge economy’, individuals need 
the education and training appropriate to these conditions. Public policy should 
support business in the creation of ‘knowledge-rich products and services’ 
which will be the source of future economic growth.83 
Within the risk society, then, there is a clear link between economic stability and the 
use of technology. 
5.5.2 Risk society and technology 
Beck considers that there is a difference between ‘a risk itself’ and the ‘public 
perception’ of that risk. In other words, he differentiates between objective and 
subjective risk. In reference to the proliferation of risks, he considers that ‘it is not clear 
whether it is the risks that have intensified, or our view of them’.84 However, he 
continues by arguing that, since risks are ‘risks in knowledge’, perceptions of risks and 
risks themselves are actually ‘not different things, but one and the same’.85 Beck is more 
explicit in terms of the relationship between the social construction of risk and science. 
Here he argues that risks are ‘social constructs which are strategically defined, covered 
up or dramatised in the public sphere with the help of scientific material supplied for 
the purpose’.86 Therefore, for Beck, there is an inherent relationship between risk, 
technology and social process. 
Many risks resulting from technological advances are not spatially or temporally 
constrained. Risks may arise at any time and within any geographic or jurisdictional 
boundary. Technological risks may affect vast numbers of individuals. Therefore, as 
Williams and Carr suggest, the ‘old orders which bound time and space have lost 
meaning or become disembodied’87 and therefore the ill-defined new ‘order’ which is 
consequently more difficult to control is reasonably seen as being inherently less secure. 
Lenk concurs in no uncertain terms: 
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Society therefore has no choice but to defend itself against unknown dangers 
flowing from our technological achievements. We are at war with our own 
products and with our overwhelming technological skills. 88 
For Giddens,89 such disembodied order is a defining characteristic of high modernity. 
The risks which are caused by technological and scientific advances are complex. In 
early industrialised society, risks could generally be perceived by the senses whereas 
many current risks are imperceptible and exist ‘in scientific knowledge rather than in 
everyday experiment’.90 Beck cites examples of risks ‘localised in the sphere of physical 
and chemical formulas (e.g. toxins in foodstuffs or the nuclear threat)’.91 This inherent 
uncertainty brings the conceptualisation of risk back to the pre-modern idea of risks as 
‘incalculable insecurities’.92 However, unlike pre-modern risks which could not be 
imputed to wrongful conduct, contemporary hazards are linked to scientific and 
technological innovation and therefore carry human responsibility. Technological 
advances are the result of human endeavour and thus in late modernity have become a 
product of knowledge. Therefore human knowledge is both a source of risks and a 
means by which they may be controlled. It follows that contemporary risks arise from 
decisions in furtherance of techno-economic advantage and utilitarian concerns made 
by a network of organisation and political groups. For Beck: 
[I]t is not the number of dead and wounded, but rather a social feature, their 
industrial self-generation, which makes the hazards of mega-technology a 
political issue. 93 
Both Beck94 and Giddens95 refer to this concept as ‘manufactured uncertainty’. The 
ultimate effect of technological advances are often difficult to assess prior to the 
introduction and adoption of the new technology. However, technological development 
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requires financial investment. The desire to protect investment may lead technologists 
to play down or refuse to calculate risks. Economic pressure will then lead politicians to 
provide reassurance that any such risks are insubstantial. As Beck argues: 
[D]angers are being produced by industry, externalised by economics, 
individualised by the legal system, legitimised by the sciences and made to 
appear harmless by politics. 96 
This manufactured uncertainly is for Giddens: 
…the defining characteristic of what Ulrich Beck calls risk society. A risk 
society is one in which we increasingly live on a high technological frontier 
which absolutely no one completely understands and which generates a diversity 
of possible futures.97 
A contemporary example of manufactured uncertainty can be found in the social 
responses to the risk of climate change which has been linked to anthropogenic factors 
resulting from attempts to improve the standard of living via industrialisation. Here 
scientists claim that the technological advances associated with the industrial world, in 
particular the increase in carbon dioxide levels due to emissions from combustion of 
fossil fuels, are resulting in an undesirable global climate shift with a range of associated 
potential associated risks which will:  
…cause more and more costly damage and disrupt the functioning of our 
natural environment, which supplies us with food, raw materials and other vital 
resources. This will negatively affect our economies and could destabilise 
societies around the globe.98 
However, scientific responses to combat climate change may yet manufacture their own 
uncertainties. For example, in a bid to be more energy efficient, the Environment 
Secretary, Hilary Benn, outlined government plans to phase out the sale of traditional 
incandescent light bulbs in the UK by 201199 in favour of ‘low-energy’ bulbs. However, 
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these low-energy bulbs, themselves the product of technological advance, have been 
claimed to exacerbate a range of ailments from migraines100 to disabling eczema-like 
reactions and light sensitivities that can lead to skin cancer.101 
For Furedi, however, a model of the world in which ‘the so-called manufactured risks 
created by humanity are sharply counterposed to the “natural” risks of the past’ is 
‘extremely one-sided’.102 Although there is some correspondence between risk and 
technological advance in contemporary Western society, Furedi argues that natural risks 
such as that from famine, flood or lightning are minimised because ‘of the high levels of 
safety assured by scientific and technological advance’.103 There are not such levels of 
technology-assured security in other parts of the world and further, even in the West, 
‘traditional’ dangers outweigh the risks posed by technology. For Furedi, the 
technological foundation of manufactured risk ‘continually underestimates the social 
influences of such perceptions’ since risks do not transcend society.104 Instead risks 
‘affect people in relation to their power and influence’.105 This is a profoundly Marxist 
perspective. 
5.5.3 Risk society and reflexivity 
In the risk society, Beck argues that risk is linked to reflexivity: 
[Risks are a] systematic way of dealing with hazards and insecurities induced 
and introduced by modernisation itself. Risks, as opposed to older dangers, are 
consequences which relate to the threatening force of modernisation and to its 
globalisation of doubt. They are politically reflexive. 106  
This ‘globalisation of doubt’, or society’s awareness of the global nature of risk 
influences the development of co-operative international institutions. The management 
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of global risk requires a network of bodies which transcend the traditional boundaries 
of the nation state to provide a coordinated approach to its management. For Lupton 
this leads to the ‘the boundaries of the political [being] removed, leading to world-wide 
alliances’.107 Therefore, risk society is transformed to ‘world risk society’ with 
corresponding ‘global citizenship’ focused on the world-wide perspective, generating 
new alliances in a new and different form of politics beyond traditional hierarchies.108 
For Beck, reflexive modernisation is a two-stage process. The first stage occurs as part 
of the transition from industrial society to risk society, which involves the production 
and proliferation of new risks as a side-effect of modernisation. However, at this stage 
the risks are not in the public concern or subject to political debate. In the second 
stage, there is a growing realisation of the risks inherent in modernisation. Industrial 
society then sees itself as a risk society and begins to self-examine and critique its own 
structures. Beck himself defines reflexive modernisation as: 
The combination of reflex and reflections which, as long as the catastrophe 
itself fails to materialise, can set industrial modernity on the path to self-
criticism and self-transformation. Reflexive modernisation contains both 
elements: the reflex-like threat to industrial society’s own foundations through 
a successful further modernisation which is blind to dangers and the growth of 
awareness, the reflection of this situation.109 
Therefore, risk society is characterised by this critical reflection (which Beck calls ‘self-
confrontation’).110 As risks become reflexive, global and therefore not amenable to 
control by nation states, the response of the state is often denial. Giddens refers to this 
in the context of the crisis in the welfare state as ‘a crisis of risk management in a 
society dominated by a new type of risk’.111 Risk society theory is therefore properly 
concerned with the distribution and management of risk, rather than avoiding or 
eradicating risk. Politics in the risk society transcends the traditional state-focused 
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hierarchies, requiring wider political debate and new forms of organisation ‘for science 
and business, science and the public sphere, science and politics, technology and law 
and so forth’.112 (emphasis added) 
At the time of the Enlightenment, geometric order, rigour and reductionism were seen 
as the means by which human progress would be achieved. Science represented a source 
of established knowledge which was considered to be more reliable than the knowledge 
that had been acquired personally by any single individual. However in late modernity, 
lay people have come to question scientific knowledge. The emergence of the global 
risk society has raised a collective awareness that science may have produced many of 
the risks that are matters of social concern. Moreover, there is a social awareness that 
scientific knowledge about risk may be incomplete or contradictory. As Lupton 
comments: 
People must deal, therefore, with constant insecurity and uncertainty: 
conventional social order seems to be breaking down in the face of the 
undermining of old certainties.113 
There is, therefore, a natural tension between the scientists as producers of risks and 
the lay public as the consumers of risks. This tension is manifested in the increasing 
willingness of the lay public to critique scientific findings based on the increased 
availability of knowledge. While technological advances brought about through science 
and engineering have given rise to communications technology that has greatly increased 
the accessibility and depth of information available to the public, it is also the same 
information that can be used to cast doubt on new science. For Beck, the process of 
modernisation and the pace of scientific advance has undermined the basis of rational 
thought since society ‘is placed under permanent pressure to negotiate foundations 
without a foundation’.114 The risks themselves become reflexive: 
In contrast to early industrial risks, nuclear, chemical, ecological and genetic 
engineering risks (a) can be limited in terms of neither time nor place, (b) are 
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not accountable according to the established rules of causality, blame and 
liability and (c) cannot be compensated or insured against.115 
More risks are generated in response to scientific or technical means of controlling the 
initial risk. Beck argues that these global technological risks are immune to control by 
insurance. For Giddens, this proliferation of risk reveals scientific knowledge to be 
‘inherently sceptical and mutable’.116 Science may not be able to solve the problems that 
it has created. Beck is supportive of the lay person’s sceptical response to technical and 
scientific risk. Rather than dismissing them as ignorant, simply requiring more 
information about the risk in order to respond appropriately, he argues that their 
apparent ‘irrationality’ is actually a highly rational response to the failure of technical 
and scientific rationality in the context of the proliferation of risks in late modernity.117 
Moreover, for Beck, the pandemic risks of modernisation have an equalising effect, and 
therefore risk societies are distinct from class societies. Many of these risks affect 
classes in the same way: ‘poverty is hierarchic, smog is democratic’.118 The risks affect 
those who have produced or profited from them and thereby transcend both class as 
well as state boundaries; for Beck they possess an inherent tendency towards 
globalisation.119 That said, the educated classes have sufficient information to be 
concerned about risk but insufficient information to be able to reconcile or quell that 
anxiety.120 
5.6 The role of the state and governmentality 
The regulatory role of the state in the management and distribution of risk is linked 
with the notion of the risk society. Hood et al consider that: 
As well as a ‘risk society’ we are also said to live in a ‘regulatory state’…The 
idea of the ‘regulatory state’ is that a new institutional and policy style has 
emerged in which government’s role as regulator advances while its role as a 
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direct employer or property-owner may decline through privatisation and 
bureaucratic downsizing.121 
From this viewpoint, the role of the state is to regulate the distribution of risks across 
society but not to control those risks since they are inherently uncontrollable. This 
shifts responsibility for risk management from the state to the individual. The idea of 
individualisation forms part of Beck’s view of the risk society122 and is also a key theme 
in the governmentality perspective on risk.  
The governmentality perspective is similar to that of the risk society in that it interests 
itself in the ways in which risk operates in late modernity. However, unlike risk society 
theories which takes a weak constructionist position, governmentality theory adopts a 
strong constructionist position. This position has developed from the work of Foucault. 
Although Foucault did not consider the topic of risk at great length, his commentary on 
governmentality and modernity has been drawn upon to extrapolate an socio-cultural 
analysis of risk. 
For Foucault, governmentality is the approach to social regulation and control that 
began to emerge in Europe in the sixteenth century, associated with the breakdown of 
the feudal system and the development of legitimately-ruling administrative states.123 
Contemporary governmentality is, for Foucault, characterised by neo-liberalism which 
prioritises individual freedom and rights against excessive state intervention. However, 
part of the remit of governmentality is concerned with risk: 
The things with which in this sense government is to be concerned are in fact 
men, but men in their relations, their links, their imbrication with those other 
things which are wealth, resources, means of subsistence, the territory with its 
specific qualities, climate, irrigation, fertility, etc; men in their relation to the 
other kind of things, customs, habits, ways of acting and thinking, etc; lastly 
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men in their relation to that other kind of things, accidents and misfortunes 
such as famines, epidemics, death, etc.124 
Like Beck and Giddens, Foucault emphasises the importance of expert scientific 
knowledge in propagating the late modern subjectivity of risk. However, rather than as 
a devise to catalyse reflexivity, expert knowledge is, for Foucault, the means by which 
populations are normalised. The technology of surveillance and measurement is used to 
construct understanding and hence becomes a means of regulation. Lupton summarises 
Foucault’s perspective on risk as: 
…a governmental strategy of regulatory power by which populations and 
individuals are monitored and managed through the goals of neo-liberalism. 
Risk is governed by a heterogeneous network of interactive actors, institutions, 
knowledges and practices.125 
This normalising activity problematises risk, thereby rendering it calculable and thence 
governable. In this sense, Foucault’s position is similar to that of Ewald’s social 
actuarialism discussed in section 5.2.1 above. For Ewald, risk from Foucault’s 
perspective is ‘a moral technology. To calculate a risk is to master time, to discipline 
the future’.126 
Governmentality includes both direct and indirect strategies to regulate society, relying 
on voluntary compliance by the autonomous self-regulated individual with state 
interests and needs as well as coercive and directive regulation. Individuals become 
participants in governmental discourse and become self-policing in pursuit of their own 
neo-liberal interests and freedoms.127 The development of risk through normalisation 
and aggregation leads to a consensus view of how individuals should then regulate their 
own conduct. In other words, individuals seek information from scientific experts 
based on risk analysis in order to apply that expert knowledge to themselves. Lupton 
uses the example of the pregnant woman in contemporary western society to illustrate 
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this point.128 Women are surrounded by a broad spectrum of expert and lay advice as to 
how they should behave both before and during pregnancy in order to minimise the 
risks to their unborn child. As such, she is positioned in a web of surveillance, requiring 
her to seek out expert advice and act upon it, lest she be found culpable in the event of 
miscarriage or birth defect. She may actively demand increased surveillance by way of 
medical examination to alleviate concerns about the risks. Failure to engage in risk-
avoidance is a ‘failure of the self to take care of itself – a form of irrationality, or simply 
a lack of skilfulness’.129 Avoiding risks becomes a moral enterprise, accepting and 
internalising the objectives of government in what Foucault terms ‘practices’ or 
‘technologies of the self’.130 Risks therefore become products of historical, social and 
politically contingent viewpoints. It is rationalisation and calculation in an attempt to 
control uncertainty and disorder that brings risk into being. In the strong 
constructionist Foucauldian perspective, it is only by categorising something as ‘risky’ 
through a process of calculated normalisation that renders it as requiring management. 
As Ewald put it: 
Nothing is a risk in itself; there is no risk in reality. But on the other hand, 
anything can be a risk; it all depends on how one analyses the danger, considers 
the event.131 
Therefore, risks only come into social existence when human actors recognise and label 
them as such.132 
For Dean, there is more than the risk society perspective of the globalisation of risks 
that are becoming more difficult to calculate.133 Rather than behaving as members of a 
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specific society or Ewald’s provident state, individuals with a dominant notion of 
selfhood move between small community or affiliation-based groups to deal with risk. 
These groups have limited and dynamic constituencies and interests. Individuals 
exposed to ‘high risk’, either as a perpetrator or victim of that risk take control to 
prevent that risk through their own actions, rather than relying upon state intervention 
or state insurance. Individuals are imbued with moral and political qualities and are 
self-interested and responsible. In the same way that the rational choice theory within 
situational crime analysis presents the criminal as one who weighs up pros and cons, 
means and ends, costs and benefits, and makes a rational choice to commit an 
offence,134 victims become rational choice actors with the responsibility for self-
protection by taking action to minimise personal risks and are culpable should they 
become victims of crime.135 The use of risk as a technique of social control has also 
been explored in relation to tort law and accidents136 as well as directly to criminal 
justice and penal policy.137 
In general, then, the strong constructionist position in relation to the governance of risk 
places less reliance on social insurance and more on autonomous self-management, self-
protection and self-responsibility. This position is in furtherance of the neo-libertarian 
political ethos which emphasises self-help and minimalises the extent to which the state 
will intervene in the management of risks. 
5.7 Governance 
There is a common theme, then, within the various analyses of risk, of the withdrawal 
of the direct intervention of the state in the management and regulation of risks in 
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favour of diffuse networks of risk management actors enabling individuals to take 
responsibility for themselves within the ‘new legal order’ offered through insurance. For 
O’Malley: 
…these responsibilising processes seemingly democratise government through 
the mobilising of risk and uncertainty. Individuals and communities are made 
free to choose how they will govern themselves in relation to a host of 
insecurities.138 
Therefore, since the potential risks that could result from the creative misuse of 
emergent technology are by their very nature unforeseen, the question to be considered 
is how such unforeseen risks should be addressed. This model of risk management by 
individuals and communities working alongside the state is referred to as ‘governance’. 
In general terms, governance is synonymous with government. The Oxford English 
Dictionary defines governance as ‘the action or manner of governing’ or ‘the office, 
function or power of governing’. Governing is in turn defined as ruling ‘with authority, 
especially with the authority of a sovereign, to direct and control the actions and affairs 
of…a state’.139 
However, the ambit of the term has expanded to encapsulate something distinct from 
government which includes non-state contributors. For example, Hyden considers that: 
Governance is the stewardship of formal and informal political rules of the 
game. Governance refers to those measures that involve setting the rules for the 
exercise of power and settling conflicts over such rules.140 
For Rhodes ‘governance…is about regulating relationships in complex systems’141 and 
for Hirst and Thompson ‘governance…is a function that can be performed by a wide 
variety of public and private, state and non-state, national and international, 
institutions and practices’.142 Inherent in all these definitions is a recognition of 
something broader than government which includes informal as well as formal rules, 
described by Kjær as ‘networks of trust and reciprocity crossing the state-society 
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divide’.143 This notion of some degree of independence from the state is echoed by 
Rosenau: 
Global governance is conceived to include systems of rule at all levels of human 
activity – from the family to the international organisation – in which the 
pursuit of goals through the exercise of control has transnational 
repercussions.144 
This is consistent with the reducing role of the state and its power in late modernity.145 
As with Hyden, Rosenau’s definition of governance also involves the concept of a 
network: in this instance, a transnational network of states, providing global governance 
within a framework of international relations. Rhodes provides a complementary 
perspective: 
Governance refers to self-organising, interorganisational networks characterised 
by interdependence, resource-exchange, rules of the game and significant 
autonomy from the state.146 
As Kjær summarises, definitions of governance focus ‘on the role of networks in the 
pursuit of common goals’. These networks may consist of a variety of state and non-
state participants active in a particular area of policy. The degree of cohesion will 
naturally vary from network to network. However, some networks may become 
sufficient concerted and cohesive to resist or even to challenge the powers of the state, 
thereby becoming self-regulatory structures within their policy sector.147 In this 
situation, the powerful governance networks regulate more according to the agendas of 
the individual actors within the network than a consideration of public policy in the 
collective interest. For Pierre and Peters, such self-organising networks short-circuit the 
democratic process by separating control and responsibility.148 The state depends on the 
specific expertise and the means of interest representation in the network which 
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influences policy although the interests of the network may challenge the interests of 
the state. From a Marxist standpoint, there is conflict between the state and the 
governance network who compete for power. The state may require a network to bring 
non-state participants into the development and governance of a policy area, yet the 
resulting policies may be obstructed by that network. The position of the network as an 
autonomous and self-governing body is therefore considerably strengthened. For 
Kickert:149 
Government is only one of many actors that influence the course of events in a 
societal system…Other social institutions are, to a great extent, autonomous. 
They are not controlled by any single superordinated actor, not even the 
government. They control themselves. Autonomy not only implies freedom, it 
implies self-responsibility…Deregulation, government withdrawal and steering 
at a distance…are all notions of less direct government regulation and control, 
which lead to more autonomy and self-governance for social institutions. 
The network becomes self-organising and self-regulating by reference to negotiated and 
agreed ‘rules of the game’.150 These rules are based on trust relationships between 
members of the network, made in furtherance of negotiated shared purposes and with 
significant autonomy from the state. There is therefore a self-referential relationship 
between the network and its environment with change being generated from within. As 
such the governance network could be considered to be an example of an autopoietic 
system.151 However, the state may indirectly steer the network towards a desired 
configuration or common goal: the network does not enjoy complete autonomy. 
Rhodes attempts to draw these definitional strands together in suggesting that the 
shared characteristics of governance are interdependence between organisations, 
continuing interaction between network members, game-like interactions rooted in 
trust and a significant degree of autonomy from the state.152 
Although the functionality of these networks is based on trust relationships, Furedi 
considers that there is a general erosion of legitimacy and authority in contemporary 
society which is expressed in the loss of public trust in science. This tendency has led to 
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fear about the consequences of technological developments and is one ‘of the most 
visible elements in the growth of risk consciousness itself’.153 There is therefore a 
relationship between declining trust and increasing consciousness of risk.154 
The increasing shift towards a governance approach to certain areas of policy 
throughout the 1980s and 1990s has been described as the ‘hollowing out’ of the 
authority of central government.155 For Rhodes, this covers four interrelated trends: 
(1) Privatisation and limiting the scope and forms of public intervention. 
(2) The loss of functions by central and local government departments to 
alternative service delivery systems (such as agencies). 
(3) The loss of functions by British government to European Union 
institutions. 
(4) Limiting the discretion of public servants through the new public 
management, with its emphasis on managerial accountability, and 
clearer political control through a sharper distinction between politics 
and administration.156 
Castells considers that nation states are losing their capacity to govern due to the 
‘globalisation of core economic activities, globalisation of media and electronic 
communication and globalisation of crime’.157 This view recognises the decentralised 
nature of the information technology networks and the corresponding facilitation of 
trans-jurisdictional criminal activity. Barlow takes the notion of the dwindling capacity 
for nation states to control global technology networks further still: 
…the Internet is too widespread to be easily dominated by any single 
government. By creating a seamless global economic zone, borderless and 
unregulatable, the Internet calls into question the very idea of a nation-state.158 
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Reidenberg argues in a similar vein: 
The new paradigm must recognise all dimensions of network regulatory power. 
As a complex mix of rule-makers emerges to replace the simple, state sovereign, 
model, new policy instruments must appear that are capable of establishing 
important norms of conduct for networks.159 
It is common ground, then, that governance blurs the distinction between the state and 
society with the state becoming a collection of networks with no sovereign actor able to 
steer or regulate. Forms of economic and political organisation are affected.160 
Braithwaite considers that risk management ‘decentralises the role of the state’ 
compared with corporations and hybrid public/private regulators.161 Offe concurs, 
stating that: 
the outcomes of administrative action are in many areas not the outcomes of 
authoritative implementation of pre-established rules, but rather the results of a 
‘co-production’ of the administration and its clients. 162 
Although these governance networks can be seen to be a challenge to traditional 
democratic accountability by blurring the single point of control inherent in the 
government there is a counter-viewpoint that the existence of governance networks can 
empower citizens: 
Given a world where governance is increasingly operative without government, 
where lines of authority are increasingly more informal than formal, where 
legitimacy is increasingly marked by ambiguity, citizens are increasingly capable 
of holding their own by knowing when, where and how to engage in collective 
action. 163 
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Similarly, Fox and Miller suggest that by participation as users and governors in 
networks, citizens may be regaining control of government in the creation of a post-
modern public administration: 
Networks…which transcend hierarchical institutions provide a feasible model 
for public administration. Some policy networks, interagency consortia, and 
community task forces exhibit potential for discourse. In these nascent forms 
are found think tank experts, legislative staff, policy analysts, public 
administrators, interested citizens, process generalists and even elected officials 
participating together to work out possibilities for what to do next.164 
In essence, the state and society are bonded together in the process of creating 
governance.165 Lenk considered that the state can no longer control technology by itself 
and foresaw the potential emergence of a governance approach to its control: 
Taken together, badly designed technology, misused technology and unmastered 
technology concur to put society in a position where it can no longer aspire to 
regulating and controlling all details through its political institutions. Well-
regulated sectors will co-exist with others from where we may expect influences 
which trigger the emergence of new types of individual and collective behaviour. 
166 (emphasis added) 
This viewpoint acknowledges that the state is not impotent in its ability to regulate 
networked technologies. As Willmore comments, ‘Governments are not helpless when 
it comes to regulation of the Internet’.167 Hirst and Thompson agree that 
‘if…mechanisms of international governance and re-regulation are to be initiated, then 
the role of nation states is pivotal’168 although the partnership between society and the 
state has necessarily limited the scope of state intervention. However the state does still 
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have a role to play in direct regulation; that is, legislation as a means of control. Public 
concern regarding threats to society are frequently met by legislative response to 
political pressure, even where there is little evidence to support the perception of the 
risk; in other words where social subjectivity outweighs current scientific objectivity. 
Examples of swift legislative response include the Dangerous Dogs Act 1991 in response 
to various incidents of serious injury or death resulting from attacks by aggressive and 
uncontrolled dogs; the firearms ban in the Firearms (Amendment) (No 2) Act 1997 
following the Dunblane massacre in 1996 and the Football (Disorder) Act 2000 
extending banning orders in response to football violence following the Euro 2000 
match between England and Germany in Charleroi. Such legislative activity links the 
notions of risk and the regulatory state. For Hood et al: 
The two ideas of ‘risk society’ and ‘regulatory state’ could, indeed, be linked in 
so far as risk and safety are often held to be one of the major drivers of 
contemporary regulatory growth, for example in the development of EU 
regulations. 169 
However, in relation to the Football (Disorder) Act 2000, the Home Secretary, Jack 
Straw, acknowledged that ‘legislation is only part of the answer to the wider 
problem’.170 This implies that the wider problem requires a governance response which 
is in line with the post-modern risk society theories where ‘the trajectory of social 
development is taking us away from the institutions of modernity towards a new and 
distinct type of social order’.171 
For Baker and Simon, the preoccupation with embracing risk encompasses a broader 
idea of ‘governing through risk’, the core idea of which is ‘the use of formal 
considerations about risk to direct organisational strategy and resources’.172 Therefore, 
informed decisions about risk influence the organisational strategies and deployment of 
resources within the members of the governance network. It follows that legislative 
strategy as formulated by government as one member of the governance network is 
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influenced by formal considerations of risk. In Simon’s view,173 the role of the criminal 
law in relation to governance has changed such that advanced industrial societies are 
increasingly governing themselves through crime. The focus has shifted towards 
‘shaping the actions of many other individuals in spaces, practices and institutions far 
beyond the criminal justice system’.174 Although criminal offences are still committed 
against the state, the impetus for control comes from offering protection to the 
innocent victim and ensuring the security of the general public. This control is 
therefore organised in terms of ‘an increasingly pervasive “fear of crime”’.175 For Furedi, 
fear, and in particular the fear of crime, has become a distinct cultural phenomenon in 
a society where the ‘uncertainties of day-to-day existence’ produce anxieties that are 
echoed in discussions on crime.176 He argues further that crime is more controlled by 
informally enforced social rules – in effect, peer pressure – than formal policing. 
However, Ericson and Haggerty consider that policing does have a role to play in 
governance:  
Crime risk, and fear of it, has become the basis for police involvement in 
governance well beyond crime control itself.177 
Therefore, for Ericson and Hagerty, risk society is ‘characterised by the marketing of 
[in]security’ which gives rise to a reflexive awareness of insecurity by the plethora of 
security products available which in turn leads to an increased level of fear.178 The role 
of ‘dangerousness’ in relation to the policing of convicted sexual and violent offenders 
under the Criminal Justice Act 2003179 has already been discussed in section 5.2.1 above. 
A further example of the interplay between risk and policing can be found in the range 
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of preventative measures against anti-social behaviour, such as anti-social behaviour 
orders,180 curfew orders181 and dispersal orders,182 which may be employed to manage the 
risk of crime without proof of a crime having been committed. This philosophy also 
extends to control orders in relation to terrorism183 and the recent introduction of 
serious crime prevention orders.184 
5.8 The precautionary principle 
The precautionary principle is simply to ‘avoid steps that will create a risk of harm’.185 
It is traditionally associated with failures of the assimilative capacity approach to 
environmental risk which considers the extent to which the environment can 
accommodate or tolerate pollutants. For Hey, this approach is ‘based on certain 
assumptions regarding the relationship between environment, science, technology and 
economics’.186 The approach fails where scientific proof of potential harm resulting 
from particular activities or substances has come too late to prevent the realisation of 
that harm and such failures have led to a re-prioritisation ‘in favour of a bias towards 
safety and caution’.187 As Hey comments: 
[The precautionary] concept requires that policy-makers adopt an approach 
which ensures that errors are made on the side of excess environmental 
protection…[It] may require preventative action before scientific proof of harm 
has been submitted.188 
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This precautionary approach recognises the limitations of science to make accurate 
predictions about future consequences of particular activities. It has been claimed that 
the precautionary principle is becoming established in customary international law: 
Opinion remains divided as to whether the precautionary principle may have 
crystallised into a binding norm of customary international law. However, the 
prevalence of the principle in recent environmental treaties, declarations and 
resolutions…suggests that it may indeed have attained this status.189 
The principle has certainly been reflected within various international documents, such 
as the United National World Charter for Nature,190 the Rio Declaration on 
Environment and Development191 and the Treaty on European Union which states that: 
Community policy on the environment shall…be based on the precautionary 
principle and on the principles that preventive action should be taken, that 
environmental damage should as a priority be rectified at source and that the 
polluter should pay.192 
However, although the Treaty does not offer a definition of the principle, the European 
Commission considered that its scope is ‘much wider’ than the environment and should 
be used: 
specifically where preliminary objective scientific evaluation, indicates that 
there are reasonable grounds for concern that the potentially dangerous effects 
on the environment, human, animal or plant health may be inconsistent with 
the high level of protection chosen for the Community.193 (emphasis added) 
The principle therefore concerns itself with potentially dangerous effects within a 
structured analysis of risk assessment, risk communication and, most significantly, risk 
management. In essence, the precautionary principle places a burden of proof on the 
producers of a product or proponents of an activity to demonstrate that their product 
or activity is ‘safe’. An example of this can be found in the law relating to defective 
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consumer products. The Consumer Protection Act 1987 establishes strict liability in tort 
on any supplier of defective goods which cause damage as a result of the defect.194 
There are limited statutory defences to this tort, although potential defendants may 
escape liability if they can prove that the state of scientific or technical knowledge was 
such that the defect was unknown and unforeseeable when the product was 
circulated.195 This allows suppliers to use manufactured uncertainty as a defence.  
The essence of the precautionary principle, then, is that activities which create a risk of 
harm should be approached cautiously until safety is proven through clear scientific 
evidence. Precaution also applies the idea of substitution. Where ‘safer’ alternatives are 
available these should be promoted over the risky activity. This creates reasonable 
suspicion of the riskier option and an impetus for the safer alternative.  
In terms of governance and regulation, the state needs to make itself aware of the 
extent of the uncertainty within the available scientific information and determine an 
acceptable level of risk for society. This determination is an inherently political 
exercise, requiring consideration of the risk itself, scientific doubt and public concern. 
The public concern element is amplified in situations which evoke strong emotional 
responses, such as terrorism. This leads to ‘probability neglect’ where public response to 
risk tends to overlook its likelihood in favour of fearing its outcome.196 Moreover, 
responses to risks vary across societies. As Wiener comments in comparing the 
responses of the United States and Europe to use of the precautionary principle: 
Viewed across the array of risks, both the United States and Europe are 
precautionary about many risks (and both resist precaution regarding other 
risks), but they repeatedly differ as to which risks to worry about and regulate 
most or earliest.197 
The reflection of cultural factors in the adoption of the precautionary principle 
demonstrates that it is related to social constructions of risk as well as to governance. 
As discussed in section 5.4 above, the correspondence between precaution and social 
constructions of risk is particularly marked for egalitarians who are especially sensitive 
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to risks of low probability but high consequence. The precautionary principle does not, 
therefore ‘resolve the problems associated with uncertainty because in some senses it 
merely draws attention to them’.198 Once attention has been drawn to a risk, it still does 
not necessarily follow that a legal response is required to mitigate against that risk. 
There is a continuum of regulatory responses from commissioning further research, 
issuing guidelines or making recommendations to the binding use of the law.  
Sunstein argues that, in many ways, the precautionary principle seems ‘quite sensible, 
even appealing’,199 considering that: 
People buy smoke alarms and insurance. They wear seatbelts and motorcycle 
helmets, even if they are unlikely to be involved in an accident. Should rational 
regulators not follow the same approach as well?200 
He describes the principle as a ‘plea for a kind of regulatory insurance’201 and 
acknowledges, as Steele, that the principle demands that neglected problems receive 
attention. However, he argues that the over-adherence to the principle will be 
‘paralyzing, forbidding every imaginable step, including no step at all’.202 
As far as technological or scientific advances are concerned, there are many examples of 
the precautionary principle at work. For instance, in relation to mobile telephones, the 
report of the Independent Expert Group on Mobile Phones chaired by Sir William 
Stewart in 2000 concluded that, despite the fact that the balance of evidence to date did 
not suggest that emissions from mobile telephones and base stations put the health of 
the UK population at risk: 
…we recommend that a precautionary approach to the use of mobile phone 
technologies be adopted until much more detailed and scientifically robust 
information on any health effects becomes available.203 
The Social Issues Research Centre encapsulated this reasoning as ‘just because there is 
no evidence of harm, that does not mean that something is not harmful’204 before 
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concurring with Sunstein that it represents a ‘serious obstacle to rational discussion’.205 
The SIRC article considers that the precautionary principle works to prevent, rather 
than encourage, scientific debate since the burden of proof is placed upon a scientific 
community which is often powerless to respond rationally and logically to those who 
make ‘unjustified and whimsical claims’.206 Therefore, even though there was no hard 
scientific evidence that mobile telephones were unsafe, there was some doubt that they 
might be and the Stewart Report recommended that: 
…national and local government, industry and the consumer should all become 
actively involved in addressing concerns about possible health effects of mobile 
phones.207 
In doing so, they advocated a networked approach to addressing the risk posed by the 
problem which is in line with the idea of a co-operative and collaborative approach to 
governance. From this, it is possible to conclude that the precautionary principle is 
‘essentially linked with a participatory and pluralistic approach to governing’.208 
However, the precautionary principle could also be linked to Furedi’s notion of 
‘governing through fear’ and unnecessary regulation in the face of limited scientific 
evidence of risk. In some instances, it has been argued that the official precautionary 
reaction to an event can prove far more damaging than the event itself. For example, 
following the outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease in the UK in 2001, the European 
Commission banned all British milk, meat and livestock exports. Six million animals 
were slaughtered in response to 2,030 confirmed cases of the disease and resulted in an 
estimated overall cost to the UK economy of around £5 billion.209 Despite this criticism, 
the UK government appears to be committed to the use of the precautionary principle. 
The United Kingdom Interdepartmental Liaison Group on Risk Assessment (UK-
ILGRA) considered that the purpose of the precautionary principle is ‘to create an 
impetus to take a decision notwithstanding scientific uncertainty about the nature and 
extent of the risk’ and stated that ‘although there is no universally accepted definition, 
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the Government is committed to using the precautionary principle’.210 A recent 
examples of this can be found in the UK Parliamentary report on harmful content on 
the internet and in video games.211 This report concluded that: 
that there is still no clear evidence of a causal link [between exposure to violent 
content and violent behaviour]; but incontrovertible evidence of harm is not 
necessarily required in order to justify a restriction of access to certain types of 
content in any medium, and…any approach to the protection of children from 
online dangers should be based on the probability of risk.212 
This demonstrates the application of the precautionary principle in a technological 
environment. 
5.9 Risk, computer misuse and the domestic criminal law 
The first part of this study concluded that the problems posed by computer misuse 
cannot readily be encapsulated within the parameters of the domestic criminal law due 
to a number of incompatibilities between their respective natures. Moreover, Chapters 
2 and 3 identified a number of potential risks which arise as a result of computer 
misuse. Many of these risks were also identified within the debates prior to the 
enactment of the Computer Misuse Act 1990 (discussed in section 2.4.3 above) and the 
amendments to the Act introduced by the Police and Justice Act 2006 (discussed in 
section 3.5.1 above). The risks considered during the legislative passage included the 
financial risk to the economy; the data integrity risks posed by computer hacking; the 
service availability risks arising from denial-of-service attacks; and the security of state 
systems such as the proposed national identity register, police DNA databases and the 
critical national infrastructure.  
There are a range of potential responses to risks. Where it is feasible to do so, the risk 
may be terminated by refraining from the risky activity. Countermeasures may be 
introduced which prevent the risk from occurring or resilience may be ‘built in’ to 
prevent the realised risk in having any detrimental impact. The risk may be reduced by 
taking action which either reduces the probability of the risk occurring (target 
hardening) or limiting its impact to an acceptable level. The management of the risk 
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may be transferred to a third party via insurance. The risk may also be tolerated if its 
likelihood or consequences are at an acceptable level or that measures to prevent or 
reduce it are impracticable or prohibitively expensive. Contingency plans may be 
developed which are executed if the risk occurs.  
From the realist perspective, risk is considered in terms of probability and 
consequences. The greater the severity and likelihood of an adverse event, the riskier 
that event becomes. Events may then be placed in risk categories against which 
insurance may be taken. However the domestic criminal law does not always sit easily 
with the notion of insurance, although it could be argued to at least offer some 
protection against the behaviour associated with computer misuse. For instance, the 
criminalisation of unauthorised access to computer systems,213 for instance, represents 
an attempt at state intervention to protect against the associated financial and data 
integrity risk on society’s behalf. Similarly, the more recent offence relating to impairing 
the performance of a computer system214 can be viewed as offering some protection 
against risks to service availability. As Policy Maker 1 commented: 
We have to ensure that our key businesses function in the current technological 
climate. I think that the law is trying to protect commerce here. 
However, the use of the domestic criminal law in response to risk does not necessarily 
protect individuals from the consequences of that risk. For example, the domestic 
criminal law does not usually provide financial restoration nor the ability to substitute 
new resources. Even if the domestic criminal law is constructed as some form of 
collective social insurance in protecting against the risks associated with computer 
misuse, it has been demonstrated by the decline of the welfare state and the increased 
use of private insurance, particularly in relation to healthcare and pension provision, 
that the state is gradually withdrawing its responsibility for individual welfare. The 
interests of the domestic criminal law are predominantly public rather than private. 
With regard to the management of risk related to computer misuse, this is in line with 
the role of the domestic criminal law being particularly apposite where there is a risk of 
collective public harm, such as a threat to national security, but less so where separate 
individuals require protection. Moreover, there is little to suggest that the domestic 
criminal law offers a significant deterrent against computer misuse. As discussed in 
sections 4.2 and 4.3 above, computer misuse often comprises de minimis harms and is 
not considered to be especially immoral. Low impact consequences of questionable 
wrongness are not traditional candidates for criminalisation. Computer misuse suffers 
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further from the reluctance of most individual and some corporate victims to report. 
These factors combine to present problems for the domestic criminal law. Its presence 
will not deter those from behaving in ways which cause little harm, are of dubious 
immorality and are unlikely to attract the interests of the criminal justice system. The 
domestic criminal law, then, is in keeping with the state’s role offering some sort of 
protection as the reinsurer of last resort against significant risk, but of less utility to the 
protection of individuals. It is therefore highly questionable whether the domestic 
criminal law is an appropriate means of managing risks to individuals, or, as with the 
welfare state, the individual should take a less passive approach to ensuring their own 
security. The active assumption of personal responsibility was clearly shown across the 
spectrum of interview participants: 
Because we’re not set up properly to deal with computer crime, people have to 
take steps to protect themselves. Surely it’s common sense. You wouldn’t go 
out and leave your windows open. Crime prevention is the key.215 
IT security is key across our whole enterprise. We spend a small fortune on 
keeping ourselves protected. No-one else is going to.216 
We have to build software and systems that are secure. There’s a lot of R&D 
going on in that area, just to try and keep one step ahead – of the criminals, as 
well as our competitors.217 
Even if the domestic criminal law is considered to provide some sort of limited 
protection against major computer misuse risk, computer misuse does not present a 
significant moral hazard. The existence of the criminal law does not significantly reduce 
the incentive for the computer user to take care to avoid loss. Although the prospect of 
a criminal conviction may provide some satisfaction to a victim of computer misuse, it 
must be remembered that the criminal law suffers from low conviction rates. Moreover, 
even where a conviction is secured, it is by no means guaranteed that a compensation 
order would be granted to offset some or all of the financial cost of recovery. This was 
seen in Lennon in section 3.3.3.2 above, where the defendant’s actions caused significant 
financial loss, but no compensation was awarded. The absence of moral hazard, as far 
as domestic criminal law is concerned, is evidenced by the range of security hardware 
and software that is available to both the business and consumer markets. Individuals 
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take personal responsibility for computer security despite the presence of the domestic 
criminal law: 
The law doesn’t offer enough protection. Not to businesses or users. The 
trouble is, is that I’m not sure whether it could. I’m certainly sure that I don’t 
know how it could. If you think that you don’t have to protect yourself because 
the law will, then you deserve all you get.218 
From the cultural and symbolic constructionist perspective, the role of the domestic 
criminal law as a response to risk will vary depending on the viewpoint of the 
individual. Using the grid-group model, individualists (low grid/low group) will support 
the use of self-regulation and thence self-management of risk. They will not consider 
that there is a significant role for state regulation of any form in general, or the use of 
the domestic criminal law in particular. Fatalists (high grid/low group) will adopt a 
passive stance. Believing that they have little personal control over risk, the presence, 
absence, efficacy or inadequacy of the domestic criminal law will not trouble them. For 
the egalitarian (low grid/high group), there will be a general distrust of the external 
constraint imposed by the domestic criminal law, although their sensitivity to high 
consequence risks would suggest that they will find favour with criminal laws targeted 
at computer misuse which impacts upon national security. The hierarchists (high 
grid/high group) will consider that the domestic criminal law has a definite role to play; 
not just in relation to computer misuse, but in terms of creating a well-defined and 
ordered society. Although this functional structuralist approach is necessarily somewhat 
artificial, given the blurring between categorisations that naturally occurs in society, it 
can be seen that the role of the domestic criminal law in relation to computer misuse is 
predominantly either marginal or restricted to high consequence events. It is only 
unequivocally desirable to those who would consider the domestic criminal law to be an 
appropriate hierarchical response to any form of risk which threatened disorder.  
Within the critically structuralist risk society, the production of computer misuse risks 
associated with technological advances has undermined the domestic criminal law as an 
established means of social control which regulates behaviour by delineating the 
boundaries of acceptable conduct. In risk society, the quantity and public awareness of 
risks have combined to require a greater level of state protection than has proven to be 
sustainable. In relation to computer technology, the increase in its power and 
accessibility has led to a proliferation of risks which, in turn, have come more into the 
public consciousness by virtue (at least, in part) of the very same technologies that 
produced those risks in the first place. State protection against such widely-known and 
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increasing risks in the form of the domestic criminal law is therefore also unsustainable. 
Moreover, the risks associated with computer misuse exist within a disembodied order 
which transcends geographic and jurisdictional boundaries, rendering the domestic 
criminal law an inadequate means of control. Equally, in risk society, technological 
advances can control, as well as produce risks. However, it has been demonstrated in 
the first part of this study that technological advances are largely decoupled from legal 
advances and therefore it is arguable that in risk society, domestic criminal law has a 
limited role to play. Even the counter-viewpoint of Furedi, who considers that the risks 
posed by technology are not as significant as they are portrayed in risk society, 
acknowledges that technology can provide high levels of safety. Therefore, it follows 
that there is a potential role for technology itself in managing the risks associated with 
computer misuse. This notion of technological control is returned to in section 7.4 
below. 
However, in the risk society, technical responses to technical risk generate more risks 
themselves. This reflexivity gives rise to global technological risks which are immune to 
complete control by the local mechanism of the domestic criminal law. These pandemic 
reflexive risks inherently tend towards globalisation. Again, therefore, a domestic means 
of control will be incomplete. This is recognised within the concept of the regulatory 
state which serves to manage distribution of risks rather than control of risks. 
Therefore, the role of the law is one of management and guidance rather than one of 
control. The domestic criminal law is capable of guiding as well as controlling conduct 
and therefore may have some role within a regulatory state framework. 
The governmentality viewpoint advocates neo-libertarianism. Although this subjugates 
excessive state intervention, it includes both direct and indirect strategies of control, 
combining both autonomous individual responsibility and coercive regulation. 
Moreover, governmentality manages risk via a network of state and private actors, 
institutions, knowledge and practice. In relation to computer misuse risk, the 
technology itself drives understanding as both a facilitator and a means of regulation. 
This understanding may be used to provide both a means of technological control and 
to inform the discourse of legal reform. There is therefore a role within the 
governmentality framework for the domestic criminal law as a means of direct and 
coercive regulation, shaped and informed by knowledge and as part of an broader 
control network. However, it must be stressed that governmentality emphasises 
autonomous self-management, self-protection and self-responsibility and that the role 
of the domestic criminal law as a form of state intervention has less prominence. 
Overall, then, regardless of epistemological position, there is a common theme which 
indicates the withdrawal of the state, to a greater or lesser extent, in the management 
of risk. It is therefore possible to conclude that, from a risk perspective, the use of the 
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domestic criminal law as a tool of the state cannot provide a complete solution to the 
problems associated with computer misuse. The first part of this study concluded in 
similar terms, albeit from an analysis of the nature of computer misuse and the nature 
of the criminal law. That is not to say that the role of the domestic criminal law is to be 
dismissed all together. It still has a role to play as part of a controlling network which 
facilitates protection against computer misuse risks. 
Governance theory proposes means of controlling complex systems within a broader 
framework than can be provided by the state alone. Governance encompasses both 
public and private institutions and practices. This is particularly noteworthy since 
computer misuse is generally viewed as a private, rather than a public, wrong. 
Moreover, since the threats or risks arising from computer misuse often come from 
individuals or sub-national groups which cannot be readily or easily controlled by 
nation states and are equally-often directed against an infrastructure which might not 
belong to the state,219 then it follows that the means of governance should come from 
private organisations as much as from the state, since bodies with a legal duty to 
prepare for and respond to emergencies are often private sector organisations. For 
instance, there is a statutory duty imposed upon transport and utility companies to co-
operate with state emergency services in response to emergencies.220 It follows that 
private control mechanisms may be appropriate in the management of computer misuse 
risk, although the state does retain its capacity to regulate matters of public or national 
safety by direct use of the domestic criminal law. Extra-legal considerations will be 
considered in Chapter 7. 
The domestic criminal law does not appear to have been deployed in any sort of 
precautionary sense. This is evidenced by the fact that, as seen in section 3.5.1 above, 
the Computer Misuse Act 1990 was not updated for sixteen years and even then was 
reactively changed in response to new forms of mischief and to fulfil the UK’s European 
obligations. From a risk society perspective, the potential risks emerging from 
technological advance are unseen and unforeseeable. Therefore it becomes impossible 
to legislate for that which is, at present, unknown, since new domestic criminal 
legislation will be drafted either too narrowly or too broadly. This problem of 
technology-neutral drafting has already been seen in sections 3.5.3 and 3.5.4 above in 
relation to the amendments within the Police and Justice Act 2006. Against a backdrop 
of precaution, it is therefore necessary to reconsider whether there is sufficient evidence 
to suggest that computer misuse poses a risk with the substantially harmful 
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consequences required to warrant a precautionary approach. Although it could be 
argued that society has been overwhelmed by a construction of computer misuse which 
emphasises its negative aspects in order to create a climate of fear, the state does not 
generally consider computer misuse to be a prime area of responsibility. This has been 
reflected in the lack of legislative impetus in its regulation. However, computer misuse 
does indisputably give rise to certain risks and it can therefore be argued that the 
precautionary principle does, at the very least, draw attention to these issues.  
Computer technology is generally a creature of private enterprise and its misuse is 
generally considered to be a private concern. In its early days, when firmly within the 
realm of the scientific, technical and military experts, it was considered that its 
unfettered use gave rise to the greatest benefits. However, as technology has evolved, it 
has created some associated risks which warrant some form of control. The domestic 
criminal law, as a public mechanism, has some part to play in that control. However, it 
will not provide a complete solution. The domestic criminal law is prescriptive, not 
network-cooperative. In relation to computer misuse, it is unsuitable as a precautionary 
tool of prevention.  Although it does carry a symbolic deterrent effect, with the 
exception of acts that are ‘more than merely preparatory’ to the commission of an 
offence,221 it comes into operation ex post rather than ex ante.  
While the various theoretical perspectives explain the limitations of the domestic 
criminal law in the context of computer misuse, they also open up a wide field within 
which alternative network-reliant control strategies may be explored. These include 
alternative tiers of legal governance at supranational and international levels, as well as 
additional tiers of extra-legal governance. The domestic criminal law is therefore best 
placed within a broader framework of governance in relation to the control of 
computer misuse risks as a tool of management and guidance as well as a tool of direct 
coercion. The next chapter will broaden the discussion from the domestic criminal law 
to consider the role of alternative tiers of legal governance within this constellation 
while Chapter 7 will examine a range of potential extra-legal alternatives. 
 
                                                        
221 Criminal Attempts Act 1981, s 1(1); R v. Griffin [1993] Crim LR 515 (CA); R v. 
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The legal governance of computer misuse: 
beyond the domestic criminal law 
 
Law is order and good law is good order. 
Aristotle (384 BC – 322 BC) 
 
The previous chapter considered the application of risk and governance theories to the 
domestic criminal law in the context of computer misuse. It explored whether the 
domestic criminal law offered a feasible solution to the risks arising from computer 
misuse which were identified in the first part of this study. In doing so, it established 
that the domestic criminal law has some part to play within a broader framework of 
governance albeit a non-exclusive part. This chapter will broaden the discussion beyond 
the domestic criminal law to consider the role of the law in general within this 
governance framework. It will introduce new tiers of legal governance at the European 
Union, Council of Europe, Commonwealth, United Nations and Group of Eight (G8) 
levels and explore the impact of these upon the UK in the light of their effects on 
national sovereign powers. It will examine the proposition that there may be advantages 
in moving beyond the domestic criminal law by examining these alternative approaches 
within the context of governing trans-border risks and trans-border technology 
networks.  
6.1 European Union initiatives 
The domestic criminal law is a vehicle for the exercise of sovereign powers through 
legislation. However, the European Union also represents an important tier of 
governance in the regulation of commerce and social affairs, exercising power, authority 
and influence which transcends national boundaries, governments and institutions. The 
enactment of the European Communities Act 1972 gave effect within the UK to all 
directly applicable European law (that is, Treaty Articles and Regulations)1 without the 
                                                        
1 Treaty establishing the European Community (as amended) (EC Treaty) [2002] OJ 
C325/33, art 249EC. 
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need for further domestic legislation.2 In doing so, the UK joined a community which 
(in the opinion of the Court of Justice of the European Communities) represented ‘a 
new legal order…for whose benefit the [Member] States have limited their sovereign 
rights’3 and the rules of which the House of Lords has held to be supreme over domestic 
law.4 The primary aim of the Treaty of Rome5 which gave birth to the European 
Economic Community (as it then was) was to create a common market and an 
economic and monetary union by implementing common policies and activities6 to 
promote employment and social protection, to raise standards of living and to facilitate 
economic and social cohesion.7 This focus on economic and social well-being has 
traditionally meant that the European Community had not interfered with the criminal 
law of Member States. However, Community law can overrule national law (including 
national criminal law) where there is incompatibility between the two.8 Moreover, the 
doctrine of equivalence which requires Member States to protect rights under 
Community law in a way no less favourable than those relating to national law may 
require Member States to give effect to Community law by providing criminal 
sanctions.9 
6.1.1 The criminal law competence of the European Community and the European 
Union 
The Treaty on European Union10 founded the European Union upon the Communities11 
‘supplemented by the policies and forms of co-operation established by [the] Treaty’.12 
The European Union currently consists of three ‘pillars’. The First Pillar is comprised of 
                                                        
2 European Communities Act 1972, s 2(1). 
3 Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen [1963] ECR 1 (CJEC). 
4 R v. Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte Factortame (No. 2) [1991] 1 AC 603 
(HL). 
5 Treaty establishing the European Economic Community (Treaty of Rome) 1957/CEE 1. 
6 Outlined in EC Treaty, arts 3 and 4. 
7 EC Treaty, art 2. 
8 Criminal Proceedings against Donatella Calfa (Case C-348/96) [1999] ECR I-11 (CJEC). 
9 Commission v. Greece (Case C-68/88) [1989] ECR 2965 (CJEC). 
10 Treaty on European Union (as amended) [2002] OJ C325/5. 
11 Comprising the European Community and the only other surviving European 
Community, the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM); the European 
Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) being absorbed into the European Community on 
the expiry of the 1951 Treaty of Paris in July 2002. 
12 Treaty on European Union, art 1 (ex art A(3)). 
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the European Communities; the Second Pillar is Common Foreign and Security Policy 
(CFSP);13 the Third Pillar is Police and Judicial Co-operation in Criminal Matters 
(PJCC), formerly known as Co-operation in the fields of Justice and Home Affairs 
(JHA).14 The Second and Third Pillars therefore supplement the traditional Community 
structure now residing within the First Pillar. They are essentially inter-governmental in 
nature; that is, they are not run by the EC institutions such as the Commission, but by 
collaboration between the governments of the Member States. The Third Pillar, then, is 
primarily concerned with co-operation between national police forces, customs 
authorities and judicial authorities and is implemented via agencies set up by the 
European Union, namely Eurojust, responsible for countering serious crime through 
closer judicial co-operation; Europol, responsible for improving co-operation between 
the police and customs authorities of the Member States; and the European Judicial 
Network (EJN).15 This co-operation includes the development of mechanisms for the 
mutual recognition of judicial decisions in criminal matters and the approximation of 
rules, where necessary, on certain ‘criminal matters’ in the Member States;16 that is: 
[P]rogressively adopting measures establishing minimum rules relating to the 
constituent elements of criminal acts and to penalties in the fields of organised 
crime, terrorism and illicit drug trafficking.17 
The criminal matters referred to here are undeniably matters of significant public 
concern with the potential to cause serious harm. 
The concept of co-operation in European criminal matters is not new. For example, in 
1977 the French government reintroduced a plan via the European Council for the 
‘European judicial space’ in response to increased terrorist activity in Europe 
throughout the 1970s. This plan was first mooted in 1975 to simplify extradition 
proceedings and improve mutual assistance between States in criminal matters via the 
harmonisation of criminal laws. However, as Vermeulen comments, the plan proved to 
                                                        
13 Treaty on European Union, Title V. 
14 Treaty on European Union, Title VI. 
15 There is an EJN in criminal matters responsible for facilitating mutual judicial 
assistance in the fight against transnational crime; there is also an EJN in civil and 
commercial matters. 
16 Treaty on European Union, art 29. 
17 Treaty on European Union, art 31(e). 
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be ‘premature and unrealistic’ since criminal justice and law enforcements systems of 
the Member States ‘are based entirely on the principle of sovereignty’.18  
The distinction between the criminal competence of the EU and the EC is 
constitutionally significant, since criminal law in particular varies between Member 
States, reflecting their fundamental differences and therefore becoming a closely 
guarded aspect of their national sovereignty. As a vehicle for approximation of laws in 
certain policy areas, European law has the ability to establish a common ground which 
can bind Member States and can shape the laws beyond sovereign boundaries in the way 
that domestic law cannot, notwithstanding the extraterritorial legislative competence of 
the UK inherent in Parliamentary sovereignty.19 
It was, however, common ground until September 2005 that the EC Treaty itself 
conferred no power to define criminal offences or prescribe criminal sanction. The 
distribution of competencies between the First and Third Pillars of the EU was then 
examined in Commission v. Council (Case C-176/03).20 The issue at hand had no 
precedent and the importance of the case was reflected by the court sitting as a Grand 
Chamber to hear observations from eleven Member States. The Commission also issued 
a Communication on the implications of the Court’s judgment;21 such communications 
being reserved for important cases such as Cassis de Dijon22 and Kalanke.23 
                                                        
18 Vermeulen, G, ‘Pre-judicial (Preventative) Structuring of International Police Action 
in Europe’ (1996) <http://www.ncjrs.gov/policing/pre75.htm> accessed 25 September 
2008. 
19 Edinburgh & Dalkeith Railway Co. v. Wauchope (1842) 8 ER 810 (HL); Mortensen v. 
Peters (1906) 14 SLT 227 (High Court of Justiciary). 
20 Commission v. Council (Case C-176/03) [2005] ECR I-7879 (CJEC). 
21 Commission (EC), ‘Communication from the Commission to the European 
Parliament and the Council on the implications of the Court’s judgment of 13 
September 2005 (Case C-176/03, Commission v. Council)’ COM (2005) 583 final, 24 
November 2005. 
22 Rewe-Zentrale AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein (sub nom. Cassis de 
Dijon) (Case 120/78) [1979] ECR 649 (CJEC) concerning measures equivalent to 
quantitative restriction on imports. 
23 Eckhard Kalanke v. Freie Hansestadt Bremen (Case C-450/93) [1995] ECR I-3051 
(CJEC) concerning positive discrimination. 
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In case C-176/03, the Court considered a Council Framework Decision24 which laid 
down a number of environmental offences in respect of which the Member States were 
required to prescribe criminal penalties. The Commission asked the Court to annul the 
Framework Decision on the grounds that the imposition of this obligation to prescribe 
sanctions based upon art 29 et seq of the Treaty on European Union (that is, a Third 
Pillar basis) was incorrect. The Commission argued that the correct legal basis for 
criminal sanctions was art 175(1) of the EC Treaty (that is, a First Pillar basis) upon 
which it had presented a proposal for an environmental protection Directive. The 
Court stated that ‘as a general rule, neither criminal law nor the rules of criminal 
procedure fall within the Community’s competence’, citing Casati25 and Lemmens26 as 
examples of cases in which it was held that, in principle, criminal legislation and the 
rules of criminal procedure are matters for which the Member States are responsible. 
However, as Tobler argues, this is no more than a general rule which ‘does not mean 
that Community law is irrelevant for the purposes of national criminal law. The 
question is rather one of degree’.27 She argues further that: 
[S]ince von Colson and Kamann28 it has been clear that the Member States’ duty 
to provide for effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions in the event of 
infringements of Community law may include the duty to impose criminal 
sanctions even where there is no explicit written Community law on the 
matter.29 
Indeed, in case C-176/03 Commission v. Council the Court explicitly stated that there is 
nothing in this general rule which prevents the Community from requiring competent 
national authorities to impose ‘effective, proportionate and dissuasive criminal 
penalties’ where they are an ‘essential measure’.30 The Court held that since arts 174 to 
176 of the EC Treaty establish general environmental policy as an essential Community 
                                                        
24 Council Framework Decision (EU) 2003/80/JHA of 17 January 2003 on the protection 
of the environment through criminal law [2003] OJ L29/55. 
25 Casati (Case 203/80) [1981] ECR 2595 (CJEC) [27]. 
26 Lemmens (Case C-226/97) [1998] ECR I-3711 (CJEC) [19]. 
27 Tobler, C, ‘Annotation: Case C-176/03, Commission v. Council, judgment of the 
Grand Chamber of 13 September 2005’ (2006) 43 Common Market Law Review 835, 846. 
28 Von Colson and Kamann v. Land Nordrhein-Westfalen (Case 14/83) [1984] ECR 1891 
(CJEC). 
29 Tobler, C, ‘Annotation: Case C-176/03, Commission v. Council, judgment of the 
Grand Chamber of 13 September 2005’ (2006) 43 Common Market Law Review 835, 846. 
30 Commission v. Council (Case C-176/03) [2005] ECR I-7879 (CJEC) [48]. 
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objective then the measures within the Third Pillar Framework Decision could have 
been properly adopted on the First Pillar basis of art 175 of the EC Treaty. 
The situation following case C-176/03 is that any criminal law required for the effective 
implementation of Community policy is a matter for the EC Treaty (First Pillar) 
whereas horizontal criminal law provisions to facilitate police and judicial co-operation 
fall within Title VI of the Treaty on European Union (Third Pillar). Peers commented 
that: 
Given that the Member States argued that this was not what they wanted to 
give to the Community as competence, it is surprising that the Court felt that it 
was. Nevertheless…there are reasonable grounds to support the Court’s 
conclusion that the Community has some sort of criminal law competence.31 
White further considers that the adoption of criminal law under the First Pillar ‘may 
still prove difficult’ within the Treaty structure, pointing out that ‘the Council was 
supported in its argument against this approach by 11 out of 15 Member States’.32 For 
Greatorex and Peter, the decision strengthens the EU as an institution by demonstrating 
the Court’s willingness to ‘strike down any attempt by Member States, even where 
acting unanimously, to legislate on matters which are properly within the competence 
of the Community legislature’.33 However, Renouf considers that the decision ‘takes 
nothing away from the powers of the Member States’ concluding that ‘Brussels cannot 
imprison Britons’.34 In its report on the criminal law competence of the European 
Community, the House of Lords, whilst accepting that there was a possibility of 
Community legislation defining offences ‘with some degree of particularity’, considered 
that this would lead to ‘problems of definition and drafting resulting in part from the 
different approaches taken by Member States’ criminal laws and rules of evidence and 
procedure’.35 
                                                        
31 European Union Committee, ‘The Criminal Law Competence of the European 
Community: Report with Evidence’ HL (2005-06) 227 [Q47]. 
32 White, S, ‘Harmonisation of criminal law under the First Pillar’ (2006) 31 European 
Law Review 81, 92. 
33 Greatorex, P and Peter, N, ‘Gloves off: Commission v. Council’ (2005) 155 New Law 
Journal 1706. 
34 Renouf, M, ‘The Euro battle to legislate’ (2005) 102 Law Society Gazette 15. 
35 European Union Committee, ‘The Criminal Law Competence of the European 
Community: Report with Evidence’ HL (2005-06) 227 [61]. 
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The decision in Commission v. Council (C-176/03) was further considered in 
Commission v. Council (C-440/05).36 Here, the main issue was whether or not the earlier 
ruling applied to EC policy areas other than environmental protection. In case C-440/05, 
which concerned the criminal law relating to ship-source pollution, the Commission 
sought annulment of a Third Pillar Council Framework Decision37 in favour of a First 
Pillar Directive.38 The Commission, supported by the European Parliament, argued that 
the subject matter concerned fell within the Community competence of transport 
policy. The Council was backed by twenty Member States, highlighting the 
predominantly-held viewpoint among the Member States that criminal law fell within 
their national sovereign competencies. The court held that the Framework Decision 
encroached on the competence given to the Community by art 80(2) of the EC Treaty39 
and therefore infringed art 47 of the EU Treaty40 and therefore ‘being indivisible, must 
be annulled in its entirety’.41 
Therefore the Community can enact First Pillar measures in respect of some criminal 
law matters insofar as they impinge on the environment, trade or other core areas of 
Community policy. However, criminal law is not, of itself, a core Community policy 
area, since Community intervention in criminal matters is only permissible on a specific 
legal basis and only then where there is a clear need. 
6.1.2 Treaty on European Union, art 42: the passerelle provision 
Article 42 of the EU Treaty introduces a passerelle (bridge) provision which may also be 
of relevance. It provides that: 
The Council, acting unanimously on the initiative of the Commission or a 
Member State, and after consulting the European Parliament, may decide that 
action in areas referred to in article 29 shall fall under Title IV of the Treaty 
establishing the European Community, and at the same time determine the 
relevant voting conditions relating to it. It shall recommend the Member States 
                                                        
36 Commission v. Council (Case C-440/05) [2008] 1 CMLR 22 (CJEC). 
37 Council Framework Decision (EU) 2005/667/JHA of 12 July 2005 to strengthen the 
criminal law framework for the enforcement of the law against ship-source pollution 
[2005] OJ L255/164. 
38 Council Directive (EC) 2005/35 of 7 September 2005 on ship-source pollution and on 
the introduction of penalties for infringements [2005] OJ L255/11. 
39 To make ‘appropriate provisions’ for sea transport. 
40 That nothing in the Treaty on European Union shall affect the Treaties establishing 
the European Community. 
41 Commission v. Council (Case C-440/05) [2008] 1 CMLR 22 (CJEC) [74]. 
  
190 
to adopt that decision in accordance with their respective constitutional 
requirements.42 
In effect, this provision would move action on police and judicial co-operation in 
criminal matters from Third Pillar Framework Decisions to First Pillar Community 
Regulations or Directives. These would be made under Title IV of the EC Treaty which 
gives the Council the ability to ‘adopt measures…aimed at a high level of security by 
preventing and combating crime within the Union’.43 While cases C-176/03 and C-440/05 
established that there is certainly some criminal competence under the First Pillar, there 
are other areas of police and judicial co-operation which could move under the First 
Pillar via a passerelle decision.  
The passerelle therefore allows the movement of a policy issue from 
intergovernmentalism to the ‘Community method’; that is, from unanimity to 
supranational qualified majority voting, without an Intergovernmental Conference. It 
follows that First Pillar measures in relation to criminal law both potentially weaken the 
positions of a Member State to exercise its veto as well as subjugating jurisdiction for 
interpretation (and enforcement in the event of non-implementation) to the Court of 
Justice. As the House of Lords comments, use of the passerelle would: 
prima facie increase the roles of the European Parliament and the Court. 
[Qualified majority voting] could replace unanimity in the Council. At stake, 
therefore, are national vetoes and national control over certain policing and 
criminal law matters.44 
However, in relation to the veto, it should be noted that the UK has an ‘opt-in’ to 
matters under Title IV EC, such that it can decide (within three months from the 
presentation of a proposal to the Council) whether it ‘wishes to take part in the 
adoption and application of any such proposed measure’.45 The House of Lords 
considers that there is ‘a good argument’46 that this opt-in will survive the passerelle and 
                                                        
42 Treaty on European Union, art 42. 
43 Treaty establishing the European Community, art 61(e). 
44 European Union Committee, ‘The Criminal Law Competence of the European 
Community: Report with Evidence’ HL (2005-06) 227 [12]. 
45 Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties 
Establishing the European Communities and Related Acts (Treaty of Amsterdam) 
[1997] OJ C340/1, Protocol on the position of the UK and Ireland, art 3. 
46 European Union Committee, ‘The Criminal Law Competence of the European 
Community: Report with Evidence’ HL (2005-06) 227 [152]. 
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apply to an enlarged Title IV and, as such, the loss of the national veto within the 
Third Pillar would be of less consequence than it might have been without retention of 
the opt-in. If the voting requirements within the passerelle included an ‘emergency 
brake’ procedure47 (by which a Member State may refer a draft Directive to the Council 
if it considers that it would affect fundamental aspects of its criminal justice system) 
then the UK would be in a very strong position. Peers commented that: 
We could opt out at the beginning or we can opt in and then pull the 
emergency brake, having decided we do not like the way the discussions have 
gone, and then they would go ahead without us, and so you still have two bites 
at opting out.48 
The House of Lords concluded that the proposal to use the passerelle deserves ‘careful 
examination and cautioned against any knee-jerk reaction resulting from media 
coverage’49 urging the UK Government to engage itself ‘in a detailed examination of the 
issues which use of the passerelle raises for the Union and the UK’.50 In common with 
many Member States, the UK was not enthusiastic about the proposal to use the 
passerelle in respect of criminal matters, although it wished to maintain a flexible and 
pragmatic approach: 
[W]e think that the current debate [on the passerelle] is effectively over. We 
should instead focus our energy on delivering practical measures.51 
Somewhat more controversially, Michael Connarty MP, a member of the House of 
Commons EU Scrutiny Committee was reported as saying: 
Once you go off the end of the passerelle, you give away the power to the 
Commission...so it is like a gangplank more than a bridge. Once you plunge off 
it, it is difficult to get back onto.52 
                                                        
47 As outlined in art III-271(3) of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe 
[2004] OJ C310/1; now superseded by art 69A(3) of the Treaty of Lisbon. 
48 European Union Committee, ‘The Criminal Law Competence of the European 
Community: Report with Evidence’ HL (2005-06) 227 [153]. 
49 Ibid, [172]. 
50 Ibid, [180]. 
51 Hansard HC vol 453 col 1256 (30 November 2006). 
52 ——, ‘MEPs in row with UK parliament over 'gangplank' report’ EU Observer (7 
December 2006) <http://euobserver.com/?aid=23045> accessed 25 September 2008. 
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The debate on the passerelle may indeed be over with the overhaul of the pillar 
structure and review of EU competencies proposed within the Treaty of Lisbon. 
6.1.3 The Treaty of Lisbon 
The Treaty of Lisbon53 was intended to come into force on 1 January 2009, subject to 
ratification by all Member States. However, following a referendum on 12 June 2008, 
the Irish electorate voted against its ratification by 53 per cent to 47 per cent54 and, as 
such, the Treaty cannot come into force in its current form. It is, however, anticipated 
that Ireland will call a second referendum in late 2009 after securing concessions on 
particular policies, including abortion, taxation and military neutrality. The Treaty of 
Lisbon therefore remains of relevance. The remainder of this section will consider its 
key provisions which are unlikely to be substantially changed despite the Irish position. 
The Treaty of Lisbon will replace the three pillar structure of the EU. Instead the EU 
will divide its policy areas into three categories: exclusive competence, shared 
competence (with the Member States) and supporting competence (where the EU 
supports, co-ordinates or supplements the actions of the Member States). Within this 
model, the EU will also seek to increase its competence within the areas formerly 
covered by the Second and Third Pillars and more definitively into the realm of the 
criminal law. Article 69B(1) of the Treaty of Lisbon provides that: 
The European Parliament and the Council may, by means of Directives adopted 
in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, establish minimum rules 
concerning the definition of criminal offences and sanctions in the areas of 
particularly serious crime with a cross-border dimension resulting from the 
nature or impact of such offences or from a special need to combat them on a 
common basis.  
These areas of crime are the following: terrorism, trafficking in human beings 
and sexual exploitation of women and children, illicit drug trafficking, illicit 
arms trafficking, money laundering, corruption, counterfeiting of means of 
payment, computer crime and organised crime. 55 (emphasis added) 
This provision is self-evidently relevant to computer misuse. Since computer crime is 
specifically mentioned in the list of criminal activities, the EU is granting itself power to 
                                                        
53 Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing 
the European Community (Treaty of Lisbon) ([2007] OJ C306/1). 
54 <http://www.referendum.ie/home/> accessed 25 September 2008. 
55 Treaty of Lisbon, art 69B(1). 
  
193 
direct Member States to adopt a minimum level of criminalisation and sanction in 
response. The trans-national nature of computer misuse gives it both a cross-border 
dimension and a need to combat it on a common basis. The examples of other 
‘particularly serious’ crimes demonstrates the EU’s perception of the problem of 
computer crime as being potentially as significant as that of trafficking in drugs, arms or 
people. Moreover, art 69B(2) gives the EU power to impose the approximation of 
criminal law where essential to fulfil Union policy via Directives which may establish 
‘minimum rules with regard to the definition of criminal offences and sanctions in the 
area concerned’.56 
The UK opposed the extension of supranational powers in these areas to avoid a 
national referendum in respect of an unpopular political issue. It has also opted out 
from the change from unanimity to qualified majority voting in the area of Justice and 
Home Affairs. This is not the only area in which the UK has opted-out of what it 
considers to be unnecessary European interference in its national affairs. The Schengen 
acquis57 concerned inter alia extradition, mutual criminal assistance, cross-border 
surveillance by police officers and a database including persons wanted for extradition 
and questioning in connection with criminal offences between Member States (the 
‘Schengen Information System’ or ‘SIS’). In theory, this would ease the way to a 
borderless internal super-state. The Schengen acquis was implemented58 via a ‘flexible 
incorporation’59 partly in the First Pillar and partly in the Third Pillar.60 However, the 
                                                        
56 Treaty of Lisbon, art 69B(2). 
57 The 1985 Agreement between the Governments of the States of the Benelux 
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UK did not sign the 1990 Convention implementing the original Schengen agreement 
and reserved an opt-out within the Treaty of Amsterdam.61 Therefore the new EU 
legislative competence within the Schengen policy areas did not automatically extend to 
the UK. The UK may, however, apply to opt-in to legislation made under Schengen in 
whole, or in part. It has done so in relation to some information sharing initiatives62 but 
has not removed border controls. Therefore the UK has allowed European interference 
with sovereignty and territoriality but only to the extent that it considers acceptable. 
The UK’s position on opting-in and out of European initiatives was also demonstrated 
in respect of the Social Chapter63 from which the UK opted-out at Maastricht in 1991 
and back in five years later following a change of government.64 
A key difficulty in extending the European system to criminal law is that there are 
bigger differences between the domestic criminal laws of Member States than between 
their respective civil laws. These differences lie in procedural aspects as well as the 
construction of individual offences. Concerns have been expressed that the Treaty of 
Lisbon gives rise to ‘classic instances of EU “state-building”’65 particularly in relation to 
                                                                                                                                                             
60 Council Decision (EC) 1999/435 concerning the definition of the Schengen acquis for 
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judicial and police co-operation.66 The EU is creating more bodies and agencies (such as 
Europol and Eurojust) to act on a Union-wide basis, with administrative67 and 
operational68 co-operation being centrally organised by the EU. Bunyan commented 
that: 
Overall we are witnessing the extension, and cementing, of the European state 
with potentially weak democratic intervention on policy-making and no 
scrutiny mechanisms in place on implementation and practice.69 
This tension between national and EU competence may also mean that measures taken 
at the EU level may become problematic to enforce, notwithstanding the EU’s urgency 
for co-operation in criminal matters. 
The legislative vehicle intended to incorporate the provisions of the Treaty of Lisbon 
within the UK is the European Union (Amendment) Bill.70 During the House of Lords 
debate on the Bill, Lord Giddens countered the argument that the Treaty of Lisbon 
further erodes national sovereignty by conceptualising ‘sovereignty plus’71 as ‘the 
capability of a country to shape its own future and to influence the wider world around 
it’.72 For Giddens, these influences are ‘much stronger as members of the European 
Union that they would be outside’73 and would enable the UK to counter ‘massive 
dynamic forces which no nation could adequately confront on its own’.74 He dismissed 
the notion of the super-state as dead, considering it to have been replaced by a Europe 
which not only acknowledges but also actively supports national identity and diversity. 
He further argued that the Treaty of Lisbon gives the UK what it desired from Europe: 
openness, flexibility and enlargement.75 Giddens’ notion of ‘sovereignty plus’ is in line 
with earlier arguments put forward by MacCormick who considered that although 
absolute or unitary legal and political sovereignty is absent from the European 
Community, sovereignty has not been lost in the sense that ‘no state or other entity 
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outside the Union has any greater power over member states individually or jointly than 
before’.76 The divided sovereignty of the Member States has been combined within the 
Community to enhance their individual positions; it being preferable in global society 
to exercise power through the EU rather than losing it to the EU and thus moving the 
UK ‘beyond the sovereign state’.77 
6.1.4 Specific initiatives relating to computer misuse 
At its Brussels meeting in 1993, the European Council sought advice on the ‘specific 
measures to be taken into consideration by the Community and the Member States for 
the infrastructures in the sphere of information’.78 The resulting report, generally 
referred to as the Bangemann Report, considered that the exploitation of the new 
technologies required to participate in ‘the new industrial revolution’ would require 
‘partnership between individuals, employers, unions and governments dedicated to 
managing change’.79 This partnership would mean ‘developing a common regulatory 
approach’80 and thus reflected the European policy objectives of flexibility, legal 
certainty, harmonisation and technological neutrality. 
6.1.4.1 Creating a safer information society 
The European Commission produced a report in 2001 entitled ‘Creating a Safer 
Information Society by Improving the Security of Information Infrastructures and 
Combating Computer-Related Crime’.81 This report echoed the economic risks 
associated with computer misuse that were raised in the debates leading to the 
enactment of the Computer Misuse Act 199082 some ten years previously: 
…there is little doubt that these offences constitute a threat to industry 
investment and assets, and to safety and confidence in the information society. 
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Some recent examples of denial-of-service and virus attacks have been reported 
to have caused extensive financial damage.83 
The report further considered that the legal responses to computer crime are 
predominantly effected by use of national criminal laws, although there is little 
consensus between states on the manner in which these criminal laws are implemented: 
In most countries, reactions to computer crime focus on national law (especially 
criminal law), neglecting alternative preventive measures…various national laws 
world-wide show remarkable differences, especially with respect to the criminal 
law provisions on hacking, trade secret protection and illegal content.84 
The Commission went on explicitly to acknowledge that there are potential extra-legal 
means of governance which have a role to play alongside legal regulation, proposing a 
number of non-legislative actions that will be further considered in the next chapter. 
However, that is not to say that national criminal laws are redundant. The nation states 
at the very least remain as the local representatives of the supranational governance 
initiatives. As Hirst and Thompson comment: 
If…mechanisms of international governance and re-regulation are to be 
initiated, then the role of nation states is pivotal.85 
The European Commission continued to set out its guiding principles for national 
criminal laws: 
National substantive criminal laws should be sufficiently comprehensive and 
effective in criminalising serious computer-related abuses and provide for 
dissuasive sanctions, helping to overcome dual criminality problems and 
facilitating international co-operation.86 
In doing so, it recognised that national criminal laws were required in order to protect 
against computer misuse although it stressed that international co-operation was key at 
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the supranational level to facilitate a harmonised approach between Member States. 
However, it recommended that it was necessary: 
…to further approximate substantive criminal law in the area of high-tech 
crime. This will include offences related to hacking and denial-of-service 
attacks.87 
Although this report was not binding on states, its proposals were furthered by the CoE 
Convention on Cybercrime and will be discussed in detail in section 6.2.1 below. These 
proposals also ultimately underpin the amendments to the Computer Misuse Act 1990 
made by the Police and Justice Act 2006 (as examined in section 3.5.1 above). 
6.1.4.2 EU Council Framework Decision on attacks against information systems 
In 2005, the Council of the European Union issued a Framework Decision on attacks 
against information systems.88 As a Framework Decision, it is binding upon the Member 
States as to the result to be achieved, but leaves form and method of implementation to 
each Member State.89 
The Framework Decision identifies the threats arising from attacks against information 
systems as ‘organised crime’ and the ‘potential of terrorist attacks against information 
systems which form part of the critical infrastructure of the Member States’.90 The 
nature of these threats is distinct from the economic concerns raised in the Bangemann 
Report. However, the Framework Decision does reiterate the desire to approximate the 
criminal law in an attempt to transcend jurisdictional difficulties between states in the 
interests of: 
…the greatest possible police and judicial co-operation in the area of criminal 
offences…and to contribute to the fight against organised crime and terrorism.91 
Interestingly, the Framework Decision also implies that there should be a de minimis 
exception to less harmful manifestations of computer misuse by stating that: 
There is a need to avoid over-criminalisation, particularly of minor cases, as well 
as a need to avoid criminalising right-holders and authorised persons.92 
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Therefore, the backdrop against which the Framework Decision is set appears to be 
emphasising the protection of public interests rather than the interests of private 
individuals. This was made explicit in the earlier proposal for the Framework Decision 
which considered the nature of the primary threat was that to communication network 
operators, service providers, e-commerce companies, manufacturing industries, service 
industries, hospitals, public sector organisations and governments themselves before  
acknowledging that there can be ‘direct, serious and damaging effects on individuals as 
well’.93 The Council also drew reference again to the ‘considerable’ economic burden 
associated with such threats.94 
The Framework Decision introduces three main areas in which measures are to be 
taken, concerning illegal access and interference with systems or data. Article 2(1) 
requires Member States to ensure that the ‘intentional access without right to the 
whole or any part of an information system is punishable as a criminal offence, at least 
for cases which are not minor’. The Member States may choose to criminalise this 
conduct ‘only where the offence is committed by infringing a security measure’.95 
Article 3 requires Member States to ensure that: 
…the intentional serious hindering or interruption of the functioning of an 
information system by inputting, transmitting, damaging, deleting, 
deteriorating, suppressing or rendering inaccessible computer data is punishable 
as a criminal offence when committed without right, at least for cases which are 
not minor. 
Finally, article 4 requires Member States to ensure that: 
…the intentional deletion, damaging, deterioration, alteration, suppression or 
rendering inaccessible of computer data on an information system is punishable 
as a criminal offence when committed without right, at least for cases which are 
not minor. 
In the use of the wording ‘at least for cases which are not minor’, each of these 
provisions reflects the de minimis exception referred to in the recitals to the 
Framework Decision. In doing so, the Framework Decision reinforces the use of the 
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criminal law as an instrument which is predominantly concerned with public wrong and 
substantial harm.96 Minor cases involving transient or trifling harm are not mandatory 
candidates for criminalisation. 
The Framework Decision goes on to require criminalisation of aiding, abetting97 or 
attempting98 these offences although it allows each Member State the option of not 
criminalising attempted illegal access to information systems.99 It further stipulates 
penalties of at least between one and three years of imprisonment100 for the system and 
data interference offences, rising to a minimum of between two and five years if the act 
has been committed by a criminal organisation101 or caused serious damages or effected 
essential interests.102 The minimum tariff of two to five years also applies to the illegal 
access offence if a security measure has been infringed in the commission of the 
offence.103  
With regard to jurisdiction, each Member State is directed to establish its jurisdiction 
where the offence has been committed within its territory (in whole or in part),104 by 
one of its nationals,105 or for the benefit of a legal person with its head office within the 
Member State’s territory.106 This includes cases where the offence is committed when 
physically present within the territory regardless of the location of the target 
information system107 or, conversely, where the target system is on its territory 
regardless of the territorial location of the offender.108 
These measures were required to be implemented by 16 March 2007 and were one of 
the driving factors behind the amendments proposed to the Computer Misuse Act 1990 
by the Police and Justice Act 2006 discussed in chapter 3. As a Third Pillar measure, it 
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could potentially be annulled in favour of a corresponding Directive, or legislative 
competence in this area could be transferred to the EC via a passerelle decision, but 
there is currently no EC legislative offering in this area. It is therefore likely that the 
Framework Decision will survive unaffected should the Treaty of Lisbon come into 
force. From the UK perspective, the implementing criminal law provisions are in place. 
The relevant provisions of the Police and Justice Act 2006109 were brought into force in 
Scotland on 1 October 2007110 and in England and Wales on 1 October 2008.111 
6.1.4.3 Current European Commission policy initiatives on cybercrime 
In the wake of the Council Framework Decision on attacks against information 
systems, the European Commission issued a further Communication ‘towards a general 
policy on the fight against cyber crime’.112 Commission Communications contain 
legislative proposals and as such are not binding on Member States. This 
Communication identified a growing sophisticated, internationalised and organised 
element to criminal activity, juxtaposed with a static number of European prosecutions 
on the basis of cross-border law enforcement co-operation.113 It considered that there is 
an ‘urgent need to take action’114 at national, European and international level, although 
the legal response is geared towards enforcement and international co-operation rather 
than the use of particular provisions of criminal law. In particular, the Communication 
conceded that: 
General harmonisation of crime definitions and national penal laws…is not yet 
appropriate due to the variety of types of offences covered by this notion. Since 
effective co-operation between law enforcement authorities often depends on 
having at least partly harmonised crime definitions, it remains a long-term 
objective to continue harmonising Member State’s legislation.115 
This statement illustrates that little practical benefit had been achieved in the preceding 
six years, since harmonisation was also a long-term objective of the 2001 
Communication discussed in section 6.1.4.1 above. The Communication makes a 
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number of extra-legal recommendations which the Commission will take forward, 
assess progress and report to the Council and Parliament. These will be returned to in 
chapter 7. In terms of legal recommendation, the Commission encourages Member 
States and relevant third countries to ratify the Council of Europe Convention on 
Cybercrime which is described as ‘arguably the predominant European and international 
instrument in this field’.116 This Convention will be further discussed in section 6.2.1 
below. 
6.1.5 Conclusion 
By virtue of the UK’s membership of the EU, it is obliged to implement both 
Community Directives made under the First Pillar and Union Framework Decisions 
made under the Third Pillar. In that respect, the route by which European measures are 
implemented is immaterial: the UK must comply. A key distinction, however, lies in the 
extent of the UK’s power during the legislative passage. First Pillar measures are often 
adopted through qualified majority voting, whereas Third Pillar Framework Decisions 
require unanimity between the Member States. In this sense, while both routes involve 
a relaxation of national sovereignty, it could be considered that the national position is 
weaker under the First Pillar than under the Third due to the lack of veto. The 
potential use of the passerelle provision by which matters of police and judicial co-
operation in criminal matters could be transferred from Third to First Pillar could 
therefore be seen as further erosion of the UK’s sovereign power. However, the 
existence of the ‘opt-in’ to Title IV measures could still operate as a limited veto, in 
that the UK could not veto a disagreeable proposal but could still choose not to opt-in 
so that it would not be bound by it. The Treaty of Lisbon would, if in force, 
restructure the competencies of the EU and would further strengthen its criminal 
competence to direct Member States to adopt a minimum level of criminalisation and 
sanction in relation to computer crime.  
However, there is a tension between the opposition to the extension of EU powers into 
traditional areas of national sovereignty and the potential ‘sovereignty plus’ benefits put 
forward by Giddens and MacCormick deriving from membership of the EU, allowing 
Member States to confront international issues more effectively in unity rather than 
individually. This tension may lead to fragmentation between the EU Member States 
and prove to be a significant obstacle to any future EU-led harmonisation initiative.  
It could also be considered that the UK has used its political influence to shape the 
initiatives coming from Europe. The exercise of the UK’s influence at the EU level is 
routine and unexceptional. It remains a significant international player capable of both 
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initiating and blocking proposals at a high level. It has one of only five seats on the UN 
Security Council. The UK has enjoyed some successes in imposing its own agenda on 
the rest of Europe; for instance in the indefinite postponing of the requirement for 
metric units on draft beer, cider, bottled milk and road signs117 and the maintenance of 
dual metric and imperial labelling on other foodstuffs.118 The UK had enacted 
computer misuse legislation in the form of the Computer Misuse Act 1990 long before 
any binding European initiatives were in place. It has long recognised the economic and 
positive social impact of new technology and has been desirous of regulation which it is 
unable to achieve beyond its own borders with its domestic law but can influence via 
the EU, the Council of Europe, the Commonwealth, the G8 or the UN. In essence, the 
UK is capable of moving its strategy of domestic control onto a wider international 
playing field. However, with the exception of the Framework Decision on attacks 
against information systems, there has been little EU legislative activity specifically in 
relation to computer misuse. Indeed, the most recent Commission Communication 
encourages Member States to adopt the CoE Convention on Cybercrime. 
6.2 Council of Europe initiatives 
The Council of Europe (CoE) comprises 47 Member States and, notably, four non-
European ‘observer’ countries: the United States, Canada, Japan and Mexico. It is 
therefore broader in reach than the European Union which comprises 27 Member 
States, all of which are also members of the CoE. Aside from the observer countries, the 
most significant non-EU inclusion in the CoE is the Russian Federation. It can, 
therefore, achieve greater global effect than the EU. It has the ability to include the 
United States and Russia as signatories to its Treaties, although their accession is 
voluntary. Therefore, the European Commission’s Communication encouraging 
ratification of the CoE Convention on Cybercrime would achieve a wider geographic 
implementation than that which could be achieved via the EU alone. The Convention 
also contains a provision that allows the CoE to open it up to a much broader 
membership by invitation to any non-member State which has not participated in the 
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elaboration of the Convention.119 Moreover, given the traditional stance of the EU to 
refrain from interference with domestic criminal law, even in the light of the passerelle 
and the Treaty of Lisbon, then the CoE Convention may prove to be a more politically 
acceptable vehicle for the implementation or harmonisation of criminal law. However, 
CoE Conventions are not statutory acts; they owe their legal existence simply to will of 
those States that may become parties to them, via signature and ratification. It is 
therefore open to CoE Member States to choose not to sign or ratify any particular 
Convention, unlike EU initiatives which are binding on Member States regardless of 
whether they are expressed by EC Directives or Regulations under the First Pillar or 
Council Framework Decisions under the Third Pillar. It follows, then, that CoE 
initiatives are broader in scope than those of the EU, but are softer in terms of 
compellability on the respective Member States. However, given the European 
Commission’s steering of EU Member States towards the CoE Convention on 
Cybercrime and the extent of its geographic reach, it is necessary to examine its 
provisions in greater detail. 
6.2.1 Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime 
Prior to the adoption of the Convention on Cybercrime, the Council of Europe had 
reported on various aspects of computer-related crime120 and issued Recommendations 
relating to both substantive offences121 and procedural law.122 However, such 
Recommendations do not bind Member States and therefore, not unsurprisingly, had 
limited effect. Therefore, in 1997, building on the principles developed in the earlier 
Recommendations, the Council of Europe established a Committee of Experts on 
Crime in Cyberspace (PC-CY) to begin work on drafting a Convention to which the 
largest possible number of Member States would become parties.123 
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The resultant CoE Convention on Cybercrime124 attempts to provide a solution to the 
problems posed by cybercrime by the use of ‘international law, necessitating the 
adoption of adequate international legal instruments’.125 Its principal aims are the 
harmonisation of domestic criminal laws in relation to cybercrime, the provision of 
procedural law for the investigation and prosecution of cybercrime offences and 
establishing effective mechanisms of international co-operation.126 Section 1 of Chapter 
II of the Convention127 sets up four categories of offences: those against the 
confidentiality, integrity and availability of computer data and systems; computer-
related offences (forgery and fraud); content-related offences (child pornography) and 
offences relating to and infringement of copyright and related rights. It also addresses 
inchoate liability in respect of attempts, aiding or abetting and issues of corporate 
liability.  Section 2 of Chapter II128 considers relevant procedural provisions. Section 3129 
addresses jurisdictional issues.  
6.2.1.1 Offences against the confidentiality, integrity and availability of computer data 
and systems 
Article 2 of the Convention requires criminalisation of the intentional access to the 
whole or any part of a computer system without right. Article 3 establishes the offence 
of the interception without right of ‘non-public transmissions of computer data to, 
from or within a computer system, including electromagnetic emissions from a 
computer system carrying such computer data’ made by technical means. Article 4(1) 
prohibits the ‘damaging, deletion, deterioration, alteration or suppression of computer 
data without right’, although parties to the Convention may require that the 
interference with data results in ‘serious harm’.130 Article 5 concerns intentional serious 
hindering without right of the functioning of a computer system by inputting, 
transmitting, damaging, deleting, deteriorating, altering or suppressing computer data. 
These articles were reflected in the EU Council Framework Decision on attacks against 
information systems as discussed in section 6.1.4.2 above. 
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Article 6 introduced the new concept of criminalising articles used in the commission of 
the aforementioned offences which ultimately posed the difficulties in implementation 
for the Police and Justice Act 2006 discussed in section 3.5.4 above: 
Each Party shall…establish as criminal offences under its domestic law, when 
committed intentionally and without right: 
a the production, sale, procurement for use, import, distribution or 
otherwise making available of:  
i a device, including a computer program, designed or adapted 
primarily for the purpose of committing any of the offences 
established in accordance with articles 2 through 5; 
ii a computer password, access code, or similar data by which the 
whole or any part of a computer system is capable of being accessed, 
 with intent that it be used for the purpose of committing any of the 
offences established in articles 2 through 5; and  
b the possession of an item referred to in paragraphs a.i or ii above, with 
intent that it be used for the purpose of committing any of the offences 
established in articles 2 through 5. A Party may require by law that a 
number of such items be possessed before criminal liability attaches.  
As is stands, art 6(1) suffers from the same limitations in respect of ‘dual use’ tools as 
the Police and Justice Act 2006. However, it is interesting to note that the Convention 
deals with this situation explicitly in art 6(2): 
This article shall not be interpreted as imposing criminal liability where the 
production, sale, procurement for use, import, distribution or otherwise making 
available or possession referred to in paragraph 1 of this article is not for the 
purpose of committing an offence established in accordance with articles 2 
through 5 of this Convention, such as for the authorised testing or protection of 
a computer system. 
Article 6(2), then, establishes that tools created for the authorised testing or protection 
of systems, such as penetration test software and network analysis tools are specifically 
excluded from the imposition of criminal liability. The Explanatory Report reconciles 
this by stating that such test tools are produced for legitimate purposes and their use 
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would therefore be considered to be ‘with right’.131 This approach was not explicitly 
taken in the Police and Justice Act 2006.  
6.2.1.2 Computer-related offences 
Article 7 criminalises intentional computer-related forgery and art 8 computer-related 
fraud; that is, manipulation of data or interference with a computer system with the 
fraudulent or dishonest intent of procuring an economic benefit.  While these offences 
may be covered by existing national criminal legislation, the Council of Europe 
specifically included them within the Convention in acknowledgement of the fact that 
‘in many countries certain traditional legal interests are not sufficiently protected 
against new forms of interference and attacks’.132 
6.2.1.3 Content-related offences 
Article 9 concerns the production, distribution, procurement or possession of child 
pornography via computer systems, including ‘realistic’ images representing a minor 
engaged in sexually explicit conduct.  
6.2.1.4 Offences related to infringements of copyright and related rights 
Article 10 criminalises the infringement of copyright and related rights where 
committed ‘wilfully, on a commercial scale and by means of a computer system’. 
6.2.1.5 Adoption of the Convention 
The Convention on Cybercrime was adopted by the Committee of Ministers and 
opened for signature in November 2001. It has been signed by 45 of the members and 
observers and ratified by 23 of them.133 The United States ratified the Convention in 
September 2006 and brought it into force in January 2007. This leaves 22 states who are 
signatories to the Convention without having ratified it: notably this includes the UK. 
However, the Convention has caused little stir within the UK. The All Party Internet 
Group inquiry into revising the Computer Misuse Act 1990 reported that it ‘received 
very few comments on the implications for the CMA of ratifying the Convention on 
Cybercrime, suggesting that this is not widely seen to be a contentious issue’.134 There 
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has also been little Parliamentary time spent on discussing the Convention outside the 
debates leading to the enactment of the Police and Justice Act 2006 which were covered 
in chapter 3. Although most had heard of it, there was limited appreciation the 
Convention among the interview participants. The response of User 4 was typical: 
I can see why Europe is trying to bring everything into line, but until it affects 
me directly, I’m not going to waste too much time finding out what it’s all 
about. I suppose, like most of my colleagues, I’m fairly apathetic. I can’t see 
that it’s that big a deal. 
There is also little concern regarding infringement of individual rights and liberties. The 
government considered that a ‘proper balance between the interests of law enforcement 
and respect for fundamental human rights’ had been achieved in its drafting.135 Despite 
the considerable lapse of time since signature, the UK government ‘fully support[s] the 
Council of Europe Convention’136 and is ‘fully committed’137 to its ratification, stating 
that the Police and Justice Act 2006 reforms will ‘ensure that the Computer Misuse Act 
1990 is fully compliant with the Convention’.138 
The Council of Europe considers the relatively slow adoption and ratification of the 
Convention to be a continued challenge to its desire for international harmonisation 
across both substantive and procedural national criminal laws: 
The challenges [to establishing a framework for international co-operation] 
include: 
o Increasing the number of parties to the Convention and the additional 
Protocol. In particular, States having already signed these treaties should 
speed up the ratification process. 
o Promoting the Convention at a global level…other States should be 
encouraged to seek accession.139 
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However, as Walden comments, the ‘comprehensive nature of the Convention, as well 
as the geographical spread of its signatories, means it is likely to remain the most 
significant legal instrument in the field for the foreseeable future’.140 The CoE has also 
initiated a ‘Project against cybercrime’, partly funded by Microsoft, aiming to have 40 
countries (including eight non-European ones) as ratifying parties to the Convention by 
February 2009.141 It has reported that reforms ‘based on Convention guidelines’ are in 
progress in Argentina, Brazil, Egypt, India, Nigeria, Pakistan and the Philippines.142 This 
demonstrates the expansion of the CoE-style approach beyond its Member States as 
well as the co-operation between public and private bodies inherent in theories of 
governance.143 
6.2.1.6 Additional Protocol criminalising acts of a racist and xenophobic nature 
During the drafting of the Convention, the PC-CY Committee discussed the possibility 
of including other content-related offences than those child pornography offences 
defined in art 9, such as the distribution of racist propaganda through computer 
systems. This notion was supported by several Member States, but was dropped when 
the United States resisted. As a result, the PC-CY Committee recommended drawing 
up an additional Protocol to the Convention as soon as practicable. This approach 
unblocked the path for the United States to sign the Convention while allowing them 
(and others) to choose not to sign the Protocol. The additional Protocol was 
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introduced in January 2003144 and required the criminalisation of various acts in relation 
to racist and xenophobic material, which it defined as: 
…any written material, any image or any other representation of ideas or 
theories, which advocates, promotes or incites hatred, discrimination or 
violence, against any individual or group of individuals, based on race, colour, 
descent or national or ethnic origin, as well as religion if used as a pretext for 
any of these factors.145 
These acts include dissemination of such material through computer systems,146 
threats147 and insults148 motivated by racism and xenophobia and the denial of genocide 
and crimes against humanity.149 It has been signed by 31 of the CoE Member States and 
observers and ratified by 11 of them.150 It came into force following the fifth 
ratification in March 2006. However, unlike the Convention itself, the Protocol has not 
been signed by either the UK or the United States. 
The position of the United States is not surprising, given its refusal to support the 
inclusion of similar provisions in the Convention itself. It considers the Protocol to be 
incompatible with the guarantee to freedom of speech provided by the First 
Amendment to the United States Constitution: 
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech or of 
the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the 
Government for a redress of grievances.151 
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This stance is in line with the Supreme Court decision in Reno v. American Civil 
Liberties Union152 regarding the regulation of materials distributed via the Internet. 
Here the anti-obscenity provisions of the Communications Decency Act153 were struck 
down for violating the freedom of speech provisions of the First Amendment. Justice 
Stevens, in delivering the judgment concluded that: 
As a matter of constitutional tradition, in the absence of evidence to the 
contrary, we presume that governmental regulation of the content of speech is 
more likely to interfere with the free exchange of ideas than to encourage it.154 
However, the United States had no objection to ratifying the child pornography 
provisions within the main Convention. This follows New York v. Ferber155 in which 
the Supreme Court held that the First Amendment right to freedom of speech did not 
prevent states from banning the sale of child pornography. It reasoned that although, 
following Miller v. California,156 pornography can only be banned if it is obscene, 
pornography depicting actual children can be proscribed regardless of obscenity to 
protect the exploitation of children in the production process. Virtual child 
pornography, that is, material produced by using young-looking adults or by digital 
manipulation, was also banned within the Child Pornography Prevention Act 1996.157 
However, in Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition158 the Supreme Court considered that 
the Act banned material that was neither obscene under Miller nor produced by 
exploiting real children under Ferber. It concluded that the prohibitions were 
substantially overbroad, in violation of the First Amendment and therefore 
unconstitutional. 
The US Department of Justice makes its constitutional position on the additional 
Protocol very clear: 
The United States does not believe that the final version of the protocol is 
consistent with its Constitutional guarantees. For that reason, the U.S. has 
informed the Council of Europe that it will not become a Party to the protocol. 
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It is important to note that the protocol is separate from the main Convention. 
That is, a country that signed and ratified the main Convention, but not the 
protocol, would not be bound by the terms of the protocol. Thus, its 
authorities would not be required to assist other countries in investigating 
activity prohibited by the protocol.159 
Therefore, not only will the United States not sign the Protocol but it will not assist 
other countries in investigating activities criminalised by it. This refusal to engage with 
the additional Protocol immediately establishes the US as a potential safe haven for 
race-related computer misuse. For Van Blarcum, this safe haven would be created by 
the visibility of ‘pre-established American sites in Europe and America’s status as an 
attractive home for European sites escaping the restrictions on speech present in 
Europe’.160 
The UK has also made it quite clear that it will not ratify the Protocol. In January 2008, 
Vernon Coaker MP, Under-Secretary of State in the Home Office, stated in a written 
answer to the question of whether the additional Protocol was to be implemented: 
The Government believe that our current law effectively deals with incitement 
to racial hatred, and strikes the right balance between the need to protect 
individuals from violence and hatred and the need to protect freedom of 
expression. We will therefore not ratify the protocol as it does not allow us to 
maintain our criminal threshold for this sort of offence.161 
The UK is therefore using the same argument as the US regarding freedom of 
expression as a determining factor in refusing to ratify the Protocol, although it has a 
different threshold of tolerance for interference with that freedom. For instance, the 
Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008162 expands the meaning of ‘photograph’ in 
relation to the Protection of Children Act 1978 to include images derived from 
photographs or pseudo-photographs as well as electronic data capable of being 
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converted into such an image. This criminalises virtual child pornography in the UK, 
although it is protected in the US via the First Amendment. 
The Public Order Act 1986 criminalised the display of any written material which is 
threatening, abusive or insulting with intent to stir up racial hatred, or which is likely to 
stir up such hatred.163 These offences were extended to religious hatred by the Racial 
and Religious Hatred Act 2006.164 The domestic criminal law therefore seems to cover 
the offences required by articles 3 – 5 of the additional Protocol. Indeed, in relation to 
religious hatred, the domestic offence offers greater protection than that required by 
the Protocol. The Protocol includes religion only if used as a pretext for racial hatred,165 
whereas the Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006 criminalises hatred against persons 
defined by reference to their religious belief (or lack thereof) regardless of race. 
Religious hatred therefore becomes distinct from racial hatred. Although certain 
religious groups such as Sikhs166 and Jews167 have been held to be racial groups for the 
purposes of the Race Relations Act 1976,168 other less ethnically homogenous religious 
groups including Muslims169 and Rastafarians170 have fallen outside its protection. As 
Lord Denning MR commented in Mandla v. Dowell Lee in the Court of Appeal, the 
Race Relations Act 1976 ‘does not include religion or politics or culture’, giving 
examples of Roman Catholics, Communists and hippies as groups who can be 
discriminated for or against ‘as much as you like without being in breach of the law’.171 
Racial hatred or religious hatred is therefore not criminalised per se. To fall within the 
criminal law, the hatred must carry some public disorder connotations. For racial hatred 
offences, it is sufficient that ‘having regard to all the circumstances racial hatred is 
likely to be stirred up’. 172 Religious hatred offences173 require direct intention to stir up 
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religious hatred, mere likelihood being insufficient. The public order element required 
to make out an offence is therefore more pronounced in relation to religious hatred.174 
Section 1(2) of the Terrorism Act 2006 criminalises the publication of statements with 
the intention175 that members of the public are directly or indirectly encouraged or 
otherwise induced to commit, prepare or instigate of acts of terrorism or Convention 
offences.176  This offence does not, however, correspond with the criminalisation of the 
denial, gross minimisation, approval or justification of crimes against humanity as 
required by article 6 of the additional Protocol. Such statements are those of 
glorification or those from which the public could reasonably be expected to infer that 
the glorification is of conduct that ‘should be emulated by them in existing 
circumstances’.177 Therefore statements glorifying genocide, for instance, would be 
unlikely to fall within s 1 of the Terrorism Act 2006, since right-thinking members of 
the public would not reasonably infer that they should emulate genocide as a result. 
The Explanatory Note gives an example of conduct which would fall within the Act: 
[I]f it was reasonable to expect members of the public to infer from a statement 
glorifying the bomb attacks on the London Underground on 7 July 2005 that 
what should be emulated is action causing severe disruption to London’s 
transport network, this will be caught.178 
Therefore, since views on historical events do not generally encourage their repetition, 
they cannot constitute the glorification of terrorism or crimes against humanity. 
The Terrorism Act 2006 also specifically considers the use of the Internet in the 
encouragement of terrorism and the dissemination of terrorist publications.179 Section 3 
                                                        
174 For other national approaches to racist content, see Akdeniz, Y, ‘Governing racist 
content on the Internet: national and international responses’ (2007) 56 University of 
New Brunswick Law Journal 103. 
175 Or recklessness; Terrorism Act 2006, s 1(2)(b)(ii). 
176 Terrorism Act 2006, Sch 1. These offences are categorised as explosives offences, 
biological weapons, offences against internationally protected persons, hostage-taking, 
hijacking or other offences against aircraft, offences involving nuclear material, 
chemical or nuclear weapons, directing terrorist organisations, offences related to 
terrorist funds and offences under the Aviation and Maritime Security Act 1990. 
Inchoate liability is included. They are not to be confused with infringements of the 
European Convention on Human Rights. 
177 Terrorism Act 2006, s 1(3). 
178 Terrorism Act 2006, Explanatory Note [24]. 
179 Terrorism Act 2006, s 2. 
  
215 
of the Act allows the police to issue a summary ‘notice and take-down’ advice to 
‘anyone involved in the provision or use of electronic services’180 used in connection 
with such encouragement or dissemination activities. Service of the notice does not 
require the authority of a court; in theory such a notice may be initiated by any 
constable. In practice, it will be initiated by a counter-terrorist officer and should be 
authorised by a police officer of the rank of superintendent or above. It is also 
recognised that take-down notices will only be used if the offending material is not 
removed voluntarily. The Home Office guidance illustrates that this could include 
content providers or aggregators, hosting ISPs, webmasters, forum moderators and 
bulletin board hosts. The advice is not binding on the service provider. However, if the 
provider ignores the advice, then they will be deemed to have endorsed the offending 
content and therefore, if subsequently prosecuted under sections 1 or 2, will be unable 
to avail themselves of the statutory defences.181 The advice cannot be served on ISPs 
who act as ‘mere conduit’: that is, an ISP who does no more than provide network 
access or facilitate the transmission of information.182 However, concerns have been 
expressed that the framework established in the Terrorism Act 2006 will ‘have an 
inhibiting effect on legitimate freedom of expression and will therefore lead to 
disproportionate interferences with free speech’.183 Such provisions in relation to 
proscribed content are of potentially broader application than terrorism. The idea of 
‘notice and take-down’ is consistent with the framework established by the EC e-
commerce Directive,184 which requires that: 
…the provider of an information society service, consisting of the storage of 
information, upon obtaining actual knowledge or awareness of illegal activities 
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has to act expeditiously to remove or to disable access to the information 
concerned.185 
However, this more general procedure is more generally encountered in terms of private 
regulation rather than via police intervention in relation to specified content. 
The additional Protocol illustrates the difficulties in harmonisation initiatives where 
there are fundamental constitutional barriers to adoption or pre-existing domestic 
legislation which goes beyond that required. Both these situations can be considered in 
terms of the State giving primacy to its sovereign affairs rather than acceding to an 
international agreement that it considers to be incompatible or unnecessary. As Whine 
comments, in relation to the issue of online hate content ‘future success depends on the 
determination of governments themselves’.186 
6.2.1.7 Criticisms of the Convention 
Although the Convention is undoubtedly legally significant, it has been criticised for a 
variety of reasons, particularly in the US. The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) 
considered that it was drafted ‘in a closed and secretive manner’187 and that it is lacking 
in protection for privacy and civil liberties. However, for Marler, there is ‘no support 
for the argument that the Convention directly violates the right to privacy’188 since the 
Convention specifically addresses human rights and privacy, concluding that: 
The right to privacy is a fundamental right. Human rights must be accorded the 
highest respect, but the potential threat to them is not definite enough to 
continue allowing cyber-criminals to violate the innocence of children, or to 
steal money from our businesses, government, and taxpayers.189 
In response to the mutual assistance provisions, the ACLU stated that: 
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Ratification of the Council of Europe’s Cybercrime Convention will put the 
United States in the morally repugnant position of supporting the actions of 
politically corrupt regimes.190 
It cited Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Romania as particular problematic examples before 
concluding that ratification would require the United States to ‘use extraordinary 
powers to do the dirty work of other nations’.191 On the contrary, prior to its opening 
for signature, the independent EU advisory body on data protection and privacy had 
stressed that the Convention should pay ‘particular attention to the protection of 
fundamental rights and freedoms, especially the right to privacy and personal data 
protection’.192 Concerns have also been expressed by communications service providers 
over the requirements imposed upon them to assist law enforcement agencies. As 
Downing comments: 
Interception of communications generally is regarded as an intrusive 
investigative technique. Unrestricted interception can constitute a grave privacy 
violation as it allows access to the most private communications and has the 
potential to inhibit freedom of speech and association.193  
In terms of enforcement, the Convention does not go so far as to allow investigators to 
conduct enquiries in a foreign state; it preserves the exclusive national jurisdictions of 
the investigation authorities within Member States, introducing ‘procedural measures, 
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but only at national level and to enable States to respond to the requests for mutual 
assistance that will continue to be submitted’.194 
Broad implementation of the Convention may also be time-consuming. As Brenner and 
Clark comment, since it incorporates substantive and procedural law that may not be 
routine in some Member States then: 
…it means implementing the Convention will be a complicated process for 
many countries, one that will take time. Consequently, even if the Convention 
proves to be a viable means of improving law enforcement’s ability to react to 
transnational cybercrime, we are unlikely to see any marked improvement in the 
near future.195 
This view is echoed by Flanagan who further considers delay resulting from the 
prospect of constitutional difficulties, the propensity of individual legislatures to ‘do 
things their own way’ and the ‘workings of special interest groups to ensure their input 
into national implementations all around the world’.196 
Lewis197 criticises the effectiveness of the Convention (in common with all international 
initiatives) on a number of grounds. He considers that there is a lack of incentive for 
many countries to participate, particularly in those developing countries where 
computer crime is not yet a significant concern. He further argues that there will be 
problems with effectiveness even where countries do participate, citing a list of 
obstacles including the speed at which new technologies are developed, differences in 
certain substantive values between States, different standards for conviction, the 
imposition of different punishments upon conviction, the failure of many countries to 
commit adequate resources to fighting computer crime and the lack of any viable 
international body to coordinate national agencies and enforce international agreement. 
However, the International Criminal Police Organisation (INTERPOL), which exists to 
facilitate cross-border police co-operation between 186 member countries, does collect, 
store, analyse and share information on electronic crime. It has also established regional 
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working parties and developed a training and operational standard initiative to provide 
enhanced investigative support to its members.198 Lewis argues that opposition from 
civil liberties groups (such as the ACLU) to increased government power might also 
hinder progress. 
Keyser raises a potential economic drawback in relation to the costs to ISPs and other 
related businesses of retaining and preserving data in case they are called upon for 
assistance by an investigating agency. He argues that associated compliance costs will be 
passed on to consumers via increased subscription and service costs, concluding that: 
…it is ultimately the consumer that will need to weigh the importance of 
policing cybercrime with the increased cost associated with Internet access 
when deciding whether to support the Convention.199 
Weber200 also highlights the potential flaws within the Convention, arguing that it will 
fail without universal participation and will take ‘years’ to ratify. Lack of worldwide 
participation could lead to safe havens beyond the Convention’s reach, meaning that 
states will still need to take unilateral action against individuals in countries that fail to 
join, ratify, implement or enforce the treaty. For Goldsmith, such unilateral assertions 
of power might encourage accession to the Convention and facilitate global adoption.201 
Weber proposes an alternative in the form of a model criminal code rather than ‘the 
widespread adoption of a treaty codifying the current law of the hegemony’.202 This 
model code, she argues, would be more easily adapted in the light of developing 
technologies and would also enable states to maintain consistency between their 
national laws and the model code. However, such a code would still be slow to create, 
would be likely to overlap considerably with the Convention and would still require 
mechanisms to facilitate cross-border investigation. 
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6.2.2 Conclusion 
The CoE Convention on Cybercrime is perhaps the most complete international 
legislative instrument in the area of computer misuse in effect at present. It is capable 
of reaching significantly more states that any EU initiative could; notably the United 
States and Russia. The Convention is legally binding; but, crucially, only upon those 
Member States which sign and subsequently ratify it. It does not therefore represent a 
mandatory minimum framework of criminal law required of each of its Member States. 
Moreover, where politically-sensitive rights are concerned, there is less likelihood of 
adoption by states that will be reluctant to allow a harmonised CoE view to be imposed 
to the detriment of their national sovereignty. A prime example of this is found in the 
refusal of the United States to sign the additional Protocol on racist and xenophobic 
acts on a fundamental constitutional basis and that of the UK on the basis that current 
domestic law is more than adequate to strike an appropriate balance between freedom 
of expression and protection from hatred. Concerns have been expressed about the 
Convention: from its impact on the right to expression and the time and cost that it 
could take to implement to the adequacy of investigative resources and the difficulties 
inherent in cross-border investigation. These difficulties are particularly striking where 
(as is the case with the United States and the additional Protocol) one state will refuse 
to co-operate in the investigation of an offence which it has not implemented within its 
own domestic legislation. 
6.3 Commonwealth initiatives 
The Commonwealth is an association of 53 independent states203 which developed out 
of the British Empire. Most of its Member States are former British colonies. It provides 
an international forum for both developed and developing nations to seek agreement on 
particular matters by consensus. Unlike the Council of Europe, its reach extends into 
many African, Caribbean and South Pacific states. The Commonwealth issued a 
Computer and Computer-related Crimes Bill which was recommended for endorsement 
by Law Ministers in October 2002.204 This Bill was developed on the basis of the draft 
CoE Convention on Cybercrime and aimed to: 
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…protect the integrity of computer systems and the confidentiality, integrity 
and availability of data, prevent abuse of such systems and facilitate the 
gathering and use of electronic evidence.205 
Its provisions are focused at computer integrity offences: illegal access,206 interfering 
with data207 or computer systems208 and illegal interception of data.209 It also proposes 
criminalising the production or possession (with requisite intent) of devices for the use 
of committing a computer integrity offence.210 Its only content offence is restricted to 
child pornography.211 In common with the CoE Convention, the Commonwealth model 
contains mutual assistance recommendations. These recommendations amend the 
Harare Scheme on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters to include the preservation 
of stored computer data to assist in a criminal investigation.212 
As Walden comments, computer misuse ‘may not figure high on the reform agenda of 
developing nations’.213 However, the similarities between the Commonwealth model 
and the CoE Convention could smooth the way to broader harmonisation beyond that 
within the CoE’s immediate reach, although, as Bourne points out, the mutual 
assistance approach is voluntary and lacks the binding force of a treaty.214 Moreover, 
adoption of a model law does not necessarily mean that every Member State is bound 
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to reproduce it without amendment. Its aim is to reduce the effort for drafters, 
particularly in small states, reinforcing ‘a world of common law in which precedents 
from one country’s court are quoted in another’s’.215 Therefore, Commonwealth states 
are left to enjoy a non-binding head-start on drafting a domestic criminal law that is 
broadly compatible with the CoE Convention. That is not to say that the developed 
world does not have an interest in good enforcement elsewhere: for example, Advance 
Fee Fraud, which involves requests to help move large sums of money with the promise 
of a substantial share of the cash in return, originates predominantly in Nigeria and was 
estimated to have caused losses of around US$4.3 billion in 2007.216 
Therefore, the Commonwealth offers the opportunity for a ‘CoE Convention style’ 
model criminal law to be implemented in a largely different set of both developed and 
developing states. However, the Commonwealth model criminal law is merely 
recommended for adoption by Law Ministers. While it might prove to be convenient 
for the legislative drafters in developing countries, it is also open to each Member State 
to adapt the law to suit their own view (and hence preserve their national sovereignty) 
or indeed to choose not to implement it at all. Moreover, the Commonwealth mutual 
assistance provisions within the Harare Scheme are voluntary and therefore without 
binding force. 
6.4 United Nations initiatives  
The United Nations (UN) is an international body comprising virtually all 
internationally-recognised independent states: 192 Member States in total.217 It has 
broad purposes in the arena of international relations; the most relevant purpose in 
relation to computer misuse is to be ‘a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations’.218 
Like the EU and the CoE, the UN has the capability to bind Member States by Treaty 
and could offer an almost-global reach to the approximation of law.  
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The UN General Assembly issued an endorsement of a general resolution on computer-
related crimes219 from the Eighth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime 
and the Treatment of Offenders as early as 1990.220 In 1994, the UN published a manual 
on the prevention and control of computer-related crime221 which identified a ‘need for 
global action’222 in the areas of substantive223 and procedural law,224 data security as a 
preventative measure225 and international co-operation.226 In particular, it recommended 
criminalisation of alteration of computer data or computer programs without right; 
computer espionage; unauthorised use of a computer and unauthorised use of a 
protected computer program (that is, use of an unauthorised copy of a computer 
program protected by law).227 It also suggested that Member States consider 
criminalisation of misuse such as trafficking in wrongfully obtained computer 
passwords and other information about means of obtaining unauthorised access to 
computer systems, and the distribution or viruses or similar programs. It also considered 
that ‘special attention should be given to the use of criminal norms that penalise 
recklessness or the creation of dangerous risks and to practical problems of 
enforcement’.228 This approach is again broadly similar to the direction taken by the 
CoE Convention.  
In 2001, the General Assembly adopted a second resolution on ‘Combating the criminal 
misuse of information technologies’.229 This resolution made a series of very general 
recommendations concerning the elimination of safe havens, co-operation between 
States in enforcement, investigation and prosecution and adequate training of law 
enforcement personnel before inviting States to takes its measures into account in their 
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efforts to deal with the issues. Such resolutions are, as the word ‘invites’ suggests, 
simply recommendations and consequently have no binding effect on Member States. 
At the Eleventh UN Congress on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice in 2005, there 
was some discussion surrounding the creation of a UN Convention on Cybercrime, 
building on the CoE Convention, while attempting to deal with some of its deficiencies 
‘regarding the effective protection of human rights, the protection of customer privacy 
and the high cost of co-operating with law enforcement investigators’.230 However, in a 
later press-release, the Congress concluded that: 
While there was a wide consensus on the need for a combined approach, and 
better mechanisms of international co-operation, participants felt that a United 
Nations Convention on Cybercrime would be premature at this stage, and it 
was more critical to provide technical assistance to Member States, in order to 
provide a level playing field.231 
The UN’s focus on technical assistance is complementary to the CoE’s Project Against 
Cybercrime which is focused on facilitating accession and implementation of its 
Convention or the additional Protocol rather than instilling technical capability.232 The 
UN has not yet resurrected the notion of its own cybercrime Convention. 
The United Nations has the broadest reach of the intergovernmental bodies discussed 
in this chapter, covering virtually all recognised states. It has adopted broad resolutions 
in the areas of computer crime; these are recommendations and compel no action on 
the part of Member States. Legislative action in the form of a UN Cybercrime 
Convention to build and improve upon the CoE offering is still considered premature. 
The UN is instead focussing on providing technical (rather than legal) assistance to 
Member States thereby harmonising technical capability rather than legal regulation.  
This approach of providing technical assistance is similar to the that adopted by the UN 
in relation to terrorism. Following the attacks on the US of 11 September 2001, the UN 
introduced a two-fold mechanism to facilitate global adoption of effective laws against 
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the financing of terrorist activity.233 The problem that the UN faced was that states 
such as Yemen, for example, were disinclined to take action since such action was 
inconvenient, not a national priority and difficult to implement for lack of technical 
expertise. The UN therefore established the Counter Terrorism Committee to which 
all states were called upon to report on the steps taken to implement its proposals 
(many of which required legislative action). As well as acting as a focal point for the 
UN efforts, this Committee also facilitates the provision of ‘assistance of appropriate 
expertise’234 to states in furtherance of the objectives set out in the Resolution. 
Therefore, the UN takes a role of co-ordination and assistance rather than direct 
coercion. However, this arrangement was only brought into being as a result of the 
political impetus following 11 September 2001. It is therefore reasonable to assume that 
that a similar co-ordinated international approach to computer misuse would require an 
event of similar gravity to precipitate it. However, the conceptual idea of co-ordinated 
international technical assistance remains at least theoretically attractive. The idea of 
technical assistance as a extra-legal means of governance will be further explored in 
section 7.4 below. 
6.5 Group of Eight initiatives 
The Group of Eight (G8) is an international forum for the governments of the leading 
industrial nations: the UK, the United States, Canada, France, Germany, Russia, Italy 
and Japan. Although it is an informal assembly by comparison to the Council of Europe 
and the European Union, it undertakes policy research which culminates in an annual 
summit meeting attended by the heads of government of each of the G8 states. The 
European Commission is also represented at the G8 summit. By virtue of its 
membership, the G8 is influential in the formation of international policy in areas as 
diverse as health, economic and social development, energy, environment, foreign 
affairs, terrorism and justice and law enforcement.  
After the 1995 Summit in Halifax, Nova Scotia, a group of experts was brought together 
to look for better ways to fight international crime. This group (which became known 
as the ‘Lyon Group’) produced forty recommendations aimed at increasing the 
efficiency of collective government responses to organised crime.235 These 
recommendations were endorsed at the G8 Lyon Summit and emphasised the 
                                                        
233 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373 (28 September 2001). 
234 Ibid, art 6. 
235 These were updated in May 2002 as the G8 Recommendations on Transnational 
Crime <http://canada/justice.gc.ca/en/news/g8/doc1.html> accessed 25 September 2008. 
  
226 
importance of a co-ordinated response to high-tech crime. As a consequence of these 
recommendations the Lyon Group’s ‘High-Tech Crime Subgroup’ was established. 
At the Denver Summit in June 1997, the G8 issued a Communiqué stating that its areas 
of concern included the ‘investigation, prosecution, and punishment of high-tech 
criminals, such as those tampering with computer and telecommunications technology, 
across national borders’ and a ‘system to provide all governments the technical and legal 
capabilities to respond to high- tech crimes, regardless of where the criminals may be 
located’.236 An accompanying Foreign Ministers’ Report considered that the response to 
computer crime required more than simply legal regulation: 
The significant growth in computer and telecommunications technologies 
brings with it new challenges: global networks require new legal and technical 
mechanisms that allow for a timely and effective international law enforcement 
response to computer-related crimes.237 (emphasis added) 
In December 1998, the G8 Justice and Interior Ministers issued a further Communiqué 
‘to meet the challenges of the information age’238 in relation to high-tech crime. In 
doing so they considered three ‘distinct components’ of a common approach to the 
‘unique borderless nature of global networks’. The first component was that the 
domestic criminal law should ensure appropriate criminalisation of computer misuse 
and facilitate the collection and preservation of computer evidence, backed up by 
sufficient technically-conversant policing resources. This was followed by the proposal 
that there should be a ‘new level’ of international co-operation consistent with the 
‘principles of sovereignty and the protection of human rights, freedoms and privacy’. 
The final observation was that there should be an ‘unprecedented’ level of co-operation 
between government and industry to develop secure systems which should be 
accompanied by best computer and personnel security practices. 239 This approach was 
                                                        
236 G8, ‘Denver Summit of the Eight: Communiqué’ (22 June 1997) [40] 
<http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/summit/1997denver/g8final.htm> accessed 25 September 
2008. 
237 G8, ‘Denver Summit of the Eight: Foreign Ministers’ Progress Report’ (21 June 1997) 
[25] <http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/summit/1997denver/formin.htm> accessed 25 
September 2008. 
238 G8, ‘Meeting of Justice and Interior Ministers of the Eight: Communiqué’ (10 
December 1997) 
<http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/g82004/97Communique.pdf> 3 accessed 25 
September 2008. 
239 Ibid, 2, 3. 
  
227 
to be underpinned by ten principles and a ten point Action Plan. Most of the principles 
concern international co-operation and policing. In relation to computer misuse, the 
most pertinent principles are the first and fourth. The first principle requires that there 
must be no safe havens for those who ‘abuse information technologies’. The fourth 
deals with substantive criminal offences: 
IV. Legal systems must protect the confidentiality, integrity and availability 
of data and systems from unauthorised impairment and ensure that 
serious abuse is penalised.240 
This requirement to legislate in the areas of data confidentiality, integrity and 
availability is supported by the third point of the Action Plan directing Member States 
to review their domestic legal systems to ensure that such abuses are ‘appropriately’ 
criminalised.241 The networked response is reinforced by point seven of the Action Plan: 
7. Work jointly with industry to ensure that new technologies facilitate 
our effort to combat high-tech crime by preserving and collecting 
critical evidence.242 
On the face of it, this point could be taken simply to require development of secure 
systems. However, taken in conjunction with the ninth principle, which requires 
systems to ‘facilitate the tracing of criminals and the collection of evidence’, it could be 
considered to imply, as Walden comments: 
…law enforcement involvement in the development of new technologies and 
the standards upon which they operate…meddling with existing…private sector 
processes.243 
In essence, the G8 principles and Action Plan strengthen the interplay between the 
criminal law and technology in the response to computer misuse. Regulation through 
technology is considered further in section 7.4 below. 
At its 2000 summit in Japan, the G8 issued the Okinawa Charter on the Global 
Information Society244 which considered that computer misuse issues ‘such as hacking 
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and viruses…require effective policy responses’ developed by engaging ‘industry and 
other stakeholders’ as well as by implementing ‘effective measures, as set out in the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Guidelines for 
Security of Information Systems’.245 The dialogue between the public and private 
sectors had been initiated prior to the summit246 which produced a set of guiding 
principles to be taken into account when developing responses to computer misuse: 
1. ensuring protection of individual freedoms and private life  
2. preserving governments’ ability to fight high-tech crime  
3. facilitating appropriate training for all involved  
4. defining a clear and transparent framework for addressing cybercriminality  
5. ensuring free and fair economic activities, the sound development of 
industry, and supporting effective industry-initiated voluntary codes of 
conduct and standards  
6. assessing effectiveness and consequences.247 
The G8 Justice and Interior Ministers again considered computer misuse as part of its 
2002 ‘Recommendations on Transnational Crime’ which was an update to the Lyon 
Group’s forty recommendations.248 The section covering ‘high-tech and computer-
related crimes’249 reinforces the view that computer misuse should be ‘adequately 
criminalised’.250 It also directs states to be ‘guided’ by earlier G8 policies as well as the 
CoE Convention on Cybercrime in reviewing its national criminal law.251 The G8 
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nations also stated their intention to become parties to the Convention and urged other 
states to do so if entitled or, if not, to approximate the measures called for in the 
Convention within their own legal frameworks.252 In practical terms, this meant that 
Russia intended to become a party to the Convention, since the other seven states had 
already done so on the date that it opened for signature. Six years later,253 Russia has 
still neither signed nor ratified the Convention. The Recommendations further stress 
the use of extra-legal as well as legal management of the problem such as co-operating 
with private industry to ensure systems security and to develop contingency plans in the 
event that those systems are attacked.254 This style of arrangement was considered in 
section 5.9 above in relation to civil contingency plans and the critical national 
infrastructure. Unlike the UN position, the G8 Recommendations make no specific 
mention of technical assistance. The Council of Europe is also aiming to facilitate close 
co-operation between the G8 High-Tech Crime Subgroup and the network of contact 
points established by the states which are parties to the Convention.255 
The G8 has blurred the distinction between law and technology (and the public and 
private domain) as tiers of governance. While its Action Plan is mostly concerned with 
international co-operation and policing, it does recommend that there is a collaborative 
effort between state and industry to ensure that new technologies are ‘policeable’: that 
is, that they facilitate the investigation of computer misuse via the collection and 
preservation of robust evidence. The role of technology as an extra-legal tier of 
governance in its own right will be considered in section 7.4 below. Moreover, the G8 
stresses the involvement of industry in the development of secure systems and 
participation and co-operation in civil contingency planning. The G8 Action Plan is not 
binding upon its Members. Instead, it follows the approach of the European 
Commission in encouraging G8 Members to ratify the CoE Convention, all of which 
(with the notable exception of Russia) have done so. This highlights the inherent 
problem with non-binding legal instruments: states cannot be compelled to sign or 
ratify. 
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6.6 Computer misuse and legal governance 
The previous chapter introduced the idea of governance as a means of controlling 
complex systems and considered the limitations of the application of domestic criminal 
law to computer misuse in the light of governance theory. Governance encompasses 
both public and private institutions and practices. The potential tiers of legal 
governance in relation to computer misuse examined by this chapter remain within the 
public sphere, recommending or requiring legislative responses. Extra-legal responses 
within the private domain will be considered in the next chapter. However, this chapter 
has broadened the scope beyond the domestic criminal law to encompass initiatives 
beyond the boundaries of the nation state. 
These initiatives lie on a continuum of compellability from those which must be 
implemented by the UK to those which offer broad guidance and suggested steps. The 
European Union measures lie at the hard end of the scale, through to less binding 
offerings from the Commonwealth, UN and G8 via the CoE Convention on Cybercrime 
which is binding on states which choose to ratify it. 
There is a role for legal initiatives beyond the domestic criminal law in the control of 
computer misuse. However, these initiatives are politically charged since they inevitably 
come, to some extent, at the expense of national sovereignty. This political sensitivity is 
particularly evident in initiatives which impinge on domestic criminal law. Where states 
have similar national values then legal harmonisation is more likely to succeed: where 
there are fundamental conflicts or where computer misuse is not a major national 
concern then it is not. In terms of the impact of initiatives beyond the domestic 
criminal law on the individual, the more remote the instigating organisation, then the 
less is its individual impact. Even where there is an impact on the individual, it is 
achieved indirectly via intergovernmental policy networks rather then directly via the 
domestic criminal law or the forms of extra-legal governance which will be introduced 
in the next chapter. If a European initiative is implemented via a Directive under the 
First Pillar or a Framework Decision under the Third Pillar, it will be binding on 
governments, not individuals. States become obliged to address the agenda; yet, the 
consequences of non-compliance or defective implementation do not generally offer 
protection to the individual. Framework Decisions do not give rise to direct effect256 
although the Court of Justice has held that the principle of indirect effect applies.257 
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For Directives, individuals are left to rely upon direct effect258 (against the state259 or an 
emanation of the state),260 the indirect effect of a presumption of compliance in 
interpretation of any domestic law,261 or a claim in state liability following defective or 
non-implementation.262 This situation therefore offers less protection to the individual 
than the domestic law. 
Attempts at legal harmonisation have value in the promotion of broadly-shared good 
principles and the need for cross-border networked co-operation in response to 
networked risk. Whine’s assertion that ‘future success depends on the determination of 
governments themselves’263 could therefore be applied to all forms of international legal 
response not just that to online hatred or Holocaust denial. The uniform adoption of a 
global minimum framework of criminal laws within each nation state with clearly 
defined cross-border co-operation, investigation and assistance provisions is a panacea. 
Absent this, the current piecemeal adoption of the CoE Convention (and the 
encouragement of other organisations for its members to adopt it) represents at least 
some international governance. The Convention is however hardly a nimble instrument 
which must lead to a consideration of whether extra-legal and private mechanisms also 
have a role to play within a governance framework. Not only may such mechanisms be 
less threatening to national sovereignty but they are also consistent with the withdrawal 
of direct state intervention in the management of complex, networked and global risk. 
Unlike intergovernmental approaches, the extra-legal and private initiatives are capable 
of addressing individuals directly rather than indirectly. Many of the intergovernmental 
organisations referred to in this chapter have made recommendations and observations 
concerning extra-legal responses. The next chapter will therefore broaden the 
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discussion further beyond legal governance to consider these extra-legal responses to 
computer misuse. 
  
7 
The extra-legal governance of computer misuse 
 
In my experience, only third-rate intelligence is sent to Legislatures to make laws, 
because the first-rate article will not leave important private interests to go 
unwatched… 
Mark Twain (1835-1910) 
 
The previous chapter considered the broad role of the law in the governance of 
computer misuse. It established that there is a role for legal harmonisation initiatives 
beyond the domestic criminal law in the control of computer misuse and that these 
prove to be a useful adjunct to national law as part of an overall governance network. 
However, such intergovernmental initiatives recognise themselves that they still do not 
provide a complete means of addressing the issues. Indeed many such initiatives come 
with recommendations or observations concerning extra-legal action as a 
complementary part of their response. This chapter will therefore broaden the 
discussion further from legal governance to explore potential extra-legal approaches. It 
will consider the emergence of networks of private sector regulation and the extent to 
which these private networks interact with the state. 
In order to perform a meaningful survey of the extra-legal proposals, it is first necessary 
to attempt to identify a framework (or frameworks) within which each individual 
proposal can be located.   
7.1 Frameworks for extra-legal governance 
This section will consider the whole range of regulatory initiatives from two alternative 
perspectives. The first perspective will considers these initiatives in terms of the balance 
between public and private interests in relation to each. The second perspective will 
involve the extrapolation of a broad typology of extra-legal proposals from the 
initiatives proposed by the various intergovernmental organisations and the activities 
they are seeking to impact upon. 
7.1.1 A public/private framework of governance 
‘Digital realism’ advocates that technology naturally becomes self-regulating: 
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[The] digital realism of cybercrime is such that the more a behaviour is 
mediated by new technology, the more it can be governed by that same 
technology.1 
This draws upon the work of Lessig2 and Greenleaf.3 Lessig draws a distinction between 
‘East Coast Code’ and ‘West Coast Code’.4 East Coast Code refers to the legislation 
that is enacted by the US Congress.5 This legislative code uses legislative commands to 
control behaviour. West Coast Code is a technical code. It is a sequence of statements 
written in a human-readable computer programming language; the instructions 
embedded within the software and hardware that makes computer technology work.6 
Lessig argues (in what he refers to as the ‘New Chicago School’)7 that ‘code is law’. 
West Coast Code becomes a newly salient regulator beyond the traditional lawyer’s 
scope of laws, regulations and norms. The coded instructions within the technology 
also serve to regulate that technology.8 However, code is not, in itself, the ultimate 
regulator of technology. In other words, ‘traditional’ law retains the capability to 
influence the environment which produces the technical code, but also social norms of 
behaviour in relation to that technology and the economic incentives and disincentives 
which help to shape both behaviour and the commercial development and adoption of 
new technology. 
Lessig therefore proposes a framework within which four ‘modalities of regulation’ 
apply to the regulation of behaviour in cyberspace. These are law, social norms, market 
or economic forces and (West Coast) code.9 These modalities equally applicable to the 
regulation of computer misuse as they are to the more general arena of cyberspace and 
are naturally interrelated. 
                                                        
1 Wall, DS, Cybercrime: The Transformation of Crime in the Digital Age (Polity Press, 
Cambridge, 2007) 3-4. 
2 Lessig, L, Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace (Basic Books, New York, 1999). 
3 Greenleaf, G, ‘An endnote on regulating cyberspace: architecture vs. law?’ (1998) 21 
University of New South Wales Law Journal 52. 
4 Lessig, L, Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace (Basic Books, New York, 1999) 53-4. 
5 In Washington DC on the east coast of the United States; hence ‘East Coast Code’. 
6 The heart of the US software industry is located on the west coast in Silicon Valley 
and Redmond (although it also a key industry in the Boston area). 
7 Lessig, L, ‘The New Chicago School’ (1998) 27 Journal of Legal Studies 661. 
8 Lessig, L, Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace (Basic Books, New York, 1999) 6. 
9 Ibid, 88. 
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The relationship between law and social norms is of fundamental importance. Organic 
development of the law is important if the equilibrium between it and society is to be 
maintained. The law must lead in some instances. Examples include the Abortion Act 
1967 which legalised abortion by registered medical practitioners and the Sexual 
Offences Act 1967 which partially decriminalised homosexuality. Equally the law can 
also follow prevailing social opinion. For instance, as gender reassignment has become 
more socially acceptable, the legal status of persons who have undergone or intend to 
undergo gender reassignment has shifted from virtual non-recognition to full 
recognition via the Gender Recognition Act 2004.10 However, the relationship is, and 
should be, symbiotic, with society developing in response to the law and the law being 
both flexible and reflexive to take account of social developments. 
Law can impose or remove free market constraints on certain behaviours by way of 
taxes and subsidies. For instance, the ownership of vehicles which emit higher levels of 
carbon dioxide is financially penalised by increased levels of taxation. A Treasury 
minister commented that changes to rates of vehicle excise duty are primarily aimed at 
changing motorists’ behaviour: 
Owners of those cars will have to make decisions about whether they want to 
continue in ownership of those cars or whether they want to trade down.11 
Conversely, use of public transport is encouraged by subsidisation of bus companies.12 
In relation to technology, economic forces empower the law to intervene as an 
instrument of regulation. As Lessig comments: 
When software was the product of hackers and individuals located outside of 
any institution of effective control, East Coast Code could do little to control 
West Coast Code. But as code has become the product of companies, then code 
                                                        
10 Council Directive (EC) 76/207/EEC of 9 February 1976 on the implementation of the 
principle of equal treatment for men and women as regards access to employment, 
vocational training and promotion, and working conditions [1976] OJ L39/40; P v. S and 
Cornwall County Council (Case C-13/94) [1996] ECR I-2143 (CJEC); Chessington 
World of Adventures v. Reed [1997] IRLR 556 (EAT); Sex Discrimination (Gender 
Reassignment) Regulations 1999 SI 1999/1102. 
11 Kirkup, J, ‘Nine million face ‘green’ road tax increases’ The Telegraph (London 9 
July 2008) 
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/earth/main.jhtml?xml=/earth/2008/07/09/earoadtax109.xml
> accessed 25 September 2008. 
12 Department for Transport, ‘Local Bus Service Support – Options for Reform’ (March 
2008). 
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can be controlled, because commercial entities can be controlled. Thus the 
power of East over West increases as West Coast Code becomes increasingly 
commercial.13 
Regulation, for Lessig, is therefore achieved via an axis between commerce and the 
state.14 This is supported by Lemley and McGowan who propose that technology itself 
is heavily influenced by economic ‘network externalities’ which can in turn promote 
‘winner-take-all’ markets.15 However, this position has been criticised. Post challenges 
Lessig’s view that the increased commercialisation of code will aid regulability. 
Reflecting upon Lessig’s argument, he comments: 
As code writing becomes commercial, it becomes the product of ‘a smaller 
number of large companies’? Why is that? Lessig writes of this concentration of 
economic power as if it were somehow foreordained, an inevitable consequence 
of commercialisation…That’s a rather strong premise, it seems to me…16 
For Post, the inexorable journey towards a single technical architecture proposed by 
Lessig is not inevitable and that different technical architectures will persist. As such, 
this will hinder the regulability of a single technology model through market forces 
alone: 
…if there are many different architectures, then there is choice about whether 
to obey these controls…Lessig’s notion that the invisible hand of commerce 
somehow drives towards uniformity may be correct, but it is surely not self-
evidently correct…the one thing that [the invisible hand does best]…is to place 
before members of the public a diverse set of offerings in response to the 
diverse needs and preferences of that public.17 
Law may also regulate architecture in the physical world. For instance, reasonable 
adjustments must be made to facilitate access to public places by disabled persons.18 
However, the law has been used to mandate technical developments, particularly in the 
                                                        
13 Lessig, L, Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace (Basic Books, New York, 1999) 53. 
14 Ibid, 6. 
15 Lemley, M and McGowan, D, ‘Legal implication of network economic effects’ (1998) 
86 California Law Review 479. 
16 Post, D, ‘What Larry Doesn’t Get: Code, Law and Liberty in Cyberspace’ (2000) 52 
Stanford Law Review 1439, 1452-3. 
17 Ibid, 1454. 
18 Disability Discrimination Act 1995, s 19(3)(a). 
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United States. These laws were introduced to ‘protect the interests of US industry’19 as 
well as (in some instances) to protect against socially undesirable behaviour. Lessig20 and 
Wall21 both cite the example of the ‘V-chip’. The US Telecommunications Act 199622 
required this to be developed and implemented by television manufacturers to facilitate 
the blocking of broadcasts with a particular rating.23 This was a response to the 
increasing levels of sexual content and violence on television which, in turn, was 
considered harmful to children. However, the V-chip has been criticised on a number 
of grounds. The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) reports that V-chip 
technology is not widely used, partly since many users are simply unaware of its 
existence and others lack the ability to programme it correctly. The Parents Television 
Council called the V-chip education campaign ‘a failure’.24 Moreover, it has been 
claimed that the blocking transmissions is a violation of the US First Amendment 
constitutional right to free speech since it should be the responsibility of parents and 
guardians to exercise their personal discretion to determine what is appropriate for 
children to view. According to the American Civil Liberties Union: 
These FCC recommendations are political pandering. They government should 
not replace parents as decision makers in America’s living rooms. There are 
some things that the government does well, but deciding what is aired and when 
on television is not one of them.25 
                                                        
19 Reno, J, ‘Law enforcement in cyberspace’ (address to Commonwealth Club of 
California, San Francisco, 14 June 1996) in Wall, DS, Cybercrime: The Transformation 
of Crime in the Digital Age (Polity Press, Cambridge, 2007) 191. 
20 Lessig, L, Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace (Basic Books, New York, 1999) 47. 
21 Wall, DS, Cybercrime: The Transformation of Crime in the Digital Age (Polity Press, 
Cambridge, 2007) 191. 
22 Telecommunications Act 1996 USC §551. 
23 Similar parental controls are available on UK satellite transmissions, but the adoption 
of the technology is not mandated by statute. 
24 Federal Complaints Commission, ‘In the matter of violent television programming 
and its effect on children’ FCC 07-50 (25 April 2007) 
<http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-07-50A1.pdf> accessed 25 
September 2008. 
25 Labaton, S, ‘FCC Moves to Restrict TV Violence’ New York Times (26 April 2007) 
<http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/26/business/media/26fcc.html> accessed 25 September 
2008. 
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While the V-chip is essentially a hardware constraint, it does require a certain level of 
programming in order to operate effectively. As the FCC acknowledges, the lack of user 
ability to operate the chip has been a limitation on its success as a regulator. Moreover, 
it also requires its target audience to take responsibility for regulating the content to 
which children under their care are exposed. As such it has some parallels with 
technological responses to computer misuse, since their adoption is primarily a matter 
of individual (or corporate) responsibility which further requires a combination of 
installation, configuration or programming expertise on the part of the user. This serves 
to highlight a potential weakness of extra-legal regulation via technology, which often 
requires a level of skill its users may not possess.  Moreover, it requires a willingness to 
assume responsibility which may be met with reluctance or opposition. The domestic 
law, however, is not a regulator to which individuals or corporations may opt-in or opt-
out. It exists independently of technological expertise or inclination as to its use. 
East Coast Code and West Coast Code are not equivalent. Indeed, they are 
fundamentally different. Lessig’s East Coast Code stops at the boundaries of the United 
States. West Coast Code is global. Moreover, software is a medium that, unlike law, is 
predicated on invention. Such invention may be focused through large international 
corporations that are subject to the influence and control of the law whilst being 
offered its protection via the law of intellectual property. However, open source 
software makes its code available under a copyright license (or via the public domain) 
that permits it to be used, changed and redistributed in both modified and unmodified 
forms. It is often developed in a public, collaborative manner that is inherently resistant 
to commercial ownership. Indeed, a 2008 report estimates that the adoption of open 
source software loses the proprietary software industry about US$60 billion per year in 
potential revenues.26 The most familiar example of open source software is the Linux 
operating system which has ultimately become supported by most of the mainstream 
commercial technology manufacturers. This demonstrates a synergy between 
commercial interests and those of the open development community.  
East Coast Code did prevail over that of the West Coast in relation to file-sharing 
software such as Napster and Grokster. As well as facilitating legitimate file-sharing 
applications, these also enabled the distribution of music files. However, they were 
eventually shut down for enabling the copying of copyright protected material.27  A 
                                                        
26 Standish Group, ‘Trends in Open Source’ (April 2008).  
27 A&M Records Inc. v. Napster Inc 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001); MGM Studios v. 
Grokster 545 US 913 (2005); Orbach, B, ‘Indirect Free Riding on the Wheels of 
Commerce: Dual-Use Technologies and Copyright Liability’ (2008) 57 Emory Law 
Journal 409. 
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further example of the disparity between East Coast and West Coast Code can be 
found in online gambling. The United States attempted to curtail online gambling 
within its own jurisdiction via the Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act of 
2006 which criminalised the acceptance of funds from bettors by operators of most 
online gambling websites. However, this has not deterred providers of online gambling 
services from continuing to operate from outside US territory and accepting bets from 
within it.28 
A similar interplay between law, culture and norms to that proposed by Lessig in 
relation to cyberspace has been considered within the sphere of business. Here, 
Teubner talks of a regulatory trilemma: a law which goes against business culture risks 
irrelevance; a law that crushes the naturally-emerging normative systems in business can 
destroy virtue; a law that allows business norms to take it over can destroy its own 
virtues.29 For both Teubner and Braithwaite,30 this trilemma can be avoided through the 
‘structural coupling’ of reflexively related systems, or nodes of networked governance. 
In other words, legal and extra-legal regulatory mechanisms must work together in 
order to achieve stability. 
Braithwaite further argues that these legal and extra-legal nodes require sufficient 
autonomy so as to avoid domination by other nodes.31 However, when coupled, these 
semi-autonomous nodes enhance each other’s capability to respond to human needs or 
societal trends.32 In Selznick’s terminology, such nodes have integrity.33 In this model, 
then, a extra-legal regulatory node can derive integrity by interacting with a legal node 
                                                        
28 Costigan, C, ‘Ladbrokes Prepared to Accept US Poker Bets Says Managing Director’ 
Gambling 911 (8 July 2008) <http://www.gambling911.com/gambling-news/ladbrokes-
prepared-accept-us-poker-bets-says-managing-director-080708.html> accessed 25 
September 2008. 
29 Teubner, G, ‘After legal instrumentalism: Strategic models of post-regulatory law’ in 
Teubner, G (ed), Dilemmas of law in the welfare state (Walter de Gruyter, Berlin, 1986). 
30 Braithwaite, J, Markets in vice, markets in virtue (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
2005). 
31 Braithwaite, J, ‘Responsive Regulation and Developing Economies’ (2006) 34 World 
Development 884, 885; Ayres, I and Braithwaite, J, Responsive Regulation: 
Transcending the Deregulation Debate (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1992). 
32 Teubner, G, ‘After legal instrumentalism: Strategic models of post-regulatory law’ in 
Teubner, G (ed), Dilemmas of law in the welfare state (Walter de Gruyter, Berlin, 1986) 
316. 
33 Selznick, P, The Moral Commonwealth: Social theory and the promise of community 
(University of California Press, Berkeley, 1992).  
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in order to build the learning capacity of a system as a whole to address potential risks. 
The role of the law here is to act as an indirect enabler rather than as a direct 
prescriptive set of principles. As Lessig comments, law as a direct regulator tells 
individuals how to behave and threatens punishment if there is deviation from that 
behaviour. As an indirect regulator, the law aims to modify one of the other structures 
of constraint. However, as Lessig comments it is desirable  that indirect regulation 
should maintain transparency as a constraint on the exercise of state power.34 Post 
approaches this from an alternative libertarian stance: 
Just as Lessig recognises the need for constraints on collective power, the 
conscientious libertarian recognises that there are times when collective action 
is required to promote the common welfare, that the government, while not 
always the answer, is not always the enemy, and that deliberation need not 
always be de-liberating. 35 
The attractiveness of law as an indirect regulator is in line with the theory proposed by 
Habermas for whom law as a ‘medium’ colonising a ‘lifeworld’ (that is, a society as lived 
or experienced) is dangerous. However, law acting as a ‘constitution’ enables that 
lifeworld more effectively to deliberate responsive solutions to problems.36  
The indirect role of the law, then, facilitates the operation of a regulatory framework 
which enables responses to problems. Each problem carries with it a range of potential 
risks and therefore the regulatory framework of legal and extra-legal nodes may be 
conceptualised as a risk-based framework. For Black, such risk-based frameworks 
provide their own ‘technology of regulation’; that is: 
a set of understandings of the world and of regulatory practices which abstracts 
from the complexities of individual organisations and provides a framework for 
rational action which accords with actors’ need to believe that the task of 
governing and controlling is one which they can achieve.37 
Black considers that, in an ideal form, such frameworks enable the rationalisation, 
order, management and control of challenging and complex regulatory need. Within 
                                                        
34 Lessig, L, Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace (Basic Books, New York, 1999) 95, 98. 
35 Post, D, ‘What Larry Doesn’t Get: Code, Law and Liberty in Cyberspace’ (2000) 52 
Stanford Law Review 1439, 1459. 
36 Habermas, J, The theory of communicative action – Volume 2: Lifeworld and system: 
A critique of functionalist reason (Beacon Press, Boston, 1987). 
37 Black, J, ‘The emergence of risk-based regulation and the new public risk 
management in the United Kingdom’ [2005] Public Law 512, 542. 
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this framework, Scott considers dispersed or fragmented resources exercising regulatory 
capacity which are not ‘restricted to formal, state authority derived from legislation or 
contracts, but also include information, wealth and organisational capacities’.38  
However, these frameworks carry their own risks in implementation, design and 
culture. This accords with the concept of manufactured uncertainty put forward by 
Beck39 and Giddens.40 The risk-based framework is therefore both (following Black’s 
terminology) a technology in itself and a source of new risk. Moreover, Baldwin cites 
the dangers of extra-legal regulation as leading to controls which are ‘lacking in 
legitimacy, prove unfair and that are exclusive and inefficient’.41 For Ogus, the key 
variables in any regulatory model are the degrees of legislative constraint, outsider 
participation in relation to rule formation or enforcement (or both) and external 
control and accountability.42 This accords with Lessig’s desire for transparency in the 
exercise of indirect legislative power by the state: 
The state has no right to hide its agenda. In a constitutional democracy its 
regulations should be public…Should the state be permitted to use 
nontransparent means when transparent means are available?43 
Within this networked regulatory model, technological and commercial regulators are 
enabled and backed by the rule of law, although this necessarily involves the devolution 
of control to distributed sources of authority. For Lessig: 
The challenge of our generation is to reconcile these two forces. How do we 
protect liberty when the architectures of control are managed as much be 
government as by the private sector? How do we assure privacy when the ether 
perpetually spies? How do we guarantee free thought when the push is to 
propertise every idea? How do we guarantee self-determination when the 
architectures of control are perpetually determined elsewhere?44 
                                                        
38 Scott, C, ‘Analysing regulatory space: fragmented resources and institutional design’ 
[2001] Public Law 329, 330. 
39 Beck, U, ‘Politics of Risk Society’ in Franklin, J (ed), The Politics of Risk Society 
(Polity Press, Cambridge, 1998). 
40 Giddens, A, Beyond Left and Right (Polity Press, Cambridge, 1994). 
41 Baldwin, R, ‘The New Punitive Regulation’ (2004) 67 Modern Law Review 351, 351. 
42 Ogus, A, ‘Rethinking self-regulation’ (1995) 15 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 97, 
100. 
43 Lessig, L, Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace (Basic Books, New York, 1999) 98. 
44 Ibid, x-xi. 
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However, Katyal considers that the lack of transparency in code is the reason why the 
government ‘should regulate architecture and why such regulation is not as dire a 
solution as Lessig portrays’.45 As Wall comments, government regulation, for Katyal, is 
‘the lesser of the two evils because it works within more transparent frameworks of 
accountability’.46  Indeed, any state initiative should be consistent with the accepted 
norms of regulatory intervention: proportionality, accountability, consistency, 
transparency and targeting.47 
This spectrum of regulatory initiatives can be therefore be viewed as existing along a 
continuum from those originating from state agencies or bodies at one extreme to those 
originating from private functions at the other. The state institutions favour ‘top-down’ 
regulation. Private institutions, which are self-tasked, originate regulation from the 
‘bottom-up’. At the two extremes of this continuum are state legislation regulating 
from the ‘top-down’ and open source software itself as the ultimate ‘bottom-up’ 
regulator.  
7.1.2 A typology of extra-legal governance initiatives 
Chapter 6 surveyed a range of new tiers of legal governance at the European Union, 
Council of Europe, Commonwealth, United Nations and G8 levels. Many of these 
responses promoted extra-legal initiatives as well as proposing legal action.  
The 2001 European Commission report ‘Creating a Safer Information Society by 
Improving the Security of Information Infrastructures and Combating Computer-
Related Crime’48 proposed four main areas. The first of these was the establishment of 
an European Union forum to ‘enhance co-operation’ between law enforcement, 
internet service providers, network operators, consumer groups and data protection 
authorities. This forum would aim to raise public awareness of risks, promote best 
practice, develop counter-crime tools and procedures and encourage the development 
of early warning and crisis management mechanisms. Such a forum would represent a 
dynamic networked approach to computer misuse which would be significantly more 
                                                        
45 Katyal, NK, ‘Digital architecture as crime control’ (2003) 112 Yale Law Journal 2261. 
46 Wall, DS, Cybercrime: The Transformation of Crime in the Digital Age (Polity Press, 
Cambridge, 2007) 202-3. 
47 Better Regulation Task Force, Better Regulation – from design to delivery (London, 
2005) <http://archive.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/brc/publications/designdelivery.html> 
accessed 25 September 2008. 
48 Commission (EC), ‘Creating a Safer Information Society by Improving the Security of 
Information Infrastructures and Combating Computer-Related Crime’ COM (2000) 
890, 26 January 2001. 
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flexible and responsive than any potential legislative response. The second was the 
continued promotion of ‘security and trust’ through products and services with 
‘appropriate’ levels of security and more liberalised use of ‘strong’ encryption 
techniques. The third was increased training of law enforcement staff and further 
research in forensic computing. The final area was a study to ‘obtain a better picture of 
the nature and extent of computer-related crime in the Member States’.49 Similarly, the 
European Commission’s later Communication ‘towards a general policy on the fight 
against cyber crime’50 reinforced the need for further training of law-enforcement 
personnel, further research, the development of technical measures to counter 
‘traditional’ crime (such as fraud) in electronic networks and private-public co-
operation in the exchange of information and the raising of public awareness.  
The United Nations considered that priority should be given to the provision of 
technical assistance to Member States, in order to provide a ‘level playing field’51 and 
thereby harmonising technical capability rather than legal regulation. 
The G8 Action Plan52 recommended that there should be a collaborative effort between 
state and industry to ensure that new technologies are ‘policeable’: that is, they 
facilitate the investigation of computer misuse via the collection and preservation of 
robust evidence. This introduces technological design as an additional potential tier of 
governance. Moreover, the G8 stresses the involvement of industry in the development 
of secure systems and participation and co-operation in civil contingency planning.  
The OECD produced a set of guidelines for the security of information systems and 
security.53 This provided a set of complementary principles for ‘participants’. 
‘Participants’ is a broadly-defined term encompassing ‘governments, businesses, other 
                                                        
49 Ibid, 31-2. 
50 Commission (EC), ‘Communication from the Commission to the European 
Parliament, the Council and the Committee of the Regions towards a general policy on 
the fight against cyber crime’ COM (2007) 267 final, 22 May 2007. 
51 United Nations, ‘“Around the clock” capability needed to successfully fight 
cybercrime, workshop told’ UN Doc SOC/CP/334 (25 April 2005). 
52 G8, ‘Meeting of Justice and Interior Ministers of the Eight: Communiqué’ (10 
December 1997) 
<http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/g82004/97Communique.pdf> 3 accessed 25 
September 2008. 
53 OECD, ‘Guidelines for the Security of Information Systems and Networks: Towards a 
Culture of Security’ (OECD, Paris, 2002) 
<http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/16/22/15582260.pdf> accessed 25 September 2008. 
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organisations and individual users who develop, own, manage, service and use 
information systems and networks’.54 The principles to which the participants are 
expected to adhere are awareness, responsibility, response, ethics, democracy, risk 
assessment, security design and implementation, security management and reassessment. 
The resulting ‘culture of security’ is one in which these participants take responsibility 
for their own safety while remaining flexible and co-operative in prevention, detection 
and response to incidents and respecting the legitimate interests of others. Risk 
assessments enable the ‘selection of appropriate controls’ which underpins security 
management of systems containing components for which security has been an ‘integral 
part of system design and architecture’. This culture is reflexive, undergoing a constant 
process of review, reassessment and modification.  
There is clearly an overlap between many of the areas proposed by the various 
organisations. These fall into a number of broad categories: warning and response 
systems; education and public engagement and technical design. The initiatives are 
founded on co-operation, information sharing, reflexivity and responsiveness. 
7.2 Warning and response systems 
The first functional category of extra-legal response is that of warning and response 
systems. These can be further subdivided into Computer Emergency Response Teams 
(CERTs) and Warning, Advice and Reporting Points (WARPs). 
7.2.1 CERTs 
In general terms, a CERT is an organisation that studies computer and network security 
in order to provide incident response services to victims of attacks, publish alerts 
concerning vulnerabilities and threats, and to offer other information to help improve 
computer and network security.55  
The CERT model derives originally from the US Computer Emergency Response Team 
which is a publicly-funded research and development centre hosted within the Software 
Engineering Institute at Carnegie Mellon University.56 It was set up in 1988 under the 
direction of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) following the 
                                                        
54 Ibid, 7. 
55 ENISA, ‘Inventory of CERT activities in Europe’ (September 2007) 
<http://enisa.europa.eu/cert_inventory/downloads/Enisa_CERT_inventory.pdf> 
accessed 25 September 2008. 
56 <http://www.cert.org> accessed 25 September 2008. 
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unleashing of the Morris worm which infected around 10 per cent of Internet systems.57 
It now largely concentrates on the study of Internet security vulnerabilities and 
associated education and training. In 2003, the US Computer Emergency Readiness 
Team (US-CERT)58 was formed as a partnership between the Department of Homeland 
Security and the public and private sectors to ‘co-ordinate defense against, and 
responses to, cyber attacks on the nation’.59 The US is also home to the National Cyber 
Forensic Training Alliance (NCFTA)60 which presents itself as ‘a neutral collaborative 
venue where critical confidential information about cyber incidents can be shared 
discreetly, and where resources can be shared among industry, academia and law 
enforcement’.61 This also, then, fosters and encourages interplay between public and 
private stakeholders. It offers an automated global incident reporting, tracking and 
response system and is funded jointly by industry, the FBI and the US government.  
For Van Wyk and Forno, a CERT exists ‘to minimise the impact of an incident on a 
company and allow it to get back to work as quickly as possible’62 whereas for Killcrece 
it should act as a ‘focal point for preventing, receiving and responding to computer 
security incidents’.63 Wiik refers to the ‘new emerging survivability paradigm’64 which 
proposes that no matter how much security is built into a system, it will never be totally 
secure,65 replacing the traditional notion of a fortress providing full protection against 
                                                        
57 Spafford, E, ‘The Internet worm program: an analysis’ Purdue Technical Report CSD-
TR-823 29 November 1988 <http://homes.cerias.purdue.edu/~spaf/tech-reps/823.pdf> 
accessed 2 April 2008. 
58 <http://www.us-cert.gov> accessed 25 September 2008. 
59 Ibid. 
60 <http://www.ncfta.net> accessed 25 September 2008. 
61 Ibid. 
62 Van Wyk, KR and Forno, R, Incident Response (O’Reilly and Associates, Sebastopol, 
2001) 21. 
63 Killcrece, G and others, State of the Practice of Computer Security Incident Response 
Teams (Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, 2003). 
64 Wiik, J, Gonzalez, KK and Kossakowski, K-P, ‘Limits to Effectiveness in Computer 
Security Incident Response Teams’ (Twenty-third International Conference of the 
System Dynamics Society, Boston, 2005). 
65 Lipson, H and Fisher, DA, ‘Survivability – a new technical and business perspective on 
security’ (Proceedings of the 1999 New Security Paradigms Workshop, Association for 
Computing Machinery, Caledon Hills, 1999). 
  
246 
malicious attack.66 This is reflected in the historic reactive nature of CERTs. Over time, 
however, such CERTs widened the scope of their services from purely reactive 
emergency response towards the more proactive provision of security services including 
preventive services such as issuing alerts and advisories and providing training on 
incident management capability, performance standards, best practices, tools and 
methods. In the late 1990s the term ‘Computer Security Incident Response Team’ 
(CSIRT) arose to reflect this broadened scope. Both terms (CERT and CSIRT) are 
synonymous in current usage. A further definition of CSIRT has been offered by West-
Brown: 
For a team to be considered as a CSIRT, it must provide one of more of the 
incident handling services: incident analysis, incident response on site, incident 
response support or incident response coordination.67 
Although this emphasises the largely reactive nature of a CSIRT and recognises that 
such impact-mitigation services will always be required, there is a growing realisation 
that some level of proactive service ought to be offered as well.68 CERTs therefore 
address different types of risk on a spectrum from serious electronic attacks on the 
public infrastructure, government departments or the financial services industry, 
through online fraud and identity theft to less serious (but more prevalent) harms 
involving general on-line nuisance. 
The constituency (that is, the set of potential users) of a CERT can include national, 
governmental or private organisations. Equally, although some CERTs may be 
ostensibly linked to particular national interests, some are effectively global, such as the 
NCFTA, whereas others focus on particular industry sectors, such as the Financial 
Services Information Sharing and Analysis Centre (FSISAC).69 By way of illustration, the 
UK currently has 19 CERTs with differing constituencies: these include large 
commercial organisations,70 former nationalised industries,71 academic institutions,72 
                                                        
66 Blakley, R, ‘The Emperor’s Old Armor’ (Proceedings of the 1996 New Security 
Paradigms Workshop, Association for Computing Machinery, Arrowhead, 1996).  
67 West-Brown, MJ and others, Handbook of Computer Security Incident Response 
Teams (2nd edn Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, 2003) 23. 
68 Killcrece, G and others, State of the Practice of Computer Security Incident Response 
Teams (Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, 2003). 
69 <http://www.fsisac.com> accessed 25 September 2008. 
70 BP DSCA (British Petroleum); Cisco PSIRT (Cisco); CITIGROUP (UK) (Citi Group); 
DCSIRT (Diageo); E-CERT (Energis); MLCERT (UK) (Merrill Lynch); RBSG-ISIRT 
(Royal Bank of Scotland Group); Sky-CERT (Skype). 
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academic networks73 and government organisations.74 Within Europe there are 111 
CERTs at institutional and national level.75 The CERT model has also been adopted in 
Asia and Australasia. 
Each of these CERTs therefore acts as an independent node, collecting, processing and 
disseminating information relating to risk, although the differences in their 
constituencies may mean that the relative prioritisation of risks differs between CERTs. 
Assuming that each CERT has some data of interest to others, it follows that 
connecting CERTs which represent both public (state) and private (commercial and 
individual) interests could produce, in Kjær’s terms, a ‘network… of trust and 
reciprocity crossing the state-society divide’76 in the pursuit of shared goals or, in 
Rhodes’ words, an ‘interorganisational network… characterised by interdependence, 
resource-exchange, rules of the game and significant autonomy from the state’.77 In 
other words, interconnected CERTs could provide a response or readiness network 
consistent with theoretical conceptualisations of governance discussed in Chapter 5. 
In terms of a networked response to a networked problem, it is necessary to examine 
the nature and extent of inter-CERT collaboration to establish whether information 
sharing alone is an adequate response or whether CERTs should build relationships 
with other bodies and assist with collaborative responses to the problems arising from 
the misuse of computer technology.  
7.2.2 Collaboration between CERTs 
Inter-CERT collaboration will be explored at both domestic and regional/international 
levels. 
                                                                                                                                                             
71 BT CERTCC and BTGS (British Telecommunications); RM CSIRT (Royal Mail 
Group); Q-CIRT (QinetiQ).  
72 EUCS-IRT (University of Edinburgh); OxCERT (University of Oxford). 
73 JANET CSIRT (Joint Academic Network); DAN-CERT (GÉANT pan-European 
research network). 
74 GovCertUK (UK Government community; public sector); CPNI (UK Centre for the 
Protection of National Infrastructure); MODCERT (UK Ministry of Defence). 
75 As at September 2007. ENISA, ‘Inventory of CERT activities in Europe’ (September 
2007) <http://enisa.europa.eu/cert_inventory/downloads/Enisa_CERT_inventory.pdf> 
accessed 25 September 2008. 
76 Kjær, AM, Governance (Polity Press, Cambridge, 2004) 4. 
77 Rhodes, RAW, Understanding Governance: Policy Networks, Governance, Reflexivity 
and Accountability (Open University Press, Buckingham, 1997) 15. 
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7.2.2.1 UKCERTs 
UKCERTs is an informal forum of domestic CSIRTs including government, academic 
and commercial teams, again designed to encourage co-operation and information 
sharing between the participants. It also invites UK WARPs to its forum meetings. The 
role of WARPs is considered in greater detail in section 7.2.5 below. There are similar 
forms of national cooperation operating in Austria,78 Germany,79 the Netherlands80 and 
Poland.81 
7.2.2.2 European Network and Information Security Agency  
The European Network and Information Security Agency (ENISA) was established in 
2004 by Regulation (EC) 460/2004.82 ENISA is a European Community Agency; that is a 
body set up by the EU to carry out a very specific technical, scientific or management 
task within the Community domain (the First Pillar) of the EU.83 ENISA’s purpose, as 
defined in its establishing Regulation is that of: 
Ensuring a high and effective level of network and information security within 
the Community and [to] develop a culture of network and information security 
for the benefit of citizens, consumers, enterprises and public sector 
organisations of the European Union.84 
It does, however, acknowledge that its objectives are without prejudice to non-First 
Pillar competencies of Member States (such as police and judicial co-operation in 
criminal matters) and the activities of the States in areas of criminal law.85 It is 
specifically charged to ‘provide assistance and deliver advice’86 to the Commission and 
Member States in relation to information security and to use its expertise to ‘stimulate 
broad co-operation between actors from the public and private sectors’.87 Part of 
ENISA’s work is in facilitating co-operation between CERTs. It also supports the 
member states in setting up their own national or organisational CERTs and provides 
                                                        
78 CIRCA (Computer Incident Response Co-ordination Austria). 
79 CERT-Verbund. 
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technical support to close the gaps between the Network Information Security 
competencies of individual EU Member States. Its 2008 work plan includes an initiative 
to facilitate co-operation between Member States to set up new governmental or 
national CERTs, acting as a ‘good practice knowledge-base and contact broker’.88  
7.2.2.3 European Government CSIRTs group  
The European Government CSIRTs (EGC) group is an informal organisation of 
governmental CSIRTs89 that is ‘developing effective co-operation on incident response 
matters between its members, building upon the similarity in constituencies and 
problem sets between governmental CSIRTs in Europe’.90 It works to develop measures 
to deal with large scale network security incidents, facilitating the sharing of 
information and specialist knowledge and instigating collaborative research in areas of 
mutual interest specifically related to the operational work of governmental CSIRTs. It 
differs from ENISA in its more limited membership: ENISA is concerned with 
facilitating communication between all European CERTs, whereas the EGC focuses 
only on governmental CSIRTs. 
7.2.2.4 Other inter-CERT collaborations 
The Task Force of Computer Security and Incident Response Teams (TF-CSIRT) 
exists to promote collaboration between European CSIRTs with a research and 
education constituency.91 It was established as part of the technical programme within 
the Trans-European Research and Education Networking Association (TERENA). It 
has similar aims to the EGC in promoting collaboration, promulgating common 
standards and procedures for responding to security incidents and providing training for 
new CSIRT staff. The Trusted Introducer (TI) programme was also established under 
the auspices of TERENA.92 It recognises the nature of the trust relationship which is a 
necessary condition for collaboration between nodes within a governance network. 
While the inter-CSIRT trust network was originally based upon personal 
recommendation between members of the particular CSIRTs involved, as the number 
of CSIRTs proliferated and staff moved on, this personal recommendation method 
became unwieldy at best. TI therefore exists to facilitate trust between European 
                                                        
88 ENISA, ‘ENISA Work Programme 2008’ 24 
<http://www.enisa.europa.eu/doc/pdf/management_board/decisions/enisa_wp_desig_ver
_2008.pdf> accessed 25 September 2008. 
89 France, Germany, Finland, the Netherlands, Sweden, UK, Norway and Switzerland. 
90 <http://www.egc-group.org> accessed 25 September 2008. 
91 <http://www.terena.nl/tech/task-forces/tf-csirt/> accessed 25 September 2008. 
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response teams by formally accrediting CSIRTs who wish to join its community. On a 
similar regional basis, APCERT was established by CSIRTs within the Asia Pacific 
region, aiming to improve cooperation, response and information sharing among 
CSIRTs in the region. APCERT consists of 20 CSIRTs from 14 economies. 
Following the foundation of the US CERT, the number of incident response teams 
grew. The interaction between these teams experienced difficulties due to differences 
in language, time-zone, and international standards or conventions. In October 1989, a 
major incident called the ‘WANK93 worm’94 highlighted the need for better 
communication and coordination between teams. The Forum of Incident Response and 
Security Teams (FIRST) was formed in 1990 in response to this problem. Since that 
time, it has continued to grow and evolve in response to the changing needs of the 
incident response and security teams and their constituencies. The FIRST membership 
consists of teams from a wide variety of organisations including educational, 
commercial, vendor, government and military.  
Finally, the Central and Eastern European Networking Association (CEENet) comprises 
23 national research and education CERTs. It is primarily a knowledge network which 
shares information regarding computer network security.   
7.2.3 Effectiveness of CERTs 
The effectiveness of CERTs can be considered at two levels. The first of these is the 
internal effectiveness of the CERT itself; the ability of the CERT to deal with its 
workload and service its constituents as a reflection of its technical, financial, 
organisational and management capability. The second is the effectiveness of inter-
CERT communication. If the networked response offered by CERTs is to be valuable, 
it follows that the propagation of pertinent information between CERTs is key to avoid 
them existing only as silos of information accessible only to the particular constituency 
of each individual CERT. 
In terms of internal effectiveness, the main challenges are described by West-Brown: 
To ensure successful operation, a CSIRT must have the ability to adapt to 
changing needs of the environment and exhibit the flexibility to deal with the 
unexpected. In addition, a CSIRT must simultaneously address funding issues 
                                                        
93 Worms Against Nuclear Killers. 
94 CERT, ‘WANK Worm On SPAN Network’ Advisory CA-1989-04 (17 October 1989) 
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and organisational changes that can affect its ability to either adapt to the needs 
or provide the service itself.95 
Therefore, internal challenges are two-fold: adroitness (both technological and 
organisational) and availability of resources. In terms of resources, as Salomon and Elsa 
comment, information security is often viewed as a drain since it is a support service 
rather than a core business activity: 
Safeguarding the enterprise itself is a fairly unglamorous task, costs money and 
is difficult to justify to managers unfamiliar with the potential consequences of 
not having a strong commitment to IT security.96 
The tension between business and technological priorities were clearly expressed in 
interview. User 1 commented: 
The IT folk are always after money for their security stuff. I don’t understand 
why they need so much…Surely it’s only a question of making sure that the 
firewalls are all up to date. 
By contrast, Technician 5 offered a diametrically opposing view: 
[Senior management] don’t realise that without us, the whole enterprise could 
come falling down about their ears. One major breach and we’re all toast. Fair 
enough, we don’t make money ourselves, but we’re safeguarding everything we 
do. 
Overstretched resources are a common issue within many CSIRTs. As early as 1994, 
only six years after the establishment of the US CERT at Carnegie Mellon, Smith 
commented that: 
About the only common attributes between existing Incident Response Teams 
are that they are under-funded, under-staffed and over-worked.97 
Moreover, according to Lipson: 
                                                        
95 West-Brown, MJ and others, Handbook of Computer Security Incident Response 
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Although the sophistication of Internet attacks has increased over time, the 
technical knowledge of the average attacker is declining, in the same manner 
that the technical knowledge of the average user has declined.98 
Therefore, more people have the capability to launch attacks and the scope, frequency 
and volume of attacks (and hence the need for CERT services) is continuously 
increasing.99 As Technician 4 commented: 
There’s more [incidents requiring some form of action] coming in all the time. 
What with investigations, analysis, countermeasures, fixing and trying to 
educate those who don’t understand or won’t take notice, there aren’t enough 
hours in the day.100 
A further complication arises in respect of the scope of ‘IT security’. It spans a wide 
range of activity within which security-related tasks may fall to groups which are not 
immediately concerned with security as a core function, such as architecture, network 
operations, IT strategy or server support.101 Even where adequately funded and 
resourced, CERTs must be able to respond swiftly to new forms of technological risk. 
By comparison with the problems faced by the domestic and international legal 
responses to computer misuse discussed in Chapters 4 and 6 respectively, a CERT 
organisation should be able to adapt to technological advances relatively quickly. 
However, the speed of response required in order to be effective is increasing. As 
Salomon and Elsa comment: 
The ‘flash-to-bang’ time between the discovery of new vulnerabilities (or 
configuration errors) and the exploit thereof on a wide scale has narrowed 
considerably…Even assuming efficient processes and good communication, the 
sheer scale of many corporate security organisations makes effective and timely 
countermeasures difficult.102 
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Communication between CERTs also poses a number of potential problems. As 
EURIM commented,103 those running CERTs differ in ‘cultural values’ and approaches 
to security. These range from those who only engage with trusted organisations to those 
which purport to provide open services to all. Moreover, some are more open to 
communication with peer organisations than others and some exist to protect the 
commercial interests and intellectual property rights of themselves and their customers. 
Police Officer 4 offered an interesting illustration of the importance of the routine 
administrative matters which underpin CERT-to-CERT communication: 
Through our WARP, we got wind of a DDOS attack that was being routed 
through a country in Eastern Europe. So the obvious thing to do was get in 
touch with the relevant CERT in that country. Would have been fine – except 
it turns out that the CERT in question had changed their phone number three 
years ago and hadn’t thought to tell anyone. Certainly would have limited the 
amount of incoming information they would have got – so, you see, without 
some sort of proper day to day coordination and action then all these bodies are 
next to useless. 
There are also legal concerns affecting CERTs. Graux comments that CERTs require 
their own legal expertise in order to develop and apply internal policies as well as to 
determine whether or not a particular incident requires the involvement of the criminal 
or civil law. He concludes that the need for international legal cooperation and 
coordination is paramount, requiring  the ‘pragmatic availability’ of legal channels of 
communication.104 There is, therefore, a role for the law to govern and inform the 
internal framework of the extra-legal response mechanism of the CERT. 
7.2.4 Conclusion: CERTs 
CERTs have two principal functions. The first is proactively to disseminate information 
regarding prevention of technical vulnerabilities and threats. The second is reactively to 
provide assistance in response to particular instances of computer misuse. CERTs exist 
to serve both public and private interests across a range of constituencies. They may 
therefore operate from both ‘top-down’ (governmental) and ‘bottom-up’ (private) 
perspectives. However, in isolation, an  inwardly-focused CERT will operate as an 
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information silo; that is, it will not exchange relevant information with other CERTs. 
Indeed, many CERTs have a closed constituency and may not even desire to participate 
in such information sharing. This lack of reciprocity is fundamentally at odds with the 
networked approach required within governance theory, even though the individual 
CERTs themselves may represent both public and private concerns. Facilitating 
communication and information-sharing between CERTs should therefore lead to a 
structure more aligned with the governance approach. This has been achieved to a 
certain extent at both national and international level through various forums of 
varying degrees of formality, membership and geographic reach. In essence, there is a 
state-led imperative for co-operation between institutions which often exists only to 
serve private interests. Provided that there is at least some co-operation, however 
reluctantly, it follows that CERTs should have a part to play within an overall 
governance network on the basis that even limited information-sharing is better than 
none at all.  
However, in order to achieve a meaningful role within this network, CERTs need to be 
effective, both internally in their capacity to cope with the nature and extent of their 
workload as well as externally in the efficiency of their information exchange. 
Historically, CERTs have been characterised by constrained resources and increasing 
workload. Moreover, despite the existence of the diverse umbrella co-ordinating 
bodies, communications between CERTs are inconsistent, depending upon the cultural 
values and individual priorities of each CERT. 
Even though an ideal CERT network seems well-suited as a extra-legal response to the 
problem of computer misuse, it must be recognised that CERTs cannot exist in a legal 
vacuum. The law still has the role of governing and informing the internal framework 
within which the CERT operates. However, CERTs do offer the advantage of an 
alternative response beyond that of the law in isolation and bring private concerns and 
day-to-day technical incidents into the response network. 
7.2.5 Warning, Advice and Reporting Points 
Warning, Advice and Reporting Points (WARPs)105 are part of the information sharing 
strategy of the UK Centre for the Protection of the National Infrastructure (CPNI).106 
They are therefore primarily a domestic initiative, although two international WARPs 
have been registered107 but are yet to be operational. There are 18 WARPs registered in 
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total, covering the public service, local government, business and voluntary sectors, 13 
of which are operational. 108 Examples include the National Heath Service (Connecting 
for Health) Information Governance WARP which provides centralised distribution of 
warnings and advisories, good practice advice brokering and trusted sharing of 
electronic related security problems and solutions and PENWARP which serves the 
journalist community. 
The model is not new or restricted only to the sphere of computer technology. For 
instance, the Radio Amateurs’ Emergency Network (RAYNET)109 is a national 
voluntary communications service for major civil emergencies or related exercises and 
local community events provided by licensed radio amateurs. It liaises with emergency 
services, local authorities and other voluntary agencies who could be involved in the 
integrated management response to major civil emergencies.110 The Environment 
Agency also operates an advisory and response service for flood risk.111 
WARPs are predominantly a ‘bottom-up’ initiative, although their increasing 
importance in the area of contingency planning and management of the critical national 
infrastructure means that they are strategically part of the ‘top-down’ agenda of the 
CPNI.  
Unlike CERTs which generally focus on broader constituencies, a WARP (according to 
the CPNI) is a ‘community based service where members can receive and share up-to-
date advice on information security threats, incidents and solutions’.112 Therefore, 
WARPs essentially operate as small-scale CERTs serving a community which may be 
within a smaller organisation or as a hub to particular organisations or individuals. 
UKERNA113 proposed a model within which WARPs reduce incidents by providing 
preventative advice and CSIRTs respond to those incidents which do, in fact, occur.114  
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WARPs generally have a greater emphasis on sharing than many CERTs. As Technician 
1 commented: 
As a security manager, I spend a great deal of time networking outside my 
company. It’s probably one of the most important things I do. We need to draw 
on outside knowledge and skills to identify new threats, share best practice… or 
just to swap ideas and ask each other’s point of view on things. Trust is 
important – you never know when you might need help from your friends. 
That’s where [the WARP] helps. 
Therefore, the idea of personal networking is added to that of the technical networking 
propagated through CERTs.  
WARPs have three core elements: filtered warnings, advice brokering and trusted 
sharing (reporting). These services are based upon software developed by Microsoft and 
the CPNI which is only available to only available to registered WARPs (that is, those 
approved by the CPNI). The filtered warning service takes alert information from a 
variety of sources, including CERTs themselves and major industry members such as 
Microsoft, Symantec and Cisco and enables WARP members to select the categories of 
warning most pertinent to their operation. Advice brokering consists of a bulletin board 
service restricted to WARP members. Trusted sharing involves the publication of 
anonymised reports to facilitate a trusted environment in which sensitive information 
concerning incidents of problems may be shared.  
There is little regulatory constraint to concern WARPs other than a short Code of 
Practice which requires little from new WARPs over a willingness to co-operate and 
share information, maintain effectiveness and not to bring the WARP model into 
disrepute.115 Agreement to this Code is a pre-requisite for registration with the CPNI.  
WARPs, therefore are lightly-regulated ‘mini-CERTs’ serving similar needs to a more 
restricted community. As with CERTs, the trust relationship between WARP members 
is important and one which is stressed by the CPNI as being crucial to their 
effectiveness. However, given the smaller scale of WARPs as compared to CERTs, it 
might be expected that there would be considerably more of the former than the latter 
in operation, although there actually remains a larger number of CERTs than WARPs 
in the UK at present. Despite this limited adoption, the role of WARPs within the 
overall constellation of governance responses seems theoretically attractive, extending 
                                                        
115 ——, ‘WARP Code of Practice v.2.0’ (August 2004) 
<http://www.warp.gov.uk/BusinessCase/CodeofPracticeV2.0.pdf> accessed 25 
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the reach of the extra-legal response network to parties that may not, of themselves, 
fall within a CERT’s constituency or have the capacity or desire to establish a CERT of 
their own. However, the very existence of WARPs does not seem to be particularly 
widespread knowledge. Few industry participants (both industrial and technical) had 
encountered WARPs, although those that had were generally supportive. Policy-maker 
1 commented on WARPs in relation to risk: 
Most security risks [to the critical national infrastructure] are scattered across 
hundreds of smaller public and private organisations. We have to extend our 
security capability; if we don’t then the country will be more at risk. WARPs 
are one way of doing that. We need more of them. 
For the CPNI, the desire to increase the prevalence of WARPs is clear. It believes that 
WARPs should become ‘endemic’ in the future, wherever a need is identified, whilst 
remaining sustainable, co-operative, flexible and versatile. It further envisages linkage 
between some WARPs and existing CERTs, with some potentially evolving into full 
CERTs themselves before concluding that ‘the future of WARPs is bright’.116 
There is limited material available in relation to the overall effectiveness of WARPs. 
This is probably due to their having been in existence a comparatively short time and 
being few in number. However, given the similarities between WARPs and CERTs in 
many respects, it seems reasonable to assume that they may both suffer from similar 
limitations in terms of capacity and inter-WARP communication. The latter may be 
less significant, since WARPs are focused on domestic concerns and registered WARPs 
may use a common communications infrastructure provided by the CPNI. 
Given the smaller reach of WARPs, they may be considered to be the computer misuse 
equivalent of a Neighbourhood Watch scheme. Whereas Neighbourhood Watch creates 
a partnership between the local community, the police and the local authority in the 
interests of protecting public safety, WARPs endeavour to create networks of trust and 
information between technology users for their protection. However, there is no formal 
link to policing through a WARP. Such a link could work in a similar fashion to that 
between a Neighbourhood Watch scheme and a local crime prevention officer or Police 
Community Support Officer. While this might seem attractive, the Home Office 
reported in 2001 that Neighbourhood Watch schemes tend to be most active in areas 
where there are relatively low crime rates. Moreover, owner-occupied households and 
those with an annual income over £30,000 were most likely to be members of a 
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scheme.117 Schemes are therefore more difficult to establish and maintain in the areas 
which need them most.118 Similarly, WARPs currently tend to serve communities which 
already have an awareness of computer misuse issues combined with the resources and 
inclination to form themselves into a group. This pattern then leaves those who are 
either unaware of the risks or insufficiently technologically adept to mitigate against 
them (that is, the more vulnerable to computer misuse) without a WARP to support 
them, just as those who are more vulnerable to burglary are less likely to enjoy the 
vigilance offered by Neighbourhood Watch. The police encourage Neighbourhood 
Watch schemes to be established in areas of need in the same way that the CPNI 
encourages the promulgation of WARPS. While there is some element of proactive 
promotion of WARPs from the CPNI, the protection of individuals from computer 
misuse is not core to its purpose which is properly concerned with the protection of 
critical national resources from terrorist or other attacks. Finally, it can be argued that 
successful schemes require a certain level of crime in order to be successful. If the 
scheme operates as a successful deterrent of crime, then recruitment of new members 
to the scheme will fall, since potential participants will tend to consider that they are 
not needed. The scheme will decline, crime rates will rise and the scheme will 
recommence. This dependency on some crime for the success of a Neighbourhood 
Watch scheme suggests that an optimal crime reduction policy may aim at a tolerably 
low level of crime rather than total prevention.119 
A further analogy can be drawn between a WARP and a Citizens Advice Bureau. The 
Citizens Advice service provides free information and advice in response to particular 
problems just as WARPs are a means of disseminating definitive information as to risk 
to particular communities within a trusted environment. However, the Citizens Advice 
service is accessible, widespread, well-known and well-established. WARPs remain low 
in number and relatively unknown.  
7.3 Education and public engagement 
Education has been identified as one of the functions of both CSIRTs and WARPs, 
which provide advisory services to their constituents. However, in terms of Lessig’s 
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modalities of constraint, education is also a means by which the law can change social 
norms. As Marshall commented: 
Education is not the teaching of the three Rs. Education is the teaching of the 
overall citizenship, to learn to live together with fellow citizens and above all to 
learn to obey the law.120 
Education is therefore a means by which certain social norms may be reinforced and the 
content of which (particularly in state schools) is regulated by law via the National 
Curriculum.121 The state can specifically exclude certain topics. For instance, section 28 
of the Local Government Act 1988 provided that: 
A local authority shall not— 
(a) intentionally promote homosexuality or publish material with the intention 
of promoting homosexuality; 
(b) promote the teaching in any maintained school of the acceptability of 
homosexuality as a pretended family relationship.122 
It is therefore readily conceivable that the law could intervene to compel a certain level 
of education in schools relating to the issues surrounding protection from the misuse of 
computer technology. However, it would take a generation before this knowledge could 
spread through the nation as a whole. Moreover, state-led education initiatives in 
schools would not circumvent the problem arising from the continued pace of 
technological advance. Knowledge acquired at, say, the age of 16 would still rapidly 
become out-of-date. As discussed in Chapter 2, one of the key drivers behind the 
emergence and growth of computer misuse was the collective diminution in general 
computing skill levels as technology became more accessible to the non-expert user. 
The exploitation of this knowledge gap became a facilitator of susceptibility to 
computer misuse. 
Therefore, an ongoing programme of public engagement is key to addressing this gap. 
In Lessig’s terms this would modify social norms such that ‘safe’ computer usage would 
                                                        
120 Thurgood Marshall, oral argument on behalf of respondents; Cooper v. Aaron 358 
US 1 (1958) (no. 1). 
121 Education Act 1996, s 351. 
122 Section 28 of the Local Government inserted a new s 2A into the Local Government 
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become commonplace and individuals and businesses would become equipped with 
sufficient knowledge to take their own precautions against computer misuse. The 
predominant UK initiative is Get Safe Online,123 involving  government, the Serious 
Organised Crime Agency and private sector sponsors from technology, retail and 
finance.124 It is the first national internet-based computer security awareness campaign 
for the general public and small businesses. Its website has 13,000 websites linked to it. 
It provides information to individuals on how to protect themselves, their families or 
their business from online threats. It has been operational since October 2005. 
However, the Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology reports that there is 
‘limited’ awareness of computer security among home as well as business users. 
Research from Get Safe Online show that users tend to assume they know how to 
remain safe online, but they do not demonstrate adequate skills when tested. 
Respondents to the Get Safe Online survey rated computer security as a high priority 
but over half admitted to little or no knowledge of safe practices. Although 75 per cent 
had a firewall, 86 per cent did not follow recommendations to update their security 
software.125 
Many of the participants interviewed during the course of this research were more 
security aware by virtue of their professional position. However, there was a consistent 
theme that education of itself would not significantly address the knowledge gap. 
Technician 3 commented specifically that: 
It [Get Safe Online] seems like a good idea on the face of it. But how many 
average users know that it exists? And, even assuming that they all do, they can 
read as many horror stories as they want and realise that they need to do 
something to protect their computers…but when they get to PC World they 
won’t have a clue where to start. They just don’t have the hands-on skills. 
Generic advice raises awareness – but even in these days of commodity 
computing, everyone’s system is slightly different. Making changes to suit their 
own set-ups might well be beyond them. 
Policy Maker 2 commented further that: 
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Education and awareness campaigns cannot help those who don’t think that it is 
their personal responsibility to protect themselves from the ill effects of 
computer misuse. 
This then raises the issue of who should carry the responsibility of protecting 
individuals and commercial concerns from computer misuse. A survey of the general 
public commissioned by Get Safe Online found that 15 per cent of people believe that it 
is their own responsibility to protect themselves; 49 per cent believe that it should be 
the responsibility of ‘big business’ and 11 per cent think that it should be a government 
responsibility.126 It follows that, given these findings, education and awareness 
campaigns will not be effective for those 85 per cent who think that responsibility for 
their protection lies with someone else. 
However, the view of IT users in industry is somewhat different. User 2 commented 
that: 
Of course we are responsible for our own protection. We have to survey the 
market and make sensible decisions as to what to buy and how to implement it 
so that we are safe. No-one else is going to tell us how to do it. We’d rather not 
tell anyone else how we did it either. 
A similar view was shared by User 4: 
We put locks on the doors and locks on our systems. Simple as that. 
The IT industry seemed ready, to a certain extent, to accept some of the responsibility 
that the general public expected it to. For Technician 8: 
The [security] products that we make absolutely have to be usable by the 
general public. Otherwise our market share will vanish. 
However, this comment seems to be driven as much by market constraints as the desire 
for taking responsibility for the general public. Clearly, if the public views the IT 
industry as being responsible for its protection, then the industry will accept that 
responsibility, but only if the price is right. Moreover, the industry itself is not generally 
responsible for offering redress, investigating security breaches (unless compelled to do 
so by contract) or imposing sanctions on offenders. 
The Computer Misuse Act 1990 draws strong analogies between burglary in the physical 
world and unauthorised access to computer systems. In relation to burglary, it is an 
accepted social norm that individuals take steps to secure their own private property. If 
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a burglary occurs, then the violation of private property rights gives rise to an 
expectation that the police will investigate and take steps to apprehend the burglar 
backed by the criminal law. However, while the physical computer which is the target 
of outside computer misuse exists as a piece of private property, located within a 
particular office or dwelling, its networked existence gives it a quasi-public presence 
within which it becomes more susceptible to attack. It is generally considered that 
individuals are afforded some degree of protection whilst in public, via policing or other 
forms of surveillance. This is backed up by the criminal sanction imposed should the 
protection fail and the individual come to harm. However, for computer misuse there is 
no analogous blanket public protection. Moreover, as already seen in Chapter 3, there is 
a general reluctance to investigate and prosecute. This is where the analogy fails. 
Perhaps a more useful role for education and awareness would be to ensure that users 
recognise that without taking steps to protect themselves (albeit in concert with the 
commercial providers of the technology that will enable them to do so) then they will 
be exposed to a greater level of risk than they might otherwise have appreciated. 
7.4 Technical regulation 
The governance initiatives covered in Chapter 6 also proposed various technical 
regulatory mechanisms. The European Commission promoted the development of 
secure products, more liberalised use of encryption technology and other technical 
measures aimed at preventing crime. The UN prioritised technical capability amongst 
its Member States to provide a minimal level of technical expertise to facilitate cross-
border investigation and enforcement. The G8 advocated a collaboration between state 
and industry to ensure that technologies are policeable. The OECD considered that 
security should become an integral part of system design and architecture.  
The role of code as regulator is central to Lessig’s theory as previously mentioned in this 
chapter. For Lessig, the regulability of a technology architecture depends on the code 
which brings that technology into being. For Lessig: 
Some architectures…are more regulable that others; some architectures enable 
better control than others. Thus, whether a [technology] can be regulated turns 
on the nature of its code.127 
It follows then, that if regulability is the aim of the state and some architectures are 
more amenable to regulation than others, then the state will favour some technical 
architectures more than others. This is in line with the aim of the G8 to design 
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technologies that are more policeable. A preferred set of technical architectures would 
also assist the UN in any initiative to provide cross-border technical assistance. 
Katyal argues that such policeable solutions must exploit the characteristics of 
networked technology, particularly its potential for natural surveillance (via means such 
as access control logs and supervisor monitoring).128 As Wall comments, these inherent 
technological capabilities can generate a range of ‘automated active policing tools that 
seek to identify wrongdoing’.129 An example can be found in ‘honeynets’.130 These 
honeynets contain a number of ‘honeypots’ which are traps set to detect attempts at 
unauthorised access. The honeypots generally consist of a computer, data or site that 
appears to be part of a legitimate network and which  seems to contain information or 
a resource that would be of value to attackers. However these honeypots are isolated, 
deliberately unprotected, and monitored. They socially engineer users to access them 
and pass through various levels of security, indicating their assent and willingness to 
proceed at each stage. Eventually, their details are recorded and, where appropriate, 
investigated. For Wall: 
Their purpose is to acquire intelligence about criminality, but also 
simultaneously to create a preventative ‘chilling effect’ which, through the 
awareness of being surveilled, tempers the actions of consumers of child 
pornography, fraudsters, spammers and hackers.131 
However, technological responses to computer misuse must balance policeability and 
security with fundamental rights such as privacy. For example, the ‘Clipper chip’ was 
developed and promoted by the US Government as an encryption device to be adopted 
by telecommunications companies for voice transmission. However, the nature of 
encryption is such that the same technology enables both confidentiality and 
surveillance. The Clipper chip simultaneously encrypted communications whilst 
permitting government to unscramble them ‘through a back door’.132 The chip 
transmitted a 128-bit ‘Law Enforcement Access Field’ that contained the information 
necessary to recover the encryption key provided that government agencies had 
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established their authority to listen to a particular communication. In this instance, 
technological policeability created the electronic panopticon.133  
However, encryption technology provides many advantages of privacy and security to 
users.134 While encryption technology has many legitimate purposes,135 it can also 
circumvent the legal powers of interception afforded to the state.136 As Akdeniz and 
Walker comment, such technology ‘can be so effective against oversight that law 
enforcement agencies have begun to voice concerns about the viability of future crime 
detection in cyberspace’.137 For Baker and Hurst: 
…cryptography surely is the best of technologies and the worst of technologies. 
It will stop crimes, and it will create new crimes. It will undermine 
dictatorships, and it will drive them to new excuses. It will make us all 
anonymous, and will track our every transaction.138 
It has been suggested, that, on balance, that state access to encryption keys would 
hinder the development of electronic commerce and infringe the individual rights of 
privacy and freedom of speech. Indeed, for Akdeniz and Walker: 
…there is no compelling state interest in such an invasion of privacy, as the 
perpetrators [in cases of Internet ‘misuse’] have been detected and evidence 
gathered without any new powers to survey or search.139 
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Even though it would not be prohibitively costly or technologically complex, encryption 
technology is not routinely embedded within software. However, Pretty Good Privacy 
(PGP) software which provides public-key cryptography and authentication is freely 
available and has proved problematic to law enforcement. In Re Boucher,140 US customs 
authorities seized a laptop computer containing encrypted files which allegedly 
contained child pornography images. The state was unable to access the files and 
subpoenaed the defendant to provide the key. The Vermont District Court held that 
forcing the defendant to reveal his PGP key would violate his right not to incriminate 
himself under the Fifth Amendment and quashed the subpoena accordingly. The 
decision is currently under further appeal brought by the prosecution. 
Although the routine use of encryption technology would help to protect the law-
abiding majority and promote safer electronic commerce, an inevitable tension between 
private and public interests will remain. The investigative and surveillance desires of the 
state will try to resist more widespread use of encryption technology even though it has 
been argued that the state does not require any such new surveillance powers to achieve 
its aims. Here, in Lessig’s terminology, West Coast Code may be used to thwart (or at 
least provide a check on) East Coast Code. 
A further potential means of regulation through technology can be found in software 
development standards. These originated within military applications,141 but are now of 
increasing importance in commercial development.142 The predominant international 
standard is ISO/IEC 12207, introduced in 1995 and revised in 2008, which: 
…establishes a common framework for software life cycle processes, with well-
defined terminology, that can be referenced by the software industry. It 
contains processes, activities, and tasks that are to be applied during the 
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acquisition of a software product or service and during the supply, 
development, operation, maintenance and disposal of software products.143  
The United States has its own adaptation of the ‘international standard’144 which it 
developed in collaboration with the Department of Defense to include more rigorous 
extended compliance requirements. The UK and Swedish software industry supports 
the TickIT145 scheme which is based upon the generic quality standard of ISO 9001146 
applied to the processes of software development. The use of such standards is not 
mandatory, although may be a contractual requirement, particularly in public 
procurement exercises. For example, the core pre-qualification questionnaire produced 
by the Office of Government Contracts for evaluation of competitive tender responses 
asks any potential supplier to provide evidence of ‘ISO 9000147 or equivalent’148 or an 
explanation as to why it is unable to do so.  
International standards are voluntary and market-driven. The requirements are fed into 
the International Standards Organisation through national member bodies. In the case 
of the UK, this is the British Standards Institution, which works with manufacturing 
and service industries, businesses, governments and consumers to facilitate the 
production of British, European and international standards. It also has a ‘close working 
relationship with the UK government, primarily through the Department for 
Innovation, University and Skills’.149 Government therefore has a role to play in setting 
domestic and international standards although as part of what is essentially a 
governance network taking both public and private interests into account. As part of 
the overall regulatory response to computer misuse, standard setting becomes a network 
within a network. 
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Microsoft could also be considered to be exercising forms of technical governance. 
Since Microsoft has over 90 per cent of the global operating system market share,150 it 
can pursue its own technological agenda. Many of its software updates are to address 
security vulnerabilities and, for many ‘average’ users, the system of updates works well 
provided that it is activated and configured accordingly. Given Microsoft’s market 
dominance, its software updates could be viewed as a means of universal governance 
rather than purely as a customer service activity. Microsoft’s governance derives its 
power from commercial (rather then political) origins, but may still be considered as a 
top-down means of governance. 
In summary, top-down development of code can provide a means of control over 
technology. However, from the bottom-up, open code provides a check on state or 
monopolistic power to regulate through code. As Lessig argues, even if open code does 
not disable government power to regulate, it changes that power: 
[Open code] is an important – some might say an essential – check on the 
power of government…Regulability is conditional on the character of the code 
and open code changes that character. It is a limit on government’s power to 
regulate – not necessarily defeating the power to regulate, but changing it.151 
Regulation through code, then, becomes a further extra-legal mode of governance. 
Within the functional regulatory framework, it can be initiated from the top-down in 
furtherance of state-led or industry-led initiatives (via closed code, or embedded 
software within hardware devices) or from the bottom-up via decentralised emerging 
norms that are, to a certain extent, resistant to state control.152  
7.5 Conclusion 
There are several advantages inherent in extra-legal governance. In particular, extra-
legal measures have a flexibility and responsiveness that is generally lacking from the 
slower-moving legislative response. From the perspective of the general end-user, extra-
legal mechanisms are less confrontational than the direct use of the law. As such, they 
tend to encourage and cajole participation rather than mandating it. Extra-legal 
responses may also act as a voice to the individual, explaining the issues and providing 
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advice in a language that is more readily understood. Technical solutions may simply 
work quietly in the background providing protection without the user being aware of 
their existence until a threat is uncovered. 
There is, of course, the prospect of the state indirectly influencing the steering of the 
overall governance network towards its own ends. This is not necessarily undesirable. 
Indeed, it is a general principle of governance theory that an effective networked 
regulatory response will cross the divide between public and private. However, where 
the hand of the state pushes the network in a direction that has the potential for 
interfering with private rights then it is crucial in the interests of legitimacy and 
accountability that this is done in a proportionate and transparent manner.  
Extra-legal responses to computer misuse are viable, but their success is dependent 
upon the extent to which private organisations and individuals engage with them. There 
is currently a general lack of awareness of many extra-legal initiatives which naturally 
limits their impact. It is only by more active participation that their potential will be 
realised. This participation requires an assumption of self-reliance and self-
responsibility; that is, a conscious acknowledgement that state-led legal responses alone 
are insufficient and that potential victims of computer misuse must therefore take steps 
to protect themselves. In turn, many of these steps requires a level of technical 
competence that may be beyond most likely victims; that is, the naïve end-users. 
This problem is compounded by the speed at which technology advances. While the 
relatively informal nature of discussion forums and information-sharing mechanisms 
can deal well with this dynamic, the most vulnerable targets of computer misuse are 
usually outside their reach and continue computing in ignorance. By way of analogy, the 
public realises that the existence of section 9 of the Theft Act 1968 will not prevent 
their homes from being burgled. Despite the existence of a very clear piece of law, 
individuals take responsibility for the protection of their own property, tacitly 
acknowledging that the legal response is insufficient and fitting locks to their doors. 
The difference here is that door locks have been the mechanism for preventing 
unwanted access for generations.153 Although locks themselves might have become more 
sophisticated pieces of engineering, their premise remains the same and is readily 
understood. Their operation is also largely the same. Even though it is perfectly 
technically possible to engineer potentially more secure locks at accessible pricing, such 
electronic key pads or biometrically-operated mechanisms are not in widespread public 
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use. Their unfamiliarity arouses suspicion and insecurity compared to the more familiar 
key. With computing, the forms of protection required are relatively new (certainly 
when compared with physical locks) and change on a very frequent basis. In order to 
assume responsibility for its own protection against computer misuse, the general public 
would be required to assume the skills of an expert locksmith with daily refresher 
training. Of course, this frequent and periodic update may be facilitated through 
software, but such software still needs to be installed and configured which requires a 
certain level of technical competence and inclination on the part of the user. 
Extra-legal responses may be further criticised for their lack of enforcement capability 
(in the criminal justice and policing sense) and their lack of uniformity, neither of 
which are problematic for legislative responses. This does not, however, fatally 
undermine their value.  
Regulatory approaches are not new. As Walker comments in relation to a regulatory 
approach to governance of the physical security of the critical national infrastructure: 
Regulatory approaches, which are built on networks of governance and are 
sensitive to the interests and cost burdens of the private sector have long been 
established and have been applied, for example, to the design of cities and 
buildings, to airport security and to commercial insurance against terrorism.154 
Similar rounded regulatory approaches have also been taken in respect of certain 
technologies and industries. For instance, the Information Commissioner exists as an 
independent official appointed by the Crown and reporting annually to Parliament to 
oversee the operation of the Data Protection Act 1998, the Freedom of Information Act 
2000 and the Environmental Information Regulations 2004. The Commissioner’s 
decisions are subject to the supervision of the courts and the Information Tribunal. 
Similarly, Ofcom exists as an independent regulator for the UK communications 
industries, with responsibilities across television, radio, telecommunications and 
wireless communications services. The Financial Services Authority (FSA) is an 
independent non-governmental body that regulates the financial services industry in the 
UK, holding a wide range of rule-making, investigatory and enforcement powers. These 
bodies each have various enforcement powers: failure to comply with notices served by 
the Information Commissioner may be dealt with as though the public authority 
concerned had committed contempt of court; Ofcom may impose enforceable 
penalties155 and the FSA can discipline authorised firms and people, impose penalties for 
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market abuse, apply to the Court for injunction and restitution orders; and prosecute 
various offences.156 Each of them may also make recommendations for issues that may 
require criminal legislation. Networked responses have also been proposed for policing 
online behaviour.157 However, each of these regulatory structures operates within a 
framework of law whilst maintaining a degree of autonomy and flexibility. 
In summary, there is a role for extra-legal functions and institutions within the 
governance networked response to computer misuse. These functions and institutions 
are primarily of private, rather than state origin. They therefore require an assumption 
of self-reliance and responsibility from individuals and may need further technical 
capability in order fully to realise their potential. However they are flexible, responsive, 
reflexive and may transcend national borders. They are a complement to legal 
responses, requiring a certain degree of legal guidance in order to maximise their 
efficacy. 
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Part 3    
Examining the solution 
  
8 
The constellation of control 
 
None of us is as smart as all of us. 
Phil Condit, Chairman of Boeing (1941- ) 
 
This chapter will offer some critical reflection on the study, including a discussion of its 
possible limitations. It will also identify possible avenues for future research, before 
summarising the findings of the preceding chapters and providing a final evaluation of 
the central thesis as a whole. 
8.1 Critical reflections, limitations and future research 
This study has explored the governance and regulation of computer misuse within the 
boundaries of time, extent and cost associated with doctoral research. As such, it has 
required a conscious effort to bound its scope. In particular, the fieldwork component 
involved a relatively small number of participants. These participants were chosen for 
their expertise, thereby maximising the potential insight and value that they could add 
to the study as a whole. While this was beneficial, it did not allow the possibility of any 
meaningful quantitative analysis. Moreover, the interviews did not engage directly with 
the general public. It may therefore prove illuminating to embark upon a broader 
attitudinal survey of public awareness, responsibility and technical competence in 
relation to computer misuse, using sample sizes which would enable meaningful 
statistical analysis. This analysis would be particularly useful given the public 
engagement necessary to maximise the effectiveness of extra-legal responses within the 
constellation of control. It would also offer a potential yardstick by which the 
individual impact of certain measures may be evaluated periodically. Similarly, this 
study has not considered the broader criminological aspects of the deviant behaviour 
associated with computer misuse such as the motivations of the perpetrators.  
Within the scope of this study, it has not been possible to undertake comparisons of 
the legislative position in England and Wales within that in other jurisdictions. 
Although many cognate jurisdictions based their initial computer misuse laws on the 
Computer Misuse Act 1990, it may be illuminating to survey how other states have 
approached the legal issues and to compare the efficacy of their attempts with that of 
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England and Wales. Potential comparators include Singapore, Malaysia, Canada, 
Australia, New Zealand and the United States (with emphasis on state rather than 
federal regulation). These are all common law jurisdictions in which computer misuse 
has been identified as problematic and which have comparable socio-demographic and 
economic factors to those of England and Wales. Equally it would be interesting to 
investigate whether any of these states provides innovative extra-legal measures in 
response to the problem. 
Should the amendments to the Computer Misuse Act 1990 introduced by the Police and 
Justice Act 2006 come fully into force, it will be interesting to monitor the extent to 
which the new provisions are used and to survey any novel issues of interpretation 
which may arise in the domestic courts. 
Finally, this study has not considered whether it might be preferable to evolve a new 
generation of computer law specifically aimed at the particular mischief of computer 
misuse, whether the law should regulate the various types of computer misuse 
pervasively within the framework of existing criminal offences or whether the law 
should combine (as it does at present) both ‘traditional’ and computer misuse offences. 
8.2 Principal research findings 
Within the bounds discussed in the previous section, this study set out to answer six 
principal research questions. Each of these was considered in a separate chapter.  
8.2.1 What is meant by computer misuse and did it present a problem for the 
domestic law? If so, how did the law respond? 
Chapter 2 considered the history of the domestic criminal law in relation to the history 
of computing. From the very earliest calculating machines to the late 1980s, the 
principal technological advancements were in capacity (both storage and processing 
power), user-friendliness (and hence accessibility) and networking (both the 
technological networks of interconnected computers and the social networks of user 
communities). Computer technology moved from the realm of the specialist and the 
scientist into private industry and the home. It consequently became part of the wider 
public consciousness. As a result of the increasing accessibility of the technology, in 
terms of both enhanced usability and decreased cost of acquisition, the technical 
capability of the average computer user has diminished. This collective diminution in 
general computing skill levels gave rise to a knowledge gap between the expert and non-
expert user, the exploitation of which acted as a facilitator and driver of computer 
misuse. Moreover, even the more technologically-aware user became vulnerable. By 
1990, computing had become relatively routine and relied upon and technology was 
often being used by experts without adequate thought for their own protection. The 
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banal nature of high-powered computing rendered an extra vulnerability, or, in other 
words, familiarity bred contempt. 
The unauthorised use of this new technology grew in parallel with the advances in the 
technology itself. In particular, with the growth in networking capability and the 
consequent ability for computers to be accessed remotely, malicious hackers and virus 
writers emerged throughout the 1980s. These risks prompted a level of increased public 
concern. The domestic criminal law was able to deal with some of the problems 
resulting from computer misuse before the Computer Misuse Act 1990, primarily 
through (often creative) use of the law relating to criminal damage. However, the 
failure of the Forgery and Counterfeiting Act 1981 in relation to the unauthorised 
access to the BT Prestel system by Gold and Schifreen and the findings of the both the 
Scottish Law Commission and the Law Commission of England and Wales led to the 
enactment of the Computer Misuse Act 1990. This created three new offences: 
unauthorised access to computer material, unauthorised access to computer material 
with the intent to commit or facilitate further offences and unauthorised modification 
of computer material. 
Although computer misuse may be framed in terms of unauthorised or unethical use of 
technology, this definition remains both technologically and socially relative. That is, 
what is unauthorised or unethical depends on the nature and capability of the 
technology itself as well as the collective viewpoint of its users. As technology advances 
in complexity and sophistication, then the ambit of its potential misuse will also 
change. This may also bring it outside the scope of the criminal law itself, as seen in 
Gold and Schifreen. The options for the law were to continue to stretch the 
interpretation of the existing criminal law in order to catch previously unforeseen 
circumstances or to draft a new statute to deal with the issue. It follows that: 
Computer misuse, which is a fluid term encapsulating the unauthorised or unethical use 
of technology, presented problems for the domestic law prior to 1990. The law 
responded via the enactment of the Computer Misuse Act 1990 which created three 
new criminal offences aimed at malicious hackers and virus writers. 
8.2.2 Was the Computer Misuse Act 1990 an effective response to computer misuse 
and has it stood the test of time? 
Chapter 3 continued the discussion of computer technology and computer misuse 
begun in Chapter 2 from 1990 to the present day and examined the practical operation 
of the 1990 Act. It demonstrated that the 1990 Act has produced relatively low 
prosecution rates while the instances of computer misuse have risen significantly. It 
seems that the Act itself has been exercised relatively lightly in comparison to the 
expansion of the problem. However, it is often the case that alternative means of 
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redress are used against perpetrators of computer misuse. For computer misuse 
committed by insiders, many commercial organisations believe that they would not 
benefit from bringing a prosecution under the 1990 Act, relying instead on internal 
disciplinary measures as a private sanction. There is no prospect of restitutionary 
damages or compensation for loss in a criminal prosecution under the Act which may 
dissuade victims from invoking the criminal law over private action which has the added 
advantage of not publicising breaches of security. A further problem lies in the fact 
that, for many victims, there is a general perception that no law has been broken and 
therefore the case goes unreported. The 1990 Act also suffers as a result of relatively 
limited expert resources within the criminal justice system. Since computer misuse can 
be problematic to investigate or prosecute then victims are also less inclined to report.  
The 1990 Act has also given rise to some curious interpretational difficulties particularly 
in relation to newer examples of computer misuse which were unforeseen at the time of 
its enactment. Its application to denial-of-service attacks in Lennon and the 
unauthorised access in Cuthbert seemed inconsistent and contrary to the intention of 
the Act. That is not to say that the 1990 Act is devoid of merit. It may have had a 
deterrent effect which is unquantifiable. However, the low prosecution rates and 
interpretational difficulties suggest that there may be other legal avenues which are 
pursued in situations where the 1990 Act might have been applied. There is a range of 
possibilities here both in statute and at common law. 
The common law offence of misconduct in public office is an apposite choice for 
prosecutors in cases where public servants (in particular, police officers) have accessed 
computer systems without authorisation. As a common law offence, it carries a penalty 
of up to life imprisonment and is therefore more attractive in the more serious cases 
where the conduct merits a penalty well in excess of that available under the 1990 Act. 
It also avoids many of the definitional problems within the 1990 Act. There are a 
number of potential statutory alternatives which can be found in the Theft Act 1968, 
Data Protection Act 1998, Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, Malicious 
Communications Act 1988 (as amended), Communications Act 2003, Terrorism Act 
2000 (as amended) and the Fraud Act 2006. The law in this area is somewhat fragmented 
and overlapping.  
The Police and Justice Act 2006 introduced three amendments to the 1990 Act, largely 
driven by the uncertainty in relation to denial-of-service attacks and the UK’s 
obligations under the EU Council Framework Decision on attacks against information 
systems and as a signatory to the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime. First, 
the unauthorised access offence is broadened and attracts an increased tariff. The 
unauthorised modification offence is replaced by a new provision concerning 
unauthorised acts with intent to impair the operation of a computer. Finally, a new 
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offence is introduced to criminalise the production, supply or acquisition of articles for 
use in computer misuse offences. However, these new provisions have been criticised on 
the basis that they are drafted in such a way that they might criminalise desirable 
activity, such as software penetration testing. There are currently no cases on the 
potentially contentious points. 
It may be doubted, given the history of the 1990 Act, whether these new provisions 
would have a significant effect if they are brought into force. This is not because of 
problematic drafting or that the Act misses the point of the problem. It may be that 
computer misuse is not amenable to governance by the domestic criminal law alone. 
Therefore: 
The Computer Misuse Act 1990 has produced relatively low prosecution rates, as well 
as instances of inconsistent application and the use of alternative bases for prosecution. 
That is not to say that it has been ineffective, but it is undoubtedly true that computer 
misuse remains a current issue. The 1990 Act has stood the test of time reasonably well, 
although new instances of misuse culminated in its amendment sixteen years on. It may 
be that computer misuse is not amenable to governance by the domestic criminal law 
alone.  
8.2.3 Does the effective regulation of computer misuse require more than just a 
response in domestic criminal law? 
Chapter 4 reflected upon the characteristics and purpose of the criminal law from a 
range of perspectives and its application to computer misuse in particular. In many 
cases, computer misuse is not generally perceived as causing significant harm. Computer 
misuse often comprises so-called de minimis harm which may be transient, 
inconvenient, trifling, secret, latent or hidden. This does not sit easily with the 
instrumentalist construction of the criminal law in which the criminal law exists to 
protect a set of interests from substantial harm. Equally, from a consensus perspective 
where criminal behaviour is determined by reference to a set of commonly-agreed social 
norms, computer misuse would not be a candidate for criminalisation unless it crossed 
the threshold of seriousness that rendered it harmful to others or society. However, 
these constructions would justify the use of the domestic criminal law for those 
instances of computer misuse which posed a threat to public safety or national security. 
Such instances would naturally fall within the remit of criminal legislation other than 
the Computer Misuse Act 1990. For example, the anti-terrorism legislation would be 
more likely to be employed in these cases since it is accompanied by enhanced police 
powers of investigation and greater limits on sentencing. 
Computer misuse is also problematic from a moralistic standpoint, since society in 
general does not consider the behaviour of the misusers to be particularly immoral. This 
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viewpoint may arise from the relationship between (mis)users and the technology, in 
which conventional moral rules and norms do not always apply. However, there is some 
support for the criminalisation of computer misuse from a structural conflict point of 
view which protects both political and economic power. The economic cost associated 
with computer misuse was a key political driver behind the enactment of the 1990 Act 
and was reiterated in the debates leading to its amendment via the Police and Justice 
Act 2006. However, while many businesses choose to protect their interests via 
alternatives to the criminal law, it must be questioned why the criminal law has not 
done more to protect those interests. As such, structural conflict theory alone does not 
provide a complete explanation. Interactionist theory suggests that moral entrepreneurs 
constructed computer misuse (which was initially considered to be harmless at worst 
and positively beneficial at best) as a sufficient risk in the late 1980s to justify the 
passage of the 1990 Act. Social pressure was brought to bear by actors with less overtly 
political positions to protect, although for the conflict theorists, this would be an 
exercise in the protection of political capitalism. 
Each theoretical standpoint suffers to a greater or lesser extent from inadequacies. It is 
therefore difficult to propose a single coherent theoretical basis for the criminalisation 
of computer misuse. However, the domestic criminal law is still considered to be an 
appropriate vehicle for the regulation of computer misuse, although, as has already been 
discussed, it is not exercised particularly vigorously. 
The criminal law demands certainty. It follows, then, that the criminal law might have 
especial difficulty in dealing with uncertain subject matter. Since it has already been 
established that computer misuse suffers from an inherent fluidity and ill-definition 
which results from its technological relativity, then it is reasonable to conclude that it 
may be problematic for the criminal law to provide effective regulation by itself. 
Moreover, save for the serous instances already mentioned, computer misuse is 
generally constructed as a private rather than a public wrong. Victims are more likely to 
seek private remedies than to pursue criminal charges, even if the police were amenable 
to proceeding. Jurisdiction presents a further issue. The criminal law is traditionally 
associated with sovereignty and states have traditionally not taken interest in criminal 
activities beyond national borders. Since computer misuse often originates outside the 
UK, this renders the use of the domestic criminal law cumbersome and unattractive as a 
means of control, except, as before, where there is a threat to national security for 
which extradition proceedings are employed. 
In summary, the domestic criminal law is an appropriate response to computer misuse 
which has the potential to cause serious harm or loss or a threat to national security. It 
may also be useful where the computer misuse is entirely within national boundaries, 
although this is an increasingly-uncommon circumstance. This is consistent with the 
  
278 
role of the criminal law dealing with significant issues of public concern within the 
domestic jurisdiction. However, computer misuse is uncertain in definition, fluid in 
nature and generally viewed as a private wrong. It often causes bulk de minimis harm 
and is not generally considered to be immoral. These aspects of its nature are 
inconsistent with the desire of the criminal law for certainty and its traditional concerns 
for upholding public morality and protecting against substantial harm and public 
wrongdoing. Hence: 
There are a number of incompatibilities between the nature of computer misuse and 
the nature of the domestic criminal law. Therefore the effective regulation of computer 
misuse may require more than just the domestic criminal law alone.  
8.2.4 How do theories of risk and governance apply to computer misuse and the 
domestic criminal law? 
Chapter 5 considered theories relating to risk from various theoretical perspectives. 
There are a range of possible responses to risk. These include introducing 
countermeasures which minimise the probability of the risk occurring or the severity of 
its consequences. Alternatively, management of the risk may be transferred to a third 
party via insurance. In some cases, no action may be taken if the risk is unlikely and its 
consequences tolerable, or the cost or practicability of precautions are prohibitive. 
From a realist perspective, risk is considered in terms of probability and consequences 
and insurance may be taken against those risks. The deterrent effect of domestic 
criminal law could be considered to act as some form of collective social insurance 
against the risks associated with computer misuse. However, the criminal law does not 
protect individuals from the consequences of the materialised risk nor does it usually 
provide financial restoration or the ability to substitute new resources. In any event, the 
state is increasingly withdrawing its responsibility for individual welfare, focusing 
instead on predominantly public interests. The domestic criminal law is readily useful as 
a tool to protect such interests, in keeping with the state’s role as an insurer of last 
resort, but it is of less utility to the protection of individuals. Individuals therefore need 
to take a more active approach to ensuring their own security. The domestic criminal 
law does not significantly reduce the incentive for the computer user to take care to 
avoid loss. As such it does not represent a significant moral hazard. This is evidenced by 
the range of security hardware and software which is available. Individuals take personal 
responsibility for computer security despite the presence of the domestic criminal law. 
Moreover, from the cultural and symbolic constructionist perspective, the domestic 
criminal law is either predominantly marginal or restricted to instances of computer 
misuse which carry severe consequences. It is only unequivocally desirable to those who 
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consider the domestic criminal law to be an appropriate response to any form of risk 
which threatened disorder or harm. 
In the critical structuralist risk society, the domestic criminal law is an established 
safety system used by the state to define the boundaries of acceptable conduct and to 
regulate behaviour by reference to those boundaries. However, the proliferation of 
technology-related risks and the increased public awareness of those risks has created a 
level of state protection which is unsustainable. Therefore technology itself may be 
deployed in managing the risks associated with computer misuse. However, in the risk 
society, technological responses to technical risk reflexively generate more risks, 
ultimately propagating pandemic risks which inherently tend towards globalisation. As 
such, a domestic response to these risks will necessarily be incomplete. The regulatory 
state approach manages the distribution of such risks rather than their control. Within 
this the role of the domestic criminal law is one of management and guidance rather 
than one of direct control. 
From the governmentality standpoint, both direct and indirect strategies of control may 
be employed, combining autonomous individual responsibility and coercive state 
control. Governmentality approaches manage risk via a combination of state and private 
actors, emphasising autonomous self-management, self-protection and self-
responsibility. Here the domestic criminal law as a tool of state intervention has less 
prominence. Therefore, regardless of epistemological position, the withdrawal of the 
state in the management of risk leads to a conclusion that the use of the domestic 
criminal law cannot provide a complete solution to computer misuse risk. This is in 
accord with the analysis performed on the basis of the nature of computer misuse and 
the nature of the criminal law. Again, however, this does not mean that the domestic 
criminal law has no part to play in response to these technological risks. It may be used 
as part of a network of control. 
Governance theory is concerned with the control of complex systems within a 
framework including both state and private institutions and practices. Since computer 
misuse is often construed as a private wrong then it follows that private control 
measures might be appropriate in the management of associated risk. Although the 
state retains its capacity to legislate directly in matters of public concern by the use of 
the domestic criminal law in such a framework, it does not appear to have been 
deployed in a precautionary sense. As such the state does not generally consider 
computer misuse to be a prime area of responsibility. Moreover, the domestic criminal 
law is prescriptive, rather than network-cooperative, and is unsuitable as a 
precautionary tool, save for its deterrent effect. With the exception of attempted 
offences, it also comes into operation ex post rather than ex ante. In summary: 
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Theories of risk and governance can be applied to explain the limitations of the 
domestic criminal law in the context of computer misuse. However, they also open up 
the potential for alternative network-reliant strategies of control to be explored and 
exploited. The domestic criminal law is therefore best placed within a broader 
framework of governance in relation to the control of computer misuse risks as a tool 
of management and guidance as well as a tool of direct coercion. 
8.2.5 What is the role of the law in the governance of computer misuse? 
Chapter 6 examined the role of the law in general within the governance framework 
introduced in Chapter 5. Governance approaches encompass both public and private 
institutions and practices. The law falls into the public part of the governance 
framework, requiring or recommending legislative (state) responses. The role of the 
domestic criminal law within this governance framework was examined in Chapter 5. 
However, there are also a number of legal initiatives originating from beyond the 
boundaries of the nation state. The extent to which these measures are binding upon 
the UK is variable, ranging from the mandatory obligations imposed by the European 
Union, through the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime which binds states 
which choose to ratify it, to recommendations from the Commonwealth, the UN and 
the G8. 
Legal harmonisation initiatives beyond the domestic criminal law are attractive in 
promoting broadly-shared good principles and facilitating cross-border networked co-
operation in response to networked risks. However, these initiatives come at the 
expense of some degree of national sovereignty and, as such, become politicised. 
Harmonisation will be more successful between states with similar values and will 
experience difficulty where there are fundamental conflicts or where one state is not 
especially concerned about computer misuse. Therefore, the uniform adoption of a 
minimum framework of criminal laws with defined mechanisms of international co-
operation in investigation and prosecution is highly unlikely. The problem of achieving 
international harmony is highlighted in the piecemeal adoption of the Council of 
Europe Convention on Cybercrime. However, this is not to say that such 
intergovernmental systems cannot be effective. In the context of terrorism, for 
instance, the global desire to achieve effective laws against the financing of terrorist 
activity was achieved through a two-fold mechanism. This mechanism involves 
oversight by the Counter Terrorism Committee, to which all countries report and 
which facilitates counter-terrorism technical assistance from richer to poorer countries. 
It is feasible that a similar model could be applied to computer misuse with the 
establishment of a co-ordinating body coupled with the provision of technical 
assistance. However, the anti-terrorism initiative only gained the political impetus to 
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bring it into being following the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001. It is therefore 
unlikely that such a co-ordinated international approach to computer misuse would be 
precipitated without an event of similar magnitude. The notion of international 
technical aid, facilitated by a co-ordinating international body remains attractive. 
A limitation of international legal initiatives lies in their impact upon the individual. 
Any impact is brought to bear via indirect intergovernmental policy networks rather 
than by the direct use of domestic criminal law and, as such, these initiatives offer less 
direct protection to individuals. However, there is still value in the various international 
legal responses to computer misuse. While these responses might not be the most 
nimble or reflexive, they do offer a legislative framework which assists in the overall 
response network, but, as with the domestic criminal law, cannot offer a complete 
solution. Indeed, many of the originating institutions have offered extra-legal proposals 
by way of response. There are also other private and technological strategies which 
must be considered. These extra-legal mechanisms do not conflict with national 
sovereignty in the way that the law does. They are also consistent with the trend of 
reducing state intervention in managing complex or networked risks. They are also 
more likely to be able to address individuals directly. Therefore: 
Legal initiatives beyond the domestic criminal law also have a role to play in the control 
of computer misuse. They offer a certain degree of harmonisation and help to enable 
the international co-operation required in response to computer misuse risks 
transcending national boundaries. However, they are problematic in terms of 
sovereignty and have limited direct impact on the individual. Moreover, they are not 
especially flexible or reflexive and their adoption is not always mandatory. The role of 
the law in the governance of computer misuse is therefore to facilitate co-operation and 
enforcement between nation states within the public part of the overall governance 
framework. This may extend to the provision of technical assistance. 
8.2.6 Can extra-legal approaches provide an effective response to computer misuse? 
Chapter 7 broadened the discussion followed in Chapter 6 from the role of the law in 
response to computer misuse to include extra-legal responses. Extra-legal responses 
have several advantages. They are generally more flexible and responsive than their legal 
counterparts, less confrontational and can act as a voice to the individual. As such, they 
can provide a viable and potentially effective response to computer misuse. However, 
they are dependent upon the extent to which private organisations and individuals 
engage with them. A lack of awareness of their very existence will also limit their 
success. Therefore their success is predicated on an assumption of self-reliance and self-
responsibility from the users of the technology itself. This will require an 
acknowledgement that legal responses, whether domestic or international, cannot 
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provide a complete solution by themselves. It will also need a level of technical 
competence sufficient to take countermeasures or to understand and act on warnings 
and advisory notices. 
Against a backdrop of rapid technological change, new risks are promulgated just as 
rapidly. Informal discussion forums and information-sharing mechanisms can deal with 
dynamically-changing and complex technological environments, although the most 
vulnerable targets are often outside of these discussion communities. The existence of 
discussion and advisory groups is nothing new. There were discussion networks 
established between experts and enthusiasts in the very early days of computing. 
However, at that time, those outside the group did not need to know or understand 
what the group was discussing since they were not personally involved with or at risk 
from the technology. Nowadays, computing is widespread and the technology is in the 
care of the unaware. A level of awareness, technological education and training is 
therefore necessary to maximise the reach (and hence the effectiveness) of many extra-
legal responses. Regulation through technology currently requires a certain level of 
competence and inclination on the part of the user. However, the technology itself 
could evolve in such a way that its protection becomes increasingly transparent to the 
user, thereby minimising the need for action or technical knowledge. This is seen to a 
certain extent in the provision of automatic updates from the key vendors, Microsoft 
and Apple, as well as frequent updates to the wide variety of protection software suites 
that are commercially available. While there still require some set-up on the part of the 
user, the level of skill needed is decreasing and may ultimately tend towards self-
configuring, self-diagnosing, self-protecting systems facilitated by the very same 
networking technology that rendered them more vulnerable to attack in the first 
instance. 
Extra-legal responses may be further criticised for a lack of enforcement capability and 
a lack of uniformity in application, accessibility and coverage. Although none of these 
criticisms presents problems for legal responses, technological responses have the 
capability to be uniformly available and will enforce the extra-legal rules contained 
within them. In summary: 
Extra-legal functions and institutions form a further part of the networked governance 
response to computer misuse. These represent predominantly private, rather than state, 
interests. As such, they require an assumption of self-reliance and may require a certain 
level of technical ability to maximise their effectiveness. Although they may be limited 
in terms of enforcement, uniformity and accessibility, they have the key advantages of 
flexibility and responsiveness whilst transcending national borders. They do, however, 
require a certain level of interaction with legal responses to realise their full potential. 
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8.3 Conclusion on central thesis 
As computer technology and computer misuse evolved, certain forms of behaviour 
presented problems for the law of England and Wales. These problems arose from the 
difficulty in encapsulating new forms of wrongdoing within the parameters of the 
existing criminal law. By way of response, the Computer Misuse Act 1990 was 
introduced which has remained (with some recent amendment) the predominant piece 
of domestic criminal law dealing with criminal computer misuse. The 1990 Act has, 
however, produced relatively low prosecution rates, been inconsistent in application 
and has not always been used as a basis for prosecution where it might have been 
possible to do so. Computer misuse remains a current problem. Therefore it must be 
questioned whether the domestic criminal law alone is a suitable tool of regulation. 
Indeed, many of the characteristics of computer misuse are incompatible with those of 
the domestic criminal law. In particular, computer misuse can be trans-jurisdictional. It 
often causes only transient or trifling harm and is not generally considered to be 
especially immoral or a matter of public concern. Its definition is uncertain and fluid. 
By contrast, the domestic criminal law focuses on the domestic landscape, concerned 
with preventing substantial harm and public wrong, upholding morality and demanding 
certainty. 
A broader perspective of risk and governance can be applied to the problems associated 
with computer misuse. Within this governance framework, the domestic criminal law 
still has limitations, but is not redundant. It has a role to play in protecting those 
interests within its ambit, as a symbolic tool of deterrence and as a practical tool of 
management and guidance. The governance framework opens up alternative network-
reliant means of control. From a legal standpoint, international harmonisation 
initiatives fit within the governance framework to facilitate international co-operation 
and enforcement. However, nation states are not uniformly compelled to adopt such 
measures. They present problems of competing sovereignty, have limited direct impact 
on the individual and are resistant to swift reflexive change. Extra-legal initiatives 
complement the legal initiatives, upholding private interests whilst retaining the 
flexibility required to respond to rapid change. However, they are not uniformly 
available, require the assumption of personal responsibility and a certain degree of 
technical capability. 
It is clear that no single response mechanism will provide an entire solution to the 
problems posed by the misuse of computer technology. Each mechanism comes with its 
own limitations. However, each mechanism also offers benefits that the others do not. 
The governance network enables the domestic criminal law, the broader law and extra-
legal responses to work together such they form a holistic response to computer misuse: 
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the constellation of control. The role of the law within this network is to enable and 
facilitate the framework within which non-legal nodes of governance operate whilst 
balancing the needs of the individual and the state. The framework thus requires 
certain statutory provisions to operate but cannot rely wholly on the direct use of the 
law. Instead, the non-legal nodes must be allowed to develop and propagate flexible 
responses to new problems while the state remains accountable for the steering of the 
network as a whole.  
The response to computer misuse is gestalt. It is greater than the sum of its parts and is 
not defined in terms of a rigid legal template, a problem-independent set of instructions 
or a collection of overriding private interests. It emerges instead from the complex 
interplay between the natural tensions within law, society and technology. Just as 
computers have moved from being standalone discrete systems to complex networked 
systems, then the response to computer misuse has also moved from the use of the 
domestic law to a diffuse model of governance within which the domestic law is but 
one regulatory node. There is, however, a role for a central authority to marshal and co-
ordinate the various regulators, so that their reach and effectiveness is maximised 
without compromising individual agendas.  
In conclusion: 
There are a number of incompatibilities between the nature of computer misuse and 
the nature of the criminal law. This means that computer misuse cannot be regulated 
effectively by the criminal law alone. Such regulation requires a reflexive and cohesive 
approach which is only viable in a global networked society by a networked response 
combining nodes of both legal and extra-legal governance: the constellation of control. 
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Appendix A    
Fieldwork 
Interview guide 
Introduction 
Thank you for agreeing to participate in this interview. As I mentioned in the invitation 
letter, my PhD research at the University of Leeds concerns the response to computer 
misuse and puts forward a range of different perspectives on the issues. It is vitally 
important that these theories are tested by gathering and applying the views of a wide 
range of experienced professionals. The purpose of this interview is to explore your 
experience of computer misuse and to seek your opinion on a range of associated issues. 
It will cover computer misuse in general terms as well as legal and extra-legal forms of 
response. 
I expect the interview to take around an hour or so in total and I shall be recording this 
interview and transcribing it afterwards.  
Some of the questions may have different responses, depending on whether you are 
answering as an individual or in your professional capacity. It would be very helpful in 
these situations if you can clarify how your answers would differ between the ‘work’ 
and ‘home’ perspectives. 
Biographical 
First of all, I would like to ask you for some biographical information: 
1. Gender? (This was not asked explicitly) 
2. Age range? (< 30; 30 – 39; 40 – 49; 50 – 59; 60+) 
3. What is your current job? 
4. What experience do you have in computing and computer security? 
5. What professional or other relevant qualifications do you hold? 
6. What professional or other relevant training have you had? 
7. Do you belong to any professional bodies associated with computing? 
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Computer misuse in general 
The first section of the interview proper will focus on the phenomenon of computer 
misuse in general. In particular, I would like to explore, where possible, your views on 
its nature, importance, dangers and influences: 
8. What do you personally understand by the term ‘computer misuse’? 
9. Do you think that computer misuse has changed over time? If so, why? 
10. What do you consider to be the greatest risk resulting from computer misuse? 
11. What other consequences does computer misuse have for your organisation? 
12. Do you think that this risk has changed over time? If so, why? 
13. In your opinion, who is responsible for perpetrating computer misuse? 
14. Do you think your views are shared by others in similar organisations? 
15. Who do you think is the predominant driving force behind general policy on 
computer misuse? (Government? Hardware industry? Software industry? 
Computer security sector? Professional bodies?) 
Legal responses to computer misuse 
I would now like to move on to discuss your views on some of the legal responses to 
computer misuse. First of all, a general question: 
General 
16. What do you think about the adequacy of legal protection from computer 
misuse? 
Next, I would like to explore your experience in relation to the policing of computer 
misuse: 
Police and related organisations 
17. Have you ever contacted the police in relation to computer misuse? If so, what 
was the outcome? 
18. Under what circumstances would you contact the police? 
19. Would there be any factors that would make you more inclined or less inclined 
to contact the police? 
20. Are you aware of any of the specialist local, national or international units who 
deal with computer misuse? (National Hi-Tech Crime Unit as was? Serious 
Organised Crime Agency? Interpol? Internet Watch Foundation? Centre for the 
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Protection of the National Infrastructure? National Infrastructure Security 
Coordination Centre?) If so, what is your understanding of their role? 
21. Have you ever dealt with any of these agencies in relation to computer misuse? 
If so, what was the outcome? 
22. Under what circumstances would you contact one of these agencies? 
23. In general, do you think that these sorts of agency should be focused on 
policing or providing expertise in relation to the management of computer 
misuse? 
We have discussed legal protection, policing and enforcement in general terms. I would 
now like to move on to a specific piece of criminal law which is particularly relevant to 
computer misuse: 
The Computer Misuse Act 1990 
24. Are you aware of the Computer Misuse Act 1990? (‘the Act’) 
25. If so, what is your opinion of the Act? 
26. Have you ever used the Act? If so, under what circumstances? What was the 
outcome? If not, why not? 
27. Have you ever used any other law in relation to computer misuse? If so, was this 
in addition to, or instead of the Act? 
28. Do you believe that the Act has any deficiencies? If so, what are they? 
29. Do you think that the Act should be amended? If so, in what way?  
30. Are you aware of the recent amendments to the Act? If so, what is your 
understanding of those amendments? To what extent do you think those 
amendments will be effective? 
Having considered the Computer Misuse Act 1990 in detail, I would like to discuss your 
experience of other legal responses to computer misuse: 
Other legal responses 
31. Do you think the Data Protection Act 1998 has a role to play in the response to 
computer misuse? 
32. Are there any other laws of which you are aware that you consider might be 
relevant as part of the response to computer misuse? 
33. What would your ideal law be in relation to computer misuse? 
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Extra-legal responses to computer misuse 
As well as the legal response to computer misuse, there are a range of extra-legal 
responses which have been used to address the issue. I would like to move on to explore 
your views on such responses: 
34. What extra-legal means do you use to regulate computer misuse? 
35. What role, if any, should private organisations play in the response to computer 
misuse? 
36. What role, if any, should the individual end-user or consumer play in the 
response to computer misuse? 
37. What help on security do you get from government sources? 
38. What help on security do you think should be provided via government sources? 
39. What professional (expert or technical) help on security do you get? 
40. What professional (expert or technical) help on security do you think should be 
provided? 
41. In general terms, who do you think is responsible for managing computer 
misuse? The government? The police? The policing agencies? The corporation? 
The individual? 
42. Are you insured against computer misuse? 
43. How do you think that legal and extra-legal responses to computer misuse 
should be balanced? 
44. To what extent do you think that there is conflict between the public and 
private interests in relation to computer misuse? 
Conclusions and reflections 
That concludes the main body of the interview. Before finishing, I would like to ask: 
45. Have you any further comments in relation to the issues surrounding computer 
misuse that have not been raised in the interview? 
  
307 
Letter of invitation 
[University of Leeds letterhead] 
[Date] 
 
Dear [Participant] 
Computer use and misuse 
I am currently undertaking research funded by the University of Leeds, under the 
supervision of Professor Clive Walker (0113 343 5022) and Professor David Wall (0113 
343 5023). 
My research explores the various ways that experienced professionals are responding to 
the challenges posed by computer misuse and puts forward a range of different 
perspectives on the issues. I believe that your particular personal expertise [participant 
specific personalisation] will be of great value to this research and will help me to 
develop my ideas. 
I would therefore like to invite you to participate in my research via an interview. The 
interview will cover a range of topics related to your response to computer misuse and I 
anticipate that it will take about hour, or possibly a little longer. I would like, with your 
permission, to record and later transcribe the interview, though your participation will 
remain confidential throughout and any linking indicators will be removed.  
As a graduate in Natural Sciences, I spent fifteen years in the IT professional services 
industry working for a variety of employers to Senior Director level before attaining a 
first class honours degree in law as a mature student. I then moved to the University of 
Leeds to conduct this research project. I am also a Chartered Fellow of the British 
Computer Society, a Chartered Engineer and a Chartered Scientist. 
I would greatly value your input into my research and I do hope that you will be willing 
to share your skills and experience with me in this important and topical project. 
I look forward to hearing from you. 
With kind regards 
Yours sincerely 
 
 
Stefan Fafinski  
BA (Hons) LLB (Hons) MA (Cantab) CEng CSci FBCS CITP 
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Consent form 
 
Computer use and misuse – consent to participate in a research interview 
o I am satisfied that I have received enough information about this research. 
o I have had the opportunity to ask questions about the research. 
o I understand that this is a research project and that there will be no direct 
benefit to me for taking part. 
o I understand the purpose of the research and how I will be involved. 
o I understand that the data obtained will be held in confidence and that my 
identity will not be divulged in the final report. 
o I understand that the recording of the interview along with any paper or 
electronic transcripts will be destroyed at the end of the project. 
o I understand that I may refuse to answer any question. 
o I understand that I may withdraw my involvement in the research at any time 
and for any reason. 
o I understand that the interview will be recorded and electronically transcribed. 
o I understand that the findings of the research will be incorporated into your 
research findings. 
o I agree to participate in a research interview. 
 
Name 
(Block capitals) 
 
………………………..………………………………………… 
Signature  
………………………..………………………………………… 
Date  
………………………..………………………………………… 
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Sample codes 
Descriptive Topic Sub-topic 
Computer misuse Definition  
 Evolution  
 Risk Commercial 
National security 
Financial 
Personal 
Data security 
 Consequences  
 Perpetrators Characteristics 
Insider/Outsider 
 Policy  
Legal responses Adequacy  
 Computer Misuse Act 1990 Awareness 
Use 
 Data Protection Act 1998 Awareness 
Use 
 Miscellaneous legal responses  
Policing Drivers  
 Agencies SOCA 
Interpol 
IWF 
CPNI 
NISCC 
Computer Misuse Act 1990 Opinion  
 Usefulness  
 Deficiencies  
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 Amendments Knowledge 
Comment 
Extra-legal responses Private CERT 
WARP 
ENISA 
 Individual  
 State  
 Profession  
 Insurance  
Responsibility Individual  
 State  
 Police/Agencies  
 Industry  
 Individual  
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